Nativism and Economic Integration Across the Developing World: Collision and Accommodation

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Abstract

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Migration and nativism are explosive issues in Europe and North America. Less well-known is the tumult that soaring levels of migration are creating in the politics of developing countries. The key difference between anti-migrant politics in developed and developing countries is that domestic migration—not international migration—is the likely focus of nativist politics in poorer countries. Nativists take up the cause of sub-national groups, defined by ethnicity, region, or both. They vilify other regions and groups in the same country as sources of migration. This kind of domestic nativism or sons-of-the-soil politics has been tremendously successful in less developed countries. Since the 1970s the majority of less-developed countries have adopted policies that aim to limit internal migration, especially rural-to-urban migration.

This book marshals evidence from Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, East Asia and India to explore the colliding trends of internal migration and nativism. Subnational migration is associated with a boom in nativist politics. Pro-native public policy and anti-migrant violence are both more likely as internal migration surges. To some extent, however, anti-migrant policy and anti-migrant violence are substitutes. When governments limit migration or shield locals from its effects, nativists are less apt to turn to violence. Here, we see a role for another major trend in the developing world: political decentralization. Decentralization strengthens subnational politicians' incentives and ability to define and cater to so-called natives, through the spending of state resources and/or anti-migrant violence.

Chapter 2

Within-country migration and nativism

In practically all countries other than tiny, globalized states such as Singapore and Lesotho, domestic migration dwarfs international migration. Across these varied contexts, there are some common anxieties about internal migrants. Consider two ethnographic portraits of natives reacting to newcomers, one study from rural India in the 1970s and the second from metropolitan Kyrgyzstan at the turn of the millenium.

The indigenous ethnic groups of Chota Nagpur—which is now in Jharkhand state, India—are the Ho, Munda, and Oraon. They are "adivasis" or "tribals" in Indian parlance. Their ancestors pre-date Aryan settlement in northern India circa 1500 BCE. Starting in 1856, coal mining transformed Chota Nagpur, bringing infrastructure, industrialization, urban settlements, government bureaucracy, and a public education system. These facilities were overwhelmingly used and staffed by migrants. Miners and industrial workers, government staff, university students, and urbanites were primarily people from northern Bihar and Bengal. A tribal state assemblyman described tribal dispossession this way:

> The rise and fall of the adivasis . . . depends on their land. If you take away their land they are like fish out of water. They do not want any other vocation in life. It used to be that half the land here was owned by the tribals as recently as the 1930s. Now, I think, it is only 25 percent. The tribals lost their lands to the new industries, especially to the Heavy Engineering Corporation. And then all the people who moved here took land from the tribals. Yes, the tribals were paid compensation, but what do they know about what to do with money? A Muslim or a Gujarati would know what to do with money, but tribals don't. So now the tribals have only the worst lands left, the water lands that other people don't want (Weiner, 1978, p. 157).

In this account, migration is indistinguishable from economic transformation.

Processes of development—urbanization, industrialization—make existing livelihood strategies untenable. The tribals lack the inclination and skills to participate in the new economy, which is ceded to newcomers. But the newcomers gobble up resources, destroying the old economy that the tribals would wish to continue.

Decades later, Bishkek, the capital of the Kyrgyz Republic, grew from 620,000 to 835,000 residents between 1989 and 2009 (Hatcher and Thieme, 2016, p. 2181). Newcomers came from northern Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s, and from the south, upon the ouster of the Askar Akayev regime in 2005 (Flynn, Kosmarskaya, and Sabirova, 2014). The combination of the new arrivals and out-migration from Bishkek to Russia reduced the Russian share of the city from 56% to 26%. Longtime Kyrgyz-ethnicity urbanites identified more with the Russians than the newcomers, giving rise to the term "Kirgiz" to refer to Russified urban dwellers, in contrast to the rural, "Kyrgyz" newcomers. Migrants built a sprawling ring of illegal settlements around Bishkek, with little access to public utilities, and worked in the undocumented economy (Thieme, 2014). Hatcher and Thieme (2016) estimate that 20% of Bishkek's people are not registered with the city government, restricting their ability to "access basic urban services, to vote, obtain credit and formally set up a business" (2177).

In 2008, a team of ethnographers asked some longtime urbanites for their memories of Frunze, as Bishkek was called under the USSR (Flynn, Kosmarskaya, and Sabirova, 2014). Respondents compared the Soviet city to present day Bishkek, arguing that the rural influx had undermined the quality of urban life.

> [Bishkek] is all southerners already . . . it is not the Bishkek it was, not the Frunze it was a long time ago . . . do you know what Frunze was like? It was such a clean, comfortable, green city, with such friendly people. It wasn't terrifying at 12 o'clock at night to be out somewhere . . . It was possible to walk through the whole of the city and nobody and nothing would bother you (1516–1517).

> [Frunze] was so green. We would go to the cinema '*Rossiya*', it is closed now . . . then it was such a huge cinema . . . and those museums. I would go to the Frunze museum, to the park, everything was so beautiful . . . and the fountains all worked. And it was so clean. I don't remember that in Frunze there was so much rubbish as there is now, there wasn't. And the people were completely different. They were all, or that's what it seemed to me, cultured. Earlier I didn't notice, and now everyone goes along, blowing their noses, spitting, and things like that. As we say, they have come down from the mountains and are here . . . on the whole now the population is from the countryside, from the *kolkhozy* [collective farm] (1514).

TABLE 2.1: Internal migration worldwide, 2005

	Past 5 years†		Lifetime‡	
Region	Migrants (millions)	Percent of population	Migrants (millions)	Percent of population
Africa	40	4.6	114	12.5
Asia	110	2.9	282	7.2
Latin America	22	4.1	100	18.0
Oceania	2	5.7	9	27.8
Europe	35	5.0	166	22.7
North America	21	6.8	92	27.8
World	229	3.7	763	11.7

†People who have moved between administrative units within the last 5 years.

‡People living outside the administrative unit of their birth.

Notes: Based on DESA (2013, Table 9).

Unlike the tribals in Chota Nagpur, these Bishkek locals are accustomed to urbanization. Unlike the tribals, longtime residents in Bishkek occupy a more prestigious and lucrative segment of the economy than the migrants (Boots, 2003). The common thread in the sentiments from Bishkek's urbanites and the Chota Nagpur tribal assemblyman is the belief that migrant encroachment has made the locals' previous way of life impossible.

2.1 The scope of internal migration

Worldover, and particularly in the developing world, the migration of people within countries is accelerating. Table 2.1 gives estimates of the total number of migrants by world region and the percent of the population those figures represent. Migrants are defined in two ways: the number of people who have moved between first-level administrative regions in their country in the last 5 years and the number of people who have made such a move since their birth. In Europe and North America, 5–7% of people shifted between administrative regions between 2000–2005. In Latin America, Africa, and Oceania the flow of internal migration in 2000–2005 was 4.1–5.7%, not too far behind Europe and North America. In Asia the percentage of the population migrating internally was more modest, about 3%. Translated into absolute terms, however, there were more than 100 million of these migrants.

Rural-to-urban migration is a growing portion of migration but not yet the majority of internal migration. Migrants travel from areas where wages are

higher and poverty rates are lower than their places of origin. Nonetheless, in Asia and Africa, most internal migration is between rural areas, from lagging to leading rural places (World Bank, 2009). In Latin America, which is already quite urbanized, urban-to-urban migration is more common than rural-to-urban migration.

The most fine-grained source of cross-national internal migration data is the Internal Migration Around the Globe (IMAGE) project. IMAGE's raw data allows for calculating average annual migration to subnational administrative units in 55 middle and low income countries. IMAGE has collected one census per country, providing a cross-section from the 1990s and 2000s, rather than a panel. For each country, we observe average annual migration into regions for 5 year (and sometimes 1, 2, or 6 year) periods in the 1990s and 2000s. For example, the data for Burkina Faso are from 2006 and the data for Cambodia are from 1994–1998. We will use the IMAGE data in coming chapters for our cross-national analyses of the effects of internal migration.

2.2 Migration and competition

Economists expect that migration increases the efficiency of the distribution of labor:

> labor migration contributes to aggregate growth by improving the distribution of labor, driving concentration. And by clustering skills and talent, migration drives agglomeration spillovers (World Bank, 2009, p. 162).

In the medium-term, labor migration promotes regional convergence through remittances and faster national growth (Mendola, 2012; Zhu et al., 2013; Housen, Hopkins, and Earnest, 2013). Restrictions on internal migration, on the other hand, "create unnecessary friction and impose the cost of forgone opportunities for economic growth and convergence in living standards" (World Bank, 2009, p. 147).

In theory, the gains from migration could be redistributed to ensure all locals and migrants benefit from population flows. Efficiency gains could be used to offset two sources of friction in particular. First, internal migrants compete with the existing population for resources like housing, clean water, and schooling (Weiner, 1978; Barnett and Adger, 2007; Faist and Schade, 2013; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Swain, 1993). Second, an influx of migrants expands the labor force—potentially lowering wages or leading to unemployment—at least in the short term. These stresses could be offset through taxation, public spending, and redistribution.

There are two reasons that the welfare gains due to migration might not be realized. The first is that some migration is not driven by better employment prospects. If a country has large disparities in public services, migrants

may move in search of those services. Migration may also be induced by push factors like environmental disasters, conflict, or inadequate support for rural development. In any of these circumstances, migration does not automatically produce gains via the efficient allocation of labor. Development organizations recommend that governments eliminate or mitigate push factors like service disparities across regions to manage internal migration.

A second bottleneck from realizing the economic gains from internal migration is a matter of governance. In a study of eight Asian mega-cities between 2003 and 2008, researchers found that migration increased cities' tax revenues (Satterthwaite, 2008). The municipal governments did not use those revenues to address migrant needs. The municipalities were also not spending these revenues with an eye to compensating natives living with the stresses of migration such as overburdened utilities, higher housing prices, or lower wages.

> All cities and most smaller urban centers face a contradiction between what drives their economic development (and the in-migration this generates) and what contributes to adequate accommodation for the workforce on which they depend. ...Cities grow as private investment concentrates there. But there is no automatic development of any capacity to govern the city and ensure that growing populations and economic activities can get the land, infrastructure and services they need. ...Two characteristics shared by most Asian urban centers are the inadequacy in provision for the basic infrastructure and services needed in all residential areas—including provision for piped water, sanitation and drainage, roads, schools, electricity and health care—and the poor quality of the housing for large sections of the population (Satterthwaite, 2008, n.p.).

The researchers emphasized that city governments simply did not think of migration as a manageable policy challenge flowing from economic success. Governments saw the problems of infrastructure and public services as "'too many people moving to cities' [and] not as their failure to develop appropriate policies" (Satterthwaite, 2008, n.p.).

Migration poses a challenge to many local governments, not just a few megacities. In the developing world, 40% of urban dwellers live in cities of no more than 1 million people (Montgomery, 2008). In these cities, access to health and sanitation services is often comparable to rural areas. Smaller municipalities have more limited budgets, tax bases, and less access to experts and bureaucratic talent.

> Yet in an era of political decentralization, these smaller cities are increasingly being required to shoulder substantial burdens in service delivery and take on a larger share of revenue-raising responsibilities (Montgomery, 2008, p. 763).

Even rural areas have to manage the challenge of internal migrants seeking public services and putting pressure on resources. Markets for agricultural land are thin in less-developed countries, so that it is virtually unheard of for a landed farmer to relocate voluntarily (Lucas, 2015). Rural-rural migration is still the dominant mode of migration in the developing world, however, due to landless laborers and movement to rural areas with relatively better services and access to national and international markets. Resource pressure due to rural-rural migration is a particularly important problem in sub-Saharan Africa, where (unlike Asia) rural populations are still growing rapidly (Boone, 2017).

Thus, gains from migration are uncertain and unevenly shared. Mechanisms for sharing the gains from migration with adversely affected populations could exist but frequently do not. Without these measures, local support for open borders and migrant-friendly public policies flags.

In fact, there is deep public ambivalence about internal migration in many less-developed countries. The 1999–2001 wave of the European Values Survey (EVS) asked respondents to agree or disagree with the statement that "When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to local people over people from other parts of the country" (EVS, 2015, p. 231). This question was asked in eight low-to-medium income countries (see Table 2.2). In every one, a clear majority of people endorsed hiring preferences for locals over internal migrants. The rate of endorsement was lowest in Slovenia at 55% and highest in Croatia at 75%.

For context, Table 2.2 also tabulates an EVS question on preferences for citizens over international immigrants. In most countries, preferences for hiring citizens were even more popular than preferences for hiring locals, although these measures were endorsed at roughly equal rates in Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia. In any event, super majorities preferred both types of son-of-the-soil privileges.

The demand for domestic nativism in less-developed Europe was on par with or even eclipsed the demand for anti-globalist nativism in western Europe. The EVS asked people throughout Europe about hiring preferences for citizens over foreigners. The last lines of Table 2.2 tabulate the answers to this question for a few Western European countries where nativism is an important political issue: Greece, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, and France. Political observers agree that anti-foreign nativism is a powerful force in, for example, French politics. 54% of French people endorsed anti-foreign hiring practices. In every lower income European country, more than 54% of people wanted hiring practices that discriminated against *internal* migrants. In most cases, demand for internal sons-of-the-soil protections in eastern Europe also eclipsed Germany's and Great Britain's external nativism.

Like those living in the transitional economies of Europe, India's citizens share a strong consensus that subnational communities can and should discriminate against domestic migrants. The national election survey in 2009 asked

TABLE 2.2: Endorsement of preferences for locals over domestic migrants in post-Communist European countries and Turkey

	% endorse preferences for	
	Locals	Citizens
Croatia	75	88
Bulgaria	75	88
Poland	71	91
Russia	70	73
Ukraine	69	70
Turkey	68	68
Belarus	60	85
Slovenia	55	76
Greece	.	78
Austria	.	74
Germany	.	64
Great Britain	.	59
France	.	54

Notes: Data from European Values Survey, 1999–2001.

respondents to agree or disagree with the statement, "for jobs in (name of respondent's state) priority should be given to people from (name of respondent's state) over people from any other state." 72% of respondents nationwide agreed and the majority of respondents in every state agreed (National Election Study, 2009). The subnational borders and governments of Indian federalism are understood by the public as a means of giving priority to non-migrants.

In Kenya, redrawing subnational boundaries was not enough to remove the expectation that local governments serve the sons-of-the-soil. The 2010 constitution reorganized eight provinces into 47 counties with elected assemblies. The county-level civil service is over one hundred thousand strong, putting the counties in charge of a substantial block of local employment (NCIC, 2016, p. xv). According to law, the counties are to give 30% or more of entry-level posts to applicants who are not from the locally-dominant ethnic group. However, a 2014–2015 audit found that only 15 counties adhered to this rule and the average county drew almost 80% of its staff from the locally-dominant ethnic group (NCIC, 2016, Tables 2 and 3). The auditors lamented that:

> The perception that counties were created for local people to wholly benefit from the financial, human and natural resources is misguided. This is aggravated by the fact that county policies such as flags seem to emphasize the indigeneity of certain groups within the county (NCIC, 2016, p. xvi).

The audit captures the popular presumption that counties should direct resources primarily to sons-of-the-soil. It also makes clear that politicians cultivated this expectation through symbolic gestures like the design of county flags.

2.3 What nativists want

When migration surges, political entrepreneurs capitalize on the demand for anti-migrant, pro-native policy. They do so because nativism is frequently a winning political strategy. Locals at least initially outnumber migrants. Locals are more likely to vote or have access to other levers of power. If incumbent politicians do not reduce local grievances in the face of migration, they risk being outflanked by upstart nativist movements or parties. The struggle between established parties and upstart nativists parallels the political response to international migration in parts of Western Europe, which has been linked to the rise of the right (Dancygier, 2010).

Nativist policies are interventions designed to benefit natives disproportionately and even at the expense of migrants. To reduce competition for resources, the government might expel migrants or deny them services. City governments use zoning rules and periodic slum clearance to discourage and purge migrants.

Local authorities discriminate against new arrivals in service provision. For example, Feler and Henderson (2011) find that in the 1980s, Brazilian municipalities withheld water lines from some neighborhoods in hopes of curbing migration.

Politicians might target spending towards natives, as in the case of Malaysia or South Africa, where government programs redistribute resources to locals. Targeting may also be implicit, when spending is targeted to geographic areas with fewer-than-average migrants. Quotas or preferences for sons-of-the-soil crop up in public and private hiring, education, and legislative representation. These programs are sought after by natives since they provide a stream of benefits rather than a one-time windfall and are difficult to repeal (Bhavnani, 2017; Bhavnani, 2009). From politicians' perspective, such programs provide incentives for people to continue to identify as natives (Acemoglu, 2001). Governments can also implicitly sanction discrimination by private actors. Such strategic nonresponses (or "forebearance;" see Holland 2016) might discourage migration in the long run. At the extreme, governments might allow vigilante groups to repel migrants through violence (Bhavnani and Lacina, 2015). Most anti-migrant pogroms and harassment have at least the passive cooperation of the local police.

The various tools of nativism above can be tried simultaneously or in any combination. They are partial substitutes for each other. In India, states that have ample resources to spend on natives are less likely to tolerate nativist riots. States pinched for fiscal resources to assuage nativists are more likely to allow and foment migrant purges (Bhavnani and Lacina, 2017).

What if there is no state accommodation of nativist grievances? Perhaps the government is inept, distracted, or committed to laissez-faire economics. Or the government may openly favor migrants, perhaps if they are from a dominant ethnic group. If nativist politicians gain no purchase within the state and nativist grievances endure, anti-migrant violence can morph into anti-state violence. Organized violence against the police or military is a high bar. But if the state is weak or some other factor, like terrain, is conducive to insurgency, nativists may take on a government that is sponsoring or protecting migrants.

What about violence primarily authored by migrants? There are cases of sustained violence by migrants against natives, usually when the migrants are acting as an extension of the state or at least with the state's reluctant protection. This is the pattern familiar from European settlement in the Americas, Oceania, and southern Africa. But among migrants without government protection, anti-state rebellion is rare.

> Why don't the migrants rebel if the state sides with the indigenous? . . . For one, immigrants lack a rural base in which to hide from state forces, get support from noncombatants, and receive protection from neighbors who are tied together in dense social networks. . . . Second,

> compared to the indigenous population, migrants have a relatively cheap alternative to war: exit to their home area (Fearon and Laitin, 2011, p. 206).

Of course, the generalization that migrants rarely muster a rebellion does not rule out individuals or small groups attacking softer targets.

2.4 Why internal migration?

Why is internal migration—as opposed to international migration—politically fraught in the developing world while it is typically a non-issue in rich countries? The greater political salience of internal migration in the developing world cannot be explained by scale. In both poor and rich countries, internal migration is a much larger flow of people than international migration. Internal migration is also more common in rich countries than poor countries, because of better infrastructure, more integrated labor markets, and higher incomes.

Domestic migration in developing countries occurs under different structural conditions than domestic migration in developed countries. The first key difference is greater spatial inequality within less developed countries. Economic production is highly concentrated in rich countries. Nonetheless, all areas of the country tend to converge in terms of household incomes and living standards thanks to mobility and state redistribution. The World Bank estimates that

> households in the most prosperous areas of developing countries—such as Brazil, Bulgaria, Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, and Sri Lanka—have an average consumption almost 75 percent higher than that of similar households in the lagging areas of these countries. Compare this with less than 25 percent for such developed countries as Canada, Japan, and the United States (World Bank, 2009, p. 2).

Ironically, development tends to increase the spatial concentration of wealth in the medium term. Within-country economic disparities are widening in countries that have grown rapidly in recent decades, as in East and Southeast Asia. Within country disparities in income also grew rapidly as post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia abandoned state planning. Domestic migration is fraught in developing countries because spatial disparities in opportunity and wellbeing are profound and growing.

Second, middle- and low-income countries are on average more diverse than rich countries in terms of languages spoken and religions practiced. Rich countries have relatively few salient ethnic groups. For example, researchers at ETH-Zurich (Girardin et al., 2015) peg the average number of politically-relevant ethnic groups in highly-developed countries at three with a range between one and

eight. In less developed countries, that average is five and the number of politically relevant groups ranges as high as 44. Because of lower historical migration, ethnic groups in poorer countries are also more likely to be concentrated in a regional homeland. Girardin et al. (2015) find an average of four regionally-concentrated ethnic groups in less-developed countries and an average of 1.5 in richer countries.

Third, the furor over internal migration in developing world politics reflects the blurred distinction between internal and foreign migration. Ethnic groups that span borders are the rule and not the exception. In the Indian state of Assam, a Bengali speaker might be an illegal migrant from Bangladesh, a recent transplant from Indian West Bengal, or be part of a family that has been in Assam for generations. Every country in Southeast Asia has both Chinese-ethnicity citizens and recent migrants from China. Yoruba speakers live throughout West Africa. Governments often lack the capacity to distinguish between international and domestic migration or between recent arrivals and naturalized citizens.

Internal and international migration are politically inseparable because public policies aimed at curbing foreign immigration will curb internal migration and vice versa. For example, in 1969 the prime minister of Ghana announced that illegal aliens would have two weeks to leave the country. Adida (2014) recounts the ordeal of "Mary," an ethnic Yoruba born in Ghana. As an adult, Mary and her husband moved from northern to southern Ghana. She initially assumed the government's Alien Compliance Order would not touch her:

> But when Ghanaians began harassing her and her family, she realized this was no joke . . . An official countdown to the December deadline was aired on the radio every day [and] Ghanaian police patrolled the streets to ensure Ghana's "aliens" were packing up their belongings. . . . Mary's husband rented a car to Lagos; they left with her child and parents promptly before the December deadline.

When ethnic groups span weakly enforced international borders, nativists define "foreigners" in terms of ethnic difference rather than legal niceties.

An even more dramatic illustration comes from Côte d'Ivoire. Booming cocoa production brought thousands of migrants to southern Côte d'Ivoire from other parts of the country and from Burkina Faso. When presidential elections were opened to multiple parties in 1990s, Laurent Gbagbo used the grievances of southerners against migrants as a natural entry point into politics. He championed "ivoirité" and a "new conception of 'strangerhood' [that] conflated immigrants from Burkina Faso (and elsewhere) with northern Ivoirian Muslims" (Côté and Mitchell, 2017, p. 661). These tensions led to electoral violence in 2000 and civil war in 2002.

2.5 Institutions that favor nativism

The political salience of domestic migration in developing countries has institutional roots, and the politics of migration are changing as many of these countries reform their subnational governments. Many post-colonial and post-communist countries have institutions regulating internal migration already in place or only recently lapsed. This institutional history and the trend toward greater political decentralization mean that subnational governments have the power to resist migration.

Countries that once used centralized planning frequently had internal registrations or passports that made it illegal for citizens to move without government permission and impossible for citizens to access services after an unsanctioned move (UNDP, 2009). Russia, China, Viet Nam, Belarus, and Mongolia used versions of this system. These migration restrictions were centrally designed. Now, however, the demand to keep and strengthen these systems is bottom-up.

In Russia, local government has kept internal migration restrictions alive. In 1925, Stalin reintroduced the Tzarist *propiska* system of internal passports to aid the collectivization of agriculture. After the Soviet Union fell, freedom of internal movement was recognized in the Russian constitution. Yet some city and regional governments use the household registration system to prevent internal migrants from voting, enrolling their children in school, and using other public services. In Moscow,

> there is strong public support for a restrictive registration regime. Some of this support can be tied to racism. It appears, however, that the majority of support for a restrictive registration system in Moscow—among both local leaders and the public—comes from a perceived need to protect against the flood of migrants many fear would occur as a result of a removal of the restrictions (Schaible, 2001, pp. 350–351).

In 1998, the mayor of Moscow affirmed the restrictions would continue even after they were struck down by the Russian Constitutional Court (see also US Department of State, 2016, p. 38).

Likewise, in China, internal migration restrictions survived the end of central planning because they had powerful subnational public support. A household registration system, the *hukou*, was a tool of central rationing and planned industrialization and a means of preventing rural-to-urban migration. The center has attempted to relax the hukou while also moving control of the system to provincial and municipal authorities. The food and fuel rationing system that the hukou once supported no longer exists. Nonetheless, cities and provinces continue to be stingy with legal permission for migration (Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Vortherms, 2017).

> The hukou derived its stickiness and its suppleness long after the economic transition was well under way from the range of social and official groups that supported it, namely, most urbanites . . . and the wealthier, magnet regions of the country (Solinger, 2014, p. 8).

Regional governments have used their newfound authority to shore up the hukou system, so that most non-elite rural people cannot easily move to the city.

In post-colonial countries, internal migration has historically been regulated subnationally. Boone (2017) describes the ethnic homeland system of colonial Africa:

> Colonial administrative structure and practice in much of twentieth-century Africa aimed at creating monoethnic rural districts ("tribal homelands" under colonial indirect rule) (278).

These homelands have an enduring imprint on identity, defining indigenous versus not: "What modern African states and demographers recognize as 'interethnic migration"' is movement between the colonial homelands (278). They also persist in law, determining land rights:

> Many postcolonial governments maintain prohibitions against the permanent sale of neocustomary land to ethnic outsiders, and almost all do so implicitly by not recording or enforcing land sales in zones of neocustomary tenure. . . . levels and rates of in-migration are controlled by ethnic insiders. (280).

Boone estimates that 90% of all land in sub-Saharan Africa is controlled through these sons-of-the-soil institutions. Colonial homelands have parallels in parts of post-colonial Asia. India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan all have "tribal" tracts, originally designated under colonialism, where particular ethnic groups have special privileges. Migrants cannot fully take part in the economy of a tribal tract. The most important restriction is usually a ban on selling land to migrants. In India, the federal states also have the power to create sons-of-the-soil preferences in state hiring and education.

2.5.1 The simultaneous boom in political decentralization

Increases in domestic migration across the developing world are happening alongside a worldwide trend in increasing political decentralization. Political decentralization—which may or may not accompany other kinds of devolution of power—is the selection of local political authorities through local elections and not by central appointment (Rodden, 2006). Figure 2.1 tracks the degree of political and administrative decentralization in 67 developing world countries over time, and shows that both have increased markedly over the past 20 years.

FIGURE 2.1: Political and administrative decentralization in the developing world



Source: Authors' calculations. Underlying data are for 67 developing countries and are from Bohlken (2016).

The proportion of developing countries wherein all subnational government tiers have elections—this is a measure of the degree political decentralization—increased from 22 percent in 1991 to 44 percent in 2010.

India, for example, amended its constitution in the early 1990s to mandate that its existing federal states all have village, city, and district level elected governments. Some authoritarian countries, notably China and Viet Nam, implemented village-level elections without opening up national participation. In cases of incomplete democratization or democratic reversals, such as Putin's Russia, the cycle of local and regional elections continues subject to central manipulation (Ross, 2014). Importantly, Figure 2.1 shows that the use of subnational elections has been accompanied by greater and not less administrative decentralization.

Decentralization is also bound up with the issues of urban growth and rural-to-urban migration. Urban governments find themselves overseeing a mushrooming number of people. Suburbs influence the life of the city but may lie outside its political jurisdiction. These suburbs instead fall under purview of "rural" jurisdictions that are frequently designed with different legal powers and administrative capacities than urban authorities. In 2015, the UN found

that almost half of less-developed countries were undertaking "decentralization of large urban centres to smaller urban, suburban or rural areas" in response to internal migration (DESA, 2015).

Finally, the number of countries that have one or more subnational ethnically-defined jurisdictions has been climbing since the 1950s. Anderson (2014) notes 27 countries that have at least one ethnofederal state or province where some ethnic group had special rights. Migrants from ethnically-distinct parts of the same countries would be unable to obtain the same privileges upon moving to these areas.

2.5.2 Decentralization draws lines for nativism

Decentralization is not a necessary condition for controversy over internal migration. Sons-of-the-soil insurgency in Southern Thailand, for example, has been intermittent for decades despite the absence of any elected subnational government there. Nonetheless, political decentralization increases the salience of sons-of-the-soil politics. When smaller political jurisdictions are created, local ethnic divides are the likely fault lines for competition in the new jurisdictions (Posner, 2005). Political scientists know, for example, that federal democracies tend to have more regionalist parties (Harmel and Robertson, 1985).

Internal migrants only exist relative to some rhetorical or real subnational boundary. Political competition within subnational borders increases the number of subnational lines that could be the basis of an electorally convenient nativism. That is, a definition of nativism that allows a politician to define her constituents as sons of the soil and label people who are not her voters as interlopers. For example, in Indonesia, "If SoS [sons-of-the-soil] narratives are ubiquitous to local Indonesian politics, they are almost completely absent from national politics" (Côté and Mitchell, 2017, p. 665). Côté and Mitchell point out that sons-of-the-soil narratives are a hard sell in national politics. The largest ethnic group in Indonesia, the Javanese, is only a plurality of the population and concentrated in less than a third of the country's provinces. On the other hand, a majority of voters in a district or provincial election are targeted with a sons-of-the-soil appeal.

Political decentralization also sets up a commitment problem between natives and migrant groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2011). Internal migration has the potential to change sub-national electorates even if the demography of the national electorate stays constant. If migrants can join the local electorate, migration poses a longterm threat to natives' political power.

Finally, migration creates externalities between subnational jurisdictions. Migrant-sending areas may under-invest in policies that would discourage out-migration, such as securing land rights in rural areas or natural disaster mitigation (United Nations, 2014). The central government may be able to ameliorate that problem

by transferring resources among units. If it does not do so, the inter-jurisdictional externalities reinforce the salience of local nativism.

The coming chapters show that political decentralization increases the likelihood of sons-of-the-soil issues becoming an important part of politics. Locally-responsive subnational governments can be expected to cater to regional ethnic majorities and to non-migrants. Political decentralization strengthens the positive relationship between internal migration and the use of nativist appeals by local politicians, as well as the odds of regional governments enacting nativist policies.

2.5.3 Decentralization and violence

The relationship between migration, political decentralization, and violence is more ambiguous. Political decentralization makes nativism more salient but it also empowers nativists to discriminate against migrants. For example, in the next chapter, we show that government hiring in India became more biased against migrants after political decentralization there.

Resources for natives, state discrimination against migrants, and violence against migrants are substitutes. When government actors deter and harass migrants, we are less likely to see nativist violence by non-state actors. Such an effort is redundant. This logic is why Fearon and Laitin argue that sons-of-the-soil wars do not occur when security forces side with locals against migrants. Boone's account of ethnic homelands in Africa comes to a complementary conclusion. Neocustomary land rules give locals control over migration. When local conditions shift, migrants are "deported" to their own ethnic group's homeland. These deportations do not lead to sustained violence, however, because the government so rarely backs the rights of settlers.

This line of argument suggests the relationship between decentralization, migration, and violence is likely to be ambiguous. Political decentralization boosts the salience of internal migration. But it also makes local bureaucracies more responsive to sons-of-the-soil concerns. If control over local affairs swings strongly toward the nativists, state repression of migrants is more likely than non-state violence against migrants. The effect of political decentralization on sons-of-the-soil riots and insurgencies may be neutral or negative.

2.6 What to expect from internal migration

Internal migration is booming. The next two chapters show that in developing countries, greater numbers of internal migrants flowing into a jurisdiction increase the non-migrant populations' receptivity to sons-of-the-soil appeals. Nativist politics becomes a larger force in the public sphere. Violence by non-migrants aimed at migrant expulsion and intimidation becomes more likely.

Greater numbers of internal migrants increase the probability of the regional or national government implementing sons-of-the-soil policies such as affirmative action for natives, spending targeted at natives, and government discrimination against migrants.

An important intermediate variable between migration and policy is the degree of political decentralization in a country. Under political decentralization, internal migration causes a larger increase in the use of nativist appeals by local politicians and the changes of regional governments enacting nativist policies. We also explore the relationship between decentralization, violence, and insurgency. We do not expect—and we do not find—a clear positive relationship between political decentralization and nativist violence. Although decentralization increases the salience of anti-migrant politics, it also increases the probability that government policy will be pro-native. These pro-native policies are often successful in preventing violence.

Chapter 4

Migration and sons-of-the-soil violence

Political violence is an important driver of migration. The UNHCR (Birkeland, Jennings, and Rushing, 2012) estimates that in 2011 there were over 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and another 15 million international refugees. Many of these people have been forced to move by large scale violence. Scholars believe population movements can also feed political violence. Refugee encampments or diaspora funding may prop up insurgencies, for example (Salehyan, 2011).

In contrast to the image of refugee warriors, domestic migrants rarely take up arms against the state. Instead, natives fight against settlers, who are either backed by the government or who are newly vulnerable after losing government support (Boone, 2017; Lacina, 2017). Opposition to migration among insurgents has been highlighted in ethnographic accounts of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Indonesia (Côté and Mitchell, 2017); central India (Jeffrey, Sen, and Sen, 2012); and Xinjiang, China.[1] Fearon and Laitin (2011) count thirty-one sons-of-the-soil civil conflicts between 1945–2008, even though they restrict their analysis to struggles involving recent migration, within a generation of conflict. A longer time frame for defining migration would add to the list of sons-of-the-soil wars the fighting by indigenous groups in Latin America, like the wars in Chiapas, Mexico and in Guatemala. Long-run sons-of-the-soil conflicts are not unique to the Americas:

> Taking a view of several centuries, Catholics in Northern Ireland see themselves as sons-of-the-soil versus Protestant settlers. Serbs in Kosovo might have the same view regarding Kosovar Albanians, Africans in South Africa vis-a-vis South African whites, or Abkhaz regarding Georgians (who migrated in Abhkazia mainly in the 1920s and 30s). . . . at least some of these cases can be profitably understood and analyzed as [sons-of-the-soil] conflicts (Fearon and Laitin, 2011, p. 200).

[1] See special issue introduced by Millward (2009).

Thus, a pressing risk from the global growth in population movements is the threat of nativist violence.

In this chapter, we show that internal migration spurs rioting in migrant destinations. We do so in two steps, first showing that subnational migration and riots are indeed positively correlated across 526 regions in 21 countries across Asia and Africa. To confirm the causal effect of migration on violence, we turn to a natural experiment in India, showing that natural disaster-induced migration in the country causes riots and also insurgency. Consistent with our finding that decentralization in India allows states to favor natives (presented in Chapter 3), India's most recent decentralization attenuated the effects of migration on violence.

4.1 Migration and violence across hundreds of regions in 21 countries

We have argued that growing internal migration is frequently met by anti-migrant violence. To test this hypothesis we combine data on internal migration from the IMAGE database with data on rioting from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project. The resulting dataset is a cross-section of over 500 subnational units across 21 countries: five in Asia (Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam), three in North Africa (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) and twelve in sub-Saharan Africa (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia).[2]

The ACLED database reports violent events across Africa and Asia, and includes information on the type of violence (battles, riots, etc.) and its location. For our analysis, we use data on riots, and aggregate these to the subnational units for which the we have migration data. For ACLED, a "protest describes a non-violent, group public demonstration, often against a government institution. Rioting is a violent form of demonstration" (ACLED 2017: 9). A note on timing: the migration data in the IMAGE database are cross-sectional. Where possible, these migration data were matched with contemporaneous riot data from the ACLED database. When riot data were missing, migration data were matched with data on riots from later years. The resulting dependent variable is logged annual average of riots in an administrative unit.[3]

To gauge the effect of migration on political violence we measured rioting broadly defined, rather than trying to identify anti-migrant riots in particular. Rioters can have multiple motivations. Datasets on war "generally rely on the

[2] The latest version of the ACLED databse covers 60 countries and the IMAGE database covers 56 countries. 21 developing countries appear in both datasets.

[3] In regressions, we weight each observation by the number of years of violence that were averaged to produce the dependent variable, similar to the procedure in Bhavnani and Lacina (2015).

official statements of belligerents to code the issues at stake. The same procedure is not possible when observing riots, since participants rarely issue statements about their reasons for rioting" (Bhavnani and Lacina, 2015, p. 771). Descriptions of rioters' motives in primary and secondary sources are inherently political (Wilkinson, 2004; Brass, 1997). In other words, whether a riot is coded as being anti-migrant, anti-Christian, anti-Oromo and so forth is influenced by or endogenous to the political process.

Figure 4.1 displays the relationship between subnational migration and riots across all of the 526 regions and 21 countries in our data. Both the scatter and fitted line describe a clear positive relationship between riots and migration. The fitted line is equivalent to the results of a bivariate regression of migration and riots. The slope implies that a 10 percent increase in migration increases riots by 3.3%.

In Figure 4.2, we disaggregate this relationship by country. The pattern is strikingly consistent across continents and countries. In 18 of 21 countries, the bivariate relationship between riots and migration is positive. The exceptions are Malaysia and Guinea, where ACLED does not record any riots in the relevant years, and Senegal, where the relationship between riots and migration is weakly negative.

The association between subnational migration and riots within country regions is robust to multivariate analysis (Table 4.1). Model 1 adds country fixed effects and slightly attenuates the correlation between migration and rioting. 10 percent more internal migration is correlated with 2.7 percent more rioting. In Model 2, we perform a robustness check. As noted above, for some countries riot data is not available for the same period as our migration data. Instead, we observe riots in one or two subsequent years, depending on available data. Model 2 confines the analysis to only the countries for which we have contemporaneous migration and violence data. Migration is a statistically significant correlate of violence, with 10 percent more migration predicting half-a-percent increase in annual rioting.

Models 3 and 4 control for PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, logged population, and logged population density in each subnational unit. Model 3 includes all countries and Model 4 includes those for which we have contemporaneous data. The positive relationship between migration and violence is apparent, though slightly attenuated, in each model.

The final models in Table 4.1 interact migration and decentralization, using a measure of subnational elections coded by Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini (2015).[4] In Model 5, the positive correlation between migration and violence is apparent for both centralized and decentralized countries, more so in the latter,

[4]See also Clarke et al. (2001). For missing countries, we used data from Bohlken (2016), The Hunger Project (2014), and US Department of the Army (2003).

FIGURE 4.1: Scatterplot of internal migrants and riots in subnational regions in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia

Notes: Data are for countries in Asia (Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam), North Africa (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) and sub-Saharan Africa (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia). Riot data are from the ACLED database; migration data are from the IMAGE database. See text for details.

FIGURE 4.2: Scatterplots of internal migrants and riots in subnational regions, by country, with lines of best fit





Notes: Riot data are from the ACLED database; migration data are from the IMAGE database. See text for details.

TABLE 4.1: Multivariate analysis of the association between migration and riots across the subnational regions of 21 countries

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Ln internal migrants	0.267**	0.0536***	0.0920**	0.0336**		
	(0.119)	(0.0170)	(0.0351)	(0.0156)		
Ln migrants * No political decentralization					0.0218	0.0469**
					(0.0596)	(0.0179)
Ln migrants * Political decentralization					0.145	0.0172
					(0.0858)	(0.0119)
Only contemporaneous?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country dummies?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Controls?	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	526	280	526	280	526	280
Adjusted R-squared	0.76	0.35	0.79	0.28	0.79	0.29

Notes: Controls are PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, logged population, and logged population density. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

but is not statistically significant. The somewhat larger relationship between migration and violence in politically decentralized countries is consistent with the intuition that decentralization fuels sons-of-the-soil politics. However, the difference between the two coefficients for migration in Model 5 is not statistically significant. Also, Model 6, which uses only our highest quality data, points in the other direction. There is a positive relationship between migration and rioting regardless of whether a country is decentralized. In countries without decentralization, however, the correlation is more than three times larger.[5] We have suggested that decentralization promotes sons-of-the-soil politics but that, by empowering nativists, it may also prevent anti-migrant violence. The mixed results of Models 5 and 6 are consistent with that ambiguity.

Bivariate and multivariate analysis of subnational data on migration and violence across 21 countries suggests that within-country migration might prompt violence. Migration is endogenous to violence, insofar as migrants choose less violent destinations, and omitted factors cause both migration and violence. Decentralization is also not an exogenous force. In some countries, like Kenya, decentralized institutions were adopted in the midst of struggles over sons-of-the-soil politics, with an eye to relieving these grievances. To more clearly expose the impact of migration, with and without decentralization, we return to the case of India.

4.2 Causal evidence from a natural experiment in India

Subnational data from India further confirm the relationship between migration and violence. Like the analysis of the Shiv Sena in Chapter 3, we use disaster-induced migration as a source of exogneous variation in population movements. We measure migration at the state level and show that these population inflows cause rioting and increase the risk of insurgency (this section draws on Bhavnani and Lacina, 2015).

Our analysis includes 25 Indian states and the National Capital Territory of Delhi, which has had a locally elected legislature and chief minister since 1994.[6] Consistent with the analysis in the previous chapter, we instrument for each Indian state's in-migration with population- and distance-weighted abnormal rainfall in other Indian states. (In the previous chapter, we instrumented in-migration into each of Maharashtra's districts with abnormal rainfall in other states). We measure rainfall outside the area where we want to predict conflict and use these shocks to the supply of migrants to instrument for population

[5] Again, however, the difference between the coefficients on migration without decentralization and migration with decentralization is not statistically significant.

[6] Union territories without self-rule are excluded from our analysis. References to states should be taken to include Delhi.

FIGURE 4.3: Scatterplot of migration into India's states and abnormal monsoon instrument, 1982–2000, with the line of best fit

Notes: Control variables, measured for the host state, are abnormal monsoon rainfall, land degradation, income per capita, unemployment among secondary-school educated male natives, trade flows from other states, population, urbanization among the native population, native male children's school enrollment rates, the share of the native male population aged 15–19, and state fixed effects.

inflows. This strategy avoids a major problem faced by studies that use disasters to instrument for economic conditions in the area of the disaster, namely the many pathways—including migration—by which natural disasters may influence conflict (Sarsons, 2015). Our empirical strategy sidesteps this problem as our instrument is not disasters in the area of study but rather disasters in migrant-sending areas.

Figure 4.3 is a scatterplot of the instrument and migration data (both have been "partialled out" using controls), with a line of best fit. As expected, the monsoon instrument is positively correlated ($\rho = 0.3$) with average annual in-migration. In India, excess and deficient rainfall in parts of the country pushes migrants into other areas.

4.2.1 Measuring migration

The migration data that we employ is from the Census of India, 1991 and 2001. As noted in the last chapter, the census categorizes period of residency by range, implicitly defining a series of unequal time periods and in-migration in each of those periods. The resulting data has the following seven periods: 2000, 1997–1999 and 1992–1996 (from the 2001 census), 1991 (imputed from the 1991 and

2001 censuses; we drop this due to some negative figures), and 1990, 1987–1989, 1982–1986 (from the 1991 census). We employ average annual in-migration in our analysis.[7]

4.2.2 Rioting and insurgency

Our data on violence come from two sources: riot data collected by the government of India (National Crime Records Bureau, 2001)[8] and insurgency data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010).[9] Rioting is transformed into the average number of riots per year in a state-period. Insurgency is the count of years of insurgency in a state-period divided by the total number of years in the state-period.

While the theories that we are testing concern violence by natives against outsiders, our dependent variables measure all rioting and the incidence of all insurgencies. Our experience coding political violence in India convinced us that media sources were both politicized and erratic in their discussion of the sons-of-the-soil aspects of riots. The inclusion of all insurgencies is justified by accounts of these conflicts. Remarkably, *all* of the insurgencies included in the UCDP/PRIO data—separatist wars in Punjab, Kashmir, and Northeast India, and the leftist rebellion in central India—have been explained using sons-of-the-soil logic by some conflict observers. These dynamics are best known in the Northeast (Hazarika, 1994) but migration has also been described as an aggravator of separatism in Punjab (Wallace, 1986) and Kashmir (Bose, 2005). The Maoist rebellion in central India has been explained as a reaction of local, particularly tribal, populations against migration and economic displacement (Harriss, 2012; Narayan, 2012). Thus, while migration is not the centerpiece of the rhetoric of every civil conflict in India, the existing literature hypothesizes links between migration and every civil conflict.

4.2.3 The effect of migration of riots and insurgency

We start our analysis of the effect of subnational migration of violence in India by examining the bivariate relationship between migration and riots (Model 1, Table 4.2; full results are in Table S6). The two are positively correlated, the same pattern seen in the subnational data from 21 countries above. In Model 2, we control for possible confounds, specifically abnormal monsoon rainfall,

[7]Our data are annual averages calculated over periods of unequal length. Throughout our statistical analysis, we use analytic weighting to account for the fact that some observations are the means of longer periods of time than others.

[8]Rioting is defined to encompass any group of five or more people that "uses force or violence in pursuit of a common aim." See Wilkinson (2004, Appendix A) for a description of how government riot data are collected and their limitations.

[9]The dataset enumerates internal armed conflicts killing at least 25 people per year in fighting between government security forces and an organized armed rebel group.

land degradation, income per capita, unemployment among secondary-school educated male natives, trade flows from other states, population, urbanization among the native population, native male children's school enrollment rates, the share of the native male population aged 15–19 and state fixed effects. This is an overlapping but richer set of controls than that we were able to use in the 21-country analysis. The estimated effect of migration on riots remains positive and statistically significant.

Lastly, we switch to 2SLS, to confirm that the positive relationship between internal migration and riots is indeed causal (Model 3). The first stage regression suggests that abnormal monsoon rainfall does indeed cause migration into India's states. The first stage F-statistic is 31, well above the informal threshold of 10 for strong instrumentation. The estimated effect of migration on riots is positive and statistically significant, with a 10 percent increase in migration causing a 5.5 percent increase in riots. In India, internal migration causes riots.

The next three regressions of Table 4.2 explore the relationship between the incidence of insurgency in India's states and migration. The analysis implies population in-flows are linked to civil war in India, but that effect is not apparent until we use our exogenous predictor of migration. In the ordinary least squares regression reported in Model 4, internal migration and insurgency are negatively correlated. This relationship disappears when the confounds detailed previously are controlled for (Model 5). The next model uses two stage least squares and tells a different story. A 10 percent exogenous increase in migration due to adverse monsoons elsewhere in India causes a 1 percent increase in the chances of insurgency. Although substantively significant, this effect is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The result should therefore be interpreted with caution.

4.3 The attenuating effect of India's decentralization

Political decentralization has an ambiguous effect on the relationship between migration and violence. On the one hand, political decentralization creates and empowers subnational governments and politicians with incentives to define and cater to locals over others. Political decentralization might therefore facilitate violence. On the other hand, decentralization might attenuate violence by empowering local politicians to discriminate against migrants, which might lessen the "need" for costly violence. In other words, political decentralization might given politicians the ability to substitute discrimination against migrants for anti-migrant violence.

In Chapter 3, we used a difference-in-differences analysis to examine the effects of decentralization on the chances that migrants are employed by the government. We found that the decentralization reforms that were implemented

TABLE 4.2: OLS and 2SLS analysis of the effects of internal migration on riots and insurgencies in India

	Ln riots				*Ln* insurgency		
	OLS Model 1	OLS Model 2	2SLS Model 3		OLS Model 4	OLS Model 5	2SLS Model 6
			1st stage	2nd stage			
Ln male migrants	0.880***	0.296**		0.548***	-0.0510***	-0.0117	0.0907*
	(0.149)	(0.140)		(0.196)	(0.0178)	(0.0277)	(0.0540)
Abnormal monsoon instrument			0.890***				
			(0.161)				
State fixed effects?	N	Y		Y	N	Y	Y
Controls?	N	Y		Y	N	Y	Y
Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
Adjusted R-squared				0.94			0.63
First stage F-statistic				31			31

Notes: Control variables, measured for the host state, are abnormal monsoon rainfall, land degradation, income per capita, unemployment among secondary-school educated male natives, trade flows from other states, population, urbanization among the native population, native male children's school enrollment rates, and the share of the native male population aged 15–19. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. See text for details.

TABLE 4.3: The effects of migration on riots, with and without sub-state political decentralization in India

Sample:	All Model 1	Centralized Model 2	Decentralized Model 3
Ln male migrants	0.306** (0.132)	0.305** (0.127)	-0.187 (0.599)
Ln male migrants * Decentralization	-0.149 (0.103)		
Decentralization	1.765 (1.236)		
State fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y
Controls?	Y	Y	Y
Observations	138	105	33
Adjusted R-squared	0.95	0.96	0.95

Notes: Observations are for state-periods; standard errors are clustered by state. Control variables, measured for the host state, are abnormal monsoon rainfall, land degradation, income per capita, unemployment among secondary-school educated male natives, trade flows from other states, population, urbanization among the native population, native male children's school enrollment rates, and the share of the native male population aged 15–19. Standard errors clustered by state. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. See text for details.

in India from 1993 on decreased the chances that migrants are government employees. In other words, decentralization creates governments that cater to natives rather than migrants. Since favoritism towards natives could substitute for anti-migrant violence, decentralization could attenuate the estimated effect of migration on riots. We test this observable implication next.

To test the possibility that decentralization does indeed lessen the degree of rioting that migration prompts, we include the interaction of migration and decentralization (and its constituent terms) in the standard OLS regression that predicts riots (Model 1 of Table 4.3; full results are in Table S7). Migrants prompt riots but this effect is attenuated (and loses statistical significance) in decentralized states. The next two models subset our data into observations pre- and post-decentralization, and also suggests that migration particularly prompts rioting without decentralization.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined the link between internal migration and violence. Using new, detailed subnational migration data from over 500 regions across 21 developing countries in Asia, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, we have shown that in-migration is associated with an increase in riots. This pattern is evident in the raw data both within and across countries, and is robust to controlling for possible confounds. To confirm that the relationship between migration and violence is indeed causal, we examine a natural experiment due to natural disaster-induced migration in India. These exogenous migration shocks cause riots and sons-of-the-soil insurgency in migrant-receiving states.

In Chapter 3, we had shown that political decentralization facilitated the redirection of government jobs to natives over migrants. Consistent with the possibility that discrimination substitutes for anti-migrant violence, we find that India's decentralization attenuated the effects of migration on violence.

Internal migration across the developing world is frequently met with hostility. Particularly under conditions of decentralization, subnational politicians define and rally against outsiders, thereby shoring up their popularity. They also direct resources away from migrants and violence towards them. These patterns are remarkably similar to the reaction in the OECD to international migrants. What, then, can countries do to handle internal migrants better? We turn to this question in our next and last chapter.

Supplementary tables

TABLE S1: Countries in the IMAGE data with less developed and transitional economies

Country	Migration data year
Argentina	2001
Barbados	2000
Bolivia	2001
Brazil	2000
Burkina Faso	2006
Cambodia	1998
Cameroon	2005
Chile	2002
China	2000
Colombia	2005
Costa Rica	2000
Cuba	2002
Dominican Republic	2010
Ecuador	2001
Egypt	2006
El Salvador	2007
Estonia	2010
Fiji	2007
Ghana	2000
Guatemala	2002
Guinea	1996
Haiti	2003
Honduras	2001
India	2001
Indonesia	2010
Iran	2011
Iraq	1997
Kenya	1999
Kyrgyzstan	1999

Continued…

Country	Migration data year
Malawi	2008
Malaysia	2000
Mali	1998
Mauritius	2000
Mexico	2010
Mongolia	2000
Morocco	2004
Nicaragua	2005
North Korea	2008
Panama	2000
Paraguay	2002
Peru	2007
Poland	2010
Rwanda	2002
Senegal	2002
Sudan	2008
Tanzania	2002
Thailand	2000
Tunisia	2004
Turkey	2012
Uganda	2002
Ukraine	2010
Uruguay	2011
Venezuela	2011
Vietnam	2009
Zambia	2000

TABLE S5: Full results of models in Table 4.1

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Ln internal migrants	0.267**	0.0536***	0.0920**	0.0336**		
	(0.119)	(0.0170)	(0.0351)	(0.0156)		
Ln migrants * Political decentralization					0.145	0.0172
					(0.0858)	(0.0119)
Ln migrants * No political decentralization					0.0218	0.0469**
					(0.0596)	(0.0179)
Ln GDP per capita			0.00366	0.00103	0.00406	-0.000128
			(0.00801)	(0.00475)	(0.00873)	(0.00576)
Ln population			0.282	-0.0101	0.275	-0.0118
			(0.175)	(0.0154)	(0.164)	(0.0162)
Ln population density			-0.0575	0.0362***	-0.0468	0.0350***
			(0.0529)	(0.0108)	(0.0431)	(0.0107)
Only contemporaneous?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Country dummies?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	526	280	526	280	526	280
Adjusted R-squared	0.76	0.35	0.79	0.28	0.79	0.29

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE S6: Full results of models in Table 4.2

	Ln riots				*Ln* insurgency		
	OLS Model 1	OLS Model 2	2SLS Model 3		OLS Model 4	OLS Model 5	2SLS Model 6
			1st stage	2nd stage			
Ln male migrants	0.880***	0.296**		0.548***	-0.0510***	-0.0117	0.0907*
	(0.149)	(0.140)		(0.196)	(0.0178)	(0.0277)	(0.0540)
Abnormal monsoon rainfall		0.0807	0.591***	-0.0485		0.0491	-0.00343
		(0.175)	(0.199)	(0.164)		(0.0572)	(0.0479)
Ln % degraded land		0.0971	-0.634***	0.236		0.0939	0.150*
		(0.413)	(0.209)	(0.354)		(0.104)	(0.0900)
Ln income per capita		0.571	0.840***	0.418		0.0838	0.0215
		(0.492)	(0.254)	(0.381)		(0.0787)	(0.0648)
Ln unemployment (%), secondary educated male natives		-0.458*	0.00645	-0.474**		0.153	0.146
		(0.250)	(0.261)	(0.220)		(0.113)	(0.0891)
Ln domestic imports per capita		-0.109	0.107	-0.119*		0.0134	0.00928
		(0.0684)	(0.0847)	(0.0609)		(0.0193)	(0.0158)
Ln state population		-0.157	0.417	-0.268		0.132	0.0867
		(1.655)	(0.833)	(1.407)		(0.247)	(0.214)
Ln native urbanization (%)		0.372	0.135	0.390		0.378**	0.385**
		(0.672)	(0.388)	(0.530)		(0.180)	(0.152)
Ln native male children's school enrollment (%)		-3.705**	-1.261	-3.660**		0.0816	0.100
		(1.637)	(1.061)	(1.469)		(0.419)	(0.364)
Ln % aged 15–24, native males		0.472	0.231	0.579		1.108**	1.151***
		(2.151)	(1.110)	(1.688)		(0.472)	(0.439)
Abnormal monsoon instrument			0.890***				
			(0.161)				
State fixed effects?	N	Y		Y	N	Y	Y
Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
Adjusted R-squared				0.94			0.63
First stage F-statistic				31			31

Notes: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. See text for details.

TABLE S7: Full results of models in Table 4.3

Sample:	All Model 1	Centralized Model 2	Decentralized Model 3
Ln male migrants	0.306**	0.305**	-0.187
	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.599)
Ln male migrants * Decentralization	-0.149		
	(0.103)		
Decentralization	1.765		
	(1.236)		
Abnormal monsoon rainfall	0.165	-0.0470	0.403
	(0.139)	(0.219)	(0.612)
Ln % degraded land	-0.000797	0.0974	-1.898
	(0.614)	(0.522)	(3.226)
Ln income per capita	0.377	1.000*	-0.302
	(0.487)	(0.572)	(0.990)
Ln unemployment (%), secondary educated male natives	-0.414	-0.470**	-2.208
	(0.344)	(0.224)	(4.167)
Ln domestic imports per capita	-0.145*	-0.0638	0.107
	(0.0750)	(0.0978)	(0.358)
Ln state population	-0.737	-2.857	-0.537
	(1.944)	(1.990)	(9.811)
Ln native urbanization (%)	0.403	0.105	1.063
	(0.816)	(0.825)	(10.61)
Ln native male children's school enrollment (%)	-3.723**	-0.329	-39.20
	(1.743)	(2.337)	(35.14)
Ln % aged 15–24, native males	1.111	2.096	-14.86
	(2.676)	(2.868)	(32.13)
State fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y
Observations	138	105	33
Adjusted R-squared	0.95	0.96	0.95

Notes: Observations are for state-periods; standard errors are clustered by state. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. See text for details.

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