Shocking the Vulnerable: Job Insecurity, Local Sociotropism and Anti-Globalization Sentiment

James Bisbee (New York)†
B. Peter Rosendorff (New York)‡

November 14, 2020

Abstract

Individual expressions of anti-globalization sentiment require both a predisposition and activation in order to be expressed. Exposure to trade shocks activate such attitudes in those that perceive insecurity as to their future job prospects. We offer a novel definition of job insecurity, based on the distance both in task and geographical space between occupations, and hence the predisposition to anti-outsider attitudes. Exposure to local, geographically proximate globalization-sourced shocks activate those sentiments, and isolationist and nationalist attitudes emerge. We find strong evidence that US survey respondents in occupations that experience high degrees of risk or vulnerability are more likely to express anti-globalization sentiment, and these sentiments are magnified when those individuals are also exposed by virtue of the district and industry of employment to a globalization shock. Local sociotropism, combined with job insecurity, intensifies anti-outsider sentiments.

*We thank Jeff Frieden, Erica Owen, Layna Mosley, Stefanie Walter, Tom Pepinsky, and participants at the 2019 International Political Economy Society meeting for helpful comments and contributions as this project developed.
†james.bisbee@nyu.edu
‡peter.rosendorff@nyu.edu
## Contents

1 Introduction 3

2 Attitudes: Shocks, Risk and Activation 6
   2.1 Economic Interests .................................. 7
   2.2 Risk ................................................. 8
   2.3 Local Sociotropism .................................. 9
       2.3.1 Activation .................................... 10

3 Building a Measure of Job Insecurity 11
   3.1 I. Job Specificity .................................. 12
   3.2 II. Job Availability .................................. 14
   3.3 Combining Specificity with Availability: Job Insecurity ....... 15
   3.4 III. Individual Level Trade Shocks ..................... 19

4 Dependent Variables: Attitudes 20

5 Estimation 20

6 Results 21
   6.1 Job Insecurity and Perceptions ....................... 21
   6.2 Anti-Globalization Views ............................ 23
   6.3 Instrumental Beliefs vs. Nativism .................... 25

7 Discussion 30
1 Introduction

Is there an anti-globalization backlash? At the individual level, survey-based evidence linking exposure to trade flows and anti-outsider attitudes has remained elusive. We offer a simple explanation: Exposure to international trade and its attendant shocks is not sufficient to generate anti-globalization sentiment, but instead shocks matter to those individuals predisposed to labor market risk. Occupational characteristics together with the availability of similar jobs in nearby locations determine perceived labor market risk, and hence the predisposition to anti-outsider attitudes. Exposure to local, globalization-sourced shocks, especially to one’s industry of employment, activate those sentiments, and isolationist and nationalist attitudes emerge. The shock makes anti-globalization sentiment salient – more so in those with a preexisting perception of a precarious professional condition.

The logic of labor market risk, when interacted with a proximate trade shock activating anti-outsider sentiments has at its core both a material and identity-based mechanism Hays, Lim and Spoon (2019). While no actual job loss need be experienced, the mere exposure to neighborhood and local industry effects of globalization heighten an existing perception of a threat either to an individual’s material wellbeing or to the individual’s status as a member of a group relative to other out-groups.

We find strong evidence that US survey respondents in occupations that experience high degrees of risk or vulnerability are more likely to express anti-globalization sentiment, and these sentiments are magnified significantly when those individuals are also exposed, at least indirectly, to a globalization shock from abroad. The key to this finding is a novel definition of job insecurity, based on the distance both in task and geographical space between occupations which is an expression of the perceived difficulty any individual might have should they search for a new job with similar characteristics to their current one. We argue that job insecurity offers only a predisposition to anti-globalization sentiment. These attitudes are activated when an individual is faced with a shock to the local economy from abroad. This local sociotropic effect Alkon (2017), combined with job insecurity, intensifies anti-outsider sentiments.

The new measure of job insecurity combines two dimensions: the first is a measure of occupational task specificity – how similar is an individual’s occupation to occupations held by others in the economy. The second dimension accounts for the relative prevalence/availability of an individual’s occupation by
state. When combined, we have a measure of how frequently jobs with similar task profiles are available in the same the state for any individual.

Our approach also stresses the role of local geographical effects of globalization. Economic decline affects communities rather than individuals. Wages and employment stagnate which in turn leads to indirect, multiplier effects: lower local economic activity knocks on to declining tax revenues and property prices, public services shrink, and crime worsens and health outcomes devastate communities (Bisbee et al. 2020, Broz, Frieden and Weymouth 2020, McNamara 2017a). An individual does not need to directly experience a wage decline or a job before trade and globalization become politically salient; they may merely look out of their front door to have antiglobalization sentiments activated.

There is some evidence that exposure to trade is related to electoral shifts in both the US (Autor et al. 2016a, Jensen, Quin and Weymouth 2017, Margalit 2011) and Europe (Colantone and Stanig 2018a, Dippel, Gold and Heblich 2015, Rommel and Walter 2018), and cross-nationally (Milner 2018), the increase in support for political parties engaging in populist rhetoric (Baccini and Sattler 2020) with stronger anti-globalization platforms (Milner 2018), and the expression of authoritarian values (Ballard-Rosa et al. 2017). Survey-based evidence that individual level isolationist or nationalist sentiment is specifically linked to individuals’ experience with globalization has however, been hard to find. Like Hays, Lim and Spoon (2019), we argue the of the level of analysis matters. They replicate Colantone and Stanig (2018a) and show that survey respondents living in economically susceptible regions are more likely to harbor anti-immigrant sentiment, and argue that this effect is mediated through xenophobic beliefs. Similarly, Cerra, Ferrara and Ruggieri (2018) suggest that Chinese import shocks drive negative attitudes towards immigrants and minorities. When it comes to attitudes about international trade, trade agreements, or international organizations, most studies have failed to find an association with exposure to trade or trade shocks. Generally the findings are similar to those of Guisinger (2017) and Rho and Tomz (2015): trade policy is a low-salience issue or its consequences are misunderstood for most voters.1

Our approach is motivated both by the material and cultural approaches to political economy. An individual’s material interests matter for their political preferences, especially over international trade and migration policy. Individuals’ cultural, ethnic, religious or ideological roots also matter for preferences. We suggest that a material shock can activate these potential identities – we focus

1See in contrast (Alkon 2017, Bisbee 2018a, Owen and Quin 2016).
here on how a potential, indirect, material shock activates anti-outsider sentiment in those that are more vulnerable to economic dislocation.

Standard approaches begin with an individual’s economic identity: An individual’s education or human (or other types of) capital or assets, their industry of employment, the characteristics of the firms in which they work, the type of job they have and even its task composition or consumption patterns, in the face of potential foreign competition (or automation), are the bases for claims about patterns of expressed political views over which parties and policies gain support (Baker 2005, Dancygier and Walter 2015, Guisinger 2009, Mansfield and Mutz 2009a, Osgood 2016, Rodrik 1995, Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, Stolper and Samuelson 1941). Expressed political sentiment is consequent to the economic conditions – if an individual is a member of a group (defined by a set of common economic conditions) that loses from globalization, members of that group are likely to express anti-globalization sentiment.

This approach takes an individual’s current economic conditions as the relevant set of primitives. More sophisticated intertemporal approaches consider that an individual’s current political sentiment or attitudes are influenced by expectations about future economic prospects or risks (Rommel and Walter 2018, Walter 2017). Individual rationality in the face of uncertainty, especially under conditions of risk aversion, predicts that individuals perceiving job insecurity will be more likely to support increased social safety nets, protection from foreign competition, and any threat to wages, perhaps from immigrants (Ehrlich and Maestas 2010a). Individual occupational risk is often proxied by current unemployment rates in their industry (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014) or “offshoreability” and/or “routineness” of an occupation (Owen and Johnston 2017a).

Personal experience of economic “shocks”, say the loss of a job or a decline in the earned wage (which may be due to a variety of sources), also matters for political outcomes. The widely used “China shock” instrument for example, captures the reduction of manufacturing jobs in districts with more workers in industries producing goods similar to those imported from China; in turn this labor market impact has affected observed electoral outcomes in identifiable ways (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013).

We argue that an individual’s perception of their occupational or labor market risk provides a foundation or a predisposition towards anti-globalization sentiment. That predisposition however is somewhat low powered, and may not win out against other potential identities (such as race or religion, or partisanship or ideology) which may have higher valence and determine political sentiment.
Instead, a predisposition, captured by perceptions of occupational risk, require activation to be come politically salient. We suggest that predisposed individuals are activated to express anti-trade and immigrant opinions after local and industrial (but not necessarily personal) exposure to a specific trade shock.

Our headline finding is that while an individual exposed to shocks in their district and their industry of employment reduces individuals’ support for NAFTA (a proxy for attitudes towards international trade) by about a modest 3%, this response is much stronger among those with greater occupational risk, rising to about a 10 percentage point shift. We find similar effects for attitudes towards immigrants, and views about isolationism.

By focusing on labor market risk instead of labor market outcomes, we emphasize the crucial role played by globalization’s losers who have not yet lost. In this way, our findings compliment a growing literature that focuses on the threat of loss instead of its realization. Uncertainty begets anxiety, which can activate preexisting latent identities. (Mansfield and Mutz 2009a, 2013, Owen and Johnston 2017a, Walter 2017). Second, by predicting variation in populist beliefs at the individual level, we show that these latent (or salient) identities are not a competing explanation for anti-globalist views, but are instead the mechanism by which economic dislocation translates into anti-globalist views.

2 Attitudes: Shocks, Risk and Activation

The rise of populist sentiments has been attributed to globalization (which includes its trade, offshoring and immigration forms) and “cultural” explanations, the essence of which is a persistent strand of racism, isolationism and xenophobia in the US which may have been activated by elite cues in the recent period (Malhotra, Margalit and Mo 2013, Margalit 2019, Mutz 2018, Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018). These two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and debate persists as to whether economic dislocation drives cultural anxiety. While we focus here on perceptions of labor market risk, we suggest that anti-outsider sentiments are activated by a fear of economic dislocation.

We draw a distinction between sentiment or attitudes expressed by individuals, and aggregate measures such as election outcomes, or vote shares. There is a rich and emerging literature that economic shocks to a region or a district have

\[\text{It is presumably possible that the variation in individuals' underlying tendencies towards of xenophobia or racism is correlated with labor market risk, in which case, it is both the cultural and the risk elements that produce the antiglobalization sentiment when activated by a the economic shock.}\]

6
induced electoral shifts. Much of the literature explores the effect of the rise of Chinese imports into the US, or filings for TAA adjustment assistance \cite{Bisbee2018a, RitchieYou2020} on the shift towards or away from more extreme candidates in local elections \cite{Autoretal2016b, FeigenbaumHall2015}, and on local and national election outcomes \cite{JensenQuinnWeymouth2017}. These presume that individual level attitudes are responsive to these shocks, but there is weak or no evidence at the individual level.

### 2.1 Economic Interests

The work on the economic bases of political attitudes has relied largely on assessing the respondent’s current economic condition. Individuals in export sectors in skill-abundant countries prefer freer trade \cite{Rogowski1987}, following the logic of Stolper and Samuelson \cite{StolperSamuelson1941}. Even within an industry those with lower skills express more support for protection or insulation from foreign competition while the more productive workers are in favor of trade (reminiscent of the firm-level approach of the new new trade theory) \cite{DancygierWalter2015, RommelWalter2018, Walter2017}. Baker \cite{Baker2005} emphasizes the individual’s role as consumer in the economy, and suggests that when preferences are non-homothetic, richer individuals prefer to consume more skill-intensive goods, and may in fact oppose freer trade in skill abundant countries. Many view their occupation as integral to their sense of self \cite{Bóetal2020}; perceptions of wellbeing improve among those that are employed in sectors that expand with commercial integration \cite{Margalit2011}. Educated individuals, reflecting a cosmopolitan identity are seen to express pro-globalization attitudes more frequently \cite{MansfieldMutz2013} as are owners of homes and other assets, especially in districts adversely affected by trade \cite{ScheveSlaughter2001a}. Importantly, the logic that links the class, sector, assets or endowments of an individual to their attitudes operates directly through the effect of trade on the values of, or the returns to those assets; less appreciated perhaps is that the value of those assets may induce the activation of identity as well. Additionally, there is little role of uncertainty in this analytical approach.

Openness by its very nature introduces exogenous shocks, and attendant economic risks, to individuals at home. The premise of “embedded-liberalism” \cite{Ruggie1982} was that support for the post-war freer trade regime was exchanged for insurance against the downside risk of openness. Cameron \cite{Cameron1978} and Rodrik \cite{Rodrik1998} recognized that more accountable governments were likely to have big-
ger social safety nets. Opposition to free trade policies is therefore a function of individual’s perception of the downside risks of globalization, but also on the availability of social protection (Baccini and Sattler 2020, Foster and Frieden 2017). How then to measure an individual’s exposure to the downside risks of exposure to international trade?

### 2.2 Risk

Occupations can be described as a combination of tasks, with different jobs defined by different intensities across a task profile. Globalization more often takes the form of trade in disaggregated tasks – where elements of production take place along an extended value chain – and hence individuals with expertise in tasks that are more easily done abroad or by machines are more at risk. Owen and Johnston (2017a) combine task routineness with the degree the good being produced by the individual is tradable, or how likely it can be produced abroad. Routineness is often found in occupations with repetitive actions, such as customer service, sorting, filing etc, and is often, but not exclusively, associated with low skill jobs. Offshoreability combines the location specificity of the job with the necessary proximity to the customer. Individuals in occupations with high task routineness producing offshoreable goods are most likely to exhibit attitudes in opposition to international trade. Implicitly, it is these workers that are more vulnerable or at risk from trade related dislocation. Owen (2020) expands this approach to include an occupation’s susceptibility to automation, and creates a “routine task intensity” index (RTI) from the task categories for each occupation, and together with a measure of “automation potential”, explores the effects of these on protectionist sentiment. Individuals in those occupations with high values of these measures are more likely to exhibit protectionist sentiment and more support of right-wing parties.

Task routineness and offshoreability are also the focus of Kaihovaara and Im (2020), but are reconceptualized as measures of an individual’s “economic vulnerability.” With a very similar empirical specification to Owen and Johnston (2017a) they find that RTI and offshoreability matter for attitudes towards immigration. More vulnerability, they argue, leads to perceptions of welfare competition or labor market competition, as well as being a ripe audience for populist appeals from right wing political entrepreneurs.

---

3We make use of the occupation task intensity vectors drawn from the United States Occupational Information Network database (available at https://www.onetcenter.org/overview.html).
More recently, Baccini and Sattler (2020) measure an individual’s “vulnerability” (at the district level) as the share of workers in manufacturing and the share of unskilled workers in a district. At the individual level, they use the education of the respondent. They find that where government austerity policies impact the most vulnerable, political parties exhibit greater tendencies to use populist rhetoric, or individuals are more likely to support populist parties.

In what follows we make use of the tasks approach of Acemoglu and Autor (2011), but we do not restrict attention to any particular subset of task dimensions. We use the information that the entire task profile offers. Moreover, our measure of occupational risk more closely captures both the susceptibility of shocks from abroad, and the difficulty of finding a new job with a similar task profile in a proximate geographic areas.

2.3 Local Sociotropism

The sensitivity of an individuals' political attitudes or behavior to adverse economic events that impact the local community or their industry of employment, even if they have not directly affected the individual, is what we mean by “local sociotropism” (Alkon 2017). Sociotropism is behavior that is sensitive to aggregate, societal conditions usually measured at the national level (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, Mansfield and Mutz 2009). We emphasize the local nature of sociotropic behavior: what is experienced close-hand has a more profound effect on beliefs and attitudes than what is learned at a distance. We expect that individuals are more acutely affected by what they see out of their front doors, rather than by more distant and abstract notions of national unemployment rates or stock market levels (Bisbee 2018). And given the diversity in economic and social conditions within the US, national indicators may be only weakly related to local outcomes (McNamara 2017). Personal lived experience shape perceptions and raise the salience of an issue, and is more likely to activate beliefs and identities (Bisbee et al. 2020, Rick et al. 2012). We also distinguish our approach from the more traditional or idiosyncratic approach where only an individual’s direct experience with economic loss matters for political attitudes.

Local adverse conditions affect an individual’s well-being even if they themselves are not direct victims of a globalization shock (Broz, Frieden and Weymouth 2020). Local spending declines as some members of the community face unemployment or declining or stagnating wages; housing prices fall as people leave the town in search of other jobs (Scheve and Slaughter 2001); the quality
of local public services declines as local income and sales tax revenues fall. Even increased precautionary household saving in response to increasingly negative economic conditions reduces local economic activity (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013). If one’s friends and neighbors elect to relocate as employment opportunities disappear, community networks suffer. Shocks to industrial employment in a district mean declines in policing, school quality and other local public goods, worse health outcomes and drug abuse. To the degree that local outcomes depend on local economic activity, a negative trade or employment shock to friends, neighbors or co-workers can adversely affect an individual’s well-being. Moreover, we might expect the effect of an economic shock to a community on an individual’s attitudes to fall with geographical distance from the location of the shock (Bisbee 2018). Attitudes and behavior are not entirely egotropic or socioiotropic but lie somewhere in between.

The extent to which proximate adverse shocks affect an individual’s perceptions about their own prospects will depend on that individual’s occupational risk. When individuals perceive themselves as mobile – they have skills or perform tasks in jobs that are more widely in demand – they will worry less that the fate that befell their co-worker will have a devastating effect on them. But individuals with lower mobility, given their occupational characteristics, will rely more heavily on local economic shocks to update their perceptions of risk. Individual labor market risk matters for perceived individual exposure to local shocks. The appropriate level of analysis for the study of populism is, therefore the interaction of the individual, the community and the industry effects.

2.3.1 Activation

Within similar individuals, different identities can be activated, inducing the expression of differing attitudes to globalization. Naoi and Kume (2015) show in an experimental setting that when an individuals’ consumer identity is activated among a random selection of Japanese respondents, attitudes to trade are less oppositional, relative to when their identity as a producer is activated. Alternatively, the characteristics of the individual’s occupation may activate sentiment towards trade and globalization. Occupations characterized by both “task-routineness” and “off-shorability” activate perceptions of insecurity and exposure to risk (Owen and Johnston 2017). The literature in social psychology however suggests that an individual’s identity alone does not necessarily imply the expression of attitudes consistent with that identity. Guisinger (2009) for instance demonstrates
that trade issues are often not salient even for those that are most susceptible to dislocations from imports. Heightened risk can activate previously latent attitudes about “others,” defined in terms of race, gender or class (Guisinger 2017). Enterprising political elites play a role in individuals’ attribution of blame, and heightened risk perceptions could lead to backlash against international trade and trade agreements, foreigners and immigrants, Wall Street bankers and financial elites who profit off foreclosures.

Individual perceptions of risk or threat to well-being generates anxiety which in turn primes the salience of identity (Ehrlich and Maestas 2010, Tajfel and Turner 1986). As an individual’s perceived risk intensifies, she becomes more likely to adopt and express attitudes antagonistic to the perceived sources of these shocks. Surges in imports, or even job loss and plant closures in one’s neighborhood, can be synthesized as a threat from outsiders (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018), and previously low salient issue dimensions become dominant. Grossman and Helpman (2019) offer a model in which an individual experiences benefits when her social group does well, and examines how changes in the benefits of social group identity matter for trade policy. In a social identity equilibrium, Shayo (2009) an individual chooses their group identity (is activated) when the emotional or psychological, together with the economic benefits from doing so exceed those from identifying with the nation as a whole.

We therefore conjecture that, in the presence of adverse economic shocks to local industry, individuals in that industry with low occupational mobility are likely to express increased hostility toward globalization and immigration, as well as greater support for increased border security, stricter citizenship requirements and stricter enforcement of laws preventing the employment of undocumented aliens. Increased perceptions of personal risk activate these anti-“other” sentiments.

3 Building a Measure of Job Insecurity

We theorize two dimensions that combine to produce the activation of anti-globalization sentiment at the individual level. We begin with an individual’s

---

4 Resource unpredictability especially has been a source of mistrust of outsiders and a precipitant cause of war (Ember and Ember 1992).

5 We do not argue that anti-“other” views are the result only of economic shocks. Indeed, these attitudes may exist as distinct from individual material conditions; Margalit (2012) suggests that anti-cosmopolitan views, or a fear of social and cultural openness, help explain hostility toward economic openness. Also see Owen and Walter (2017).
occupation, and in particular, how similar an individual’s occupation is to others in the economy. Two occupations that are similar to each other in terms of the tasks they require are relatively easy to move between, while those that are dissimilar pose greater barriers to transition.

The dimension accounts for the supply of similar occupations within the individual’s geographic proximity. We weight the occupational specificity with the relative prevalence of that occupation among all occupations in the respondent’s state. There may be other jobs close in task space but they may be all in a different state – that individual may experience more anxiety about job risk than an individual with many similar jobs in their state. These two elements provide a measure of perceived occupational risk, or alternatively a measure of an individual’s predisposition to anti-globalization sentiment.

Predisposition alone is insufficient to generate anti-globalization views. Activation of the predisposition requires exposure to an external shock. We adopt a “local sociotropic” approach (Alkon 2017, Bisbee 2018a), relying on proximate exposure to an import shock as the precipitant event. Note that we do not require the individual to lose their job, because of, say, increased imports from China. All we require is that the individual is in a district and currently works in an industry that has been affected – and perhaps they see the effects of imports on their neighbors, co-workers, local firms, and their communities. We have the geographic location and the industry of employment of the respondent, and we calculate our own version, of the “China shock instrument” (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013) for each individual in our sample.

The interaction of these three factors – occupational specificity, job availability and exposure to a globalization shock – provide a strong basis for the expression of opinions opposed to trade and immigration. When an individual’s occupational status is perceived as at risk, a set of opinions and attitudes are activated by proximity to a trade shock.

3.1 I. Job Specificity

Each occupation is characterized by a 12-dimensional vector of standardized tasks; standard network techniques allow us to graph the links between occupations and to measure the uniqueness or the specificity of any job. In a sense an individual in a job for which there isn’t another close by in task-space may be

---

6 However, we do expect that the direct experience of job loss is the strongest “dose” of the activation.
7 We do not restrict attention to a subset of the tasks that might constitute any occupation (such as routineness), but instead make use of the entire task profile vector as in Owen and Johnston (2017b).
more “at-risk” than an individual in an occupation for which there are many others with similar task profiles. This is the first stage in measuring an individual’s “predisposition” to a particular sentiment.

Every occupation can be decomposed into a set of tasks, or more precisely, for every occupation \( j \), we can write a task-intensity vector \((t^j_1, t^j_2, ..., t^j_d)\), where \( d \) is the number of task dimensions. Occupation task intensity vectors are drawn from the United States Occupational Information Network database which contains expert assessments of every occupational category used in the U.S. Census [Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003]. These experts assign numerical values for the intensity with which different skills, abilities, tasks, and contexts are used in each occupation, ranging from 1 (the least intensively used) to 5 (the most intensively used).

The similarity between any two occupations \( i \) and \( j \) can be written in terms of Euclidean distance \( d_{ij} = \left( \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\gamma=1}^{d} (t^i_{\gamma} - t^j_{\gamma})^2 \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \). Two jobs involve similar tasks if their \( d_{ij} \) is relatively close to 0, whereas jobs that are very different have a score closer to 1. If the task profile of an individual’s job is not that distant (in Euclidean terms) from other jobs, there are lower barriers to finding a new job in the event of economic dislocation, and we view this individual as less at-risk along the occupational dimension. Conversely, an individual in a job with a task profile that is very distant from other jobs finds herself with skills and experiences that are less in-demand, which we interpret as greater occupational risk.

To develop a running example, Jill is a fence erector (SOC 47-4031) working and living in Jim Thorpe, PA. Her primary duties involve erecting and repairing metal and wooden fences and fence gates around highways, industrial establishments, residences, or farms using hand and power tools. To take a small selection of examples from Jill’s current occupation as a fence erector, this role requires little in the way of writing skills (1.94) but much in the way of equipment maintenance (3.69). This occupation doesn’t require strong memorization abilities (1.63) but does rely on visualization abilities (3.25). Jill’s typical activities don’t include a lot of documenting information (1.83) but she does perform a lot of general physical activities (4.26).

Her current occupation is relatively intensive in manual skills, making the transition into an occupation as a structural iron and steel worker (SOC 47-2221) relatively straightforward – she has those skills and experience. The difficulty

---

\[ \text{Owen and Johnston} \ (2017b) \] use one dimension of these task vectors, routineness, and interacts this with the offshorability of the occupation to determine attitudes to trade protection across 22 developed economies in 2003 (and 20 in 2013). Their data is borrowed from [Acemoglu and Autor (2011)].
associated with transitioning into the terrazzo workers and finishers occupation (SOC 47-2053) are slightly higher as she will need to learn about the appropriate mixtures of cement, sand, pigment, and marble chips to create floors, stairways, and cabinet fixtures. The costs associated with transitioning into a job as a computer software engineer for applications (SOC 15-1031) are much higher still, requiring multiple years learning programming languages.

If the only new jobs are looking for computer software engineers, Jill is much more at-risk than if there is labor market demand for iron and steel workers. Importantly for our story, Jill needn’t be laid off to perceive these risks. Even if she is not actively looking for a new job, we assume that she has a general sense of her prospects.

3.2 II. Job Availability

When Jill considers her labor market prospects, what is her reference? We assume that geography plays an important role in determining the sense of occupational risk felt by Jill. Put simply, if there is labor market demand for iron and steel workers a thousand miles away from Jill, it is less reassuring than if the same jobs are demanded in Jill’s state. The underlying intuition is that the costs to relocating 1,000 miles away are higher than those associated with staying in the same state, forcing Jill to confront a trade-off between moving to keep working in a similar field, or investing in new skills to stay in the same area.

Here we rely on the job-to-job (J2J) database obtained from the Census. The publicly available version of these data measure the annual number of workers who transition from one job to another by state. For example, we can calculate the total number of workers who left jobs in Pennsylvania and went to find new employment in New Jersey, as given in the example of Figure 1. Conversely, we can do the same for workers in Oregon, South Carolina, and Arizona, revealing two important components of relocation. First, there is clear evidence of a gravity bias in which the preponderance of job movers stay within the same state or move to a nearby state. Second, there is also evidence of population (or more likely, economic) gravity, wherein workers who do move further away are much more likely to relocate to more economically active states like California, Florida, or Texas; and not to states like those in northern New England, West Virginia, or Mississippi.

We can also make use of the J2J dataset and examine the flows from one industry to another by state. As illustrated in Figure 2, the majority of job-to-job
flows occur along the diagonal, meaning that most transitions occur within an industry, not across them. Nevertheless, we do note some consistent patterns in the job flows across industries. For example, workers leaving jobs in the manufacturing sector consistently shift to jobs in the administration, support, and waste management sector. Relatedly, there is clear evidence of cross-industry flows between the retail, accommodation, and administration sectors.

3.3 Combining Specificity with Availability: Job Insecurity

In the event of job loss, where do you go? The preceding discussion highlights the important barriers to finding new employment. First and most importantly, there are the barriers associated with the gap between an individual’s skill set and those required by a new job. Second, there are the barriers associated with relocating geographically for a new job. And third, there are barriers to moving from one industry to another for a new job.

We construct a novel measure of job insecurity (or labor market risk) that
Figure 2: J2J Flows by industry. Rows indicate the industry from which workers depart and columns indicate the industry to which they transition. Cells are sorted such that the industries that employ the most workers in a state are in the top-left of each panel. Cells are sized to reflect the (logged) ratio of jobs relative to the most transitions. The diagonals display within-industry transitions.

incorporates these factors. To define terms, let $i$ index the individual (a respondent in our survey), $j, k \in \mathcal{J}$ represent occupations/jobs where $j$ is $i$’s current job. Similarly, let $s, q \in \mathcal{S}$ represent US states, where $s$ is $i$’s current state of residence. Finally, let $n, m \in \mathcal{N}$ represent industries, where $n$ is $i$’s current in-
dustry of employment. Our objective is to build a measure of occupational risk for individual $i$ with job $j$ in industry $n$ living in state $s$, $R_{jns}^i$.

Our primary component of risk combines the euclidean distance between any two occupations $j$ (the respondent $i$'s current or most recent occupation) and $k$ (a potential new occupation), with the share of occupation $k$ in the respondent's current state or industry. For example, for occupation $j$ in state $s$, we take the weighted average distance between $j$ and all other occupations $k$ where the weights are given by $k$'s share of total employment in the respondent's current state $s$. Formally:

$$R_{jns}^i = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \left( d_{jk} * \frac{L_{ks}^i}{L_s^i} \right)$$

where $L_{ks}^i$ is the total jobs in occupation $k$ in respondent $i$'s current state $s$, and $L_s^i$ is the total jobs in $i$'s home state $s$. This yields a risk measure $R_{jns}^i$ which is larger for when $i$ is employed in an occupation $j$ that uses very different skills from other occupations in the same state.

An analogous measure can be constructed on the basis of industry, wherein individual $i$'s risk is defined as the euclidean distance between her current occupation $j$ and some other occupation $k$, weighted by the share of all jobs in her industry $n$ that are of occupation $k$.

$$R_{jn}^i = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \left( d_{jk} * \frac{L_{kn}^i}{L_n^i} \right)$$

These two measures represent the difficulty $i$ may face in finding a new job in the same state or industry that the respondent is currently employed in. (Unfortunately, data availability means that we cannot calculate the three-way share of occupation $k$ in industry $n$ in state $s$.) If we only relied on these measures, it would be tantamount to assuming that labor is completely immobile between states or across industries.

To relax this assumption, we augment the above measures with the job-to-job data. These data allow us to calculate the above metrics for any state $q$ and any industry $m$ by weighting these choices based on the empirically observed job flows. Denote a job flow from $i$'s home state $s$ to $q$ by $L_{s \rightarrow q}^i$ (and analogously from $i$'s industry $n$ to $m$ by $L_{n \rightarrow m}^i$). Denote the sum of labor outflows from $i$'s state $s$ to all other states as $\sum_{q \neq s} L_{s \rightarrow q}^i$, and from $i$'s industry $n$ to all other industries by $\sum_{m \neq n} L_{n \rightarrow m}^i$. 
Similarly to $R_{j}\theta_{q}$ above, we add the further weights – the share of total J2J flows from state $s$ that go to $q$. Formally:

$$R_{j}\theta_{s} = \sum_{k} \left( d_{jk} \frac{L_{kq}}{L_{q}} \frac{L_{s\rightarrow q}}{\sum_{q\neq s} L_{s\rightarrow q}} \right)$$

Analogously, for occupation $j$ in industry $n$, we take the weighted average distance between $j$ and all other occupations $k$ in a different industry $m$, where the weights are given by the share of total J2J flows that go from $n \rightarrow m$. Formally:

$$R_{j}n = \sum_{k} \left( d_{jk} \frac{L_{kn}}{L_{n}} \frac{L_{n\rightarrow m}}{\sum_{m\neq n} L_{n\rightarrow m}} \right)$$

Each of these risk components $R_{j}s,$ $R_{j}\theta_{s},$ $R_{j}n,$ and $R_{j}n$ correspond to different barriers to transitioning between a job in occupation $j$ in industry $n$ in state $s$ and a new job. $R_{j}s$ captures the difficulty in finding new work in the same state. $R_{j}\theta_{s}$ captures the difficulty in finding new work in a different state. $R_{j}n$ captures the difficulty in finding new work in the same industry. And $R_{j}n$ captures the difficulty in finding new work in a different industry.

Given that the weights are already embedded in these measures, calculating a summary measure, summing across all potential states of occupational risk for an individual working in occupation $j$ in state $s$ is simply:

$$R_{i}S = \sum_{q} R_{j}\theta_{s}$$

$$= \sum_{q} \sum_{k} \left( d_{jk} \frac{L_{kq}}{L_{q}} \frac{L_{s\rightarrow q}}{\sum_{q\neq s} L_{s\rightarrow q}} \right)$$

The analogous sum provides us a measure of industry-based occupational risk, summing across all industries:

$$R_{i}N = \sum_{m} R_{j}n$$

$$= \sum_{m} \sum_{k} \left( d_{jk} \frac{L_{kn}}{L_{n}} \frac{L_{n\rightarrow m}}{\sum_{m\neq n} L_{n\rightarrow m}} \right)$$

Without job data that is binned by occupation, state, and industry together, we calculate our final measure of occupational risk as simply the mean of these
two measures.

\[ R_{jns}^i = \frac{1}{2} \left( R_{js}^{iS} + R_{jn}^{iN} \right) \tag{1} \]

We expect the greatest risk for an individual \( i \) holding job \( j \) to accrue from the challenges in finding new work in the same state \( s \) and/or industry \( n \). If an individual’s set of occupation-specific skills is very different from those skills required by other occupations in her state or industry, we would expect her to face higher occupational risk. These measures allow us to test this theory in a series of regressions.

### 3.4 III. Individual Level Trade Shocks

Our empirical context is the United States, where we obtain geocoded survey data from the General Social Survey (GSS) that includes the respondent’s most recent occupation and industry of employment, covering the period from 1993 to 2018. During this period, the United States experienced what is commonly referred to as the “China Shock” [Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013]. In 2001, China joined the WTO and obtained permanent normal trading relations with the United States and other member countries. The US experienced an import boom from China, especially in manufacturing sectors, and while some exporters in the US saw their profits rise, local firms that competed with Chinese imports experienced market contractions.

Existing research in both economics and political science has relied on geographic labor markets to assign exposure, where having more workers employed in an import competing industry means that the location has greater exposure. The benefit of our data is that we needn’t rely on aggregate measures of labor markets to calculate our survey respondents’ exposure to the China Shock. Specifically, we observe their industry of employment directly, allowing us to connect them directly to the change in competing goods imported from China. Formally, for respondent \( i \) working in industry \( n \), we calculate:

\[ IPW_{nt}^i = \Delta M_{nt} \]

where \( \Delta M_{nt} \) is the change in Chinese imports competing with goods produced in industry \( n \) between 1989 and the year the respondent was surveyed.
4 Dependent Variables: Attitudes

We obtained geocoded data from the General Social Survey (GSS) by special request. These data cover the period from 1993 to 2018 for the United States. Topics include questions about free trade agreements, questions about globalization, and questions about immigration. In addition, we examine several questions about the individual’s perception of her labor market position to confirm that the interaction of import exposure and our measures of occupation risk indeed predict greater anxiety and dissatisfaction. The full description of these variables is included in the appendix.

5 Estimation

We use a variety of methods to estimate the relationship between import exposure and political beliefs. Our workhorse regression specification nests respondents within commuting zones by year and controls for pre-treatment individual-level covariates, including gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, age, foreign born status, foreign born status of the respondent’s parents, religion, and number of children born. We confirm our results are robust to dropping potentially post-treatment controls including marital status, religion, and children. With this specification, we predict variation in political beliefs as a function of the change in county-level import exposure, formally specified as:

\[ y_{inst} = \alpha_s + \delta_t + \beta_1 \Delta IPW_{int} + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 S_s + \epsilon_{inst} \]  

(2)

where \( \alpha_s \) and \( \delta_t \) are fixed effects for state and year, respectively; \( X_i \) is a vector of pre-treatment individual-level covariates including educational attainment, race, sex, and party affiliation; and \( S_s \) is a vector of state-level pre-treatment measures including the state’s unemployment rate and the share of the labor force employed in manufacturing in 1989.

These measures predict variation in political beliefs as a function of exposure to import competition. We are also interested in determining whether the strength of this relationship is moderated by the occupational risk of an individual’s job. In theory, we expect individuals working in higher risk occupations to be more sensitive to import competition. Effectively, this requires the potentially heroic assumption that occupational risk is pre-treatment, allowing us to use it as a moderator in interacted regressions. Clearly, this is not the case given that
part of our measure incorporates the availability of similar occupations in a given state. If import competition changes local labor markets in a regional manner, or if it influences the composition of skills and tasks required by an occupation, the pre-treatment assumption is invalidated. To account for this possibility, we construct the measure using O*NET data and geographic occupation data from 2000, prior to China’s accession to the WTO. The interaction specification can be written:

\[
y_{inst} = \alpha_s + \delta_t + \beta_1 \Delta IPWI_{nt} + \beta_2 R_{jns} + \beta_3 \Delta IPWI_{nt} \times R_{jns} + \beta_4 X_i + \beta_5 S_s + \epsilon_{inst} \tag{3}
\]

where \(R_{jns}\) is the occupational risk measure defined in equation (1) above for individual \(i\) (who holds job \(j\) in industry \(n\) living in state \(s\)). Of course each individual \(i\) with job \(j\) is surveyed at time \(t\).

6 Results

6.1 Job Insecurity and Perceptions

Before turning to our exploration of the determinants of anti-globalist beliefs, we validate that our measure of occupational risk does indeed predict variation in the respondent’s subjective evaluation of their labor market position. Specifically, we regress a battery of outcomes on the respondent’s exposure to Chinese import competition, which we dichotomize to be 1 if the respondent works in an industry whose output competes with Chinese imports, and 0 otherwise. We interact this trade exposure dummy with the individual’s occupational risk measure, \(R_{jns}\) as defined in equation (1) above.

While no one question asks specifically about occupational risk, several questions are relevant to our validation exercise. Specifically, we focus on three types of questions – those pertaining to the individual’s job specifically, those pertaining to the individual’s income, and those pertaining to the individual’s overall satisfaction with her job, finances, and life in general.

We binarize each of these questions such that a value of 1 corresponds to agreement with the panel titles displayed in Figure 3. Figure 3 presents the marginal effects plots of the relationship between individual-level exposure to Chinese import competition (y-axes) across varying levels of occupational risk (x-axes). We shade the binned marginal coefficients by whether the interaction estimate is significant at the 95% confidence level. As illustrated, there is con-
sistent evidence of the primary quantity of interest – individuals employed in import-competing industries are more pessimistic about their economic situation when their occupation is also more at risk.

Figure 3: Marginal effects (y-axes) of exposure to Chinese imports across standardized measures of occupational risk (x-axes) for a range of questions pertaining to the individual’s subjective experience in the labor market.

These patterns reflect the validity of the economic measures we apply to the data, revealing consistent relationships between the attributes of the respondents’ labor market conditions and their subjective views on the same. But what about the beliefs that are more abstract? Specifically what about those beliefs that carry more powerful political consequences?
6.2 Anti-Globalization Views

We start our analysis by combining multiple questions on international trade, immigration, and international organizations that were asked over the period of our analysis. We do this by identifying consistently worded questions on NAFTA’s benefits for the US (trade), accepting new immigrants (xenophobia), and three questions about the power of international companies and organizations. Since each category of interest is comprised of several questions, we use principal component analysis to reduce each to a single dimension, which we refer to as “synthetic” measures of protectionism, xenophobia, and isolationism. In each case, positive values reflect more protectionist views, more anti-immigrant views, and more anti-IO views. We predict variation in these outcomes as a function of individual covariates, local factors, and the interaction between the respondent’s exposure to Chinese imports (also dichotomized) and her occupational risk measure. Figure 4 plots the marginal relationships between anti-globalist views and import competition across the support of occupational risk.

![Figure 4: Marginal effects of individual import penetration exposure (y-axes) on a synthetic globalist opinions (panels) across levels of occupational risk (x-axes), $R_{jns}^i$. Black points indicate statistically significant interaction coefficients.](image)

There is significant evidence that exposure to Chinese import competition prompts anti-globalist views on international trade and international organizations among individuals working in occupations at higher risk. And while the interaction coefficient for immigrants is not statistically significant, it shares the expected sign. These results capture an anti-globalist sentiment that manifests not among those who have already lost due to globalization, but among those who are most threatened by it.

These results are based on the full risk measure that combines the industry
and state dimensions. But which of these components of occupational risk are most important? To evaluate this question, we re-run the above regressions using just the $R_{js}^S$ and $R_{jn}^N$ components of the measure. These results are summarized in Figure 5 and 6.

Figure 5: Marginal effects of individual import penetration exposure (y-axes) on a synthetic globalist opinions (panels) across levels of (industry-based) occupational risk (x-axes), $R_{jn}^N$. Black points indicate statistically significant interaction coefficients.

Figure 6: Marginal effects of individual import penetration exposure (y-axes) on a synthetic globalist opinions (panels) across levels of (state-based) occupational risk (x-axes), $R_{js}^S$. Black points indicate statistically significant interaction coefficients.

As illustrated, the disaggregated risk measures return positive marginal effects for the synthetic measures of xenophobia and international organizations, although in neither case do these reach conventional levels of statistical significance. A difference conclusion is drawn when we look at the synthetic trade measure, however. Here, we see no evidence of increasing protectionist sentiment across the support of the industry-based measure of occupational risk (left panel...
However, when we define occupational risk in terms of geography, we see a positive and statistically significant interaction term (left panel of Figure 9).

6.3 Instrumental Beliefs vs. Nativism

The preceding results suggest that exposure to the China shock alone is insufficient to generate the anti-globalist wave currently seen sweeping advanced industrial democracies. The threat of import competition must be paired with labor market insecurity, which we measure using novel calculations of occupational risk.

However, the main results treat this anti-globalist wave in aggregate, looking only at dimension-reduced summaries protectionism, xenophobia, and distrust of international organizations. Our data allow us to test more nuanced claims than these. Specifically, is xenophobia couched primarily in economic or cultural anxieties? Is disdain for NAFTA due primarily to skepticism over free trade’s benefits? Or does it better correspond to a more general resentment against participation in an international system that impugns US sovereignty?

To answer these questions, we disaggregate the synthetic variables back to their constituent questions. In all cases, we predict variation in these responses as a function of individual-level China shock exposure interacted with the full occupational risk measure that combines the state and industry dimensions. By looking at the responses to carefully-worded survey questions, we can explore the motivations and justifications for the increase in anti-globalist views we summarize above, starting with questions about immigration.

We begin with views on immigrants, and examine whether the xenophobia documented above is due primarily to economic or cultural concerns. As illustrated in Figure 7, we see strong evidence of xenophobia stemming from the former. Specifically, occupational risk is significantly (black) predictive of greater skepticism about the economic benefits of immigration. The one exception to these statistically significant results (gray) obtains for the belief that increased immigration leads to higher unemployment. While trade-exposed individuals are more likely to believe that immigrants take jobs away from Americans, they do not believe that these lost jobs translate to greater unemployment writ large.

Striking evidence of the economic concerns with immigrants may not be particularly surprising, given the predictors of occupational risk interacted with import competition. While free trade’s losers do not have immigrants specifically to blame, their economic distress is attributable to foreign workers who either
Immigrants take jobs away from Americans

Immigrants do not improve America's economy

Immigrants lead to lower economic growth

Immigrants lead to higher unemployment

5.4
5.6
5.8
6.0
6.2

−0.15
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10

5.4
5.6
5.8
6.0
6.2

−0.1
0.0
0.1

5.4
5.6
5.8
6.0
6.2

Figure 7: Marginal effects of individual-level trade exposure (y-axes) on beliefs about the economic consequences of immigration to the United States (panels) across varying levels of occupational risk (x-axes). Black points indicate statistically significant interaction effects.

produce goods more cheaply or are the destination for offshored jobs. For individuals suffering from globalization’s consequences in this manner, immigrants may be a particularly salient example of a foreign worker and are thus – unfairly – blamed for the economic problems created by a different set of foreign workers. We emphasize that these results are consistent with a misguided but instrumental motivation for the xenophobic dimension of the anti-globalist wave.

But there are other dimensions along which individuals may hold anti-globalist sentiments with respect to immigrants. One well-documented theory from the psychology literature holds that out-group resentment is amplified under conditions of scarcity, as individuals compete over resources (Bianchi, Hall and Lee 2018, Krosch and Amodio 2014, Tajfel and Turner 1986, Tajfel et al. 1971). If this channel is active, we might expect to see increased xenophobia expressed in terms
of competition over public goods, articulated in resentments against perceived claims on public goods. Figure 8 summarizes the marginal effects as above, this time focusing on a subset of survey questions interrogating xenophobia through the lens of unfair beneficiaries of government resources. As illustrated, there is consistent evidence of this dimension of xenophobia, with trade exposed individuals being significantly more likely to express resentment against the perceived special treatment of immigrants in the United States. Importantly however, the top row of plots suggests that this resentment is narrowly focused on concrete measures of government and social assistance. This is consistent with psychological theories of out-group antipathy motivated by competition over scarce resources.

At the furthest remove from purely economic concerns is the dimension of xenophobia that is explicitly nativist in its origins. By “nativism”, we mean the identity-based beliefs about the sanctity of American culture and definition of who can and can not be American. This definition is distinct from “populism” which refers to a set of beliefs pitting “the people” against “the elite”. Both sets of beliefs have found political expression over the past decade in advanced industrial democracies, although populist candidates have found more success at the ballot box. As illustrated in Figure 9 we find striking evidence of a nativist response among those most threatened by globalization’s economic dislocation. The top row expresses skepticism toward globalist claims of the benefits of immigration at the ideational level. The bottom row goes a step further to express decidedly nativist stances on what defines an American citizen, emphasizing ancestry and birth.

These varying dimensions of xenophobia get at the underlying nativist component of free trade’s losers in the United States. Unfortunately, there are far fewer detailed questions on the topics of trade and international organizations, precluding our ability to dig into the constituent parts of these beliefs to the same level of detail. We look across a range of topics in Figure 10 noting that all interaction terms are positive, suggesting that those with greater occupational risk hold more nativist views. In particular, there is significant evidence that occupational risk is an important moderator on an individual’s skepticism about NAFTA, and suggestive evidence that occupational risk exaggerates her skepticism about free trade’s benefits in terms of better products.

Similarly, in the bottom row there is significant evidence that at-risk respondents that compete with Chinese imports are more likely to belief that international organizations take away too much power, and suggestive evidence that they believe multi-national corporations harm local businesses. But paradoxically, at-
Figure 8: Marginal effects of individual-level trade exposure (y-axes) on beliefs about the government resources for immigrants (panels) across varying levels of occupational risk (x-axes). Black points indicate statistically significant interaction effects.

risk respondents are insignificantly less likely to indicate that America should not follow the decisions of international organizations. We posit that this discrepancy may stem from the timing of when the more general question was asked – specifically during the Iraq War when the legitimacy of international organizations for war efforts may have been more salient. We do note that the strongest results obtain for aspects of international organizations that threaten US sovereignty,
whereas the interaction effects for the specific economic concerns with MNCs, while positive, is not statistically significant. The economic insecurity generated by trade exposure and occupational risk therefore appears to be couched more firmly in concerns with independence, autonomy, and national identity than it does with the purely economic threats posed by globalization.

Figure 9: Marginal effects of individual-level trade exposure (y-axes) on beliefs about the relationship between immigrants and social cohesion (panels) across varying levels of occupational risk (x-axes). Black points indicate statistically significant interaction effects.
Figure 10: Marginal effects of individual-level trade exposure (y-axes) on beliefs about international organizations and multinational corporations (panels) across varying levels of occupational risk (x-axes). Black points indicate statistically significant interaction effects.

7 Discussion

The relationship between exposure to free trade’s negative consequences and political beliefs about free trade are moderated by an individual’s occupational risk. We show that individuals in industries and districts facing a high degree of import penetration exhibit more negative opinions about free trade agreements. But importantly, we show that these reactions are stronger among those who face greater occupational insecurity.

We calculate job insecurity or vulnerability as a combination of job specificity and job availability. When disaggregated, these dimensions of occupational risk somewhat predict heterogeneity in the relationship between opinions and trade exposure. But the strongest moderating effects come when the dimensions are combined.

These results highlight the importance of expanding our understanding of
who wins and loses under free trade. Exposure to trade’s negative consequences can influence the policy preferences that define the microfoundations of trade’s political economy. But this exposure interacts with an individual’s occupational risk profile in important ways. This understanding augments the conventional wisdom about the political economy of trade by redefining both who reacts to trade’s effects, and how strongly they react.

Our findings also reveal more precisely the degree to which the backlash against globalism is entwined with baser beliefs about identity, citizenship, and culture. We document striking patterns between the threat of economic dislocation due to import competition and beliefs that are adjacent to, but extend beyond, the economic concerns with free trade, international organizations, and immigrants. Put bluntly, those who are hurt by globalization hold more nativist views, ranging from the qualities that define an American citizen to the anxiety that foreign cultures erode our own.

We argue that the patterns we document are causal in the sense that our respondents confront unforeseen labor market threats. Yet we emphasize that, even in the absence of causal claims, these descriptive patterns are striking. In our data, free trade’s potential (and not necessarily actual) losers adhere to a worldview of eroding American power, the decline of American culture, and the powerlessness of American sovereignty. While our empirical results remain circumscribed to the United States at the turn of the 21st century, we argue that they capture a common pattern across advanced industrial democracies. We believe our picture of how economic dislocation leads to rising nativism presents a serious challenge to the liberal world order.
References


URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22637


**URL:** jamesbisbee.com


**URL:** https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1678662


URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755773920000144


URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013516066


URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.33.4.152


McNamara, Kathleen R. 2017b. “Constructing Economic Interests: Geography, Culture, and the Liberal International Order.”


URL: https://www.pnas.org/content/115/19/E4330


URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2017.1307245


URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/710322


URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962581


URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710264


URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199600000945


