Exploring the Globalization-Participation Connection: Survey Evidence on Voting Patterns among Winners and Losers

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Abstract

Despite findings that globalization depresses voter turnout, in recent years a number of highly globalized countries have experienced electoral victories for anti-globalization candidates and parties. Our explanation for these electoral events is that globalization creates distinct patterns of political behavior in winners and losers. Surprisingly, previous studies do little to examine how the distributional effects of globalization influence participation. We test the effects of globalization on voting behavior using data from two original surveys in the United States. Participants received randomized primes about globalization and expressed their (pre-existing, unprimed) view of the welfare impacts of globalization. We confirm previous results that randomized globalization treatments do not influence beliefs about government room to maneuver. However, our results show that self-reported losers from globalization are more likely to vote than winners, but only if they believe they are in the majority of Americans. Self-reported losers who perceive themselves to be in the minority of Americans are less likely to vote. Our evidence suggests potential voters display considerable strategic behavior depending on their perception of the likelihood that their policy preferences will be represented as a result of the election.

Voters are pushing back against globalization in the Western world. The Brexit vote, election of Donald Trump, and support for nationalist parties in Europe all indicate a trend that voters are rejecting the long-standing liberal economic policies commonly pursued in the rich, industrialized world. Candidate Trump, for example, campaigned on leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership, renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement, imposing tariffs on China, and punishing firms doing business abroad. To the surprise of many, the manufacturing Midwest, Trump's "silent majority," voted for him in large part because of their belief that a President Trump would "turn around… this wave of globalization [that] has wiped out our middle class" (Alden 2016). For many decades, countries in Europe and North America as well as other industrialized nations maintained few restrictions on the international movement of goods or capital *and* public support for such openness. Today, however, voters seem to be galvanized in rejecting globalization. The PEW global attitudes survey, for example, points to a "skepticism" among Americans, Japanese, and some Europeans on trade and investment (Stokes 2014).

A rather puzzling element of these recent events is that political science research shows that, under globalization, constituents vote less and do not punish politicians for poor economic performances. Various authors use macro-level evidence to convincingly demonstrate how globalization depresses voter turnout (Steiner 2010, Karp and Milazzo 2016). Marshall and Fisher's (2015) study of various globalization flows adds to and corroborates this previous work: trade has no impact on voter turnout, while foreign direct investment (FDI) decreases it. How can we reconcile these empirical results with recent events? Why are voters turning up at the ballot box to oppose globalization?

We argue that previous studies do not directly account for how the distributional effects of globalization and the political environment impact political participation. In this analysis, we

relax the assumption that globalization symmetrically affects all citizens and their political participation. Instead, we test for differing political behaviors and perceptions among the winners and losers of globalization using original survey data on Americans from both a small MTurk pilot and a larger nationally representative Qualtrics survey. We analyze the effect of priming globalization on respondent beliefs about government room to maneuver and turning out to vote. Participants received randomized primes about either trade or FDI that also measured, but did not manipulate, whether the respondent held a positive or negative view of the welfare impacts of that flow. Like previous studies we find no effect of simply priming globalization on voting behavior. However, when we instead consider the respondents' views of globalization, we find significant differences between self-declared winners and losers in their intention to vote.

Existing theories of political participation emphasize that voting turnout depends upon whether there are parties/candidates representing potential voters' preferred policies and whether potential voters believe that such parties/candidates can prevail in electoral competition. We argue that the winners and losers from globalization react differently to such conditions. Our results show that those who believe globalization is bad for themselves and their families (whom we term the self-reported losers from globalization) are more likely to vote than winners from globalization, if they believe that they are among the majority of Americans. If the losers believe that only a minority of Americans view globalization as bad for the country, they turnout at lower rates. This finding on the intention to vote is consistent across both surveys despite differences in the two samples on the correlation between views of globalization and beliefs about government policy effectiveness. The replication of this finding on voting in both the MTurk and Qualtrics surveys provides confidence that these results are meaningful and not just a consequence of the respondents' perceptions on room to maneuver.

Our analysis adds a nuanced perspective to two puzzles in the current literature. First, it offers a novel interpretation that can reconcile previous inconsistent findings on how globalization affects political participation. Macro-level studies report that globalization reduces voter turnout (Marshall and Fisher 2015, Steiner 2010, 2016). Yet, micro-level studies, such as Hellwig et al.'s (2008) survey experiment, find no significant impact of globalization on mass perceptions of government's room to maneuver. By exploring how the winners and losers engage the political process, we provide an explanation for why, in our globalized era, citizens may disengage from voting even though they still believe that the government is able to enact a range of policies and influence the economy.

Second, this article adds to an emerging debate on the success and future of the embedded liberalism compromise. Unlike the current U.S. administration, discussed in the introduction, previous U.S. presidents have typically supported both global economic integration and compensation to those individuals that reject it as economically harmful. For example, President Obama often advocated for "the benefits of an integrated global economy [to be] more broadly shared by more people, and… the negative impacts … squarely addressed" (Eilperin 2016). In recent history, across the industrialized world, widespread support for globalization has been maintained with governmental assistance targeted towards those who could not compete in the global economy—scholarship has coined this the embedded liberalism compromise (Ruggie 1982, Polanyi 2001, Cameron 1978). Extensive evidence exists that embedded liberalism did work in the industrialized democracies, including the United States and Western Europe (Ehrlich and Hearn 2014, Hays et al 2005, Pitruzello 2004). However, as our introduction indicates, this compromise is now questioned by academics, policymakers, and the masses (Abdelal and Ruggie 2009, Glatzer and Rueshemeyer 2005, see also Walt 2016). By examining how the *losers*

of globalization are behaving in the political arena, we have a better understanding of whether and where the embedded liberalism compromise is failing.

Our article is structured as follows. First, we detail the room to maneuver-voting paradox in the existing literature, examining prevailing explanations for how globalization impacts both political participation and perceptions on government efficacy. We then present our argument on why globalization's winners and losers exhibit divergent political behavior. Our penultimate section presents the empirical findings from our original surveys in Qualtrics and MTurk. Last, we conclude.

Review of Existing Research: Inconsistencies in the Room to Maneuver-Voting Evidence

Classic economic voting literature examines how voters reward or punish politicians for economic performance. The responsibility hypothesis, for example, asserts that voters hold the government responsible for economic events, such as growth, inflation, and unemployment (see Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). International political economy research pushes this economic voting debate further by asking how globalization impacts this relationship: Do voters believe national policies and politicians can influence economic outcomes in a *globalized* economy?

Two schools exist on perceptions of room to maneuver under globalization: constraint/convergence and compensation/divergence. The constraint hypothesis points to voter skepticism that politicians can influence economic outcomes. Complex interdependence and increased economic integration limit national policymakers' room to maneuver and cross-national policy convergence is expected. Put simply, global market forces and international financial institutions influence national policies, inhibiting the ability and space of politicians to influence their local economy and respond to societal demands. The compensation hypothesis, on the other hand, contends that governing officials continue to have the autonomy and capacity

to pursue divergent policies under globalization. For example, governments can and do compensate the losers of globalization through social spending and other government policies. If voters believe that globalization induces constraint/convergence, they have fewer incentives to turnout to vote because regardless of who wins an election, there will not be much difference in economic policy. If voters believe the compensation/divergence hypothesis, their incentives to turnout to vote are preserved. Hellwig, Ringmuth, and Freeman's (2008) micro-level survey experiment provides evidence for the compensation/divergence thesis—the broader public perceives that there is room to maneuver under globalization.

Given this evidence that the broader public perceives government as having some room to maneuver under globalization, it is then logical to ask: Do people vote? Do voters reward and punish elected officials for economic performance under globalization? Several studies employing macro-level evidence focus on assessing these questions. Specifically, they examine the impact of globalization on vote share, voter turnout, and other forms of political participation to understand if and how citizens assign responsibility of globalization to government officials.

Overall, this literature finds that globalization correlates with lower voter turnout (Marshall and Fisher 2015, Steiner 2010, 2016), although, in some settings, it can increase protest or unionization (Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter 2017, Robertson and Titelbaum 2011).[1]

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[1] Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter (2017) examine globalization's effect on protesting. They find no difference between trade and FDI on the likelihood of protesting. Instead, skill-level seems to interact with globalization to cause protest in Russia. Robertson and Teitelbaum (2011) present macro-level evidence that FDI increases labor protest, although this relationship is mediated by the level of democracy in the country.

Globalization reduces the propensity of potential voters to connect economic and incumbent performance (Hellwig and Samuels 2007), and, relatedly, turnout to vote (Steiner 2010, Karp and Milazzo 2016). Building on this literature, Marshall and Fisher (2015) examine how differing types of market integration impact political behavior. They theorize that governments will be more constrained by capital flows than trade because trade patterns- based disproportionately in intra-industry and intra-firm flows—are slow to change, while capital flows are quite mobile and quick to react to changing circumstances. Voter perceptions on their government's room to maneuver should therefore be strongest under conditions of high capital flows: "constraints on government policy that reduce incentives to vote are more likely to be induced by foreign ownership of capital, while compensation through increased government spending is more likely (if at all) associated with international trade" (Marshall and Fisher 2015). In support of their contentions, Marshall and Fisher (2015) analyze macro-level data and find that trade has no impact on voter turnout, while FDI decreases it.

Across these studies, the theoretical explanation for the correlation between globalization and low voter turnout is that voters' perceptions of government efficacy are low. This explanation is touted despite some survey evidence to the contrary (i.e., Hellwig, Ringmuth, and Freeman 2008). Furthermore, Hellwig (2008, 2015) show that, while voters do limit their demands on government economic policy due to globalization, they tend to increase their demands in other areas. This finding presents a fundamental challenge to the argument that globalization decreases voting due to its constraints on government room to maneuver, as demands in other issue areas should provide strong incentives to participate.

Taken together, the results of current scholarship are surprising. Survey research supports perceptions among the broader public of government's room to maneuver (i.e., the

compensation/divergence hypothesis), but the macro-level evidence finds globalization is associated with less voting. How can these works be reconciled? Steiner (2016) and Kosmidis (2018) are among the first scholars to link the globalization-'room to maneuver'-political participation chain together. Employing data from a survey experiment in Greece, Kosmidis (2018) finds that randomly manipulating information about government's room-to-maneuver does not meaningfully influence political participation. Therefore, even if globalization does influence perceptions on room-to-maneuver, the 'room to maneuver'-political behavior connection may not be as previously theorized. Steiner's (2016) survey shows that citizens who believe there is less room to maneuver under globalization are then less likely to vote.

Although important contributions, Kosmidis' (2018) and Steiner's (2016) articles have some limitations. First, while Steiner (2016) accounts for left-right partisanship, he and Kosmidis (2018) do not directly account for variations in the distributional impacts of different globalization flows. Additionally, Steiner's (2016) data is from a single national election, in which Steiner emphasizes that the British left party had moved significantly rightward and there was considerable consensus among the major UK parties around a neo-liberal ideological approach. Kosmidis (2018) conducts his survey in Greece after the Eurozone crisis, also a unique period in history. Consequently, our analysis builds on Kosmidis' (2018) and Steiner's (2016) articles to further understand the globalization-'room to maneuver'-political participation relationship. We explore voter turnout patterns across groups who are differentially impacted by globalization.

Argument: Distinct Voting Behavior of Globalization's Winners and Losers

We argue that the winners and losers of globalization will exhibit distinct political behaviors. Building on political theories of voting (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), we present two mechanisms for why winners and losers turnout to vote or not. We argue that the existence or extent of a potential voter's grievance influences his or her voting behavior. Individuals are more likely to act when facing large losses or grievances. However, we argue that this behavior is mediated by the electoral competitive environment. Building on the pivotal voter model, our second mechanisms points to how individuals who believe that their views are shared by only a small minority of other potential voters are dis-incentivized from voting as the election is unlikely to bring an advocate of their preferred policies to power. Put simply, if I perceive that my views are represented by a larger group in my community, I am more likely to vote because it is more likely my candidate will be competitive in the election. If I perceive that my views are held by a minority unlikely to achieve political representation in my political community, I am less likely to vote, even if I have grievances. We, therefore, hypothesize that the losers of globalization- i.e., those individuals with many grievances—who perceive themselves to be in the majority are more likely to vote than losers who perceive themselves to be in the minority. Due to their grievances, if they do not feel hopelessly outnumbered, losers are also more likely to turnout than those who feel they benefit from globalization. Our logic and mechanisms are described in depth below.

First, building on prospect theory, we argue that the distributional consequences of globalization significantly impact citizens' incentives to participate in the political arena. Prospect theory asserts that people are more likely to take action and accept low probabilities of success to avoid losses than they are to secure gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Fanis 2004,

Booij, van Praag, and van de Kuilen 2010). Because globalization's losers are facing anticipated or already realized losses of economic status or security, we argue they will be more likely to place greater importance on the outcome of the election and participate in it at higher rates, relative to winners. Citizens harmed by globalization have incentives to participate politically to demand the creation or continuation of compensatory or protectionist policies such as welfare-state spending or tariff and non-tariff barriers.

Winners of globalization, on the other hand, are more less likely to have their incentives to participate altered by globalization. Citizens reaping employment benefits from globalization have fewer incentives for political participation because national economic interests and a long policy history in advanced industrialized countries lead governments to consistently favor openness. For instance, Ezrow and Hellwig (2014) provide evidence that, in more open economies, parties are less likely to respond to voter preferences due to concerns about market reactions to policy choices. We acknowledge that this effect for winners may change if previously open countries begin to use significant protectionist policies, which could place those who benefit from globalization in a loss/grievance frame. Additionally, for winners, their economic well-being is frequently influenced by international, rather than domestic factors, decreasing the importance of elections for them. In sum, this first mechanism suggests that the losers of globalization- because of their grievances- are more likely to engage in political activity.

While losers are more likely to vote ceteris paribus, we argue that their ultimate behavior is mediated by a strategic calculus of voting. Following the pivotal voter model, we posit that individuals assess how important their vote will be in determining the outcome. While the likelihood that any one voter is pivotal for the election is always negligible, the utility of voting

is expected to be lower for those individuals who believe that they are in a minority unlikely to receive significant representation as a result of an election (Duffy and Tavits 2008, see also Großer and Schram 2010).[2] Viewing oneself as being in the majority or the minority can therefore significantly impact incentives to turnout.[3] We argue that, *regardless of their grievances*, if the losers from globalization view themselves as unlikely to prevail in a political contest (i.e., they are in the minority) they will be less inclined to turnout (Kam and Utych 2011).[4] Losers will be most likely to vote when the perception is that they are part of a larger group and the electoral contest is close.

This pivotal voter dynamic impacts which party/politician prevails as well as parties' stances on issues related to globalization. Previous studies focus on voting data from national elections where party platforms have already been decided and in a period and context in which neo-liberalism was the overwhelmingly predominant political dogma.[5] It is therefore unsurprising that 1) the broader public viewed the outcome of the election with little import because parties and candidates rarely embraced anti-globalization platforms and 2) losers felt that their votes were not going to greatly influence the outcome of the election because they were

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[2] See Palfrey and Pogorelskiy (2017) for how party communication increases turnout for the majority party.

[3] This contention obviously varies based on electoral rules but would be most discouraging to participation in a system with majoritarian electoral rules.

[4] More specifically, see Kam and Utych (2011) for a review of literature and test of mechanisms for why turnout is higher in close elections.

[5] For example, Marshall and Fisher's (2015) study focuses on OECD countries from 1970-2007.

in the minority. When all major parties reach a neo-liberal consensus, such as in Steiner's (2016) survey of the 2001 UK election, losers have little incentive to vote. Winners, however, given the dominant neo-liberal political discourse over this post-World War II, pre-U.S. financial crisis period, were more likely to perceive their policy preferences as being the policy preferences of the majority. [6] In the recent political climate, however, greater variation exists in party/candidate platforms and opponents of globalization have become more vocal. Today, we expect losers to turn out at higher rates in elections where a contender and/or public advocate publicizes policies on limiting globalization's effects, such as in President Trump's campaign and the UK's 2016 Brexit referendum. There may also be diffusion effects from country to country as globalization backlash produces electoral victories elsewhere.

In sum, we hypothesize that the winners and losers of globalization will have distinct voting behaviors, depending on their grievances and the perceived popularity of their opinion on globalization. Losers facing great grievances from globalization are more likely to vote. Yet, all individuals who feel hopelessly outnumbered or completely unopposed would be expected to have lower incentives to turnout than those who think their votes might make a difference in a close race. Figure 1a and 1b below map our argument.

[Figure 1a and 1b about here]

Our specific hypotheses are:

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[6] If there is an overwhelming majority in favor of globalization, the incentives for winners to turnout may decrease as their participation is unlikely to be necessary for neo-liberal platforms to prevail.

H1: Globalization's losers, who also perceive themselves to be in the majority, are more likely to vote than globalization's winners who perceive themselves to be in the majority or minority.

H2: Globalization's losers, who also perceive themselves to be in the majority, are more likely to vote than globalization's losers who perceive themselves to be in the minority.

While we do not focus our analysis on the following, our pivotal voter mechanism theory also implies that globalization's winners, who perceive themselves to be in the majority, are more likely to vote than globalization's winners who perceive themselves to be in the minority. However, given the context of long-standing policies of openness even when significant doubts about globalization have been raised during elections, it is unclear whether there will be significant differences among winners. Finally, we are agnostic on the likelihood of voting across losers and winners who both perceive themselves to be in the minority. Prospect theory would indicate losers are more likely to vote in this scenario, because of their grievances. However, if winners believe that they are in the minority it is possible that the prospect of an anti-globalization backlash prevailing at the polls puts even winners into a loss frame of mind. If the latter occurs, no significant difference between winners and losers would be expected. The pivotal voter mechanism would indicate no significant difference across the groups.

Data and Methodology

In order to test these assertions, we present regression results from a survey conducted using Qualtrics with 1,500 adult respondents from a nationally representative sample in the United States in the summer of 2018. Later in the paper, we present results from a survey conducted in Amazon's Mechanical Turk with 455 respondents in the spring of 2018 to show

that the pattern on voting intention replicates in two separate samples. In the surveys, we incorporated an experiment in our survey questionnaire to compare our results with prior observational studies about the differential effects of various globalization flows and survey experiments about the effects of priming respondents with information about globalization. The randomized treatments provide information either on multinational corporations' (MNCs) operations or trade flows to two different treatment groups. We then asked each of these treatment groups about their perceptions of the effects of that globalization flow for themselves and their families. The treatments were designed to prime respondents to think about globalization without challenging or manipulating a particular view of globalization. The wording of the MNC and trade treatments are below:

> *MNC Treatment*: "A multinational company is a firm that has business and/or production operations located in more than one country. In 2016, US multinational companies invested over $300 billion in new business operations in other countries (around 2% of total national production). Foreign multinational companies invested over $468 billion in new business operations within the United States (around 3% of total national production). Investment in multinational companies both into and out of the United States increased over the past year. Foreign investment into the United States increased nearly 20% and US investment abroad increased by 7%."

> *Trade Treatment*: "Imports occur when American firms and consumers buy goods and services produced by other countries. Exports occur when foreign firms and consumers buy goods and services produced in the United States. In 2017, the US imported $2.9 trillion worth of goods and services (around 15% of total national production) and exported $2.3 trillion worth of goods and services (around 12% of total national productions). Both imports and exports increased by around 6% over the previous year."

We then asked each respective treatment group, "Thinking about you and your family personally, do you think multinational companies in [OR trade between] the U.S. and other

countries is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing?" Responses were listed as a four-point scale from very good (1) to very bad (4).

Given previous research and the role of skill-level, industry of employment, and socio-tropic considerations in determining individuals' views on globalization, we argue that it is impossible to randomly assign or manipulate views on globalization in a survey experiment.[7] Therefore, we use self-reporting, not experimental manipulation, to code the winners and losers in our survey. Winners are those respondents who indicate trade or MNCs have positive effects on their personal economic outcomes, while losers respond that these globalization forces have negative effects on their personal economic situation. We employ both a continuous scale of globalization preferences as well as dummy variables for each category, omitting the very good responses as the reference group.

After this priming of the treatment groups on globalization, we then asked about their likelihood of voting in the next election (our dependent variable). Specifically, the survey question was: "How likely are you to vote in the next election? Very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, not likely at all." Higher values indicate the respondent is more likely to vote. We also solicited their opinions on how much government economic policy impacts their personal economic outcomes and the country (measures of RTM) and how much influence voting has on government decisions about economic policy (a measure of government responsiveness). All respondents were then asked, "in your opinion, do most Americans believe that globalization is good for the economy or bad for the economy?" in order to assess if the respondent believes

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[7] Lockerbie (2006), for example, highlights the role of sociotropic (and egotropic) considerations in voting.

he/she is in the minority or the majority. We code this as a dichotomous variable with 0

representing the respondent believes that most Americans think globalization is good and 1 is

most Americans believe globalization is bad. The globalization treatment is not intended to

prime respondents to think a certain way on if the majority or minority view globalization

positively or negatively in the United States. Just as above, we use the self-reporting response to

this question, "in your opinion, do most Americans believe that globalization is good for the

economy or bad for the economy," to code the respondent's perception on if he or she is in the

majority or minority.

Since winners and losers are not manipulated by the survey and may differ substantially

in observed and unobserved characteristics, we also measure attitudes toward trade or MNC for

respondents in the control group. The control group responded to all questions about voting,

room to maneuver, and government responsiveness to voting prior to seeing any mention of

globalization, so these responses do not reflect any priming on globalization. Results do not

indicate any evidence that answering the questions on voting participation, RTM, and

government responsiveness influenced whether survey respondents viewed trade or MNCs as

positive or negative on their personal economic outcomes (results available upon request).

We also collected the standard demographic information on the respondents' interest in

politics and perceptions of current economic conditions at the start of the survey (so that the

globalization treatment did not influence answers to these questions). Additional demographic

questions on their gender, age, party identification, income, and educational attainment appeared

at the end of the survey. Please see the Appendix C for survey question wording and descriptive

statistics.

Empirical Results

Experimental Results

Comparisons of the control and treatment groups confirm the findings of previous survey experiments that randomly priming globalization does not influence respondent perceptions of government's room to maneuver. Priming globalization also does not significantly correlate with beliefs about government's responsiveness to voters. Our findings further support previous work that globalization does not induce people to turnout to vote (Steiner 2010, Karp and Milazzo 2016). Priming our respondents to think about globalization does not change their stated intention to vote. There are no differences between the trade and MNC treatments and the control group on these variables. Additionally, the treatments do not affect respondents' view of what the majority of Americans think about globalization. Results for analyses with all these dependent variables are shown in Table 1. Because of the randomized treatments, we do not use control variables in these analyses. OLS regressions were employed, except for a logit estimation for the model with the dichotomous dependent variable on most Americans' view of globalization.

[Table 1 about here]

Contra theoretical arguments in Marshall and Fisher (2015) that FDI constrains government room to maneuver more than trade and thus has a greater negative affect on voter turnout, we find that there is no difference in RTM beliefs between the trade and MNC treatments. However, we do find that those who received the MNC treatment are more likely to self-report that globalization has negative effects on them personally. If our hypothesis is supported, this result is ultimately consistent with Marshall and Fisher's (2015) broader findings:

greater exposure to FDI in a national population increases the number of potential voters who view globalization negatively.

Corroborating Previous Findings: Globalization and Room to Maneuver

We now use our full survey sample to assess whether winner and losers differ in their perceptions of government room to maneuver under globalization. Previous studies measure room to maneuver as beliefs about the government's ability to influence the national economy.[8] We follow this established operationalization by measuring an individual's perception of the government's RTM regarding the national economy. We also ask an additional question about their perceptions on whether government policy can affect their family's personal economic situation. See Appendix C.

In line with the previous research (Hellwig, Ringmuth, and Freeman 2008), the respondents display considerable belief in government RTM. Only 14.3% of the full sample answered in the lower half of a six-point scale from none at all to a great deal for the question about how much "the government's economic policies influence how the national economy is doing." While respondents believe that the government is less able to influence "how your family is doing economically", still nearly 80% of the full sample place the influence in the top half of the same six-point scale.

We conduct an OLS estimation to further assess the impact of our globalization prime on respondent's perception of room to maneuver, see Table 2. We include control variables in these

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[8] For example, Steiner 2016 uses this question, "In today's worldwide economy, how much influence do you think British governments have on Britain's economy?"

models because winner and loser status is not randomly assigned. The dependent variable in all models is belief about the extent to which government policies influence national and personal economic outcomes. Column 1 and 2 include dummy variables for answer choices that globalization is 'good', 'bad', and 'very bad' with the reference category being 'very good.' Column 3 and 4 present a continuous measure of globalization as the independent variable of interest. Appendix A.1 presents an estimate of an ordered logit model.

[Table 2 about here]

We find that those who are negatively affected by globalization have significantly lower perceptions about the effects that government policy can have on the economy. This result is robust to the alternative ordered logit model specification. This suggests that, if globalization does change perceptions about room to maneuver, these effects are concentrated among the losers from globalization. The overall effects of globalization on perceived room to maneuver in a policy may, thus, depend on prevailing attitudes toward globalization.

Corroborating Previous Findings: Globalization and General Voting Behavior

We first test whether those respondents with negative views of globalization report lower probabilities of voting in the coming election. Table 3 presents the effects of how globalization affects people on likelihood of voting using an ordinary least squares regression. Appendix A.2 presents an ordered logit estimation of this model. The ordered logit model indicates that negative views of globalization decreases the likelihood of voting, but this finding is not as robust as the estimations in Table 3.

[Table 3 about here]

We also assess the influence of globalization on respondent's perceptions of the government responsiveness to voters, using the following survey question as our dependent variable of interest: "When ordinary people participate in the political process by voting, how much influence do you think they have on government economic policy decisions." Appendix A.3-A.4 present the results, our findings are consistent as Table 2, globalization is either statistically insignificant or negatively associated with beliefs on how much influence voting has on government economic policymaking.

Testing our hypothesis: Grievances, Collective Action, and Voting under Globalization

We argue that the decision to vote under globalization should depend on both grievances (loser status and the accompanying loss aversion framing) and perceptions of whether parties/candidates espousing policies consistent with potential voters' preferences have a chance of winning (pivotal voting model). We employ a self-reported measure of grievance using the question on the effects of globalization on the respondent's personal economic situation. Perceptions of being a pivotal voter are a function of whether the respondent perceives him or herself to be part of the majority or minority, with the assumption that incentives to vote are lower for those who know that their preferred candidate/party/policy are unlikely to win the election—i.e., they perceive themselves as in the minority. We measure this variable by asking each respondent whether they believe that most Americans believe that globalization is good for the economy or bad for the economy. See Appendix C.

To first understand how perceptions about being a pivotal voter might influence decisions to participate, we assess how the globalization treatments change perceptions about what most

Americans think about globalization. The binomial dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent believes that most Americans think globalization is bad for the country. The results of the logit analysis are shown in Table 4. Relative to those who believe that globalization has a very good effect for them personally, those who believe that globalization does not affect them as positively or affects them negatively are less likely to believe that most Americans have a negative view of the effects of globalization. In other words, respondents with more negative views of globalization are more likely to think that they are in the minority of Americans with respect to their views on globalization.[9]

[Table 4 about here]

To directly test our hypotheses, we now examine how political participation varies based on the respondent's view of globalization *and* her beliefs about whether her views on globalization are in the majority of Americans or the minority. We find divergent patterns on the likelihood of voting in the next election. Table 5 shows reported likelihood of voting in the next election using an ordinary least squares regression. Appendix A.5 presents the ordered logit estimation results. We measure the dependent variable in these models using a four-point scale with higher values indicating more likelihood of voting. The independent variables of interests are the respondent's view of globalization personally, what most Americans think of globalization, and the interaction of the two. As above, the respondents' views on globalization are measured as a continuous variable with higher values representing the "losers," or those who view globalization as a

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[9] However, in the MTurk sample the opposite relationship exists and those with negative views of globalization are more likely to think most Americans believe globalization has bad effects.

negative force. The un-interacted coefficients on the globalization variables show the effect on voting turnout for those who believe that globalization is good, bad, or very bad for the economy and that most Americans view globalization as good. The reference category is those that believe globalization has "very good" effects for them (and most Americans believe globalization is good). The coefficient on the interaction term indicates the impact of viewing globalization negatively and believing that most others also view its effects as negative. We control for a number of factors (such as education) that might be correlated with both views of globalization and propensity to participate. We also include controls on age, education, gender, partisanship (a 7-point scale from Strongly Democrat to Strongly Republican), income, interest in politics, how much the government's economic policies influence family's economic situation, and beliefs about government responsiveness to ordinary voters (a measure of the RTM).

[Table 5 about here]

These estimations show that those who view globalization as bad for the country and believe that they are in the majority are more likely to vote than those who think that globalization is positive. However, if they believe that they are in the minority, they are less likely to turnout to vote. Figure 2 plots the marginal effects. Among all the respondents who believe most Americans think globalization is bad, it is the respondents who personally believe globalization is also bad (i.e., they are in the majority) who will turnout to vote at higher rates than respondents who personally believe globalization is good (i.e., they are in the minority). Figure 3 highlights that winners are only more likely to turnout to vote when they perceive themselves to be among the majority of Americans.

[Figures 2 & 3 about here]

Control variables show that those that believe the government is more likely to be responsive and government economic policy influences family's economic situation are more likely to vote. Older and more educated respondents as well as women are more likely to vote. Respondents with more interest in politics are, unsurprisingly, more likely to vote. Income and partisanship do not exert significant influence on the likelihood of voting.

Replication

To confirm the robustness of our results, we also conducted a survey in Amazon's Mechanical Turk in the spring of 2018. In total, we have 455 adult respondents from the United States. Appendix C contains survey questions and descriptive statistics.

As above, first we assess the effect of the respondent's view on globalization on her respondent's perception of government's room to maneuver and her likelihood of voting. Appendix B.1-B.4 present the regression results using both ordinary least squares and ordered logit estimations. Here, the perceived effects of globalization on the respondent personally are statistically insignificant in predicting respondent's perception of government's room to maneuver on both the national economy and personal economic outcomes.[10] Globalization's effects are also statistically insignificant in predicting respondents' beliefs about government responsiveness to voters or their likelihood of voting in the next election. These findings do support previous work that globalization does not induce people to turnout to vote (Steiner 2010, Karp and Milazzo 2016).

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[10] The ordered logit estimation provides evidence of a positive relationship.

Next, as we did previously in Table 4, we conduct a logit analysis of how views on globalization affect respondents' perceptions about what most Americans think about globalization. Appendix B.5 presents the results. Respondents with more negative views of globalization are more likely believe that most Americans also think globalization is bad. Unlike the Qualtrics findings, this sample indicates that losers are more likely to think that they are in the majority. We attribute this correlation to this particular MTurk sample and the timing of the survey. While both surveys were administered during periods in which President Trump's tariffs and associated retaliatory measures were in the news, the effects of said tariffs were not clear at the time of the spring MTurk survey. Only a few tariffs had been suggested; fewer still had gone into effect. Exemptions or extensions for key trading partners were in place. Yet, at the time of the fall Qualtrics survey, additional tariffs were announced and enacted and additional retaliatory measures by China, Canada, the European Union, Mexico and Turkey had been put in place. Agricultural subsidies were also distributed to cover lost export sales (Brown and Kolb 2018). Despite these inconsistencies, the finding that voting turnout is affected by both grievances and the respondent's perception of the majority view does replicate across both samples. This relationship, therefore, is not being driven by a specific correlation between view of globalization and perception of the majority view, since those differ in sign the samples. We discuss this result now.

As a final test, we regress the respondent's personal view on globalization interacted with her perception of the broader American public's view of globalization on her likelihood of voting. We control for the same variables as above in our estimations. The ordinary least squares regression and marginal effects are presented below in Table 6 and Figure 4, Appendix B.6 contains the ordered logit results.

[Table 6 about here]

[Figure 4 about here]

Replicating our Qualtrics estimations and supporting our hypotheses, the MTurk survey data reveals that respondents who view globalization as bad for the country and believe that they are in the majority are more likely to vote than those who think that globalization is positive. However, those who believe they are in the minority and view globalization as negative report lower intentions to vote than the same reference group.

Conclusion

Our analysis newly examines the relationship between globalization and political behavior in order to better understand when and why the public turns out to vote in our current age of complex interdependence. We present the findings of our 2018 U.S. survey to better understand previous research on how the public both believes government has room to maneuver and is less likely to vote under globalization. After controlling for age, gender, income, education, party identification, political interest, and room to maneuver beliefs, we find that the likelihood of turning out to vote depends on the respondent's personal grievances associated with globalization and her perception of whether her view of globalization comports with the majority opinion on the effects of globalization for the country. Respondents who view globalization as bad for their households (i.e., the self-reported losers) and believe that they are in the majority opinion of Americans are more likely to vote than the self-reported winners of globalization. However, if the self-reported losers of globalization believe that they are in the minority opinion of Americans, they are less likely to turnout to vote. Our hypotheses are also supported in an

analysis of survey data from Amazon's mechanical turk, although we are cautious about the representativeness of this sample.

Our survey results lend insight into why the losers of globalization may be engaging more in elections in recent years and what policymakers and advocacy leaders can do to balance their demands with continued open markets. Academics and policymakers have recently pointed to a potential unraveling of the embedded liberalism compromise as broad support for globalization declines. Our study was motivated by this prospect and logic: embedded liberalism is failing, and the result is a growing dissatisfaction among the losers of globalization and a corresponding increase in anti-globalization voting. However, interestingly, our findings indicate that the cracks in embedded liberalism may not necessarily be a recent phenomenon. Following our argument, it could be surmised that, perhaps, the losers felt grievances throughout the post-World War II embedded liberalism era. However, it is only today that they feel galvanized to act politically because of the change in elite-level political rhetoric now highlighting the blight of globalization. As individuals and groups opposing globalization speak out more and more, the losers increasingly perceive themselves to be part of a larger group of Americans. Put simply, the losers are now more likely to believe that their votes will translate to policy action. Previously, during the post-World War II, pre-U.S. financial crisis, neoliberal policies were broadly accepted and touted by most politicians, leaving losers feeling deeply in the minority and less incentivized to vote, even though they had grievances.

Political leaders interested in ensuring both liberal economic policies and the welfare of their constituents must tackle both of these issues head on. A unique policy prescription our analysis points to concerns the messaging surrounding globalization. Bringing certain voices pro or against globalization into political or media debates may influence how the broader public

perceives their ability to influence national economic policy. Tight electoral contests prompt all sides to engage, while elections with limited policy choices incentivizes the minority (i.e., those with an underrepresented opinion) to disengage.

Further research on this topic is warranted. Testing our hypotheses and mechanisms with a survey conducted in a country with proportional representation is apt. One of our mechanisms—on being a pivotal voter—is (perhaps) most salient in majoritarian systems like the United States. While we expect our findings to translate to countries with proportional representation electoral institutions, it is likely that the effect is most pronounced in majoritarian countries because of the winner-take-all system. Further surveys should also assess the role of other forms of globalization on political participation. Financial capital and migration are both growing forms of exchange and salient features of current political and media debates. The impact of either or both of these flows on political participation has been understudied. Finally, future work should assess the role of globalization and our proposed mechanisms—grievances and pivotal voting—on other forms of political behavior, such as protesting, signing petitions, or donating to political causes and parties. Current research on this topic is also limited.

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FIGURES AND TABLES FOR TEXT

Figure 1: Argument Summary

Figure 1A: When Respondents Perceive to Be Among the Majority of Americans

Negative/Bad (Loser) ← How does globalization affect you? → Positive/Good (Winner)

Grievances / Satisfaction

Negative/Bad ← How does the broader public feel about globalization? → Positive/Good

Perceive gov't as more likely to respond / Perceive gov't currently does and will respond

Higher incentive to vote ← Voting behavior? → No impact on likelihood of voting

Figure 1B: When Respondents Perceive to Be Among the Minority of Americans

Negative/Bad (Loser) ← How does globalization affect you? → Positive/Good (Winner)

Grievances / Satisfaction

Positive/Good ← How does the broader public feel about globalization? → Negative/Bad

Perceive gov't as less likely to respond / Perceive gov't as less likely to respond

Lower incentive to vote ← Voting behavior? → Lower incentive to vote

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Perceived Distributional Effects of Globalization on Likelihood of Voting, Given Respondent Perception that Most Americans Think Globalization is Bad (Qualtrics)

Respondent Belief is "Most Americans Believe Globalization is Bad"

Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Perceived Distributional Effects of Globalization on Likelihood of Voting, Given Respondent Perception that Most Americans Think Globalization is Good (Qualtrics)

Respondent Belief that "Most Americans Believe Globalization is Good"

Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Perceived Distributional Effects of Globalization on Likelihood of Voting, Given Respondent Perception that Most Americans Think Globalization is Bad (Mturk)

Table 1: Effects of Randomized Globalization Treatments

	Gov't policy influence National	Gov't policy influence personal	Gov't responds Voters	Voting Intention	View of Glob.	Most Americans— Glob. Bad (Logit)
MNC	-0.006	-0.044	0.022	-0.002	0.138***	0.013
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.095)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.141)
Trade	0.023	-0.058	-0.016	-0.074	-0.029	0.191
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.095)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.144)
Constant	4.702***	4.498***	4.012***	3.540***	1.790***	0.946***
	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.099)
Observations	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Globalization on Perceived Room to Maneuver (OLS)

	(1) Policy Effect-National	(2) Policy Effect-Family	(3) Policy Effect-National	(4) Policy Effect-Family
Globalization				
Good	-0.479***	-0.470***		
	(0.065)	(0.071)		
Bad	-0.567***	-0.526***		
	(0.094)	(0.101)		
Very Bad	-0.903***	-1.000***		
	(0.213)	(0.230)		
Continuous			-0.312***	-0.306***
			(0.041)	(0.045)
Controls				
Female	0.227***	0.222***	0.213***	0.210***
	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.067)
Part ID	0.014	0.010	0.012	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Income	0.039***	0.068***	0.041***	0.070***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Age	0.009***	0.005**	0.009***	0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.001	-0.048	0.005	-0.044
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)
Political Disinterest	-0.326***	-0.311***	-0.335***	-0.320***
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Constant	4.784***	4.727***	5.059***	4.998***
	(0.181)	(0.195)	(0.192)	(0.207)
Observations	1,495	1,495	1,495	1,495
R-squared	0.204	0.177	0.198	0.171

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Globalization on Likelihood of Voting (OLS)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.018	
	(0.044)	
Bad	-0.051	
	(0.063)	
Very Bad	-0.135	
	-0.142	
Continuous		-0.029
		(0.028)
Constant		
Female	0.100**	0.101**
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Party ID	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income	0.004	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.079***	0.079***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Political Disinterest	-0.318***	-0.318***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Policy Affect Family	0.073***	0.073***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Gov't Responds Voters	0.049***	0.049***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	2.989***	3.023***
	(0.149)	(0.158)
Observations	1,495	1,495
R-squared	0.310	0.310

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Globalization on Perception of How Most Americans View Globalization (Logit) (DV: "Most Americans Believe that Globalization is Bad")

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.683***	
	(0.163)	
Bad	-1.879***	
	(0.204)	
Very Bad	-2.711***	
	(0.471)	
Continuous		-0.942***
		(0.095)
Controls		
Female	-0.002	0.015
	(0.140)	(0.139)
Party ID	-0.048	-0.044
	(0.033)	(0.033)
Income	0.091***	0.089***
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Age	-0.012***	-0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.029	0.023
	(0.062)	(0.062)
Political Disinterest	-0.145**	-0.132**
	(0.065)	(0.065)
Constant	2.407***	3.437***
	(0.418)	(0.447)
Observations	1,495	1,495

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Globalization*Perceptions on Majority Opinion of Globalization on Likelihood of Voting (OLS)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.155	
	(0.099)	
Bad	-0.163	
	(0.110)	
Very Bad	-0.389**	
	(0.180)	
Continuous		-0.090**
		(0.046)
Most Americans Believe	-0.083	-0.168
	(0.094)	(0.125)
Good*Most Americans	0.172	
	(0.110)	
Bad*Most Americans	0.172	
	(0.137)	
Very Bad*Most Americans	0.787**	
	(0.322)	
Continuous*Most Americans		0.114**
		(0.057)
Controls		
Female	0.096**	0.092**
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Partisanship	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income	0.005	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.075***	0.078***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Political Disinterest	-0.318***	-0.319***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Policy Affects Family	0.075***	0.076***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Gov't Responds Voters	0.047***	0.047***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	3.066***	3.124***
	(0.169)	(0.182)
Observations	1,495	1,495
R-squared	0.315	0.313

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Globalization*Perceptions on Majority Opinion of Globalization on Likelihood of Voting (MTurk, OLS)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.089	
	(0.115)	
Bad	-0.515***	
	(0.178)	
Very Bad	-0.243	
	(0.349)	
Continuous		-0.177**
		(0.073)
Most Americans Believe	-0.158	-0.390*
	(0.177)	(0.232)
Good*Most Americans	0.292	
	(0.204)	
Bad*Most Americans	0.701***	
	(0.266)	
Very Bad*Most Americans	0.613	
	(0.448)	
Continuous*Most Americans		0.264**
		(0.107)
Controls		
Female	0.191**	0.184**
	(0.078)	(0.078)
Partisanship	-0.050**	-0.052**
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Income	0.026	0.025
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.071*	0.067*
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Political Disinterest	-0.322***	-0.317***
	(0.050)	(0.049)
Policy Affects Family	0.038	0.042
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Gov't Responds Voters	0.144***	0.135***
	(0.031)	(0.030)
Constant	3.055***	3.313***
	(0.273)	(0.287)
Observations	455	455
R-squared	0.231	0.224

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix A: Qualtrics Survey Results

A.1 Globalization on Perceived Room to Maneuver (Ologit)

	(1) Policy Effect-National	(2) Policy Effect-National	(3) Policy Effect-National	(4) Policy Effect-National
Globalization				
Good	-0.971***	-0.856***		
	(0.116)	(0.115)		
Bad	-1.066***	-0.946***		
	(0.166)	(0.161)		
Very Bad	-1.465***	-1.669***		
	(0.447)	(0.427)		
Continuous			-0.584***	-0.532***
			(0.075)	(0.073)
Controls				
Female	0.397***	0.324***	0.368***	0.298***
	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.106)
Party ID	0.016	0.014	0.010	0.008
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Income	0.078***	0.110***	0.082***	0.113***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age	0.015***	0.008**	0.015***	0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	-0.019	-0.073	-0.011	-0.065
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Political Disinterest	-0.561***	-0.481***	-0.578***	-0.499***
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.052)
Cut 1	-4.526***	-4.386***	-5.029***	-4.848***
	(0.363)	(0.347)	(0.383)	(0.367)
Cut 2	-3.804***	-3.501***	-4.299***	-3.961***
	(0.340)	(0.326)	(0.360)	(0.346)
Cut 3	-2.315***	-2.016***	-2.797***	-2.472***
	(0.321)	(0.313)	(0.341)	(0.333)
Cut 4	-0.667**	-0.491	-1.148***	-0.950***
	(0.316)	(0.310)	(0.334)	(0.328)
Cut 5	0.680**	0.748**	0.178	0.275
	(0.316)	(0.310)	(0.332)	(0.327)
Observations	1,495	1,495	1,495	1,495

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A.2 Globalization on Likelihood of Voting (Ologit)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.545***	
	(0.167)	
Bad	-0.527**	
	(0.215)	
Very Bad	-0.447	
	(0.456)	
Continuous		-0.220**
		(0.095)
Constant		
Female	0.409***	0.377***
	(0.140)	(0.139)
Party ID	0.021	0.017
	(0.035)	(0.034)
Income	0.046	0.047
	(0.031)	(0.030)
Age	0.028***	0.028***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.224***	0.228***
	(0.061)	(0.061)
Political Disinterest	-0.917***	-0.923***
	(0.070)	(0.070)
Policy Affects Family	0.259***	0.265***
	(0.057)	(0.056)
Gov't Responds Voters	0.170***	0.170***
	(0.052)	(0.051)
Cut 1	-1.588***	-1.657***
	(0.497)	(0.526)
Cut 2	-0.529	-0.592
	(0.491)	(0.520)
Cut 3	1.092**	1.027**
	(0.492)	(0.520)
Observations	1,495	1,495

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix A.3 Globalization on Perception Government Responsive to Voters (OLS)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.615***	
	(0.081)	
Bad	-1.014***	
	(0.115)	
Very Bad	-1.308***	
	(0.263)	
Continuous		-0.503***
		(0.051)
Constant		
Female	-0.035	-0.046
	(0.077)	(0.077)
Party ID	0.003	0.003
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income	0.079***	0.080***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Age	-0.005**	-0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.021	0.023
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Political Disinterest	-0.360***	-0.366***
	(0.036)	(0.036)
Constant	5.110***	5.587***
	(0.223)	(0.236)
Observations	1,495	1,495
R-squared	0.243	0.242

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix A.4 Globalization on Perception Government Responsive to Voters (Ologit)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.948***	
	(0.115)	
Bad	-1.423***	
	(0.163)	
Very Bad	-1.873***	
	(0.413)	
Continuous		-0.722***
		(0.074)
Constant		
Female	-0.007	-0.027
	(0.107)	(0.106)
Party ID	0.013	0.010
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Income	0.125***	0.126***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age	-0.006*	-0.006**
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	0.028	0.035
	(0.047)	(0.047)
Political Disinterest	-0.499***	-0.509***
	(0.052)	(0.052)
Cut 1	-4.449***	-5.123***
	(0.331)	(0.353)
Cut 2	-3.338***	-4.003***
	(0.320)	(0.342)
Cut 3	-2.150***	-2.809***
	(0.314)	(0.335)
Cut 4	-0.831***	-1.496***
	(0.309)	(0.329)
Cut 5	0.100	-0.577*
	(0.309)	(0.327)
Observations	1,495	1,495

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix A.5 Globalization*Perceptions on Majority Opinion of Globalization on Likelihood of Voting (Ologit)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.883**	
	(0.392)	
Bad	-0.944**	
	(0.415)	
Very Bad	-1.277**	
	(0.601)	
Continuous		-0.325**
		(0.153)
Constant		
Female	0.392***	0.365***
	(0.141)	(0.140)
Party ID	0.017	0.015
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Income	0.050	0.049
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Age	0.029***	0.028***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.215***	0.226***
	(0.061)	(0.061)
Political Disinterest	-0.926***	-0.927***
	(0.070)	(0.070)
Policy Affects Family	0.262***	0.267***
	(0.057)	(0.056)
Gov't Responds Voters	0.174***	0.174***
	(0.052)	(0.052)
Cut 1	-1.966***	-1.940***
	(0.599)	(0.616)
Cut 2	-0.900	-0.874
	(0.593)	(0.610)
Cut 3	0.725	0.745
	(0.593)	(0.610)
Observations	1,495	1,495

Standard errors in parentheses*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Appendix B: Mturk Survey

B.1 Globalization on Perceived Room to Maneuver (MTurk, OLS)

	(1) Policy Effect- National	(2) Policy Effect- National	(3) Policy Effect- Family	(4) Policy Effect- Family
Globalization				
Good	-0.237**		-0.050	
	(0.118)		(0.135)	
Bad	-0.035		0.102	
	(0.157)		(0.180)	
Very Bad	-0.014		0.591*	
	(0.263)		(0.303)	
Continuous		-0.011		0.114
		(0.065)		(0.075)
Controls				
Female	0.084	0.087	0.274**	0.271**
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Party ID	0.028	0.027	0.045	0.041
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Income	-0.024	-0.024	0.039	0.038
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.046	-0.041	-0.052	-0.052
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Political Disinterest	-0.105*	-0.123**	-0.270***	-0.285***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Constant	4.926***	4.824***	4.197***	4.026***
	(0.248)	(0.268)	(0.285)	(0.307)
Observations	455	455	455	455
R-squared	0.027	0.015	0.064	0.058

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

B.2 Globalization on Perceived Room to Maneuver (MTurk, Ologit)

	(1) Policy Effect-National	(2) Policy Effect-National	(3) Policy Effect-Family	(4) Policy Effect-Family
Globalization				
Good	-0.467**		-0.092	
	(0.217)		(0.216)	
Bad	-0.069		0.214	
	(0.291)		(0.283)	
Very Bad	0.017		1.243**	
	(0.488)		(0.506)	
Continuous		-0.016		0.227*
		(0.120)		(0.122)
Controls				
Female	0.174	0.171	0.442**	0.429**
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.174)
Party ID	0.050	0.048	0.081	0.076
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Income	-0.058	-0.058	0.053	0.049
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.093	-0.078	-0.097	-0.089
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Political Disinterest	-0.230**	-0.261**	-0.431***	-0.454***
	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Cut 1	-5.795***	-5.551***	-4.470***	-4.094***
	(0.734)	(0.753)	(0.598)	(0.621)
Cut 2	-4.389***	-4.146***	-2.499***	-2.121***
	(0.538)	(0.564)	(0.465)	(0.495)
Cut 3	-2.738***	-2.498***	-1.162***	-0.784
	(0.474)	(0.504)	(0.446)	(0.477)
Cut 4	-1.038**	-0.810*	0.462	0.827*
	(0.458)	(0.490)	(0.443)	(0.478)
Cut 5	0.779*	0.988**	1.790***	2.139***
	(0.456)	(0.490)	(0.453)	(0.490)
Observations	455	455	455	455

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.3 Globalization on Likelihood of Voting (MTurk, OLS)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	0.008	
	(0.096)	
Bad	-0.157	
	(0.127)	
Very Bad	0.073	
	(0.218)	
Continuous		-0.037
		(0.053)
Controls		
Female	0.183**	0.177**
	(0.078)	(0.078)
Party ID	-0.046**	-0.049**
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Income	0.020	0.020
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.067*	0.064
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Political Disinterest	-0.334***	-0.334***
	(0.050)	(0.049)
Policy Affects Family	0.043	0.045
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Gov't Responds Voters	0.132***	0.126***
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Constant	3.090***	3.185***
	(0.271)	(0.282)
Observations	455	455
R-squared	0.211	0.208

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.4 Globalization on Likelihood of Voting (MTurk, Ologit)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.131	
	(0.284)	
Bad	-0.460	
	(0.364)	
Very Bad	0.275	
	(0.628)	
Continuous		-0.091
		(0.151)
Controls		
Female	0.603***	0.592***
	(0.222)	(0.221)
Party ID	-0.152**	-0.162**
	(0.065)	(0.064)
Income	0.020	0.020
	(0.070)	(0.070)
Age	0.035***	0.035***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	0.140	0.131
	(0.112)	(0.111)
Political Disinterest	-0.869***	-0.882***
	(0.142)	(0.140)
Policy Affects Family	0.084	0.093
	(0.090)	(0.090)
Gov't Responds Voters	0.448***	0.424***
	(0.089)	(0.088)
Cut 1	-1.018	-1.214
	(0.823)	(0.850)
Cut 2	0.028	-0.171
	(0.814)	(0.839)
Cut 3	1.388*	1.183
	(0.818)	(0.842)
Observations	455	455

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.5 Globalization on Perception of How Most Americans View Globalization (MTurk, Logit)

(DV: "Most Americans Believe that Globalization is Bad")

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	0.543**	
	(0.258)	
Bad	1.253***	
	(0.334)	
Very Bad	1.485***	
	(0.559)	
Continuous		0.574***
		(0.141)
Controls		
Female	0.154	0.159
	(0.202)	(0.201)
Party ID	0.051	0.054
	(0.058)	(0.058)
Income	-0.114*	-0.112*
	(0.063)	(0.063)
Age	0.019**	0.019**
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Education	0.007	0.011
	(0.105)	(0.105)
Political Disinterest	-0.152	-0.152
	(0.125)	(0.124)
Constant	-1.396**	-2.004***
	(0.604)	(0.644)
Observations	455	455

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.6 Globalization*Perceptions on Majority Opinion of Globalization on Likelihood of Voting (MTurk, Ologit)

	(1)	(2)
Globalization		
Good	-0.429	
	(0.338)	
Bad	-1.332***	
	(0.479)	
Very Bad	-0.635	
	(0.892)	
Continuous		-0.485**
		(0.204)
Most Americans Believe	-0.555	-1.202*
	(0.555)	(0.707)
Good*Most Americans	1.019	
	(0.624)	
Bad*Most Americans	1.918**	
	(0.778)	
Very Bad*Most Americans	2.063	
	(1.295)	
Continuous*Most Americans		0.802**
		(0.323)
Controls		
Female	0.584***	0.566**
	(0.225)	(0.224)
Partisanship	-0.161**	-0.170***
	(0.066)	(0.065)
Income	0.036	0.036
	(0.071)	(0.070)
Age	0.032***	0.032***
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Education	0.151	0.140
	(0.113)	(0.112)
Political Disinterest	-0.847***	-0.845***
	(0.144)	(0.141)
Policy Affects Family	0.095	0.109
	(0.092)	(0.091)
Gov't Responds Voters	0.493***	0.458***
	(0.093)	(0.090)
Cut 1	-1.006	-1.641*
	(0.835)	(0.875)
Cut 2	0.053	-0.588
	(0.826)	(0.865)
Cut 3	1.448*	0.799
	(0.831)	(0.867)
Observations	455	455

Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire and Descriptive Statistics

C.1 Survey Questionnaire in Order it was Presented to Respondents

"By completing this research, you are consenting to participate in this study. You must be 18 or older to participate in the study."

Introduction Demographic Question (Presented to all respondents)

How interested are you in politics?
1: Very interested
2: Fairly interested
3: A little interested
4: Not at all interested

Treatments (1/3 respondents got treatment 1, 1/3 respondents got treatment 2, 1/3 respondents control group).

Treatment 1

A multinational company is a firm that has business and/or production operations located in more than one country.
In 2016, US multinational companies invested over $300 billion in new business operations in other countries (around 2% of total national production). Foreign multinational companies invested over $468 billion in new business operations within the United States (around 3% of total national production). Investment in multinational companies both into and out of the United States increased over the past year. Foreign investment into the United States increased nearly 20% and US investment abroad increased by 7%.

Thinking about you and your family personally, do you think multinational companies in the U.S. and other countries are a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing?
1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Somewhat bad
4. Very bad

Treatment 2

Imports occur when American firms and consumers buy goods and services produced by other countries. Exports occur when foreign firms and consumers buy goods and services produced in the United States. In 2017, the US imported $2.9 trillion worth of goods and services (around 15% of total national production) and exported $2.3 trillion worth of goods and services (around 12% of total national productions). Both imports and exports increased by around 6% over the previous year.

Thinking about you and your family personally, do you think trade between the U.S. and other countries is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing?
1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Somewhat bad
4. Very bad

Room to Maneuver and Political Participation Questions
(All respondents receive these questions)

When ordinary people participate in the political process by voting, how much influence do you think they have on government economic policy decisions.

1: None at all
2
3
4
5
6: A great deal

In your opinion, how much does the government's economic policies influence how the national economy is doing?

1: None at all
2
3
4
5
6: A great deal

In your opinion, how much does the government's economic policies influence how your family is doing economically?

1: None at all
2
3
4
5
6: A great deal

How likely are you to vote in the next election?
   1. Not likely at all
   2. Not very likely
   3. Somewhat likely
   4. Very likely

Next substantive Question (Control group will receive first receive treatment 1 or treatment 2, then this substantive question; Treatment groups will receive this last substantive question immediately following political participation questions).

In your opinion, do most Americans believe that globalization is good for the economy or bad for the economy?

   1. Very good for the economy
   2. Good for the economy
   3. Bad for the economy
   4. Very bad for the economy

Demographics (Presented in random order to all respondents at end of the survey)

What is your gender?
   1. Male
   2. Female

What is your age? _____

What is your Party identification?
   1. Strongly Democrat
   2. Democrat
   3. Independent, leaning toward the Democrat party
   4. Independent

5. Independent, leaning toward the Republican party
6. Republican
7. Strongly Republican

What is your annual income?
1. Under $20,000
2. $20,001-$40,000
3. $40,001-$60,000
4. $60,001-$80,000
5. $80,001-$100,000
6. $100,001-$120,000
7. $120,001-$140,000
8. $140,001-$160,000
9. $160,001-$180,000
10. $180,001-$200,000
11. Over $200,000

What is your highest level of educational attainment?

a. High school
b. Vocational training
c. College or professional degree
d. Graduate school degree

C.2 Qualtrics Descriptive Statistics

Variable Name	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Scaling of Variable
Age	43.1	15.7	16	91	Exact age
Disinterest Politics	2.1	1.0	1	4	1: Very interested 4: Not interested at all
Education	2.5	1.1	1	4	1: High school 4: Graduate school degree
Female	1.5	0.5	1	2	1: Male 2: Female
Globalization treatment (combined)	1.8	0.7	1	4	1: Very good 4: Very bad
Govt Policy Influence on National Economy	4.7	1.2	1	6	1: None at all 6: A Great Deal
Govt Policy Influence on Personal Economic Outcomes	4.5	1.3	1	6	1: None at all 6: A Great Deal
Govt responds to voters	4.0	1.5	1	6	1: None at all 6: A Great Deal
Income	3.8	2.9	1	11	1: Under $20,000 11: Over $200,000
Likely to Vote	1.5	0.8	1	4	1: Not likely at all 4: Very likely
Most Americans	0.7	0.4	0	1	0: Good or Very Good 1: Bad or Very Bad
Party ID(7-pt)	4.1	2.1	1	7	1: Strongly Democrat 7: Strongly Republican

C.3 Mturk Descriptive Statistics

Variable Name	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Scaling of Variable
Age	35.1	10.9	19	70	Exact age
Disinterest Politics	2.0	0.8	1	4	1: Very interested 4: Not interested at all
Education	2.5	1.0	1	4	1: High school 4: Graduate school degree
Female	1.4	0.5	1	2	1: Male 2: Female
Globalization treatment (combined)	2.0	0.7	1	4	1: Very good 4: Very bad
Govt policy on National Economy (RTM)	4.6	1.0	1	6	1: None at all 6: A Great Deal
Govt Policy on Personal Economic Outcomes	4.2	1.2	1	6	1: None at all 6: A Great Deal
Govt responds to voters	4.0	1.3	1	6	1: None at all 6: A Great Deal
Income	2.7	1.7	1	11	1: Under $20,000 11: Over $200,000
Likely to Vote	1.6	0.9	1	4	1: Not likely at all 4: Very likely
Most Americans	0.4	0.5	0	1	0: Good or Very Good 1: Bad or Very Bad
Party ID(7-pt)	3.3	1.7	1	7	1: Strongly Democrat 7: Strongly Republican