

Rules of Aid:

A survey experiment on the logic of aid allocation in post-conflict countries¹

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Abstract

International aid donors increasingly focus their resources on fragile and conflict-affected countries, often stuck in a cycle of violence and underdevelopment. They aim to incentivize peaceful cooperation among potential warring parties and discourage violence, helping recipient countries to break out of the conflict trap. In spite of the large amount of aid allocated to these countries and their potential geopolitical importance, there is scant research on the logic donors follow when allocating aid to fragile and conflict-affected countries, particularly at the sub-national level. The broader aid literature has posited a stark difference between donors who are motivated by humanitarian need versus their strategic interest. This scholarship, however, overlooks how and why donors engage with states and societies at the sub-national level and whether this behavior is different in conflict-affected countries. This paper strives to better understand the influence of donor aid allocation practices on the political behavior and policies of recipient governments. Relying on an original survey-embedded experiment administered to over 12,000 individuals and obtaining 1,100 responses from individuals working for donor and implementing organizations, this paper argues that donor aid allocation behavior is conditioned by the particular conflict and peace dynamics and by type of aid that is delivered. Using the responses from the large pool of respondents from different types of organizations (e.g., IOs, INGOs, bilateral aid donors, multilateral aid donors) working in diverse conflict-affected contexts, this paper shows that donors have key windows of opportunity to influence war-to-peace transitions in particular ways. As the first global survey experiment of country-level staff, this survey sheds crucial light on an important but understudied population.

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Introduction²

How do international aid donors respond to peace processes? The World Bank's 2011 *World Development Report* (2011, 16-18), the World Bank's recent *Pathways to Peace* report (2018), and Goal 17 of the Sustainable Development Goals argue that aid should be used in peace processes to incentivize peaceful cooperation and discourage violence (UN General Assembly 2015, 25).³ In fact, OECD donors currently give the majority of their aid to fragile or conflict-affected countries to help these countries break out of the violence-poverty trap (OECD 2016). The literature on international aid, however, is inconclusive on the question of how international aid donors allocate aid during peace processes. On the one hand, the literature argues that aid is not responsive to sub-national dynamics within a country because donors give aid primarily to strategic allies (Alesina and Dollar 2000; De Mesquita and Smith 2009) or their domestic policy orientations (Dietrich 2016). On the other hand, more recent scholarship argues that aid donors use aid to buy the hearts and minds of potential spoilers to the peace process, requiring a high degree of responsiveness to sub-national conflict dynamics (Findley 2018; Haas 2018; Steele and Shapiro 2017; Zuercher 2017). We contend that donors are responsive to peace processes, but in predictable ways. Rather than responding to each peace process in a unique way, donors apply their limited aid allocation options in relatively predictable ways in response to perceived signals from the country context that the peace process is progressing in a positive (i.e., more peaceful) direction.

To test this assertion, this paper uses an original survey-embedded experiment administered to over 12,000 individuals working for donor and implementing organizations in over 180 countries to uncover the perceived patterns of donor behavior in conflict-affected countries. This is thus an expert survey administered to a relatively understudied population of aid donors and aid recipients (other than recipient governments) operating at the country level. Each of the over 1,100 survey respondents was randomly assigned one of eight treatments that vary in terms of whether or not the donor considers the country to be a top strategic priority, or not, and whether or not the country is experiencing high levels of violence and political instability (*strong violence*), low levels of violence and political instability (*mild violence*), low levels of progress toward "peace" (*mild peace*), or high levels of progress toward peace (*strong peace*). By using experimental methods, we aim to mitigate the potential social desirability bias

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³ In 2015, the member states of the United Nations adopted Sustainable Development Goal 17, which commits United Nations member states to use their development aid to "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels" (UN General Assembly 2015, 25).

that may arise when donors and implementing agencies are asked to describe aid allocation behaviors in conflict-affected countries. Knowing very well how aid should be allocated in principle, these experts might over-report desired allocation behavior in a non-experimental context. Our large pool of respondents (1,110) from diverse organizations and conflict-affected contexts also allows us to assess whether the perceived patterns are consistent across contexts, irrespective of the background of the respondents, the countries in which they have worked, or the organizations for whom they work or have worked.

Below, we discuss our theoretical model and then describe our empirical approach and provide an overview of our treatments, our respondents, and outcomes of interest. We then present our preliminary empirical results and discuss their relationship to our theoretical expectations. We close by outlining the potential implications of these findings and further analyses and hypothesis tests that we will carry out.

Theoretical Model

In contrast to existing aid allocation literature that overlooks the effect of the country environment on behavior (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Swedlund 2017), we contend that donor aid allocation patterns are conditioned by the recipient country's particular stage in its peace process. Rather than allocating aid in response to the particular circumstances of a particular peace process, donors respond to typical scenarios in a peace process with relatively standard responses. The literature on international peacebuilding focused on the template-like responses of international peacebuilding and peacekeeping interventions (Autesserre 2015; Campbell et al. 2011) This standard peacebuilding and peacekeeping response is driven in part by bureaucratic specialization and the tendency of international bureaucracies to reproduce themselves (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Barnett et al. 2007). Even UN peacekeeping mandates have become relatively standard, containing largely the same components regardless of the actual context in which UN peacekeeping is being deployed (Howard and Dayal 2018; Petrie and Morrice 2015).

This standard response of international actors to civil wars has evolved into what Richard Gowan and Stephen Stedman (2018) call the "International Regime for Treating Civil War." They argue that in response to civil wars, the United Nations, the African Union, and many of their member states have consistently responded to civil wars with the same set of interventions. When the war is ongoing, they use conflict mediation to attempt to stop it. Then, once the warring parties have reached a comprehensive peace agreement, a peacekeeping force is deployed.

In spite of the fact that the majority of ODA is given to conflict-affected and fragile countries (OECD 2016), neither the peacekeeping literature nor the aid literature has examined whether aid donors also implement a similar post-conflict aid treatment regime. International aid organizations have many of the same bureaucratic and top-down decision-making practices as UN peacekeeping operations, so we would expect them also to deliver standardized responses. Much of the general literature on international aid has argued that international aid driven by donor priorities, rather than the priorities of the recipient country, because of the broken feedback loop of international bilateral aid (Martens et al. 2002; Gibson et al. 2005). In other words, the recipient of the international aid does not have the authority to provide feedback to the aid decision-maker, based in the OECD country capital, about whether or not the aid is working. Consequently, there is no incentive for donors to respond to variation in the preferences of recipient countries or changes in the context.

These arguments in the general aid literature are in sharp contrast to donor policies on aid effectiveness in conflict-affected countries. As mentioned above, both multilateral and bilateral donors have committed themselves to responding to the rapidly changing conflict and cooperation dynamics that accompany peace processes and to the preferences of the recipient government and society (UN General Assembly 2015, 25; IDPS 2016). We contend that this commitment to responsiveness to civil war peace processes has not led to the type of demand-driven aid imagined in the policy-frameworks. Instead, it has led to standard international aid treatment regime for civil wars. This standard approach is driven in large part by the conditions surrounding different the four traditional buckets of ODA that donors can allocate to conflict-affected countries: humanitarian, development, transitional aid (peacebuilding, governance, or democratization aid), and budgetary aid.

These types of aid and the associated aid modalities remain relatively constant. Development aid funds programs and projects that are implemented either by the recipient government or by International Organizations (IOs) or International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs).

Budgetary aid directly funds the recipient government's budget. Humanitarian aid supports short-term interventions implemented by IOs or INGOs. Transitional aid supports peacebuilding, democracy, or governance projects that are primarily implemented by IOs and INGOs. Each of these types of aid is associated with a standard set of partners and contractual agreements.

Development and budgetary aid are generally implemented with some degree of direct cooperation from the government. Budget aid goes directly into the recipient government's

budget. Development aid is typically allocated in the form of project or program support. Projects can be implemented by IOs, INGOs, or private contractors but are implemented under a general development cooperation agreement to support the government's priorities. Program support is usually given to specific sectors and associated government ministries, such as health or education, in the host country and aims to help to develop and support the government's sector-wide plan. Development and budgetary aid, thus, involve direct cooperation with the recipient government and, possibly, the direct allocation of aid to the recipient government. Thus, the provision of development and budgetary aid signal that the donor has confidence in the government's policy frameworks and ability to manage the aid.

Humanitarian aid, however, tends to focus on delivering goods and services directly to the population, usually without collaborating directly with the host government. In fact, donors often provide humanitarian aid directly to INGOs or IOs precisely because they do not have confidence that the government is willing or able to serve the interests of its population. Transition aid, such as funding for peacekeeping or immediate post-conflict peacebuilding projects, may involve some direct collaboration with the government but is largely focused on achieving short-term gains, or peace dividends, and is most often carried out through INGOs or IOs.

Given that donors have a limited set of aid allocation behaviors (increase, decrease, no change) and that these behaviors are limited to four broad categories of aid (humanitarian, development, transitional, and budgetary), each of which is associated with standard aid modalities (through or around government), then we can expect that donors will have a relatively limited standard set of aid allocation responses to peace processes. We expect that the difference in their responses will be conditioned by the degree of confidence that they have that the peace process is progressing in the right direction. We focus on countries that have already experienced a civil war and post-conflict elections to narrow the scope of countries to in which a basic condition of *de jure* sovereignty has been met, which donors tend to use as a precondition for considering allocating the four different types of ODA aid (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Reilly 2011).

As is described in more detail below, each of our survey respondents was randomly assigned one of four contexts in which aid took place, which we term the strong violence, mild violence, mild peace, and strong peace treatments. In this treatment context, we ask each respondent a series of questions about whether they are likely to observe increases, decreases, or no change in donor aid allocation behaviors in relation to four types of aid: humanitarian, development, transitional, and budgetary aid.

The four hypothetical countries that we provide resemble country contexts that over 70 percent of our respondents reported to have experienced and reflect the events that actually took place in 54 of the countries in which our respondents were currently based within two years prior to their response to the survey (see Appendix). The four hypothetical scenarios that respondents were randomly assigned are listed below. We have labeled them as strong violence, mild violence, mild peace, and strong peace in this paper, but not in the survey.

- *Strong violence* - Lately in Country A, violence has significantly increased. Opposition groups and government are increasingly using violence resulting in dozens of civilian deaths and the displacement of hundreds of people.
- *Mild violence* - Lately in Country A, tension between opposition groups and the government has grown. The government is responding to the tension by detaining opposition politicians and placing restrictions on independent media outlets and national NGOs.
- *Mild peace* - Lately in Country A, tension between opposition groups and the government has declined. Parts of the peace agreement(s) are being implemented and the population generally feels safe to move about the territory.
- *Strong peace* - Lately in Country A, following recent elections that were widely viewed as free and fair, the government has undergone a peaceful change in the dominant political party. Independent media and national NGOs are flourishing.

While there are of course multiple other characteristics that could be used to describe variation in the context of a country undergoing a post-conflict peace process, we chose four typical scenarios that respond directly to the policy frames that donors claim to pursue in post-conflict countries. International aid donors contend that post-conflict peace processes should be based on an inclusive political settlement that ensures that all potential spoilers to the peace process and marginalized groups are included in the peace process (DFID 2009; IDPS 2016; UN General Assembly 2015, 25; World Bank 2018; OECD-DAC 2007, 2011). These same frameworks view the presence of a robust civil society and independent media as crucial signals of progress toward liberal democracy, the institutional framework embodied in these inclusive political settlements (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; World Bank 2018). Escalating violence and the oppression of opposition groups are viewed as signs that the inclusive political settlement is unraveling and may completely fall apart, leading to reduced donor confidence in the peace process.

We expect that each of the typical types of post-conflict country environments will be associated with a standard set of donor aid allocation behaviors. Strong violence and mild

violence will be associated with less direct cooperation with the post-conflict environment and, thus, less development or budgetary aid and more humanitarian aid in response to the needs of people affected by the violence. We expect that mild peace and strong peace, on the other hand, will be associated with increased donor confidence in the recipient government and, thus, increased development and budgetary aid and reduced humanitarian aid. The specific expectations for each of our treatment scenarios and each type of aid are listed in the table below.

The overall theory is that typical country scenarios that signal positive progress in the peace process are associated with increases in the types of aid that more directly support the recipient government.

Table 1: Expectations for Aid Allocation Behavior in Post-Conflict Country Types

	Strong Violence	Mild Violence	Mild Peace	Strong Peace
Humanitarian Aid	↑ Hum. Aid	↑ Hum. Aid	↓ Hum Aid	↓ Hum Aid
Transitional Aid	↓ Tran. Aid	↑ Tran. Aid	↑ Tran Aid	↓ Tran Aid
Development Aid	↓ Dev. Aid	↓ Dev. Aid	↑ Dev. Aid	↑ Dev. Aid
Budgetary Aid	↓ Bud. Aid	↓ Bud. Aid	↓ Bud. Aid	↑ Bud. Aid

Empirical Approach

To test our theoretical argument on how donors allocate their aid in response to conflictual or cooperative events, we designed a survey experiment, which we sent to both donor and implementing agencies in over 180 countries. We fielded this survey in July and August of 2017 and opened it for a final second round in March 2018.

We assembled our contact list of over 12,000 people who work for donors or implementing partners at the country level from several sources. First, we compiled the contact lists that the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) creates of the donors, UN Agencies, and INGOs that operate in countries where OCHA is present. OCHA is present in most countries that receive significant amounts of humanitarian aid, meriting its coordination. Second, we compiled the contact list of country-based UN leadership maintained by the UN Development Group, which is charged with the coordination of development aid on the ground in all countries that receive development aid. Third, we compiled the contact lists

maintained by the Logistics Cluster of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which lists the specific contact people in donor and implementing agencies that can support logistical coordination during humanitarian emergencies. Fourth, we searched the websites of OECD-DAC donors to collect the available contact lists for their country-based staff. Finally, we asked survey respondents to recommend additional experts who could complete the survey and distributed the survey to this snowball sample.

We opted for an experimental approach instead of regular surveys because social desirability could very likely bias any purely survey-based results and thus could result in an overestimation of aid allocation patterns to peace processes. Since it would be difficult to hide the purpose of our survey, donors might feel the need to show more responsiveness in their allocation patterns than is actually present. Using survey experiments allows us to circumvent this problem (Mutz 2011; Morton and Williams 2010).

In particular, after asking respondents a few questions concerning the type of organization they work for and in which countries, we presented a scenario of a hypothetical country A.⁴ The scenario started with a short description of Country A that was identical for all respondents:

[Country A] is a post-conflict country, which means that it has experienced civil war or significant armed violence. It has undergone a peace process and has held its first round of democratic elections.

This common introduction served the purpose of ensuring that all respondents had a similar country context in mind when thinking about aid allocation. Had we not described the country as a post-conflict country in this way, respondents might have had very different baseline categories of countries in mind, ranging from conflict-ridden countries to very peaceful countries, which might have induced unintended variation in their stated responsiveness of their aid allocation patterns.

After this common introduction, however, the scenario differed resulting in eight treatment groups to which respondents were randomly allocated. The first distinction was that half of the treatments spoke of Country A as a top priority country whereas the other half spoke of Country A as not a top priority country. After this, each treatment consisted of two additional sentences describing the situation in Country A in more detail. Overall our experiment consisted of four different specific scenarios resulting in eight overall treatment groups given the

⁴ We decided to present a hypothetical country instead of an actual country to maximize the generalizability of our findings.

distinction between top and not-top priority countries. Table 2 provides an overview of the respective treatments.

Table 2: Overview of Treatments

<i>Top priority / Not-top priority</i>			
<i>Strong Violence Treatment</i>	<i>Mild Violence Treatment</i>	<i>Mild Peace Treatment</i>	<i>Strong Peace Treatment</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lately in Country A, violence has significantly increased. • Opposition groups and government are increasingly using violence resulting in dozens of civilian deaths and the displacement of hundreds of people. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lately in Country A, tension between opposition groups and the government has grown. • The government is responding to the tension by detaining opposition politicians and placing restrictions on independent media outlets and national NGOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lately in Country A, tension between opposition groups and the government has declined. • Parts of the peace agreement(s) are being implemented and the population generally feels safe to move about the territory. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lately in Country A, following recent elections that were widely viewed as free and fair, the government has undergone a peaceful change in the dominant political party. • Independent media and national NGOs are flourishing

The treatments differed in whether the overall situation in Country A was described as currently violent or peaceful. Furthermore, we provided a treatment in which violence was already very prevalent even leading to the deaths of civilians and a treatment in which violence was only slowly manifesting itself. Similarly, we provided one treatment with some peaceful steps, such as parts of the peace agreement that are being implemented, and one treatment that displays Country A as very peaceful even resulting in a change in government. Overall, we can thus distinguish between a strong versus a mild violent treatment and a strong versus a mild peaceful treatment.

To ensure the comparability of our treatments we kept the wording at a similar length and provided about the same level of detail for each treatment. We pretested our survey using our contacts for New Guinea. We opted for New Guinea because it is a country with a relatively small number of contact points, which allowed us to test the survey relying on the actual experts we are interested in while at the same time not losing too many contacts for our final survey. Furthermore, it was important to restrict ourselves to one specific country not to violate the

Stable Unit Treatment Value assumption (SUTVA) if respondents of the pretest had spoken about our survey to colleagues and thus potential future respondents at the same office.

Following our treatment text, we first asked respondents whether they had already experienced the specific situation as described in our scenario. This question serves two purposes: for one it is important for us to differentiate those with actual experience with such a situation from those without such experience. Furthermore, for those respondents who had not experienced such a scenario we introduced our set of outcome variables with the line:

If you have not experienced or observed the context described in Country A, please just tell us your opinion in response to the questions below.

Hence, we pay attention in our analyses to these two sets of respondents since for one set answers to our questions are rather hypothetical whereas for the other set it is not. Table 3 below displays the number of respondents per category as well as how many of them have already experienced the described scenario. It becomes apparent that many more respondents from implementing agencies, 854, answered our survey than respondents from donors, 149. In both categories, however, most respondents classify themselves as working for a multi-mandate organization. In addition, a majority of our respondents has already experienced the type of scenario we described in their treatment.

Table 3: Overview of Respondents

Donors: 149

Type of Donor	Number of respondents	Type of mandate	Number of respondents	Experience with described scenario
Bilateral Donor (such as DFID, USAID, JICA, etc.)	105	development mandate	21	yes: 15 / no: 6
		humanitarian mandate	2	yes: 1 / no: 1
		peacebuilding mandate	2	yes: 2 / no: 0
		multi-mandate	63	yes: 43 / no: 20
Multilateral Donor (such as the European Commission, World Bank, etc.)	44	development mandate	18	yes: 12 / no: 6
		humanitarian mandate	5	yes: 3 / no: 2
		peacebuilding mandate	1	yes: 0 / no: 1
		multi-mandate	13	yes: 9 / no: 4

Implementing Agencies: 854

Type of Donor	Number of respondents	Type of mandate	Number of respondents	Experience with described scenario
Multilateral Implementing Organization (such as the United Nations Development Program, UNICEF, etc.)	401	development mandate	21	yes: 9 / no: 12
		humanitarian mandate	10	yes: 6 / no: 4
		peacebuilding mandate	1	yes: 1 / no: 0
		multi-mandate	352	yes: 256 / no: 92
International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) (such as MSF, Care International, etc.)	266	development mandate	17	yes: 12 / no: 5
		humanitarian mandate	20	yes: 15 / no: 5
		peacebuilding mandate	3	yes: 1 / no: 2
		multi-mandate	208	yes: 163 / no: 42
National Non-Governmental Organization	171	development mandate	7	yes: 5 / no: 2
		humanitarian mandate	6	yes: 6 / no: 0
		peacebuilding mandate	13	yes: 9 / no: 4
		multi-mandate	131	yes: 101 / no: 26
Private Contractor	16	development mandate	2	yes: 2 / no: 0
		humanitarian mandate	1	yes: 1 / no: 0
		peacebuilding mandate	3	yes: 3 / no: 0
		multi-mandate	9	yes: 7 / no: 2
Other type of organization	97	development mandate	7	yes: 3 / no: 4
		humanitarian mandate	12	yes: 11 / no: 1
		peacebuilding mandate	10	yes: 6 / no: 4
		multi-mandate	62	yes: 41 / no: 21

To complement our descriptive statistics in Table 3, in the Appendix we provide a list of countries of the people who received the survey as well as the countries our respondents came from. Table 4 displays an overview of the respondents’ age distribution and gender and whether they consider themselves mostly as international or national staff. These descriptive statistics show that while age is relatively evenly distributed we observe that a majority of our respondents are male. With regard to type of staff, we observe that international and national staff are almost balanced. More importantly, the descriptive statistics in Table 4 show that the

profiles of respondents do not significantly vary by treatment group. In fact, the treatment groups are nicely balanced with regard to all variables displayed in Table 4.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Respondents

	Strong Violence Treatment	Mild Violence Treatment	Mild Peace Treatment	Strong Peace Treatment
Number of respondents	361	355	357	361
Type of actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor: 16% • IA: 74% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor: 16% • IA: 74% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor: 16% • IA: 74% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor: 16% • IA: 74%
Age	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 – 34: 6% • 35 – 44: 31% • 45 – 54: 35% • 55 – 64: 23% • 65 – 84: 4% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 – 34: 8% • 35 – 44: 30% • 45 – 54: 36% • 55 – 64: 23% • 65 – 84: 3% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 – 34: 6% • 35 – 44: 24% • 45 – 54: 43% • 55 – 64: 25% • 65 – 84: 2% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 – 34: 9% • 35 – 44: 28% • 45 – 54: 36% • 55 – 64: 23% • 65 – 84: 4%
Gender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Male: 72% • Female: 28% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Male: 73% • Female: 27% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Male: 74% • Female: 26% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Male: 76% • Female: 24%
Type of Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intl.: 53% • National: 46% • Neither: 1% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intl.: 48% • National: 49% • Neither: 3% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intl.: 51% • National: 47% • Neither: 2% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intl.: 52% • National: 45% • Neither: 3%
Experienced scenario	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor: 75% • IA: 73% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor: 65% • IA: 77% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor: 73% • IA: 74% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor: 60% • IA: 68%

In our survey we pose questions related to several different kinds of outcome variables. In particular, we ask whether in their treatment scenario, respondents believe that their organization (in case they worked for a donor organization) or their donor(s) (in case they worked for an implementing agency) would increase, decrease, or not change the amount of aid. We ask this question with respect to the following four categories of aid: (1) Development Aid; (2) Humanitarian Aid; (3) Budgetary Aid; (4) Transitional Aid (Peacebuilding, Governance, Early Recovery, etc.). Based on these variables we created four different ordinal dependent variables. Table 5 provides an overview.

Table 5: Dependent Variables

Dependent variables		
Amount of Aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development Aid • Humanitarian Aid • Budgetary Aid • Transitional Aid (Peacebuilding, Governance, Early Recovery, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase (1) • Decrease (2) • No change (3)

Empirical Results

This section presents our analysis of allocation patterns in countries affected by war-to-peace transitions. We start our analysis with a description of our four dependent variables. Table 6.1 displays the proportion of respondents who would, following their respective treatment scenario, increase, not change or decrease the amount of aid in the respective aid category. In Table 6.1, we differentiate this by treatment category. In addition, we differentiate the stated allocation patterns by type of organization, i.e. donors versus implementing agencies. Table 6.1 shows the descriptive results for the implementing agencies and Table 6.2 for donors.

It becomes apparent that not only do respondents in different treatment groups show large variations in their assessment but that donors and implementing agencies also show considerable variation given the same treatment scenario. Starting with the common patterns, we observe that respondents tend to increase both humanitarian and transitional aid in response to violence and at the same time reduce (or not change) development and budgetary aid. This pattern is reversed for countries that follow a peaceful trajectory.

Despite these common patterns we also observe some differences between donors and implementing agencies: For example, only 26% of donors would decrease development aid in countries that are currently plagued by strong violence while 41% of implementing agencies would decrease aid under such circumstances. Donors would rather not change the allocation pattern of development aid given this scenario, 47% opted for no change, while no change is the most preferred option only for 26% of the implementing agencies. With regard to humanitarian aid we observe some striking differences in response to peace processes. Given either the mild or the strong peace scenario, implementing agencies are almost equally split into those who would decrease humanitarian aid under such circumstances (47% under mild peace and 44% under strong peace) and those who would increase it (40% under mild peace and 49% under strong peace). This is very different from donors who would largely reduce humanitarian aid in this context (63% under mild peace and 64% under strong peace).

Table 6.1: Distribution of dependent variable by treatment – implementing agencies

	Development Aid	Humanitarian Aid	Budgetary Aid	Transitional Aid
Strong violence	41% decrease 28% no change 31% increase	18% decrease 9% no change 72% increase	46% decrease 27% no change 28% increase	11% decrease 14% no change 74 % increase
Mild violence	38% decrease 24% no change 38% increase	24% decrease 21% no change 55% increase	43% decrease 27% no change 30% increase	13% decrease 21% no change 66% increase
Mild peace	13% decrease 20% no change 66% increase	47% decrease 14% no change 40% increase	19% decrease 35% no change 47% increase	13% decrease 14% no change 74% increase
Strong peace	19% decrease 16% no change 65% increase	44% decrease 16% no change 49% increase	24% decrease 28% no change 48% increase	15% decrease 13% no change 72 % increase

Table 6.2: Distribution of dependent variable by treatment – donors

	Development Aid	Humanitarian Aid	Budgetary Aid	Transitional Aid
Strong violence	26% decrease 47% no change 28% increase	3% decrease 13% no change 85% increase	42% decrease 25% no change 33% increase	2% decrease 14% no change 84 % increase
Mild violence	19% decrease 61% no change 19% increase	3% decrease 57% no change 40% increase	67% decrease 28% no change 6% increase	3% decrease 17% no change 80% increase
Mild peace	5% decrease 15% no change 79% increase	63% decrease 28% no change 10% increase	9% decrease 41% no change 50% increase	9% decrease 23% no change 69% increase
Strong peace	12% decrease 15% no change 73% increase	64% decrease 11% no change 25% increase	23% decrease 38% no change 38% increase	10% decrease 12% no change 78 % increase

Moving from this descriptive analysis to an inferential analysis, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the predicted probabilities based on a multinomial regression analysis with the various aid categories as dependent variables and the treatment variables as our independent variables. The tables show for each scenario the predicted probability of a donor (Table 7.1) or implementing agency (7.2) choosing decrease, no change or increase for the respective aid type. The corresponding regression results can be found in the Appendix. Since our dependent variables range from 1 (decrease) to 3 (increase) we considered a multinomial logistic regression framework to be most appropriate.⁵

The results show a clear overall pattern: in response to the two violence scenarios both donors and implementing agencies tend to reduce budgetary and development aid whereas they are more likely to increase transitional and humanitarian aid. The pattern is almost reversed if we consider the more peaceful scenarios. Here the most likely option is to increase (or at least not change) the amount of development and budgetary aid but reduce humanitarian aid. Transitional aid seems to be an exception in that all types of actors tend to support its increase independent of the scenario type.

Table 7.1: Predicted probabilities for aid allocation – donors

	Development Aid	Budgetary Aid	Humanitarian Aid	Transitional Aid
Strong violence	26% decrease*** 47% no change*** 28% increase***	42% decrease*** 25% no change*** 33% increase***	3% decrease 13% no change*** 85% increase***	2% decrease 14% no change*** 84 % increase***
Mild violence	19% decrease*** 61% no change*** 19% increase***	67% decrease*** 28% no change*** 6% increase	3% decrease 57% no change*** 40% increase***	3% decrease 17% no change** 80% increase***
Mild peace	5% decrease 15% no change** 79% increase***	9% decrease 41% no change*** 50% increase***	63% decrease*** 28% no change*** 9% increase*	9% decrease* 23% no change*** 69% increase***
Strong peace	12% decrease** 15% no change** 73% increase***	23% decrease*** 38% no change*** 38% increase***	64% decrease*** 11% no change** 25% increase***	10% decrease** 12% no change** 78 % increase***

⁵ Since our dependent variables are ordinaly scaled we would in principle also estimate ordered logistic regression. Yet for some of these regressions the parallel regression assumption is violated. To ensure comarability of our results we decided to use multinomial regression models for all regressions instead.

Table 7.2: Predicted probabilities for aid allocation – implementing agencies


	Development Aid	Budgetary Aid	Humanitarian Aid	Transitional Aid
Strong violence	41% decrease*** 28% no change*** 31% increase***	46% decrease*** 27% no change*** 28% increase***	18% decrease 9% no change*** 72% increase***	11% decrease*** 14% no change*** 74 % increase***
Mild violence	38% decrease*** 24% no change*** 38% increase***	43% decrease*** 27% no change*** 30% increase***	24% decrease 21% no change*** 55% increase***	13% decrease*** 21% no change*** 66% increase***
Mild peace	14% decrease 20% no change** 66% increase***	19% decrease*** 35% no change*** 46% increase***	46% decrease*** 14% no change*** 40% increase*	13% decrease*** 14% no change*** 73% increase***
Strong peace	19% decrease** 16% no change** 65% increase***	23% decrease*** 28% no change*** 48% increase***	44% decrease*** 16% no change** 40% increase***	15% decrease*** 13% no change*** 72 % increase***

However, these general patterns hide some interesting variation between the two types of actors considered here. With regard to development aid in times of violence donors are more likely to opt for no change. Implementing agencies, however, are equally likely to support decrease and increase. Hence in contrast to donors they really opt for change and a reaction. This is similar with regard to humanitarian aid. If we look at the mild violence treatment no change is the most likely option for donors. Yet again implementing agencies react with either increase or decrease but not with no change. In contrast, donors are much more eager to cut humanitarian aid in response to peace while implementers are much more reluctant to do so. Finally, if we look at budgetary aid we observe that donors mostly agree on decreasing it in times of mild violence. Implementers, however, are very undecided in this respect with all three options being almost equally likely.

To graphically illustrate the different responses of donors and implementing agencies given our treatment conditions, Figure 1 shows a difference-in-means analysis. Since we could not have asked our outcome variables without providing a specific type of scenario, our survey does not have a control group in the common sense, i.e. a group that received no information as is common in most survey experiments. In contrast, we rely on one of the extreme categories, in particular the strong peace treatment, as our baseline category. The logic of selecting strong peace as the baseline category is that strong peace is closest to the normal mode of operation

for most donors who, in spite of their commitment to delivering more aid to conflict-affected countries, still provide the vast majority of their aid to stable countries.

Figure 1: Difference in means by treatment groups



Dots show difference in means between treatment group and baseline group who received strong peace treatment. Lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

The results as displayed in Figure 1 further corroborate the results of our multinomial regression analysis. In particular, we observe that both types of actors are much more likely to reduce development aid and budgetary aid in violent times while they are more likely to increase humanitarian aid in such settings. The one exception is transitional aid for which all types of responses, increase, decrease and no change, are about equally likely independent of the country scenario.

Robustness Checks

We have checked the robustness of our findings in various ways. First, we distinguish the results between those who stated that they have experienced the described scenario and those that have not. While the results do not differ much some subtle difference do exist, see Appendix for the results. For example, implementing agencies without experience of the scenarios are more likely to opt for no change with regard to development aid in times of strong and mild violence

than those implementing agencies that have experienced the scenario. Furthermore, those donors having experienced the scenario almost completely agree (96%) to increase humanitarian aid in times of violence while only 55% of donors without experience of the scenario would opt for an increase.

In addition, we have run a seemingly unrelated ordered probit analysis to account for the fact that respondents' decision with regard to one type of aid might not be independent of his or her decision to increase, not change or decrease other types of aid. The results of the analysis can also be found in the Appendix. Again, the results do not differ from our results in the main text, which we see as underlining the robustness of our results.

Aid Allocation Behavior and Influence

We also asked our respondents which types of aid behavior are deemed to be most influential on the government. Our respondents reported that in times of mild or strong violence, donors are more likely to influence the behavior and policies of the recipient government if they decrease their development or budgetary aid. By showing that they will not directly support governments who promote the escalation of violence, decreases in aid may discourage this type of behavior. To the contrary, in times of mild or strong peace, our respondents indicate that aid increases in development or budgetary aid are likely to increase donor influence. Donors can signal their approval for more cooperative and democratic policies by providing aid. It is also likely that these countries share the sectoral priorities of many donors, enabling them to engage in more direct development cooperation.

Our respondents argued that when donors deliver humanitarian or transitional aid during times of mild or strong violence, however, they have no real influence on government policies or behavior. This could be due to the aid modalities used by humanitarian or transitional aid, which sidestep the government. In times of mild or strong peace, however, humanitarian and transitional aid are viewed to have the most influence on government behavior when they are increased or maintained. This may be because the recipient government and the donors are collaborating in the delivery of the humanitarian aid, even if it is not likely to go directly through the government, and because the government views this as supporting and reinforcing its own legitimacy (Campbell, Murdie, DiGiuseppe 2018).

The implication of our theory is that if donors want to use their aid to influence the political behavior and policies of conflict-affected countries, then they will need to apply the right aid modality at the right time. By taking advantage of windows of opportunity presented by changes in the war-to-peace transition, donors may be able to use their aid to influence political change. But if donors provide relatively consistent and stagnant aid, simply use their

aid to buy off strategic allies (Alesina and Dollar 2000), then they are unlikely to influence intentionally the country's conflict and peace dynamics.

Conclusion

The preliminary survey results discussed here aim to help explain patterns of aid allocation behavior during post-conflict peace processes. As expected, we find that that the mild peace and strong peace categories are associated with predicted increases in development and budgetary aid and decreases in humanitarian aid. Mild violence and strong violence, in turn, are associated with predicted increases in humanitarian aid and decreases in development aid. Interestingly, our expectations for transitional aid were not supported by the results. Respondents indicated that transitional aid would increase in all four country scenarios.

These results challenge existing claims in the aid allocation literature that donors are not responsive to changes in the country context (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Easterly 2006). Instead, we show that donors are perceived to be responsive to changes in the post-conflict country context in standard ways. The patterns of donor aid allocation are motivated, at least in part, by the degree to which the aid donor perceives that it can collaborate directly with the recipient government. These perceptions, we contend, are largely shared among donors and implementing partners operating in different contexts and working for different types of organizations. The heterogeneity of our respondents points to a kind of standard post-conflict aid treatment regime. By looking across different types of non-military aid, we are able to present a more complete picture of the aid allocation response of aid donors, both bilateral and multilateral, than has been identified in the existing scholarship.

In the next stage of this paper we will compare the predicted donor responses to our hypothetical country cases to real aid allocation behaviors in response to countries that resemble our hypothetical country cases. We will also integrate open-ended responses from our surveys into our analysis to add some contextual grounding to our broader statistical analysis.

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Appendix

List of countries contacted with number of individuals contacted and replied

Country	Contacted	Replied
Afghanistan	159	19
Albania	27	4
Algeria	25	5
American Samoa	1	0
Angola	16	6
Antigua and Barbados	7	0
Argentina	27	1
Armenia	28	6
Australia	14	2
Austria	3	3
Azerbaijan	26	2
Bahamas	1	0
Bahrain	9	1
Bangladesh	44	6
Barbados	13	1
Belarus	13	0
Belgium	21	6
Belize	10	0
Benin	17	2
Bhutan	23	3
Bolivia	24	2
Bosnia & Herzegovina	25	6
Botswana	16	1
Brazil	42	3
Brunei	3	3
Bulgaria	2	1
Burkina Faso	460	44
Burundi	26	11
Cambodia	32	8
Cameroon	490	2
Canada	12	1
Cape Verde	8	
Central African Republic	566	50
Chad	354	0
Chile	19	1
China	28	4
Colombia	42	7
Comoros	20	1
Cook Islands	1	0
Costa Rica	15	0
Cote d'Ivoire	11	2
Croatia	5	
Cuba	9	2

Cyprus	7	0
Czech Republic	32	2
DPR Korea	23	1
Democratic Republic of Congo	2,507	199
Republic of Congo	15	65
Denmark	7	1
Djibouti	17	2
Dominican Republic	23	5
East Timor	16	
Ecuador	39	1
Egypt	56	9
El Salvador	30	7
England	1	
Equatorial Guinea	12	1
Eritrea	12	0
Ethiopia	77	10
Fiji	39	1
Finland	90	11
France	13	3
French Polynesia	1	
Gabon	11	0
Gambia	16	2
Georgia	41	5
Germany	3	7
Ghana	30	5
Greece	88	1
Guatemala	22	6
Guinea	228	3
Guinea Bissau	29	2
Guyana	8	1
Haiti	55	11
Honduras	12	2
Hong Kong	3	
Hungary	1	1
Iceland	270	3
India	26	6
Indonesia	78	2
Iran	24	1
Iraq	16	6
Ireland	1	0
Israel	3	4
Italy	2	1
Jamaica	16	1
Japan	5	0

Jordan	36	7
Kazakhstan	25	2
Kenya	23	12
Kiribati	1	0
Kosovo	23	
Kuwait	17	3
Kyrgyzstan	36	3
Lao PDR	23	2
Lebanon	48	6
Lesotho	10	1
Liberia	49	6
Libya	28	2
Luxembourg	47	1
Macedonia	9	
Madagascar	26	8
Malawi	30	4
Malaysia	16	0
Maldives	11	1
Mali	781	71
Mauritania	417	32
Mauritius	6	1
Mexico	19	5
Micronesia	1	0
Moldova	27	0
Mongolia	31	1
Montenegro	7	
Morocco	29	
Mozambique	88	5
Myanmar	1,617	176
Namibia	14	1
Nepal	202	50
Netherlands	3	2
New Zealand	5	0
Nicaragua	87	8
Niger	427	46
Nigeria	32	7
Norway	14	3
Oman	5	0
Pakistan	27	9
Palestine	57	0
Panama	14	4
Papua New Guinea	32	4
Paraguay	25	1
Peru	20	5

Philippines	39	2
Poland	2	0
Portugal	1	0
Qatar	3	0
Romania	2	0
Russia	2	1
Rwanda	32	4
Samoa	14	3
Sao Tome and Principe	12	0
Saudi Arabia	14	2
Senegal	16	16
Serbia	24	4
Sierra Leone	41	4
Singapore	3	0
Slovak Republic	112	6
Slovenia	10	2
Solomon Islands	19	1
Somalia	46	10
South Africa	24	0
South Korea	2	1
South Sudan	109	9
Spain	61	0
Sri Lanka	26	3
St. Kits and Nevis	3	0
Sudan	62	21
Suriname	7	0
Swaziland	10	0
Sweden	12	1
Switzerland	73	9
Syrian Arab Republic	28	7
Tajikistan	34	3
Tanzania	38	0
Thailand	18	2
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced..	1	2
Timor-Leste	7	2
Togo	12	0
Tonga	12	1
Trinidad and Tobago	2	1
Tunisia	35	6
Turkey	18	4
Turkmenistan	18	1
Uganda	36	10
Ukraine	23	6
United Arab Emirates	15	1

United Kingdom	220	2
United States of America	27	29
Uruguay	13	2
Uzbekistan	27	1
Vanuatu	12	1
Venezuela	13	5
Vietnam	28	5
West Bank and Gaza	2	0
Yemen	33	4
Zambia	16	3
Zimbabwe	23	2

Respondent countries of residence experiencing a treatment scenario

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Afghanistan	<i>Strong violence</i>	Political violence is common, especially during election cycles. A resurgent Taliban and rise in Islamic State activities has led to more violence. A number of actors perpetrate attacks on civilians.
Algeria	<i>Mild peace</i>	Algeria has experienced a sharp decrease in violence, and reconciliation laws passed in 1999 and 2006 have helped to stabilize the country. Journalists continue to face harassment.
Angola	<i>Mild violence</i>	Since 2016, Angola has imposed restrictions on media and assembly. Clashes with Cabinda separatist groups continue.
Bangladesh	<i>Mild violence</i>	In 2018, the opposition leader was detained. Journalists continue to face harassment and intimidation.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	<i>Mild peace</i>	Political process excludes minorities from holding certain offices. Attacks on journalists are regular.
Burkina Faso	<i>Mild peace</i>	While Islamist violence and social unrest continue, the country experienced a peaceful transition of power in 2016 elections.
Burundi	<i>Strong violence</i>	The Inter-Burundian Dialogue was suspended in January 2016. The country continues to experience civil and political unrest. There have been credible reports of torture and enforced disappearances at hands of government and security forces. There is no viable opposition or media freedom.
Cambodia	<i>Strong violence</i>	In July 2016, a critic of the Prime Minister is assassinated in the capital. The Supreme Court bars the opposition in 2017. Since 2016, levels of outright violence are low, but civil unrest continues. There is no media freedom.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Central African Republic	Strong violence	The country held its first peaceful elections in 2015/16, but violence between various militias and the government resume in November 2016. Aid agencies withdraw from the country in July 2017. Ongoing violence and political/civil unrest continue to impact large numbers of people throughout the country.
Chad	<i>Strong violence</i>	The government cracked down on journalists and the opposition in September 2017. Power is concentrated in the executive. Civil and political unrest is on-going, and attacks by Boko Haram are frequent.
Colombia	<i>Mild peace</i>	The FARC disbands, but clashes between the ELM and the government are on-going.
Comoros	<i>Mild peace</i>	While there have been peaceful transfers of power and no significant civil/political unrest since 2016, several organizations report that journalists self-censor given the country's defamation laws/penalties for defamation.
Côte d'Ivoire	<i>Mild peace</i>	Attacks by Islamist militants occurred in March 2016. From 2016 into 2017, soldiers and police have mutinied over pay and working conditions. In 2017, civilian deaths resulted from these mutinies. Journalists are harassed. The media is nominally free but faces government scrutiny.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	<i>Strong violence</i>	Ongoing conflict has displaced millions of people. Ethnic violence kills 2,000 in June 2017, and civilians have been killed and displaced during clashes between government and militias in the first few months of 2018.
Djibouti	<i>Mild violence</i>	Rates of political violence are low, but there is a complete lack of media freedom and no viable opposition.
Dominican Republic	<i>Strong peace</i>	There is a vibrant opposition party, and the media is free and independent.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Ecuador	<i>Mild peace</i>	Since 2017, the media has begun to operate independently. There is a viable opposition, and elections are free and fair. Political institutions are not completely independent, and human rights abuses continue to occur.
Egypt	<i>Mild violence</i>	The government quashes dissent and jails journalists. In 2016, the government imposed sweeping oversight of the media. Sectarian violence continues. Opposition groups have called for a boycott of the 2018 elections.
El Salvador	<i>Mild peace</i>	Elections are generally credible, and a viable opposition exists. Journalists face harassment, especially when investigating corruption, but the media is generally free. While civilians experience high levels of violence at the hands of gangs and militias, government attacks on civilians are very rare.
Equatorial Guinea	<i>Mild violence</i>	In January 2016, police arrest opposition members and their families. Elections are not seen as credible, and the country has not experienced a transition of power since 1979. In May 2018, the Supreme Court upholds a ban on country's main opposition party which itself was accused of acts of violence prior to 2016 elections. Despite this, attacks on civilians are infrequent.
Ethiopia	<i>Strong violence</i>	Security forces kill dozens of civilians in 2016-18. Ethnic tension and civil unrest continue. Opposition parties exist, and elections are somewhat credible, but post-election violence is common. In 2016, the government restricted internet and social media access and jailed journalists in response to anti-government protests. The state of emergency was lifted in 2018, but restrictions on movement and media persist.
Fiji	<i>Mild peace</i>	The media faces some restrictions, and journalists were charged with sedition in 2018. There is viable political opposition, and elections are scheduled for November 2018.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
FYR Macedonia	<i>Strong peace</i>	A democratically-elected coalition government, headed by former opposition members, enjoys popular support. Despite restrictions on media prior to 2017, the situation is improving.
Gambia	<i>Strong peace</i>	Following 2016 elections, which ousted long-time incumbent Jammeh, independent media have begun to take hold in the country. While the transitional process continues, the country has seen a dramatic improvement politically and in terms of human rights.
Guatemala	<i>Mild peace</i>	Elections are seen as credible, though corruption is rampant. In 2017, the president expelled head of a UN anti-corruption mission. Opposition exists and the media are partly free, but civil unrest is on-going.
Guinea	<i>Mild violence</i>	In 2018, the country held its first free local elections since the end of military rule in 2005, but opposition claimed the government rigged the vote. Media censorship continues. In 2017, the government closed radio stations for insulting state institutions
Guinea-Bissau	<i>Mild violence</i>	In 2017, radio stations were closed for four months. Journalists engage in self-censorship. Political coverage is restricted. On-going human rights violations, weak rule of law, and political instability contribute to a tense political climate, but fears of widespread violence have failed to materialize.
Haiti	<i>Mild peace</i>	There were isolated incidents of election violence in 2016 and 2017, but the elections were seen as credible overall.
Honduras	<i>Mild violence</i>	Corruption and political tension is widespread. Elections in 2017 were not free and fair. Journalists and the media faced threats and violence during the election cycle.
Indonesia	<i>Mild violence</i>	The government uses anti-blasphemy laws to threaten and intimidate the media. Opposition groups face harassment but can run for office, and elections are generally seen as fair. Islamist insurgency and social unrest continue to undermine political progress.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Iran	<i>Mild violence</i>	Approximately two dozen people were killed during mass protests in December and January 2017/2018. Islamist-inspired attacks continue to occur. Candidates for office must be approved by the Guardian Council. Human rights abuses are pervasive.
Iraq	<i>Mild violence</i>	The 2018 parliamentary elections were largely seen as free and fair. On-going tension in the Kurdish provinces and continued Islamist violence undermine steps toward peace. Journalists are harassed and attacked by pro-government militias as well as by opposition groups.
Lesotho	<i>Mild violence</i>	During the 2017 elections, the country experienced politically-motivated killings. Members of opposition groups are targeted, but civilians are largely spared. The media faces restrictions and cannot operate completely independently.
Liberia	<i>Strong peace</i>	The 2017 elections were free from violence, and the country experienced a peaceful transfer of power. The new president promises to address freedom of expression, but old laws that target journalists are still active. A lack of financial resources compromises the independence of the media, as outlets may seek funding from political groups.
Libya	<i>Strong violence</i>	The UN-backed government declares state of emergency after dozens of people are killed in clashes with militias in 2018. Factionalism and weak rule of law persist, and outbreaks of violence are regular.
Madagascar	<i>Mild violence</i>	Clashes between opposition supporters and security forces leave two dead in April 2018. Protests against deaths were permitted after security forces left the area in the capital. Political and civil tension lingers, but violence is not widespread.
Mali	<i>Mild peace</i>	While the country continues to experience Islamist attacks, the government and militia groups have conducted joint patrols to protect civilians and target suspected members of terrorist groups. Media freedom is improving.
Country	Type	Events 2016-2018

Mozambique	<i>Mild violence</i>	The death of the leader of Renamo, a rebel group, cast doubt on the peace process which began in 2017. Tension between the government and rebel groups is on-going. The last elections were held in 2014.
Myanmar	<i>Strong violence</i>	Separatist violence persists, particularly between rebel groups (usually ethnic minorities) and government forces. The government carried out genocide against the Rohingya in Rakhine state and continue to abuse ethnic minorities in Kachin state.
Namibia	<i>Strong peace</i>	Following post-independence separatist insurgencies, Namibia has conducted free and fair elections and the media is generally independent and operates without restrictions.
Nepal	<i>Mild violence</i>	In November 2017, Maoist rebels targeted civilians prior to legislative elections. Journalists also faced harassment during this election cycle. Relations between the government and rebels remain tense, though former rebels have entered into political office.
Niger	<i>Mild violence</i>	Despite a lack of state capacity and on-going Islamist attacks, violence between the government and opposition groups or civilians is infrequent. The main opposition boycotted the 2016 elections. The media does not operate independently.
Papua New Guinea	<i>Mild peace</i>	There were no major outbreaks of political violence, though journalists were targeted by security forces in 2017 elections.
Philippines	<i>Strong violence</i>	Political violence persists throughout the country. In 2018, over 30 people were killed during elections. A government crackdown, violent terrorist and separatist activity, and human rights abuses persist throughout the country.
Republic of the Congo	<i>Strong violence</i>	In 2016, opposition groups boycott the election, calling it fraudulent. Opposition members were forcibly disappeared, and persistent human rights abuses continue to occur throughout country

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Rwanda	<i>Mild violence</i>	Opposition groups faced a crackdown in the 2017 election. The elections not seen as credible. In September 2018, opposition members were elected to parliament for the first time. Media freedom is low, with opposition outlets shut down.
Serbia	<i>Mild peace</i>	While civil tensions continue to exist, particularly between ethnic groups, civil/political violence is minimal. Journalists face threats and intimidation. These incidents are rarely investigated.
Sierra Leone	<i>Mild peace</i>	In April 2018, the opposition won the presidency, and the country experienced a peaceful transfer of power. Opposition groups face harassment but are generally able to run for office and operate in the country. The media is partly free and independent but are subject to libel and defamation laws. In 2017, three journalists were charged with "seditious and criminal libel."
Somalia	<i>Strong violence</i>	In 2016, leaders in two regions (Puntland and Galmudug) agree to a ceasefire in the disputed city of Galkayo. Fighting there displaced 90,000 people. Elections were held in November 2017, which resulted in a peaceful transition of power. Despite this, ongoing tensions between factions and clans, as well as an al-Shabab insurgency, undermine much of the peace processes
Tajikistan	<i>Strong violence</i>	In a referendum in May 2016, presidential term limits were lifted. The election was not credible. No viable opposition exists in the country. In 2016 and 2017, the government cracked down on opposition members, who faced lengthy sentences for vague charges of "extremism."
Timor-Leste	<i>Strong peace</i>	Since 2016, elections have been free and fair, with opposition gaining power in 2018. Media is vibrant and allowed to operate independently.

Country	Type	Events 2016-2018
Tunisia	<i>Strong peace</i>	While general elections haven't been held since 2014, municipal elections in 2018 were free and fair, with many parties vying for seats. Public officials sometime harass journalists, though this has not led to jail sentences or spurious charges
Uganda	<i>Strong violence</i>	General elections in 2016 were marred by violence, killing over 20 people. Electoral violence is common during and after campaigns. Opposition exists, but it is subject to harassment and intimidation. In June 2017, the government directed security officers to scan internet media for articles/posts critical of the government.
Ukraine	<i>Mild peace</i>	Following revolution in 2014 and Russian-backed insurgency in the eastern part of the country, the Minsk talks failed to resolve the conflict. Opposition parties in Kiev-controlled areas are free to operate. Journalists are harassed, particularly in east.

Multinomial Regression Results - Donors

	(1) Development aid	(2) Budgetary aid	(2) Humanitarian aid	(4) Transitional aid
Outcome 1				
strong violence	-0.42 (0.70)	1.02 (0.73)	-3.36*** (1.22)	-1.57 (1.27)
mild violence	-0.96 (0.74)	1.39* (0.74)	-4.58*** (1.16)	-1.39 (1.28)
mild peace	-0.92 (1.02)	-0.99 (0.94)	-0.95 (0.67)	-0.76 (0.95)
constant	0.18 (0.61)	-0.51 (0.52)	1.74*** (0.54)	-0.22 (0.67)
Outcome 2				
base outcome				
Outcome 3				
strong violence	-2.14*** (0.57)	0.29 (0.70)	1.11 (0.77)	-0.06 (0.65)
mild violence	-2.75*** (0.62)	-1.61 (1.18)	-1.16 (0.71)	-0.29 (0.69)
mild peace	0.03 (0.63)	0.20 (0.63)	-1.91** (0.90)	-0.76 (0.63)
constant	1.61*** (0.44)	0.00 (0.44)	0.81 (0.60)	1.86 (0.48)
Observations	163	90	138	149
Log Likelihood	-139.26	-88.39	-103.15	-95.68

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Multinomial Regression Results – Implementing Agencies

	(1) Development aid	(2) Budgetary aid	(2) Humanitarian aid	(4) Transitional aid
Outcome 1				
strong violence	0.19 (0.27)	0.73*** (0.27)	-0.37 (0.32)	-0.33 (0.36)
mild violence	0.26 (0.28)	0.66** (0.27)	-0.95*** (0.27)	-0.62* (0.34)
mild peace	-0.57* (0.31)	-0.45 (.29)	0.19 (0.28)	-0.16 (0.36)
constant	0.19 (0.22)	-0.18 (0.20)	1.04*** (0.19)	0.10 (0.25)
Outcome 2				
base outcome				
Outcome 3				
strong violence	-1.30*** (0.25)	-0.50* (0.26)	1.11*** (0.29)	-0.04 (0.27)
mild violence	-0.93*** (0.25)	-0.41 (0.26)	0.01 (0.25)	-0.55** (0.26)
mild peace	-0.22 (0.25)	-0.26 (0.24)	0.16 (0.28)	-0.02 (0.28)
constant	1.40*** (0.18)	0.54 (0.17)	0.93*** (0.19)	1.69*** (0.20)
Observations	947	747	961	928
Log Likelihood	-929.83	-789.40	-906.01	-731.90

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Predicted probabilities for choosing increase/no change/decrease – donors –
differentiating between those who know and those who do not know the scenario

	Development Aid	Budgetary Aid	Humanitarian Aid	Transitional Aid
Strong violence	22% decrease*** 36% decrease** 47% no change*** 45% no change*** 30% increase*** 18% increase	35% decrease*** 71% decrease*** 23% no change** 28% no change* 41% increase*** 0% increase	0% decrease 9% decrease 3% no change 36% no change** 96% increase*** 54% increase***	0% decrease 10% decrease 15% no change** 10% no change 85% increase*** 80% increase***
Mild violence	18% decrease*** 21% decrease* 60% no change*** 64% no change*** 23% increase*** 14% increase	64% decrease*** 0% decrease 27% no change** 54% no change*** 9% increase 46% increase***	5% decrease 0% decrease 59% no change*** 54% no change*** 35% increase*** 46% increase***	0% decrease 9% decrease 16% no change* 18% no change 84% increase*** 73% increase***
Mild peace	3% decrease 10% decrease 14% no change** 20% no change 83% increase*** 70% increase***	5% decrease 25% decrease 50% no change*** 0% no change 44% increase*** 75% increase***	65% decrease*** 55% decrease*** 26% no change*** 33% no change** 9% increase 11% increase	7% decrease 13% decrease 22% no change*** 25% no change 70% increase*** 63% increase***
Strong peace	8% decrease** 17% decrease* 21% no change** 6% no change 71% increase*** 76% increase***	21% decrease* 25% decrease** 36% no change*** 42% no change*** 43% increase*** 33% increase**	50% decrease*** 81% decrease*** 10% no change 12% no change 40% increase*** 6% increase	9% decrease 11% decrease 17% no change** 6% no change 73% increase*** 83% increase***

Results for respondents without experience of the scenario are printed in red

Predicted probabilities for choosing increase/no change/decrease – implementing agencies – differentiating between those who know and those who do not know the scenario

	Development Aid	Budgetary Aid	Humanitarian Aid	Transitional Aid
Strong violence	43% decrease*** 34% decrease*** 22% no change*** 44% no change*** 34% increase*** 23% increase***	45% decrease*** 45% decrease*** 24% no change** 36% no change*** 31% increase*** 18% increase***	22% decrease*** 8% decrease** 11% no change*** 6% no change** 67% increase*** 86% increase***	13% decrease*** 7% decrease** 15% no change*** 13% no change*** 72% increase*** 80% increase***
Mild violence	40% decrease*** 32% decrease*** 22% no change*** 35% no change*** 39% increase*** 32% increase	44% decrease*** 42% decrease*** 24% no change*** 37% no change*** 32% increase*** 21% increase***	25% decrease*** 17% decrease*** 21% no change*** 25% no change*** 54% increase*** 58% increase***	14% decrease*** 6% decrease* 20% no change*** 26% no change*** 66% increase*** 68% increase***
Mild peace	14% decrease 14% decrease*** 20% no change** 19% no change*** 65% increase*** 67% increase***	20% decrease*** 15% decrease*** 35% no change*** 35% no change*** 45% increase*** 51% increase***	44% decrease*** 52% decrease*** 14% no change*** 12% no change*** 41% increase*** 35% increase***	13% decrease*** 14% decrease*** 15% no change*** 11% no change*** 73% increase*** 75% increase***
Strong peace	19% decrease*** 20% decrease* 15% no change** 18% no change 66% increase*** 61% increase***	26% decrease* 18% decrease*** 30% no change*** 25% no change*** 44% increase*** 56% increase***	43% decrease*** 49% decrease*** 20% no change*** 7% no change** 37% increase*** 44% increase***	16% decrease*** 12% decrease*** 14% no change*** 13% no change*** 70% increase*** 75% increase***

Results for respondents without experience of the scenario are printed in red

Seemingly unrelated probit regression for donors

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Mixed-process regression           Number of obs   =       172
                                   Wald chi2(12)    =       143.78
Log likelihood = -421.04951       Prob > chi2    =       0.0000
  
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-----+-----
                |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
donor_hum      |
  strong_vio   |   2.165814   .314811     6.88   0.000     1.548796    2.782832
  mild_vio     |   1.101709   .2865016    3.85   0.000     .5401767    1.663242
  mild_peace   |  -.1509543   .2882091    -0.52   0.600    -.7158337    .4139251
-----+-----
donor_tran     |
  strong_vio   |   .1691417   .3048868     0.55   0.579    -.4284255    .7667089
  mild_vio     |   .0300953   .3231002     0.09   0.926    -.6031695    .6633601
  mild_peace   |  -.3320935   .2966337    -1.12   0.263    -.9134849    .2492978
-----+-----
donor_bud      |
  strong_vio   |  -.4670143   .314535     -1.48   0.138    -1.083492    .1494629
  mild_vio     | -1.284108   .3484055    -3.69   0.000    -1.96697    -.6012456
  mild_peace   |   .2882072   .321042     0.90   0.369    -.3410237    .917438
-----+-----
donor_dev      |
  strong_vio   |  -1.03684   .2574732    -4.03   0.000    -1.541478    -.5322017
  mild_vio     | -1.063565   .2707129    -3.93   0.000    -1.594153    -.5329776
  mild_peace   |   .2776837   .2935578     0.95   0.344    -.2976791    .8530464
-----+-----
  
```