

Security Through Solidarity: How Populism Reshapes Global Governance

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Abstract

Scholars have long argued that international organizations (IOs) solve cooperation problems through the timely, accurate provision of information. Yet, performing this role often requires international institutions to rely on member states for essential data and details. What happens when members refuse to supply accurate information? We argue that IOs often broaden their information base by exchanging more information with each other. We test our argument using an original dataset of information sharing among IOs in the development lending issue space. We show that when IOs face resistance from populist leaders in key member states, they sign more and deeper information sharing agreements with other institutions. To explore the mechanism driving these results, we supplement our main analysis with a case study of U.S. information provision to IOs under the Trump administration. Our findings suggest that populism has reshaped global governance, causing IOs to deepen and strengthen global networks.

Keywords: international organizations, populism, information

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Scholars have long argued that international organizations (IOs) solve cooperation problems through the timely, accurate provision of information (Keohane, 1984; Dai, 2002). IOs accomplish this by employing experts who provide relatively unbiased conclusions on the basis of which states can make decisions and judgments.¹ Indeed, some argue that this information and expertise is even more valuable to member states than the financial resources IOs can offer.² For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) helps to determine rates of disease in countries around the globe, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank supply economic data on almost all countries, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) offers information on trade flows and trade barriers. In addition, IOs evaluate and report information about compliance with international agreements, reassuring members that others are not violating the rules without their knowledge.³ Members can then feel confident about following their own commitments since they know they will not be taken advantage of.

However, performing this role often requires member states to share essential data and details with international institutions. States often do not allow IOs to collect their own information or perform surveillance due to concerns about sovereignty and control, so IOs must instead solicit this material from states. For instance, member states provide the WTO and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) with information about their firms' compliance with trade and investment agreements;⁴ they supply the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with information about their own and other states' nuclear programs; and they furnish the WHO with information about disease outbreaks and other health data. States also supply information about their own and other states' compliance with environmental, human rights, economic, and

¹See e.g. Milner (2006). Though also see Malik and Stone (2018); Kilby and Michaelowa (2019) on bias in information published by IOs.

²See e.g. Clemens and Kremer (2016).

³See Simmons (2010) for a review.

⁴Firms often play a key role in this process (Brutger, 2017).

other agreements.⁵

While IOs often require such information to fulfill their mandates, considerable variation exists in states' willingness to provide it. Indeed, while some politicians seek to expand international cooperation, international organizations also commonly become targets for other leaders and parties who wish to retrench from global commitments. For example, both the U.S. and China have expressed unwillingness to share essential details about the origins of the novel coronavirus with the WHO;⁶ the U.S. has placed restrictions on its ability to give information to the International Criminal Court (ICC)⁷ and the United Nations;⁸ and states such as Canada and Brazil have limited the details they would provide to the WTO (Carnegie and Carson, 2020). In other cases, while states continue to share information with IOs, their information is biased or otherwise lacking in quality. For example, the Trump administration has injected misinformation into a variety of data and reports that IOs would otherwise find useful, especially pertaining to climate change.⁹

In the face of such intransigence, one might expect IOs to retrench their operations or even cease to function. However, we argue that IOs are not powerless entities, and instead fight back against these challenges. In particular, we claim that they attempt to better insulate themselves from and reduce their reliance on deviant stakeholders by sharing information with other organizations operating in their issue space. This cooperation can place the IO within an institutional

⁵See e.g. Hafner-Burton (2008) on naming and shaming in human rights. The Paris Climate Agreement also relies on self-reporting – see https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris_en.

⁶Kuo, Lily. “China Withheld Data on Coronavirus from WHO, Recordings Reveal.” *The Guardian*. June 2, 2020. See also Worsnop (2019).

⁷<https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31495.html>

⁸<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3047>

⁹<https://climate.law.columbia.edu/Silencing-Science-Tracker>.

network, increasing the extent to which other organizations rely on it for resources and vice versa. Different IOs derive their information from different sources, so such agreements can allow IOs to collect more and better information. In this way, an IO can reduce its dependence on member state principals and increase its prospects of survival. In other words, IOs may be able to achieve greater security through solidarity.

We test our argument with an original dataset that documents information sharing between IOs in the development issue space over time.¹⁰ Specifically, we track the number of new information sharing agreements signed by each development organization for each year in which multiple development IOs operated and documentation is available (1956-2018). We also systematically examine the content of these agreements, as we code the categories of information shared by each IO in a given year. We combine this data with information on which leaders are reluctant to share high quality information with IOs, which we capture using an indicator of whether the leader of an IO's major stakeholder is a populist. As we discuss subsequently, the costs of accurate information provision are greater and the benefits are smaller for these actors. Regression analysis performed on these data show that in such cases, IOs sign more information sharing agreements with other organizations encompassing more informational categories. To explore the mechanism driving these results, we supplement our main analysis with a case study of U.S. information sharing with IOs under the Trump administration, finding strong support for our theory.

Our theoretical framework contributes to several large streams of literature. First, we address the drivers and consequences of cooperation and coordination between IOs. While this behavior has become increasingly common, we still know little about when it occurs and why. Existing theories highlight factors including a desire to overcome gridlock among member states (Abbott et al., 2015), the prevention of forum shopping (Clark, 2020), and the minimization of

¹⁰Though we focus on development, our theory is highly generalizable, as we discuss subsequently.

overlap in IO activities.¹¹ In contrast with these explanations, we emphasize cooperation as a defensive strategy that can allow IOs to continue their work in the face of member intransigence. Cooperation might thus help prevent IOs from dissolving, losing legitimacy, or entering “zombie” territory.¹²

Next, we contribute to longstanding questions of who has power within IOs. Many scholars argue that IOs merely reflect the wishes of their most powerful members (Mearsheimer, 1995), emphasizing how these states exercise control through funding (Broz, 2008), staffing (Nelson, 2017; Clark and Dolan, 2020), exit (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2018), bribery (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009), and other policy levers such as the size of loans or stringency of conditionality.¹³ However, we shift the focus to examine how IOs respond to members’ efforts to limit their influence and activities, extending and revising the literature that investigates how IOs can increase their independence from member state principals (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Johnson, 2014). While this work tends to study individual IOs, emphasizing particular IOs’ partial autonomy with unique (and sometimes pathological) bureaucratic cultures, we look at the resulting connections across IOs.

Finally, we build on recent work exploring resurgent populism and its consequences for international cooperation.¹⁴ While this body of literature has provided important findings regarding the impact of populism on policies such as immigration and foreign aid (Heinrich, Kobayashi and Lawson, 2019; Shehaj, Shin and Inglehart, 2019), much less is known about how populism

¹¹See Gehring and Faude (2014) on divisions of labor and Henning and Pratt (2020); Green (2020) on hierarchy and differentiation.

¹²See Tallberg and Zürn (2019) on legitimacy; Gray (2018*a*) on zombie IOs.

¹³See Andersen, Hansen and Markussen (2006); Stone (2008); Copelovitch (2010); Stone (2011); Kersting and Kilby (2018).

¹⁴See Busby, Gubler and Hawkins (2019); Carnegie and Carson (2019*b*) on populist rhetoric; Bearce and Scott (2018) on populism and public opinion of IOs.

affects policymaking in international institutions. Though scholars have established that populists tend to mobilize public opinion against IOs generally (Bearce and Scott, 2018; Copelovitch and Pevehouse, 2019; Voeten, 2020), the consequences of populism for global governance are still relatively unexplored.

Information, Populism, and International Organizations

IOs are typically constructed to collect key data and documents, leverage their expertise to analyze them, and release policy recommendations and conclusions (Keohane, 1984; Dai, 2002).¹⁵ This information comes from a variety of sources. At the most intrusive level, members may allow IOs to conduct on-the-ground inspections or other types of surveillance. For instance, the IAEA investigates its members' nuclear sites; prosecutors of war crimes tribunals often interview witnesses or visit suspect sites; the UN uses drones to monitor peacekeeping agreements; and the WHO inspects member states to evaluate their health conditions.

Yet members often perceive such data collection methods as infringing on their sovereignty.¹⁶ Therefore, IOs instead often request information from members that pertains to ongoing assessments or evaluations. For example, the World Bank and IMF ask for economic indicators and other data that can assist with their evaluations of countries' economic health, helping to forestall economic crises and inform market actors.¹⁷ States can also bring information to IOs voluntarily, as they do when filing an international trade or investment dispute or if they detect another state's non-compliance with international laws and wish to report it. This behavior is often encouraged by IOs – for instance, the African Development Bank (AfDB) adopted the Whistleblowing and

¹⁵Also see Chapman (2007); Fang (2008); Morse (2019).

¹⁶See Pollack (1997); Abbott and Snidal (1998); Nielson and Tierney (2003); Hawkins et al. (2006) for discussion of when and to what extent states delegate to and act through IOs.

¹⁷The IMF's Article IV consultations are perhaps the clearest example of this behavior.

Complaints Handling Policy in 2007, through which the organization promises anonymity to any actor that reports fraud, corruption, or other suspicious activities.¹⁸

However, because information is such an essential component of global governance, it represents a weapon that states can use to undermine IOs. Without informational inputs, IOs may be unable to reach key judgments, thus failing to fulfill their mandates. Member state information is critical in order for IOs to determine which states are complying with their agreements, whether an economic or health crisis is on the horizon, or whether conflict has broken out.¹⁹ Cutting off the spigot of timely and accurate information can cripple IOs, preventing them from performing their jobs properly. In such cases, it is difficult to tell which countries are obeying international laws and norms, monitor and enforce agreements, or otherwise cooperate on global issues.

Consider several examples of instances in which information suppression undermined IOs, both in the security and economic realms. In the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the tribunal nearly shut its doors when the U.S. refused to provide its evidence of crimes committed and knowledge of suspects' whereabouts (Moranchek, 2006). Similarly, the IAEA's performance was severely critiqued after the international community learned of its failure to detect Iraq's nuclear weapons program in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. This failure was attributed in large part to the agency's inability to receive intelligence tips from member states (Carnegie and Carson, 2020). UN peacekeepers have also been stymied by a lack of timely, accurate information about rebel movements and objectives (Dorn, 1999). In the economic realm, the WTO could not adequately adjudicate cases without private firm-level details, which many states refused to supply prior to the IO's reforms in 2001 (Carnegie and Carson, 2020). Following the European debt crisis, the IMF could not ascertain the health of other countries' banks unless those countries supplied data on the Banks' loan portfolios and other economic information (Jones

¹⁸See "Whistle Blowing and Complaints Handling Policy." *African Development Bank Group*. January 2, 2007.

¹⁹See e.g. Simmons (2010) on compliance.

and Hilbers, 2004).

For leaders who are opposed to IOs' goals or objectives, then, withholding information can present an attractive option, both due to its efficacy in undermining IOs and because whether or not information is shared is hard to observe. While there are several avenues through which states might undermine IOs – including threatening their funding or refusing to confirm nominees to important positions²⁰ – curbing access to quality information can be especially easy to hide. While publics, NGOs, and other actors may be quick to criticize a state that has not paid the funds it has promised to an IO, they are frequently unaware of whether a state possesses a piece of information but decides not to share it. States often hold classified or otherwise secret knowledge that they glean from their intelligence bureaucracies or private economic actors that is unobservable to others. Alternatively, a leader may stop collecting public data or documents on which an IO relies if these no longer fit within the leader's priorities, which is also difficult to detect. For example, as we discuss subsequently, countries like the U.S. have ceased collecting information on climate change on which some IOs, like the World Bank, rely. Restricting information transmission may thus allow leaders to promote their objectives while avoiding pressure from lobbyists, NGOs, domestic publics, member states, or other actors.²¹

Another advantage of suppressing information as opposed to using other tools to undercut IOs is that the former affords states the appearance of compliance. While cutting funding or exiting an IO constitute blunt tools that undercut an IO's activities across the board, targeted information suppression can subtly steer an IO away from outcomes that are undesirable to an informed state.

²⁰U.S. President Donald Trump, for instance, has threatened WHO funding and refused to confirm nominees to the WTO appellate body. See “Trump Hates the International Organizations that are the Basis of U.S. Wealth, Prosperity, and Military Power.” *The Washington Post*. July 2, 2018. Also see von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2018) on withdrawal from IOs.

²¹Of course, some lobbyists or other domestic actors may support such actions, in which case information suppression can satisfy them while avoiding broader controversy.

For example, if a state fails to provide data and documents about its own violations of international norms and laws, or those of an ally, it can provide the veneer of lawfulness and legitimacy. Or, refusing to supply information about a disease or disaster may fool observers into downplaying such adverse events, so that the country avoids disruptions to travel and trade. Similarly, disallowing scientists to report their findings to an IO may lead the public to conclude that such findings do not exist.

Yet not all leaders seek such a weapon. Although a variety of leaders may have incentives to restrict accurate information from IOs at times, we anticipate that populist leaders have especially strong motivations to do so. While the definition of populism has been debated, a consistent theme that emerges from the literature is that populism is a set of ideas that pit “the pure people” against “the corrupt elite” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Populists are specifically marked by anti-elite rhetoric, which paints nationalist and “outsider” candidates as attractive alternatives to globalists and lifelong bureaucrats (Busby, Gubler and Hawkins, 2019).

IOs and their staffs often represent particularly attractive targets for populist candidates and leaders, as populists may portray them as members of a global “elite” class who therefore should not be trusted (Bearce and Scott, 2018). Copelovitch and Pevehouse (2019) highlight two strands of populism – nativist and redistributionist – and argue that both can result in hostility toward international organizations. Since nativists are anti-immigrant, they are often also anti-internationalist. Redistributionists focus on who benefits from IOs, but since elites are typically believed to gain the most from IOs, they also tend to oppose IOs and their activities. While these two groups may vary in the degree of their opposition to IOs, both should view them with suspicion in general. Since nativists tend to be right-wing and redistributionists tend to be left-wing, our argument applies to populists across the political spectrum.

We argue that populists’ antagonism toward IOs often leads them to restrict or alter information flows to these organizations. For nativists, who only support international policies that leave their country better off relative to other countries, information may represent a key national advantage. Withholding data and documents that could help other nations in any way may be seen

as a means by which to promote national strength at the expense of others. Redistributionists, in contrast, may suppress data because they feel that IOs benefit elites to the detriment of the common people. They may refuse to support or bolster organizations when they conclude that the benefits of this support will be felt unevenly.

Moreover, since both strands of populism emphasize anti-elitism, both types of populists may restrict accurate information because they do not trust the international elites that govern IOs and wish to weaken them. They may believe IOs' increasing influence limits state leaders' room to maneuver (Mair, 2013) and therefore betrays the people (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017). For example, populists leveraged skepticism of IOs resulting from their governing of austerity politics in the European Union and their perceived appeasement of market actors in Latin America (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).

Populist leaders can undermine IOs' information collection and generation efforts in two different ways. First, they may withhold relevant information by blocking scientists and other officials from sharing it or failing to fund information gathering efforts. Domestic programs may be cut or defunded, which then curtails the information funneled up to IOs, or funding that was earmarked for IOs specifically could dry up. In these situations, the amount of information shared with IOs is reduced. Second, populists may provide misleading or incorrect data and documents, which often occurs when states inject bias into domestic information that is shared with IOs. IOs are then unable to use the information as intended. Indeed, scholars have found that misinformation increases support for populist parties (Castanho Silva, Vegetti and Littvay, 2017; van Kessel, Sajuria and Van Hauwaert, 2020). Those who favor populists are often prone to believe conspiracies and other kinds of misinformation (Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Norris, Cameron and Wynter, 2018), again due to the perception that elites are disingenuous and that their narratives are meant to distract them from hidden power sources (Oliver and Wood, 2014). Because populists' supporters are receptive to false information, spreading these narratives can garner political support. As a result, populist politicians are frequently associated with the use of conspiratorial rhetoric and other kinds of misinformation (Bergmann, 2018).

Information Sharing Among IOs

In the face of these populist threats to information acquisition by IOs, we anticipate that IOs seek information elsewhere. They can do so through several avenues. First, IOs could attempt to gather information themselves. However, as mentioned previously, there are often major restrictions on their ability to do so due to states' concerns about sovereignty and desires to limit IOs' power. Moreover, IOs could try to rely more heavily on open source information or information provided by third parties like NGOs, but this information can be limited since only states possess the large intelligence gathering bureaucracies, funding, and technology to gather many types of data.

We thus hypothesize that IOs respond to informational shortfalls by collaborating with other IOs. We define such information sharing as the exchange of otherwise private knowledge across organizations, and we look specifically at formalized arrangements to do so rather than ad hoc or one-off instances of sharing. These arrangements typically require a formal document such as a memorandum of understanding signed between high-level officials from two organizations. For example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) signed an archetypical information sharing memorandum in 2018 in which the two parties promised to increase the “exchange of information and promotion of knowledge-sharing to benefit from each other’s experience, resources and expertise. Potential areas for information sharing may include: (i) economic, financial and business information on common areas of interest; (ii) information with respect to processing of potential projects for co-financing; and (iii) information in relation to mitigation and management of risks, arising from the co-financing of projects.”²² Importantly, these agreements are signed by IO staff in the absence of member state oversight, allowing IOs to broaden their information base without the approval or agreement of powerful members.

²²See “Memorandum of Cooperation Between the Eurasian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.” <https://bit.ly/3c9436n>

Collaborating in this manner represents an attempt to reduce an IO's dependence on specific member states while broadening its information bases, as IOs vary widely in their sources of information. Members may only share information with select IOs, particularly since IOs have different membership compositions and members' trust in each IO varies considerably. IOs also have different infrastructures and procedures, providing additional variation in the information they are able to collect. Some may have capacities to conduct on-the-ground investigations (e.g. the IAEA), while others may have privileged access to historical data (e.g. the UN). They are also staffed by different types of experts, allowing them to gather and assess information differently. Thus, they may anticipate that cooperation will allow them to pool resources to gain a fuller picture of a given situation. Information sharing also can embed IOs in institutional networks, through which each IO can rely on other IOs operating in the issue space.

Of course, information sharing may represent only a partial solution to the problem. If a leader restricts information to all IOs, IOs may have no way to retrieve it. However, information sharing can help when IOs in a given domain each possess different information, so that sharing provides them with a fuller picture of a situation or issue than they could glean on their own. For example, the IMF and World Bank began to exchange information regarding the performance of Banks in European states after these states were reticent to provide it. Since each IO specialized in gathering different types of information, sharing the information provided the IOs with a broader picture of these countries' economic health.²³

As another example, as we discuss subsequently in the case study, the Trump administration has restricted information to the World Bank pertaining to energy and the environment. The Bank subsequently signed information sharing agreements with the Arab multilateral development banks, which stated that a key objective is to obtain information regarding energy. The Bank may therefore have tried to help mitigate its loss of U.S. information with data and details from another IO. European multilateral development banks could also help in this endeavor, as they monitor and

²³IMF official. Interview by authors. January 10, 2018.

collect data on emissions and clean energy production.

Other such cases abound in the security realm, as well. For instance, as mentioned previously, the U.S. has been reticent to share intelligence with the UN, particularly hampering its ability to conduct peacekeeping missions effectively. Perhaps as a result, the UN has signed a variety of information sharing agreements with the EU, NATO, and the AU to glean such information from these IOs instead.²⁴ The UN has also signed information sharing agreements with the OPCW, which may be partly in response to reports of hidden chemical weapons information from the U.S.²⁵

Despite the benefits IOs can derive from information sharing, we do not expect them to engage in this practice routinely. While IOs may expect this cooperation to help them circumvent threats from powerful member states, these agreements also impose costs on IOs. Member states are often hesitant to convey sensitive information to these organizations due to fears of leaks (Carnegie and Carson, 2019a), and they may become even more reticent to cooperate if IOs are likely to share this information with other organizations. This could occur both because members do not trust the IOs with which information is shared or because data may become more susceptible to leaks and privacy breaches during transmission. Moreover, such agreements often require new infrastructure and policies to govern the practice of sharing, which can create both economic and political costs, particularly if the IOs face significant status quo bias. Staff may feel reluctant to change their practices and to learn new systems of handling and managing data. Finally, IOs often compete with each other for funding and influence, and may therefore wish to protect their turf by withholding information from other institutions. They also may have particular ideologies and cultures that conflict with those organizations they would otherwise share information with, impeding cooperation.

Due to the costs inherent in information sharing, we expect that IOs engage in this be-

²⁴Data collected by authors. Available upon request.

²⁵See “US ‘hid Iraq Chemical Weapons Incidents.’” *BBC News*. October 15, 2014.

havior primarily when they confront a major threat to their functioning. In particular, when influential shareholders elect populist leaders, IOs should face incentives to broaden their information bases. We focus on an IO's leading shareholder because many organizations are disproportionately controlled by a single powerful state. For instance, the U.S. is the major stakeholder in many development IOs, including the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). China and Russia wield comparable power in the AIIB and EDB respectively. Moreover, a large literature shows that the most powerful stakeholder often holds both formal and informal influence over international organizations, resulting in policies that reflect the preferences of the most powerful principal.²⁶ At the World Bank and IMF, for example, the U.S.'s friends and allies tend to receive larger loans with faster disbursement and fewer and less stringent policy conditions attached.²⁷ We thus hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1. *IOs sign more and deeper information sharing agreements when their major stakeholder is led by a populist.*

Information Sharing Agreements

To test our theory, we utilize hand-coded original data on information sharing in the development issue space covering the entire period for which at least two development IOs existed (1956-2018).²⁸ There are 28 development IOs operating in the space, and many commonly engage

²⁶Formal influence includes voting power and control over important leadership positions, while informal influence manifests in the composition of staff more broadly, the beliefs held by these staff members, and the location of the IO's headquarters (Novosad and Werker, 2019).

²⁷See Andersen, Hansen and Markussen (2006); Stone (2008, 2011); Kersting and Kilby (2018); Clark and Dolan (2020).

²⁸Information sharing agreements could not have been signed when the World Bank was the only IO active in the development area (1945-1956).

in cooperation by pooling resources and expertise. Table A1 includes basic information about each development IO, including their names, abbreviations, year of creation, and number of members. Our data specifically tracks the signing of information sharing agreements, which typically take the form of memorandums of understanding. They are signed by autonomous, high-level IO bureaucrats, and they are not subject to approval or ratification by member states. Therefore, they constitute a particularly attractive strategy for IOs, as member states are unable to block these agreements.

We study development for several reasons. First, this area generates theoretical leverage because it features high levels of cooperation despite existing literature that characterizes the space as unambiguously competitive (Lipsy, 2015, 2017).²⁹ As Figure A1 shows, information sharing agreements have been signed by IOs in the development space in many of the years post-1970. Because these agreements tend to persist indefinitely, each agreement signed in a given year remains active in the years that follow. This figure illustrates that information sharing is quite common between development IOs. Figure 1, meanwhile, plots average information sharing between IOs in the development regime complex over the period 1956-2018. It shows that while inter-organizational sharing is common, it is pursued unevenly. Existing research suggests that these trends may be driven by resource considerations (Gest and Grigorescu, 2010; Brosig, 2011) or autonomy concerns (Biermann, 2008, 2015).

Additionally, development is representative of many economic issue areas in terms of the sensitivity of the information collected and shared by IOs. Therefore, development does not constitute an easy case for information sharing, and we anticipate that our argument generalizes to other economic IOs as well.³⁰ Indeed, information sharing agreements signed by development

²⁹Development is distinct from areas like emergency lending, in which few IOs operate (Lipsy, 2015), or environmental governance, where IOs are fragmented and hierarchically ordered (Keohane and Victor, 2011; Green, 2020).

³⁰We discuss scope conditions further in the conclusion. We note that this area also represents a




Figure 1: **Average Levels of Information Sharing Among Development IOs.** The size of the circles is increasing in the information sharing of the IO in question. Thicker lines connecting IOs indicates more information sharing on average.

IOs cover several categories of information, some of which are quite sensitive. Figure A2 plots the total number of agreements pertaining to various informational categories. Note that while each agreement corresponds to at least one category, some correspond to several. We interpret agreements covering more informational categories to be deeper than others.

We hand-coded the categorical information on the basis of the information sharing agreements’ contents. “Economic” agreements involve the sharing of economic statistics; “General”

hard test for the theory because while big shareholders often collect data about recipients and share it with the IO (e.g. WDI data), these IOs often need data and documents from recipients as well.

agreements speak broadly (and often vaguely) about improving cooperation and information sharing; “Managerial” agreements mention sharing information about best practices and administration; “Project specific” agreements discuss the transmission of information related to co-financing operations; “Statistical” agreements specifically mention the sharing of country statistics; “Strategies” correspond to information about assistance strategies and development plans; and “Technical” agreements discuss the sharing of knowledge about policies, research, and expertise. Figure A2 shows that sensitive information, such as economic figures, is shared less often than information about projects, strategies, and technical research and expertise.

Notably, the IOs in the issue space vary in terms of their propensity for signing information sharing agreements. Figure A3 shows the average number of information sharing agreements signed by each IO in the development space in a given year. Newer IOs, such as AIIB and NDB, appear to sign such agreements most frequently, while some smaller IOs, such as BDEAC, BDEGL, and the EADB, have never shared information. However, most IOs – including prominent regional banks like the ADB, AfDB, and IADB – sign a new information sharing agreement about once every 2-3 years, which suggests that information sharing is a fairly widespread form of inter-organizational cooperation.

Empirical Analysis

To test our claims, we use two dependent variables that are derived from our original dataset. The first is a count of the number of information sharing agreements signed by an IO in a given year. The second is a measure of the depth of these agreements, namely the number of informational categories covered by the information sharing agreements that an IO signs in a given year.³¹ In other words, we sum the number of agreements that fall into each informational category for each year.

³¹These measures mirror those used to study the stringency of loan conditions – see e.g. Stone (2008); Clark and Dolan (2020).

We merge our original data with cross-national data on populism from the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, which uses the contents of academic articles from 66 leading peer-reviewed journals in political science, sociology, and regional studies to code populist executive leaders.³² Specifically, they “identified all articles published in these journals on the subject of populism, as well as political leaders linked with populism; then vetted each potential case study, consulting with country and regional experts.”³³ This populism measure takes the form of an indicator variable and covers all countries over the period 1990-2018. We cross-check this data with a second populism data source – the BYU Global Populism Database – which draws on leaders’ speeches to construct populism scores that vary between 0 (no populism) and 2 (all discourse is dominated by moral disgust and populist antagonism).³⁴ Since it is derived from speeches, this variable accords with recent and revised definitions of populism that focus on leaders’ rhetoric (Busby, Gubler and Hawkins, 2019). While these data cover only 40 countries over the period 2000-2018, we confirm that each applicable populist leader from the binary data is also coded as populist in this data set.³⁵ We therefore expect our populism measure to be quite robust.

As our theory indicates, we are interested in whether the most powerful stakeholder in a given IO is led by a populist. To identify the most powerful member state, we code which state has

³²See <https://institute.global/policy/populists-power-around-world>.

³³Populist governments, in their working definition, are united by two fundamental claims: (1) Elites and “outsiders” work against the interests of the “true people,” and (2) since populists are the voice of the “true people,” nothing should stand in their way.

³⁴See <https://populism.byu.edu/>.

³⁵Specifically, we consider a country to be led by a populist if the BYU populism score is above 0.4 (at least somewhat populist) and if the populism binary from the Tony Blair Institute is equal to 1 in a given year.

the highest vote share in each organization.³⁶ Where two or more countries tie for the most voting power in an IO, we examine another lever of influence by coding which country holds the highest position of power (such as the President or Managing Director) in the organization. Our unit of analysis is then the IO-year.

In some of our models, we include additional control variables. First, we add two IO-specific covariates – the NUMBER OF MEMBERS in the IO and IO AGE – which we hand-coded from IO websites. On the one hand, IOs with more members might be more susceptible to gridlock and therefore may be more likely to pursue cooperation with other IOs (Abbott et al., 2015). On the other hand, IOs with broader memberships can draw on a larger pool of informational resources and may therefore have less need for information sharing agreements (Gest and Grigorescu, 2010; Pratt, 2018). Meanwhile, older IOs might be more cooperative, as their staff have had more opportunities to build relationships with staff from other organizations through joint meetings, crisis simulations, and the like.³⁷ Second, we control for several characteristics of each IO’s most powerful stakeholder, including that country’s per capita GDP (GDPPC) and level of democracy (POLITY).³⁸ Richer and more democratic countries might be more willing and able to share information with IOs, thereby muting an IO’s incentives to pursue information sharing agreements.³⁹

We use ordinary least squares with IO, year, and agreement type fixed effects, where the

³⁶This is a common measure of institutional power in the literature – see e.g. (Lipsky, 2015; Kaya, 2015). Countries with large vote shares in a given IO may also possess veto power; for example, this is the case for the U.S. at the World Bank.

³⁷Staff views have been shown to affect policymaking in IFIs – see Nelson (2017).

³⁸GDP per capita is logged and measured in constant 2010 USD; it comes from the World Development Indicators. Democracy is measured as a country’s Polity2 score from Jaggers and Gurr (1995).

³⁹Vreeland, Hollyer and Rosendorff (2011); Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2018).

	Number of agreements			Number of categories		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Populism	0.260*** (0.077)	0.257*** (0.077)	0.241*** (0.084)	0.487*** (0.128)	0.482*** (0.128)	0.450*** (0.143)
Number of Members		0.004 (0.005)			0.006 (0.008)	
IO Age		0.005 (0.004)			0.004 (0.007)	
Polity			-0.005 (0.006)			0.001 (0.011)
GDPPC			0.180 (0.117)			0.239 (0.201)
N	727	727	694	727	727	694

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 1: **Primary Results.** Model type is OLS. IO, year, and agreement type fixed effects are included.

agreement types correspond to the categories described previously. Standard errors are robust. Our parsimonious baseline model includes no additional control variables, and we subsequently add the control variables described previously. These results are shown in Table 1.

The results offer strong support for our theoretical contentions, as IOs whose leading stakeholders are populist sign significantly more information sharing agreements covering more informational categories. In each specification, the results obtain statistical significance at the 0.01 level. Moreover, the coefficients are substantively large. When an IO's most powerful stakeholder is led by a populist, an IO signs around 0.25 more information sharing agreements covering around 0.45 more informational categories. Given that the mean number of agreements signed by a given IO in a given year is 0.25, and the mean number of categories is 0.47, these effects are quite meaningful.

To increase confidence in our findings, we perform several robustness checks. First, we include both the IO-specific and stakeholder-specific covariates in the same specification (Table A2). Second, we use a Poisson specification since our DVs are count variables (Table A3). Third,

we swap IO fixed effects for major stakeholder fixed effects (Table A4). Fourth, we add a linear time trend (Table A5). Results are robust to each of these alternative specifications.

U.S. Case Study

To trace our mechanism and supplement our main results, we include a case study in which we investigate the effects of the election of Donald Trump – a prototypical populist – on U.S.-led IOs’ propensity to sign information sharing agreements. We select this case both due to the geopolitical importance of the U.S. and data availability.

Our theory anticipates that U.S.-led IOs pursued information sharing agreements with other IOs in the wake of Trump’s election because of an increase in information withholding or distortion. To test this, we first verify that these agreements rose during this time period. We then use data on U.S. information suppression and falsification to check whether this behavior also increased during Trump’s time in office. We identify both an increase in information sharing agreements and a drop in accurate information provision as theorized. Though we cannot make causal claims based on this data, our descriptive evidence supports our theoretical claims.

To start, we plot the number of information sharing agreements signed by U.S.-led development IOs over the period 1980-2018.⁴⁰ Such IOs include the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, North American Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and International Fund for Agricultural Development. Figure 2 shows that there has been a massive uptick in information sharing from U.S.-led IOs since Trump was elected. Specifically, significantly more information sharing agreements were signed between IOs in 2017 than in years prior.⁴¹

Our theory predicts that this trend is the result of Trump’s efforts to cut off the flow of

⁴⁰We start our plot in 1980 because before this date, only a handful of instances of information sharing existed, and not all U.S.-led development IOs had been created.

⁴¹This trend is not driven by cooperation between U.S.-led IOs and newer IOs, as shown in




Figure 2: **Number of Information Sharing Agreements Signed by U.S.-led Development IOs 1980-2018.** The red line demarcates 2016 (the year of Trump’s election).

accurate information from the U.S. to IOs. We discuss these suppression dynamics further and provide some descriptive statistics of what kinds of information have been silenced or distorted in Appendix 2.2. In general, we find that suppression events are primarily related to information in the areas of public health and climate change — two areas of particular interest to development IOs as they pursue their sustainable development mandates. Moreover, the Trump administration often justifies the withholding of such information using populist rhetoric, such as anti-elite statements.⁴²

Appendix 2.1.

⁴²See, e.g. accusations that scientific agencies such as the FDA and CDC have ‘deep state motives.’ Diamond, Dan. “Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19.” *Politico*

This implies that the administration’s choice to stop providing this information is at least partly attributable to populism, though we acknowledge that other factors may also have contributed to it.

Consider several examples which show that the Trump administration has restricted information in these domains using each of the three tactics described previously. First, the Trump administration has forbidden scientists to share information with international bodies, or otherwise constrained their work. For example, when a U.S. scientist co-authored a report for the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – which prepares climate reports for leaders around the world – he received a cease-and-desist letter. He “viewed the letter as an attempt to deter him from speaking out.”⁴³ Similarly, in April 2020, a research chemist from the U.S. Geological Survey was told not to disclose his affiliation to the government when publishing research on climate change, and an August 2018 survey of scientists from the DOI found that over one-quarter have engaged in self-censorship under Trump.⁴⁴

A second method the Trump administration has used to restrict information to IOs is to cut funding for information gathering activities. One example is the United Nations’ REDD+ program, which encourages countries to reduce deforestation. Compliance with this program was monitored by NASA’s Carbon Monitoring System; however, this system was canceled by the Trump administration. As a result, the UN could no longer obtain critical information that it needed to run the program.⁴⁵ Similarly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an IO which pro-

September 11, 2020. Also see McGinley, Laurie, Carolyn Y. Johnson, and Josh Dawsey. “Trump Without Evidence Accuses ‘deep State’ at FDA of Slow-Walking Coronavirus Vaccines and Treatments.” *The Washington Post*. September 16, 2020.

⁴³Plumer, Brad and Coral Davenport. “Science Under Attack: How Trump is Sidelining Researchers and Their Work.” *The New York Times*. December 28, 2019.

⁴⁴See <https://climate.law.columbia.edu/Silencing-Science-Tracker>.

⁴⁵Bassett, Luke, Kristina Costa, and Lia Cattaneo. “Burning the Data: Attacks on Climate and

duces scientific assessments of climate change’s impact, relies exclusively on information provided by scientists and peer reviewed studies. The U.S. “has some of the best climate data in the world, and they are essential to the production of the IPCC.” As a result of cuts to funding, however, “the quality of such assessments could suffer from a reduction in available data.”⁴⁶ More generally, many bodies that conduct scientific research or create information that might be shared with IOs have faced cuts.⁴⁷

A third way that the U.S. has curtailed information is to inject bias into domestically gathered information that is then shared with IOs, or that lead IOs to doubt the quality of the information provided by the United States more generally. For example, in September 2019, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management published its environmental impact statement for drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, concluding that no concerns related to climate change exist. Similarly, the White House ordered changes to the CDC’s coronavirus guidelines in May 2020 based on political considerations.⁴⁸

While such activities are not new, they have increased greatly under the Trump administration (Berman and Carter, 2018). However, to determine whether the Trump administration

Energy Data and Research.” *Center for American Progress*. June 13, 2018.

⁴⁶Bassett, Luke, Kristina Costa, and Lia Cattaneo. “Burning the Data: Attacks on Climate and Energy Data and Research.” *Center for American Progress*. June 13, 2018. Indeed, two U.S. federal data sets proved pivotal to its 2014 conclusions, and the DOE’s carbon emissions data is a key source for its determinations regarding precipitation patterns (Ibid).

⁴⁷For instance, the Trump administration’s proposed 2020 budget would cut funding to the EPA by 30 percent; NIH by 12 percent; NSF by 9 percent; and USDA by 15 percent. See <https://climate.law.columbia.edu/Silencing-Science-Tracker>. While these cuts were merely proposed, IOs may worry that such threats will be acted upon, and seek to share information preemptively.

⁴⁸See <https://climate.law.columbia.edu/Silencing-Science-Tracker>.

has systematically curtailed accurate information sharing with development IOs in particular – the domain of our main analysis – we follow Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2014), who utilize data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) to construct a measure of government transparency.⁴⁹ These indicators are collected and published by the World Bank, so we leverage the share of missing data from the WDI for each country as a proxy for the extent to which a government has limited its information sharing with development IOs broadly and the Bank specifically. To do so, we extract the indicators utilized by Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2014) to build their transparency index and then calculate the share of these variables for which there is missingness for each year from 1960-2019.⁵⁰

In particular, we focus on whether the U.S. restricted the flow of information to the Bank in the wake of President Trump’s election. Because Trump is a populist, our theory anticipates a reduction in information sharing between the U.S. and development IOs. Figure 3 shows that information sharing with the World Bank decreased after Trump came to office. Specifically, the percent of WDI variables for which there is missingness jumped from less than 20 percent in 2015 to around 60 percent in 2019. Suppression has also increased each year since Trump was elected.⁵¹

⁴⁹This measure is utilized by HRV in a number of papers, primarily examining regime type and change (Vreeland, Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011; Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2015, 2018, 2019).

⁵⁰Because variable names and data collection efforts have shifted, and some variables in the original Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2014) data are no longer a part of the WDI dataset, we are able to match 73 of the 120 variables from the original data, which only extended to 2010.

⁵¹While a slight increase in missingness is expected in recent years, as some indicators take longer than others to be collected and transmitted, the U.S. increase is steeper and faster than the average country’s over the same period. To be more specific, from 2016 to 2019, U.S. missingness increased by 35 percentage points. On average, countries experienced only a 22 percentage point increase over the same period. From 2016 to 2018 (WDI data is more complete for 2018), the




Figure 3: **Share of U.S. Missing WDI Data 1960-2019.** Data comes from the World Development Indicators. Variables are matched with those from Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2014). The red line again demarcates 2016 (the year of Trump’s election).

Moreover generally, the correlation between our populism measure and WDI missingness is 0.35 ($p = 0.02$), which suggests that Trump’s behavior is illustrative of a broader trend.

In sum, descriptive evidence tracking information suppression by the Trump administration and information sharing by U.S.-led development IOs offers support for our theoretical contentions. Shortly after President Trump assumed office in January 2017, his administration began gutting scientific agencies, injecting bias into government data and publications, and restricting the transmission of information to IOs. U.S.-led development IOs like the World Bank and the

difference is 20 percentage points for the U.S. compared to 6 percentage points on average.

Inter-American Development Bank then inked information sharing agreements with an array of IOs beginning in 2017 in order to triangulate information from multiple sources, as our theory expects.

Moreover, these findings generalize to other countries as well. For example, Figure A7 shows that Turkey similarly restricted information sharing with the World Bank in the wake of populist Recep Erdogan's election as President in 2014. Turkey is also the largest stakeholder in the Economic Cooperation Organization Trade and Development Bank, which has signed two new information sharing agreements since 2014. It had signed only one such agreement over the course of its operational history before Erdogan was elected (2005-2014).

Conclusion

This paper shows that while the supply of accurate information provided to IOs often dries up when populists assume power in key member states, IOs are not powerless. Instead, they attempt to circumvent this issue by sharing information with other IOs to reduce their reliance on the flow of information from these key stakeholders and embed themselves in large institutional networks. This, in turn, may make IOs more resilient to present and future attacks by member states. To test this theory, we use regression analysis of an original dataset of information sharing between the 28 IOs in the development financing space from 1956-2018. We find that a rise in populism among key IO stakeholders is associated with more and deeper information sharing agreements among IOs. We supplement this analysis with a case study of information suppression by the Trump administration, finding support for our theoretical mechanism.

Our theoretical framework is highly generalizable, as the idea that IOs agree to pool information in an effort to circumvent challenges to their information supply can apply to any IO that relies on information to do its job. It also is most applicable to IOs that depend heavily on third party information, rather than those that tend to collect their own. While we focus on the development space, IOs share information in many economic issue areas, including emergency

lending and environmental cooperation,⁵² to which similar dynamics should pertain. While IOs also sometimes exchange information in the security realm,⁵³ the information shared between security organizations might be more sensitive than in most economic arenas, so information sharing may be less common in this domain.⁵⁴ Moreover, our theory likely generalizes beyond the time period considered in our analysis. While populism has surged recently in many countries including the U.S., U.K., Brazil, Turkey, Russia, Poland, and Hungary, it is not a new phenomenon. Instead, populism has a long history within a variety of countries (Copelovitch and Pevehouse, 2019), suggesting that our theory may apply historically as well. However, we also note that IOs may have had fewer opportunities for information sharing in the past, as fewer IOs existed in the same issue area.

Our theory has broad implications for scholarship on global governance. Standard theories of international cooperation assert that IOs promote such cooperation by collecting and analyzing information (Dai, 2002), yet few scholars have interrogated how and when that information is provided by member states. Moreover, IOs are often viewed as passive actors that merely carry out the will of their powerful members (Mearsheimer, 1995). We reexamine these assumptions, deriving new insights about how IOs react to challenges from their members. We demonstrate that IOs can and do act in their own interests against powerful member states when they are threatened. We thus speak to the conditions under which IOs can promote cooperation, and the strategic choices faced by those tasked with fulfilling cooperative goals.

In addition, our results contribute to the large literature on forum shopping, which occurs when a state strategically selects an international forum based on which is most likely to produce

⁵²See e.g. IMF-ESM cooperation in emergency lending (Henning, 2017).

⁵³For instance, see EU-NATO cooperation in the defense arena (Biermann, 2008) and EU-IAEA cooperation in the nuclear space (<https://bit.ly/3g60NZY>).

⁵⁴Of course, the economic and security realms are connected (Davis and Meunier, 2011; Davis and Pratt, 2016). This represents a promising area for future research.

a favorable result for that state (Busch, 2007; Davis, 2009; Gray, 2018*b*). Cooperation between IOs may undercut forum shopping opportunities for member states of multiple institutions by limiting their outside options (Clark, 2020). Since we show that when IOs' leading stakeholders are populists, they cooperate more by signing information sharing agreements, this may reduce forum shopping opportunities. IOs thus may find it easier to enforce their preferred policy solutions in such cases.

Our findings also carry a number of policy implications. First, they imply that IOs are not helpless in the face of challenges to their writ. We highlight a key strategy that advocates of global governance may take to try to empower IOs to receive information more independently from their powerful members. These kinds of pathways could be explicitly built into the design of IOs to help these institutions combat future threats. More broadly, while recent scholarship has been pessimistic about the impact of populism on global governance,⁵⁵ our study offers room for optimism, as IOs may be able to partially insulate themselves from these threats. Powerful states may find it more difficult to sabotage IOs' activities than many assume.

Finally, our study suggests many directions for future work. For example, scholars could investigate additional methods that IOs use to resist challenges to their mission or functioning such as co-financing, joint meetings, or joint crisis simulations. Moreover, while we focus on populism as a key danger to IO autonomy, scholars could also examine the consequences of other threats, and how IOs' reactions differ depending on the nature of the challenge. Finally, additional work could incorporate domestic politics into our framework, analyzing how domestic populations may shape leaders' behavior toward IOs or IOs' reactions to these challenges.

⁵⁵See e.g. Bearce and Scott (2018); Heinrich, Kobayashi and Lawson (2019). Though see Chaudoin et al. (2017).

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Supporting Information for “Security Through Solidarity: How Populism Reshapes Global Governance”

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1 Supporting Statistical Information and Robustness Checks




Figure A1: Number of Information Sharing Agreements Signed Over Time.




Figure A2: Number of Information Sharing Agreements Signed By Information Category




Figure A3: Average Number of Information Sharing Agreements Signed by IOs

Institution	Date	Members
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)	1944	189
Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)	1956	41
European Investment Bank (EIB)	1958	27
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	1959	48
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)	1960	14
African Development Bank (AfDB)	1965	80
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	1966	68
East African Development Bank (EADB)	1967	4
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)	1968	21
Andean Development Corporation (CAF)	1968	18
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)	1970	27
Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)	1973	57
West African Development Bank (BOAD)	1973	8
Development Bank of the Central African States (BDEAC)	1975	6
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)	1975	11
Development Bank of the Great Lakes States (BDEGL)	1976	3
OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)	1976	12
Nordic Investment Bank (NIB)	1976	8
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	1977	177
Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB)	1985	22
Nordic Development Fund (NDF)	1989	5
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	1991	69
Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB)	1992	11
North American Development Bank (NADB)	1993	2
Economic Cooperation Organization Trade and Development Bank (ETDB)	2005	10
Eurasian Development Bank (EDB)	2006	6
New Development Bank (NDB)	2013	5
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)	2015	75

Table A1: **Development Banks List.** The membership data is accurate as of February 2020 and includes only shareholding members of each institution.

	Number of agreements	Number of categories
	Model 1	Model 2
Populism	0.241*** (0.084)	0.449*** (0.143)
Number of Members	0.006 (0.005)	0.012 (0.008)
IO Age	0.009** (0.004)	0.013* (0.007)
Polity	-0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.011)
GDPPC	0.166 (0.118)	0.210 (0.201)
IO fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Agreement type fixed effects	Yes	Yes
N	694	694

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A2: **Full Covariates Robustness Check.** Model type is OLS.

	Number of agreements		Number of categories	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Populism	0.587* (0.348)	0.364 (0.413)	0.602** (0.278)	0.323 (0.325)
Number of Members	0.652 (104.337)		0.652 (104.213)	
IO Age		-0.053 (0.071)		-0.025 (0.066)
Polity		2.374* (1.366)		2.168** (1.067)
GDPPC	-33.220 (5425.536)	-44.514 (5008.599)	-33.220 (5419.052)	-42.628 (4967.197)
N	727	694	727	694

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A3: **Poisson Robustness Check.** Model type is Poisson. Poisson models yield coefficients that can be interpreted as follows: for a one unit change in the predictor variable, the difference in the logs of expected counts is expected to change by the respective regression coefficient, given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. IO, year, and agreement type fixed effects are included.

	Number of agreements		Number of categories	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Populism	0.257*** (0.077)	0.241*** (0.084)	0.482*** (0.128)	0.450*** (0.143)
Number of Members	0.004 (0.005)		0.006 (0.008)	
IO Age	0.005 (0.004)		0.004 (0.007)	
Polity		-0.005 (0.006)		0.001 (0.011)
GDPPC		0.180 (0.117)		0.239 (0.201)
N	727	694	727	694

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A4: **Country Fixed Effects Robustness Check.** Model type is OLS. IO, year, and agreement type fixed effects are included.

	Number of agreements		Number of categories	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Populism	0.217*** (0.076)	0.214** (0.083)	0.424*** (0.126)	0.421*** (0.142)
Number of members	0.004 (0.005)		0.006 (0.008)	
IO Age	0.006 (0.004)			
Polity		-0.004 (0.007)		0.003 (0.011)
GDPPC		0.245** (0.121)		0.368* (0.206)
N	727	694	727	694

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A5: **Time Trend Robustness Check.** Model type is OLS. IO, year, and agreement type fixed effects are included, as is a linear time trend.

2 Supplemental Material for the U.S. Case Study

2.1 Cooperation Based on IO Age

The trend we report of US-led IOs signing information-sharing agreements with other IOs in the wake of Donald Trump's election is not driven primarily by cooperation between U.S.-led IOs and newer IOs, like the NDB and AIIB. While the NDB and AIIB were created in 2013 and 2015 respectively, presenting existing IOs with new opportunities for cooperation, U.S.-led IOs like the World Bank pursued cooperation with them while also redoubling their efforts to cooperate with older IOs. For example, the Arab Coordination Group (CG), which consists of several development IOs led by Arab and oil-producing states, has existed since the mid-1970s.¹ U.S.-led IOs like the World Bank rarely pursued cooperation with the CG before Trump was elected. However, as Figure A4 shows, U.S.-led IOs signed a flurry of information sharing agreements with IOs from the CG in 2017. Given that American and Arab IOs had over three decades of opportunities to cooperate before Trump's election, it seems plausible that U.S.-led IOs more aggressively sought cooperation with the CG in order to diversify their information base as Trump took office.

¹See <http://www.arabfund.org/Default.aspx?pageId=601>. Specifically, the CG includes the AFESD, BADEA, OFID, and IsDB, and it first met in 1975.




Figure A4: Number of Information Sharing Agreements Signed by U.S.-led Development IOs with Arab IOs 1980-2018.

2.2 Suppression of Science

To supplement our main analysis of information suppression under the Trump administration, we provide additional description of Trump’s efforts to do so that is relevant to development IOs’ operations. In particular, we explore such events over the period 2017-2019 using data from the Silencing Science Tracker.² This database systematically documents the Trump administration’s “attempts to restrict or prohibit scientific research, education or discussion, or the publication or use of scientific information, since the November 2016 election.”³ Suppression events are primarily related to information in the areas of public health and climate change — two areas of particular interest to development IOs as they pursue their sustainable development mandates.

Figure A5 shows the number of suppression events undertaken by the U.S. government

²See <https://climate.law.columbia.edu/Silencing-Science-Tracker>.

³Ibid.




Figure A5: **U.S. Information Suppression 2017-2019.** The vertical line denotes 2016. Data comes from Silencing Science Tracker <https://climate.law.columbia.edu/Silencing-Science-Tracker>.

over the period 2017-2019, while Figure A6 places these suppression events into categories corresponding to the type of suppression. These plots show that the Trump administration has engaged in systematic and prolonged efforts to undermine the provision and publication of scientific information.

Several of these categories are relevant to IOs’ data collection efforts. Specifically, the “Bias” category represents attempts to inject misinformation or political bias into scientific reports and government studies. Next, “Budget Cuts” comprise efforts to defund bodies that conduct scientific research or create information that might be shared with IOs. “Personnel Changes” represent the dismissal of scientists or gutting of agencies like the EPA. “Research Hindrance” is perhaps most relevant to this paper, as it involves government intervention to block the publication of reports or transmission of information. “Self-Censorship” includes instances where government researchers avoid inquiry into certain topics for fear of government censorship or suppression.




Figure A6: **U.S. Information Suppression Events by Category 2017-2019.** The vertical line denotes 2016. Data comes from Silencing Science Tracker <https://climate.law.columbia.edu/Silencing-Science-Tracker>.

2.3 Information Suppression in Turkey




Figure A7: **Share of Missing WDI Data for Turkey 1960-2019.** Data comes from the World Development Indicators. Variables are matched with those from Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2014). The red line demarcates 2014 (the year of Erdogan's election).