

Right-Wing Populism and the Rise of Internationalism in Europe*

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September 1, 2021

Abstract

Populist radical right (PRR) parties have become increasingly electorally successful in Europe over the past decade. These parties frequently campaign on platforms that emphasize their opposition to international economic integration (free trade, European integration, and immigration). At the same time, however, public opinion surveys suggest that Europeans are becoming more supportive of international economic integration. How can we explain these diverging trends? I argue that the growing popularity of PRR parties produces an increase in support for international economic integration in Western Europe. As PRR parties and their anti-internationalism become more prominent in public discourse, so do their extremist tendencies. Anti-internationalism therefore becomes linked to right-wing extremism in public discourse, leading individuals who reject this extremism to shift their attitudes in favor of international economic integration. To test this argument, I create an original measure of the link between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism in media discourse for eight Western European countries, using supervised machine learning. I combine this measure with survey data to show that the more Euroskepticism is linked to extremism, the higher support for European integration is. I complement this analysis with an unexpected event during survey design that allows me to causally identify the effect of a closer link between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism on public opinion. My findings suggest that, under the right political circumstances, the electoral backlash against globalization can be counter-balanced by rising internationalism.

*I gratefully acknowledge support for this project from the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), Canada. I am also grateful to Vincent Arel-Bundock, Jiwon Baik, Colin Cepuran, Ani Chen, Alexandra Cirone, Richard Clark, Amanda Clayton, Alex Dyzenhaus, Naomi Egel, Peter Katzenstein, Jonathan Kirshner, Cameron Mailhot, Jörg Matthes, Tom Pepinsky, Lindsey Pruett, Ken Roberts, Aditi Sahasrabudde, Kim-Lee Tuxhorn, Steven Ward, Jessica Chen Weiss, participants at the 2019 BSIA PhD Dissertation Workshop in Global Political Economy, the 2021 Western US Graduate Research Workshop on the European Union, and the Cornell Department of Government Dissertation Colloquium, and panelists at the 2021 European Political Science Association Annual Conference for helpful comments on earlier versions.

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In the last decade, there has been increasing concern over the rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe. These parties have generated considerable political instability and disrupted the established political order. They are often considered a danger to liberal democracy, an open international economy, and the protection of socially progressive values. The dramatic increase in vote shares for PRR parties in the wake of the global financial crisis is commonly attributed to a backlash in European public opinion: increasing disillusionment with the political establishment, growing hostility toward immigrants, and decreasing support for the European Union (EU) (Colantone and Stanig 2018; Hobolt and De Vries 2016; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Parties that campaign on anti-immigration, anti-globalization, and Euroskeptic platforms are able to attract these dissatisfied voters.

Importantly, however, public opinion surveys reveal that Europeans are becoming *more supportive* of immigration, European integration, and globalization, even as parties that oppose these forms of international economic integration continue to gain electoral ground. As Figure 1 shows, PRR parties in Western Europe saw a dramatic increase in vote share after 2008 that has continued up to 2018. Looking at attitudes toward international economic integration over the same time period, we observe a steep growth in support for immigration, European integration, and globalization, well surpassing pre-crisis levels of support.¹

How can we explain the puzzling trend of increasingly internationalist publics amid growing vote shares for parties that campaign on anti-internationalist platforms? In this paper, I argue that support for international economic integration has grown *because of*—rather than *despite*—the increased prominence of anti-internationalist PRR parties. When these parties became more prominent in the wake of the euro and migrant crises, Western Euro-

¹The trend lines in this figure are based on the ten Western European members of the EU for which European Social Survey (ESS) data are available for the years 2004–2018—Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK). Eurobarometer data on support for the EU and support for globalization produces similar trends for Western Europe as a whole. *Support for EU* is based on the ESS question about the desired extent of European unification, *support for immigration* is based on the ESS questions whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy and whether immigrants make the country a better place to live, and *support for globalization* is based on the Eurobarometer question whether globalization is an opportunity for economic growth. *Support for immigration* and *support for globalization* have been rescaled to a 0–10 scale.




Figure 1: Trends in average PRR party vote share and public opinion in ten Western European countries, 2004–2018. Data on PRR party vote shares is drawn from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2021). Weighted public opinion measures are drawn from the ESS for support for the EU and immigration, and from Eurobarometer survey data for support for globalization.

pean publics became more aware of their anti-internationalist positions. With this greater influence for PRR parties, however, has also come greater recognition of their extremist tendencies. When PRR parties are the dominant anti-internationalist actors in the political system, anti-internationalism becomes linked with right-wing extremism in public discourse. This means that individuals who hold only weak preferences on international economic integration will increasingly alter those preferences to become more internationalist. This process in turn leads aggregate public opinion to shift toward greater internationalism.

I test hypotheses derived from this argument in two empirical studies designed to address the difficulties associated with analyzing public discourse and attitude change: one focusing on cross-national variation, the other on causal identification within a single case. In Study 1, I create an original measure of the link between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism in the media discourse in eight Western European countries between 2000 and 2019, using a supervised machine learning approach. I combine this new measure with Eurobarome-

ter survey data to test the relationship between media discourse and support for European integration. I find that closer links between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism are correlated with higher levels of support for European integration and that this correlation is stronger for countries in which PRR parties are the primary actors promoting Euroskepticism. In Study 2, I use an unexpected event during survey design to causally identify the effect of an exogenous shock linking anti-internationalism with right-wing extremism in public discourse. Specifically, I study the effect of the murder of UK Member of Parliament Jo Cox in 2016 on internationalism, using British Election Study (BES) data to compare responses collected in the days before the murder to those collected in the days after. I show that support for immigration and European integration increased after Cox's murder and media coverage that tied anti-internationalism to political violence and right-wing extremism.

This research points to the importance of domestic political contestation in shaping attitudes toward international economic integration. Importantly, attitudes are affected by the strength of the link between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism, which varies between countries and over time depending on issue salience, media attention, and the strategies adopted by parties in the political system. The framework I describe points to the existence of a counterbalancing mechanism in the face of the backlash against globalization, potentially strengthening our confidence in the resilience of the liberal international order. However, this mechanism depends on a continuing link between anti-internationalism and extremism in public discourse, which is far from guaranteed. In particular, mainstream parties co-opting anti-internationalist positions could end up decreasing support for international economic integration among the broader public by weakening the link between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism.

Explaining Internationalism in Public Opinion

I use internationalism and anti-internationalism as umbrella terms to refer to attitudes and party positions on three key forms of international economic integration: free trade, European integration, and immigration. While the dynamics of party politics and public opinion may look different for each of these forms, the argument presented here should apply to each of them. This is because they are all issues that relate to international engagement and have as such historically been less salient in domestic political contestation in many Western democracies (Dancygier and Margalit 2020; Guisinger 2017; Hooghe and Marks 2009). On the one hand, this makes these issues attractive for challenger parties such as PRR parties to compete on. On the other hand, their low salience means public opinion toward them is likely to be more malleable than attitudes toward issues that have historically been more highly politicized. While I use the terms internationalism and anti-internationalism in the theoretical framework to refer to attitudes and party positions toward any of the three forms of international economic integration I study, I focus on Euroskepticism (Studies 1 and 2) and anti-immigration sentiment (Study 2) in the empirical section.

What factors could account for the shift toward more internationalism in public opinion at a time when parties promoting anti-internationalism are seeing greater electoral success? There are large scholarly literatures that seek to explain public opinion on different forms of international economic integration. Broadly, these analyses consider instrumental economic reasons, on the one hand, and sociocultural preferences, on the other, as determinants of attitudes. Support for European integration and free trade has been linked to economic opportunity, with factors such as education, age, and occupation determining attitudes (Gabel 1998; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Owen and Johnston 2017; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Other scholars point to identity considerations as important factors in explaining attitudes toward international economic integration: conception of national identity with regard to European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2002), in-group favoritism with regard to free trade (Margalit 2012; Mutz and Kim 2017),

and perceived cultural threat with regard to immigration (Hartman, Newman, and Bell 2014; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013).

More recent analyses look at determinants of changes in both public opinion and vote share for parties promoting anti-internationalism in the wake of the global financial crisis. Most commonly, these studies focus on (perceived) economic factors, such as individuals' perceptions of how economic crises have affected them (Hobolt and De Vries 2016), country-level economic indicators (Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia 2013), or trade-related shocks to the economy (Ballard-Rosa, Jensen, and Scheve 2021; Ballard-Rosa et al. 2021; Bisbee et al. 2019; Colantone and Stanig 2018). In these accounts, opposition to international economic integration and increases in anti-internationalist party vote share go hand in hand. While some scholars have explored whether political parties can “cue” anti-internationalist sentiment (Harteveld, Kokkonen, and Dahlberg 2017; Neiman, Johnson, and Bowler 2006), there has been relatively little scholarship on the relationship between electoral dynamics and public opinion that would help explain the puzzle of growing public support for international economic integration amidst increasing electoral success for parties campaigning on anti-internationalist platforms.

A number of researchers have noted that support for international economic integration has either increased or remained stable in a range of countries (Matthijs and Merler 2020; Turnbull-Dugarte 2020; Walter 2021b). Some studies offer insights into why this development may be occurring: Minkus, Deutschmann, and Delhey (2019) show that the election of Donald Trump to the United States (US) presidency had a positive effect on support for European integration in Europe. Similarly, Schwartz *et al.* (2021) find that the Brexit vote increased support for immigration in the UK, due to both a perceived reduction in threat and the controversies about xenophobia and racism during the referendum campaign. In the theoretical framework outlined below, I build on this research to argue that the increasing prominence of PRR parties and the resulting linking of anti-internationalism to extremism is driving the observed changes in public opinion.

The Theoretical Framework: Anti-Internationalism as Extremism

To explain the growing support for international economic integration in Western Europe at a time when parties campaigning on anti-internationalist platforms are increasingly electorally successful, I draw on the literature on the rise of the integration-demarcation cleavage, studies of PRR party strategies, and on the social psychology literature on social norms. The euro and migrant crises raised the profiles of PRR parties across Western Europe and highlighted their anti-internationalism in public discourse. Increasing prominence as well as PRR party strategies and practices, however, have also led to greater media attention and public awareness of their extremist tendencies. This means that anti-internationalism is increasingly linked to right-wing extremism in media discourse, leading the majority of the population that rejects extremism to extend this rejection to anti-internationalism as well. In this way, the growing prominence of PRR parties contributes to rising support for international economic integration.

The Distribution of Weak and Strong (Anti-)Internationalists

Since before the outbreak of the global financial crisis, scholars have posited the development of a new cleavage in Europe, centered on the issues of globalization, European integration, and immigration (Kriesi et al. 2006). This new conflict has been referred to as the “integration-demarcation divide” (Kriesi et al. 2008) or the “transnational cleavage” (Hooghe and Marks 2018). Studies suggest that it is driven by (perceived) effects of globalization on individuals and communities, has become increasingly important since the 1990s, and affects individuals’ political attitudes and behavior (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Jackson and Jolly 2021; Kriesi et al. 2008; Kuhn, Solaz, and Van Elsas 2018; Teney et al. 2014).

While Kriesi et al. (2008) describe this new cleavage as dividing “the winners” from

“the losers” of globalization, this relatively static conceptualization does not explain why the median survey respondent increasingly identifies as a “winner” of globalization. Instead, in order to understand the recent growth in support for international economic integration, I argue that we need to explore how this new cleavage relates to other cleavages and political identities.

In particular, I posit that the issue area of international economic integration is subject to *asymmetric strengths of preferences*. While individuals with weak preferences on international economic integration may either support or oppose it, it is rare for individuals who support international economic integration to have strong preferences on it (or at least, strong enough preferences to affect their vote choices). Instead, people with strong preferences on international economic integration tend to oppose it.² As such, while the integration-demarcation cleavage may represent the most salient political identity for the subsection of the public that holds strong anti-internationalist preferences, it is unlikely to be the most meaningful one for both weak opponents and weak advocates of international economic integration. Figure 2 shows the four categories along these two dimensions.³

I argue that as the upper right quadrant of strong preferences in favor of international economic integration is relatively sparsely populated, parties have little incentive to politicize the internationalist end of the integration-demarcation spectrum, leading to the general depoliticization of international economic integration among the political establishment (Freeman 1995; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Ibsen 2019). By contrast, the more densely populated upper left quadrant represents an opportunity for challenger parties—and PRR parties in particular as the “political losers” in the party system—to gain votes by politicizing the anti-internationalist end of the spectrum (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; De Vries and Hobolt 2020).

²We can think of this in similar terms as the traditional notion of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits associated with economic integration (Alt and Gilligan 1994; Ehrlich 2007; Frieden and Rogowski 1996).

³While Figure 2 is a stylized representation of the distribution of the population across these four quadrants, Eurobarometer survey data suggests that this representation is fairly accurate for attitudes toward immigration. Based on responses to questions on immigrants’ contribution and whether or not immigration is noted as one of the two most important issues, the average percentages for 2000–2019 are 6 for strong internationalists, 11 for strong anti-internationalists, 38 for weak internationalists, and 45 for weak anti-internationalists.




Figure 2: Schematic representation of the two dimensions along which attitudes toward international economic integration vary: degree of support for international economic integration and strength of preferences. Shading represents posited distribution of population, with lighter areas more sparsely populated and darker areas more densely populated.

This configuration means that political discourse on international economic integration is disproportionately led by anti-internationalist parties, including PRR parties.

PRR Parties and Discourse on Anti-Internationalism

In political contexts in which PRR parties are the primary proponents of anti-internationalism, they therefore dominate the discourse on international economic integration. This has few ramifications for public opinion as long as these parties exist only on the margins of the political system, gaining few votes and receiving little media attention. The euro crisis and subsequent migrant crisis, however, brought issues of international economic integration to the foreground, prompting strong media and public attention. PRR parties were able to strategically exploit the new salience of issues related to international economic integration by pivoting to a greater emphasis on anti-internationalism in their platforms and rhetoric, and experienced unprecedented gains in vote share across much of Western Europe. Several

new PRR parties with strong anti-internationalist platforms—such as the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in Germany, *Forum voor Democratie* (FvD) in the Netherlands, and *Vox* in Spain—emerged in response to these crises.

I argue that this new prominence of PRR parties—particularly in the absence of other anti-internationalist parties—fundamentally reshaped the discourse on international economic integration. Their dominant position in the discourse meant that the integration-demarcation divide was no longer viewed as a free-floating cleavage, but instead became tied to PRR parties’ broader political programs. As PRR parties became the loudest voices in the discourse on international economic integration, members of the public heard their anti-internationalist message and increasingly based their reactions to it on their attitudes toward the PRR parties more generally. For the majority of the population who occupy the two lower quadrants in Figure 2—who have weak preferences either in favor or against international economic integration—attitudes toward international economic integration are likely to be more malleable than attitudes toward other aspects of PRR parties’ rhetoric and platforms.

If individuals with weak preferences change their attitudes toward international economic integration based on how they feel about other aspects of PRR parties, in which direction should we expect their opinions to change? I argue that three key aspects of the strategies and practices employed by PRR parties and politicians mean that we should expect these individuals to shift their preferences *in favor* of international economic integration. First, PRR parties tend to opportunistically switch the focus of their rhetoric and platform based on trends in the salience of different issue areas (Rovny 2013; Wodak 2015).⁴ As the salience of issues related to international economic integration gradually declined after the euro and migrant crises, many PRR parties in Western Europe have (re-)turned to emphasizing other aspects of their platforms. Similar to their strategy on international economic integration,

⁴A senior AfD strategist noted in an interview that the shift in the party’s focus from EU policy to the migrant crisis in 2015 had been “necessary” to the continued success of the party, stating that “issues like the opening of the borders [to refugees] in 2015 ... were served to us on a silver platter, we would be crazy not to make use of them” (Interview with the author, January 2020).

they underline their distinctiveness in the political space by adopting positions and rhetoric that fall outside the scope of mainstream politics as a means of maintaining ownership over these issue positions (Meguid 2008). For instance, the fight against the “Islamization” of Western societies, opposition to the dismantling of traditional gender roles, and resistance to “climate hysteria” are three of the focal points these parties have commonly (re-)emphasized in the post-crisis period. Such positions and rhetoric are applauded by their supporters, but are also recognized as extreme by a large proportion of the public. These members of the public may not consider Euroskeptic or anti-immigrant rhetoric transgressive, but are able to identify when PRR parties break taboos in relation to issues with which they are likely to be more familiar.

Second, the increased prominence and electoral success of PRR parties raised the potential gains—with regard to power, influence, and resources—of party leadership, encouraging both in-fighting within PRR parties and the founding of rival parties. For instance, the AfD in Germany has suffered from severe in-fighting throughout its short life, while the FvD was founded in 2016 as a rival party to the older *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) in the Netherlands. These rivalries within and between PRR parties tend to generate more extremist rhetoric and positions, as politicians seek to “outflank” one another in their competition for media attention and hardline supporters. As such, the public is more strongly reminded of PRR parties’ extremism even as they become more prominent. As a senior AfD strategist noted, politicians who engage in this type of “provok[ing]” rhetoric “enjoy [the increased media attention], but we [the party] don’t,” as it contributes to the extremist image of the party (Interview with the author, January 2020). Third, scholars of PRR parties have found that these parties often tolerate or employ ambiguity toward right-wing extremism as a strategic tool to gain media attention and appeal to their supporters (Schroeder, Weßels, and Joly 2019; Wodak 2015). While aiming provocative, radical statements at their base, they show the “respectable” side of the party to the broader public, allowing them to present themselves as victims of a biased media environment and “political correctness” when the party

as a whole is held accountable for the statements in question. While these strategies are effective tools for PRR parties, they also reinforce perceptions of these parties as extremist.

Crucially, the media has played an important role in each of these processes. As analyses of media responses to rising populist parties have found, media outlets have incentives to award disproportionate attention to challenger parties, thereby amplifying PRR parties' voices in public discourse. In particular, studies have found that populists "typically employ highly emotional, slogan-based, tabloid-style language" that attracts media audiences (Mazzoleni 2003, 5). Similarly, their anti-establishment positions necessarily make them politically contentious, providing easy controversy for media outlets to cover. At the same time, however, the media also have incentives to highlight controversial or extreme aspects of the parties in question (Stewart, Mazzoleni, and Horsfield 2003).

This represents a double-edged sword for PRR parties. On the one hand, they can use extreme rhetoric to take advantage of the "free advertising" the media provides them (Mazzoleni 2003, 15). On the other hand, this tactic can also backfire, resulting in media coverage that focuses more on the extremism than the party's intended message. As the senior AfD strategist quoted above noted: "How are you most likely to get [media coverage]? Through something that has to do with National Socialism or German colonialism or ... something that has to do with German history" (Interview with the author, 2020). While PRR parties are therefore able to exploit media incentives to gain more publicity, they also run the risk of being portrayed in a more extremist light whenever they make use of these tactics. The interlinking incentives of both PRR parties and the media therefore increase the likelihood that 1) PRR parties dominate media discourse on international economic integration and 2) the media discourse on international economic integration increasingly becomes a discourse about PRR parties' extremism.

Anti-Internationalism as Right-Wing Extremism

I argue that as a result of these PRR strategies and media incentives, the broader political program that the integration-demarcation divide became tied to is increasingly associated with right-wing extremism in the media. As a large literature has shown, the way in which political issues are covered in the media can shape the way publics think about them (Boukes and Boomgaarden 2015; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Lecheler and de Vreese 2010). The more public discourse links anti-internationalism with right-wing extremism, the more expressions of anti-internationalism take on a specific social meaning.⁵ In a context in which anti-internationalism is not associated with right-wing extremism, stating that one dislikes the EU conveys only information pertaining to the individual’s attitude toward the EU. By contrast, in a context in which anti-internationalism *is* closely linked to right-wing extremism, stating that one dislikes the EU conveys an additional social meaning—that one may be sympathetic to far-right ideas and groups. In this way, anti-internationalism becomes a “loaded” position to take.⁶

I argue that this new social meaning attached to anti-internationalism is important because of the strong social norms against (explicit) right-wing extremism in Western Europe (Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsflaten 2013). According to the social psychology literature on social norms, individuals will go to considerable lengths to avoid (being perceived as) violating social norms, including suppressing their own prejudices (Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien 2002; Guimond et al. 2013; Walker, Sinclair, and MacArthur 2015). This adjustment of attitudes and behavior is particularly prevalent in contexts where social norms are clear and brought directly to bear on the situation at hand (Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsflaten 2013; Zitek and Hebl 2007). In contexts in which anti-internationalism may be taken to convey sympa-

⁵I follow Lessig’s definition of social meaning as “the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context” (1995, 951). Social meaning refers to the additional information beyond the literal content that is conveyed by behavior or identity.

⁶This dynamic is similar to the way in which the American politics literature has described polarization among the US public along partisan lines, where “[a] single vote can now indicate a person’s partisan preference *as well as* his or her religion, race, ethnicity, gender, neighborhood, and favorite grocery store” (Mason 2018: 14, emphasis in original).

thy for right-wing extremism, individuals who hold anti-internationalist preferences but also wish to adhere to social norms should therefore feel pressure to alter their preferences on international economic integration.

The literature on the relationship between partisanship and policy preferences in American politics posits that the extent to which individuals update their issue positions to match their partisanship or vice versa depends on how much importance they attach to the issue (Carsey and Layman 2006; Levendusky 2009). I argue that, similarly, the extent to which individuals shift their anti-internationalist preferences in order to adhere to social norms should depend on the strength of these preferences. If, as posited above, the majority of Western Europeans hold *weak* preferences on international economic integration, we should see considerable changes in attitudes among individuals with anti-internationalist preferences. In other words, I expect individuals in the lower left-hand quadrant (weak anti-internationalist preferences) in Figure 2 to increasingly shift to the lower right-hand quadrant (weak internationalist preferences). While the minority of the population that holds strong anti-internationalist preferences may continue to hold these preferences despite the associated violation of social norms, we should expect overall public opinion to shift in favor of international economic integration at precisely the same time that PRR parties campaigning on anti-internationalist platforms are more prominent than ever.

Hypotheses

In this paper, I focus on testing two broad implications of my theoretical framework.⁷ Above, I argue that attitudes toward international economic integration are affected by the reshaping of the discourse on international economic integration as attention to PRR parties' anti-internationalism *and* their right-wing extremism grows. Based on this, we should expect to see more internationalist publics the more public discourse associates the two:

⁷I test hypotheses related to the specific mechanisms outlined above in other work.

H1: Support for international economic integration will increase as anti-internationalism is more closely linked to right-wing extremism in public discourse.

However, as my argument relies on PRR parties being the dominant voices in the public discourse on international economic integration, we may expect there to be limits to this relationship. In particular, the portion of the public with weak preferences may be less likely to shift their attitudes if the integration-demarcation divide is less strongly tied to PRR parties' right-wing extremism. This is likely to be the case if there are strong alternative voices in the discourse on international economic integration, such as Euroskeptic radical left parties or even mainstream parties that seek to mobilize voters with strong anti-internationalist preferences. These alternative voices can weaken the dominant role of PRR parties in the discourse. As such, we should expect a weaker shift in support of international economic integration where such voices are present.

H2: The effect of closer links between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism in public discourse on support for international economic integration will be stronger in countries where PRR parties are the primary political actors promoting anti-internationalism.

In the remaining sections of this paper, I describe the research design and present findings from two empirical studies that test the hypotheses outlined above: a cross-national media and survey analysis and a study focused on the effects of the murder of Jo Cox in the UK.

Study 1: Cross-National Media and Survey Analysis

For this empirical analysis, I first describe my original measure of the link between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism in the media in eight Western European countries. I then present results from regression analysis using this measure and Eurobarometer survey data.

Measuring the Euroskepticism-Extremism Link in Media Discourse

To test the hypotheses outlined above at the cross-national level, I require a dynamic measure of the link between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism in public discourse. While there are existing data sets that contain information on parties' positions on issues such as European integration, immigration, or traditional values over time (such as the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Manifesto Project, and the Comparative Campaign Dynamics Dataset), there are a number of factors that make them unsuitable for evaluating my argument.

First, they typically only capture information on parties at specific moments in time (usually centered on elections), making it difficult to track the evolution of parties' agendas and media portrayals of them at a more fine-grained level. Second, these data sets do not code for tendencies toward right-wing extremism. While they can provide snapshots of parties' positions or statements with regard to issues such as LGBTQ rights or Islam, these capture only one or two aspects of the type of right-wing extremism which PRR parties often evoke. The much more common way that PRR parties are linked to right-wing extremism in public discourse—with explicit references to the far right, (neo-)Nazi ideology, fascism, or, simply, right-wing extremism—is left out of these data. Third, existing data sets focus exclusively on a country's parties (and portrayals of them in the media). However, the linking of anti-internationalism with right-wing extremism in public discourse is not necessarily limited to discussion of specific domestic parties. It can, instead, occur when talking about non-parliamentary groups such as the Identitarian movement, individuals such as Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik, parties in other countries, or in relation to more abstract groups or concepts.⁸

For these reasons, therefore, I create a new means of measuring the link between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism in public discourse. To do so, I analyze the

⁸For instance, Ireland does not have a prominent PRR party, but Irish media often links Euroskepticism to right-wing extremism, both in discussions of Ireland's referenda on European treaties and when reporting on other countries (particularly the UK).

discourse on European integration and right-wing extremism in newspaper articles in eight Western European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK) from 2000 to 2019.⁹ These countries were chosen for a number of reasons. First, to avoid problems arising from machine translation, I selected only countries for which I am able to read and hand-code articles in their original language (English, Dutch, French, German, Italian, and Spanish).¹⁰ Second, to minimize media bias, I restricted the sample to countries for which articles from at least two newspapers are available through Nexis Uni for most of the 2000 to 2019 period. Importantly, the resulting sample of countries features considerable variation on factors such as presence and strength of PRR parties, economic conditions, and historical support for European integration.

I first construct corpora of newspaper articles from 2000 to 2019 for each country in the sample.¹¹ The corpora are drawn from two newspapers per country, selected based on availability through Nexis Uni, circulation numbers, and ideological slant to maximize the ability to capture articles that are both widely read and ideologically diverse.¹²

The initial corpora of articles mentioning EU institutions or European integration were constructed using comprehensive Boolean queries in each of the six relevant languages (King, Lam, and Roberts 2017). After removing duplicates, this process generated a combined corpus of just over one million articles. I then hand-coded between 400 and 1,000 articles per country (over 5,500 in total), classifying them as either linking Euroskepticism to right-wing extremism (1) or not (0). As an example, the article containing the following text from Spanish newspaper *El País* was classified as “1”:

⁹For this study, I look only at European integration. In future research I will also analyze discourse on immigration and globalization.

¹⁰While the role of newspapers in providing political information has undoubtedly changed over the last twenty years with the transformation of the media landscape and the continued rise of social media, existing research suggests that individuals’ perceptions of politics is still responsive to newspaper coverage, suggesting that using newspaper articles for the media analysis is appropriate (Somer-Topcu, Tavits, and Baumann 2020).

¹¹The exception is Austria, for which articles are only available from 2004 onward. The year 2000 was chosen as a starting point due to constraints on data availability.

¹²Table A1 in the appendix provides an overview of the newspapers used for the analysis.

“Vox is the Spanish version of the national populism we see in Europe ... [Their] enemy includes the European Union, which is perceived as a danger to national interests ... [I]n Vox’s political culture one can also find a positive assessment of the dictator Franco, and an image of World War II and the Civil War inherited from the Francoist version of history” (Thomàs 2019).

The article references both Vox’s Euroskepticism and its support for former fascist dictator Francisco Franco, thereby clearly tying Euroskepticism to broader right-wing extremist positions.

Based on these hand-coded texts, I trained machine learning algorithms to categorize the remaining articles in each country-specific corpus. Tests indicated that the accuracy of these classifiers was high (with accuracy rates ranging between 0.88 and 0.95). While the type of right-wing extremism with which Euroskepticism was associated in the articles varied somewhat by country, references to Islamophobia, racism, homophobia, antisemitism, anti-feminism, and, simply, right-wing extremism or fascism were common across nearly all corpora.¹³

I used these classifications to create a measure of how closely Euroskepticism is linked to right-wing extremism that captures the number of articles categorized as 1 divided by the total number of articles at the country-year level (*Euroskepticism-extremism link*). In addition, I also created a rolling average of the current value and the two previous years’ values of this measure (*Euroskepticism-extremism link_{rolling}*) to capture the fact that the extent to which individuals associate Euroskepticism with right-wing extremism is likely to reflect public discourse from the recent past as well as the present.

Figure 3 plots the values of the *Euroskepticism-extremism link* measure over time for each of the countries in the sample. We can see considerable variation in the over-time trends, suggesting that the measure is capturing important country-level differences in public discourse. Trends for Germany and Spain clearly show how the emergence of the AfD and Vox, respectively, changed the discourse surrounding Euroskepticism in these countries. By contrast, trends are more varied for countries such as Austria, France, the Netherlands, and

¹³Further details on the coding scheme, classifiers used, and accuracy rates can be found in Appendix A.




Figure 3: The *Euroskepticism-extremism link* measure by country over time.

the UK, where PRR parties were engaging in both Euroskeptic and right-wing extremist rhetoric for much of the period under analysis. In Italy, where the most prominent PRR party during this period was gradually transitioning from a regionalist populist party to a Euroskeptic PRR party (Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone 2018), the level of association between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism is relatively low and the trend mostly flat. Ireland, which did not have a prominent PRR party during this period, shows surprisingly high values on *Euroskepticism-extremism link*, boosted first by the politicization of European integration surrounding multiple referenda on European treaties and then by Brexit, which was covered extensively in Irish media.

Quantitative Analysis

Having created a new measure of the link between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism, I next conduct a quantitative analysis to explore its relationship with support for European

integration. I combine the *Euroskepticism-extremism link* measure with Eurobarometer survey data covering the same time period to test whether higher values on this measure are associated with higher levels of support for European integration (H1). I use the same data to test H2, comparing the strength of the relationship posited in H1 in countries where PRR parties are the primary political actors promoting Euroskepticism to countries that either lack PRR parties or have other prominent parties promoting Euroskepticism.

I operationalize support for European integration as responses to the question whether membership in the EU has been a good or bad thing for the respondent’s country (*support for EU*).¹⁴ I use two different approaches for this analysis: first, I fit multilevel models with country random intercepts, to account for the nested nature of the survey data. Second, I create time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data by collapsing *support for EU* to the country-year level. I then estimate two-way (country and decade) fixed effects models using these data.¹⁵

The multilevel models take the following form:

$$\text{Support for EU}_{ict} = \alpha + \beta \text{Euroskepticism-extremism link}_{ct} + \gamma \mathbf{Z}_{ict} + \delta \mathbf{W}_{ct} + v_c + \epsilon_{ict}$$

where i , c , and t index individuals, countries, and years, respectively; β reports the effect of the *Euroskepticism-extremism link* measure; \mathbf{Z}_{ict} is a set of individual-level control variables; \mathbf{W}_{ct} is a set of time-varying country-level control variables; and v_c and ϵ_{ict} represent the country-level random variable and the individual-level error term, respectively.

The TSCS models take the following form:

$$\text{Support for EU}_{ct} = \alpha + \beta \text{Euroskepticism-extremism link}_{ct} + \gamma \mathbf{Z}_{ct} + \zeta_c + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ct}$$

¹⁴Responses are coded as 0 (“A bad thing”), 1 (“Neither good nor bad”), or 2 (“A good thing”). This question was asked at least once each year between 2000 and 2019. Anderson and Hecht (2018) show that this question loads highly onto the core dimension of support for European integration and is therefore suitable for this type of analysis.

¹⁵As the patterns I seek to explain occur at the aggregate level, but opinion change occurs at the individual level, I show results from both models to guard against issues related to ecological inference.

where c and t index countries and years, respectively; β reports the effect of the *Euroskepticism-extremism link* measure; \mathbf{Z}_{ct} is a set of time-varying control variables; ζ_c represents country fixed effects; δ_t represents decade fixed effects; and ϵ_{ct} is the error term. To take into account the serial correlation in the panel data and the small number of countries in the sample, I cluster standard errors at the country level using the wild cluster bootstrap method (Cameron and Miller 2015).¹⁶

The set of individual-level control variables includes gender, age, age at which the respondent completed their education, and self-placement on the left-right political scale. Previous studies have shown that these individual-level variables can affect support for European integration (Gabel 1998), and controlling for them helps account for variation within country-years. The set of time-varying country-level control variables includes unemployment rate, growth in gross domestic product (GDP), PRR party vote shares, the number of effective parties, and the ideology of the governing party.¹⁷ I control for these country-level variables to ensure that my results are not the product of alternative explanations related to countries' economic conditions or political system. It is plausible, for instance, that media discourse and support for European integration are both a consequence of the state of a country's economy. Similarly, the strength of PRR parties in a country could affect support for the EU directly, as well as shaping media discourse. Changes in the party system and in the government could also generate changes in media coverage and in attitudes toward the EU. For instance, both the media and the public could be reacting to the government's position and policies on European integration, as suggested by the thermostatic model of public responsiveness (Soroka and Wlezien 2010).

Table 1 shows the results for the multilevel models. In Models 1 and 2, the simple version

¹⁶The wild cluster bootstrap method was implemented using the `multiwaycov` package in R based on 1,000 replications.

¹⁷Measures of PRR party vote shares and number of effective parties for each country-year are based on the last national election. The variable *governing party ideology* has four categories: center-left, center-right, grand coalition, and other. Data on unemployment rate and growth in GDP are drawn from the World Bank, while data on PRR party vote shares, number of effective parties, and ideology of the governing party are drawn from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2021).

of the Euroskepticism-extremism link measure is used, while in Models 3 and 4 the three-year rolling average is used. Demographic and country-year level control variables are included in Models 2 and 4. For each specification, the coefficient on the measure of association between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism is positive and statistically significant. The size of the coefficients suggests that a one-standard deviation increase in the Euroskepticism-extremism link is associated with an increase in support for European integration of 3 to 11 percent of a standard deviation. While this increase appears modest, it is important to note that in these models, the equivalent increase for a one standard deviation increase in education—one of the strongest predictors of support for European integration noted in the literature—is 16 percent of a standard deviation.

Table 1: The Euroskepticism-extremism link and support for European integration, multi-level models.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Euroskepticism-extremism link	0.055*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.004)		
Euroskepticism-extremism link _{rolling}			0.094*** (0.004)	0.049*** (0.005)
Control variables		✓		✓
Observations	303,206	229,674	303,206	229,674
Countries	8	8	8	8

Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Results for control variables and country random intercepts omitted from the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2 shows the results for the TSCS models. In Models 1 and 2, the simple version of the *Euroskepticism-extremism link* measure is used, while in Models 3 and 4 the three-year rolling average is used. Models 2 and 4 include the set of country-year level control variables. The coefficients on the measures of the association between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism are positive and statistically significant for each of the specifications. The size

of the coefficients suggests that a one-standard deviation increase in the *Euroskepticism-extremism link* measures is associated with an increase in support for European integration of 11 to 39 percent of a standard deviation, considerably larger—but also more variable—than the estimates provided by the multilevel models. In general, therefore, these analyses show suggestive, cross-national evidence that closer links between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism are associated with greater support for European integration.

Table 2: The Euroskepticism-extremism link and support for European integration, TSCS models.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Euroskepticism-extremism link	0.084*** (0.019)	0.037** (0.017)		
Euroskepticism-extremism link _{rolling}			0.143*** (0.033)	0.071** (0.029)
Control variables		✓		✓
Observations	156	156	156	156
Countries	8	8	8	8

Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors clustered at the country level using wild cluster bootstrap in parentheses. Country fixed effects and decade fixed effects included in all models but omitted from the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In addition to economic conditions and changes in the party system and government, a further alternative explanation for the patterns we observe is the UK’s vote to leave the European Union in 2016. Others have described how Brexit may have affected attitudes toward European integration in other EU member states (De Vries 2017; Minkus, Deutschmann and Delhey 2019; Walter 2021a) and the examples of media discourse in Germany and France indicate that it may have also shaped media coverage. To ensure the results shown above are not merely a function of the impact of Brexit, I estimate additional models which include a dummy variable capturing whether the year is pre- or post-2016 (*Brexit*). Results from

these models—both multilevel and fixed effects—are reported in Table B4 in Appendix B. For each of the specifications, the coefficient on the variable measuring the link between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism is positive and statistically significant (though it only reaches statistical significance at the 90% confidence level for Model 3). These results are reassuring evidence that the relationship between the Euroskepticism-extremism link and support for European integration is not simply the product of Brexit.

To test H2, I divide the countries in my sample into those where PRR parties are the primary political actors promoting Euroskepticism ($PRR\ Euroskepticism = 1$) and those where either other political actors are also prominent promoters of Euroskepticism or no prominent PRR parties are active ($PRR\ Euroskepticism = 0$).¹⁸ As above, I then fit a multilevel model as well as a fixed effects model using the TSCS data, interacting $PRR\ Euroskepticism$ with $Euroskepticism-extremism\ link$.

Figure 4 plots the estimated relationship between $Euroskepticism-extremism\ link$ and $support\ for\ EU$ for both values of $PRR\ Euroskepticism$ (results from the multilevel model on the left and the fixed effects model on the right). In both specifications, the estimated relationship is clearly stronger for countries in which PRR parties are the primary proponents of Euroskepticism, providing evidence in favor of H2. It is noteworthy, however, that the regression line for countries in which PRR parties are not the only proponents of Euroskepticism also slopes upward, indicating a positive relationship between $Euroskepticism-extremism\ link$ and $support\ for\ EU$. This suggests that we should still expect H1 to apply in cases such as the UK, the context for Study 2 below.

¹⁸The coding for this variable is described in detail in Appendix B.




Figure 4: Association between linking Euroskepticism with right-wing extremism and support for European integration, interaction models.

Study 2: The Murder of Jo Cox and Internationalism in the UK

While the strategy described above provides evidence that closer links between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism co-occur with higher support for international economic integration, there is potentially a great deal of unobserved heterogeneity between these countries that could be affecting public opinion dynamics. Similarly, we cannot rule out reverse causality: plausibly, changes in support for international economic integration could affect public discourse, thus changing the extent to which Euroskepticism is linked to right-wing extremism in media coverage. Causal identification of the effect of changes in public discourse on attitudes is inherently difficult due to the likely endogeneity of public discourse to the political dynamics it is meant to capture. Therefore, I use a second strategy—an unexpected event during survey design—to test the causal effect of closer links between anti-internationalism

and right-wing extremism on support for international economic integration.

In this study, I analyze the consequences of the murder of Jo Cox, a Member of Parliament (MP) for the Labour Party in the UK.¹⁹ Cox was killed on 16 June 2016, exactly a week before the Brexit referendum. I argue that her murder was an unexpected event that tightened the link between anti-internationalism (specifically, Euroskepticism and anti-immigration sentiment) and right-wing extremism in media discourse and in the minds of the UK public. As this event happened while the BES was fielding a wave of its Internet Panel, I am able to compare survey responses on support for the EU and immigration collected in the days prior to the murder of Jo Cox to those collected in the days afterwards. This allows me to conduct a more rigorous test of H1 in the context of the UK. In using an unexpected event during survey design, I follow other authors who use this type of design to identify the effect of specific events on public opinion (Bove, Efthyvoulou, and Pickard 2021; De Vries 2018; Giani and Méon 2021; Solodoch 2021). In addition, as the BES data is drawn from a panel, I am also able to compare the wave-on-wave *change* in support for the EU and immigration among individuals who completed the second survey just after Cox’s murder to the change in support among those who completed it just prior to the murder. As I describe below, this second design relies on weaker assumptions as I am able to hold constant time-invariant respondent characteristics. While both analyses generate results that are consistent with H1, results from the second analysis are considerably more robust.

The Setting

Cox’s murder heightened the association between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism in British media discourse and in the minds of the public, due to the nature of

¹⁹Bove, Efthyvoulou, and Pickard (2021) use a similar research design, looking at the effect of three terrorist attacks—one of which is Cox’s murder—on support for the EU. However, they do not look at the effect on attitudes toward immigration and therefore attribute the effect on support for the EU to citizens’ increased perception of security risks associated with leaving the EU. By contrast, my argument that the attack on Cox concentrated the association between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism for the British public is able to account for the increase in support for immigration as well as the increase in support for European integration.

both the attacker and the victim. In particular, Cox was known for her pro-EU and pro-immigration views, while her murderer, Thomas Mair, was a right-wing extremist with ties to neo-Nazi groups. The murder was a highly salient incident in the UK, dominating headlines for several days and horrifying the public. Almost immediately, the media tied together Cox's internationalism, Mair's right-wing extremism, and the Brexit referendum in its coverage of the murder.

We can see this linking of anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism in much of the media coverage of the murder. Within hours of the event, the Guardian reported that Mair had shouted "Britain first" during the attack and mentioned the possibility of a connection to the fringe, far-right political party of the same name (Booth, Dodd, and Parveen 2016), while noting in a separate article published a few hours later that Cox "argued strongly in favour of allowing more refugees into the UK" (Langdon 2016). The day after the murder, the Daily Mail reported on "claims that [Cox] was targeted over her support for immigration and ties with Brussels" (Tapsfield 2016). On June 21, the BBC echoed this narrative, quoting her husband saying Cox had "died for her views" (BBC News 2016). In an article published on June 17, the Daily Telegraph stated that Cox was "passionate about remaining in the EU" and had on the day before her murder posted a photo on Twitter of her family protesting Nigel Farage's Brexit flotilla (Rayner 2016). On the same day, the Guardian reported that "Nazi regalia" had been found at Mair's house and that he had links to a US-based neo-Nazi group as well as a pro-apartheid group in South Africa (Guardian 2016). Mair's first court appearance on June 18 was covered extensively in the British press, and his statement "My name is death to traitors, freedom for Britain" was quoted widely, drawing a direct connection between his apparent support for Brexit and his political violence. In its coverage of the court appearance, the Daily Mail stated that it had "uncovered fresh evidence of far-Right [*sic*] involvement in the [Brexit] referendum campaign," reporting that "[a] racist South African-inspired group linked to Mair ... urged its supporters to campaign for a Leave vote" (Beckford 2016).

Analyses of social media data support this interpretation of closer links between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism in public discourse in the wake of the murder. Dobрева, Grinnell, and Innes (2020) find similar connections being drawn between the attack and the Brexit referendum on social media. Similarly, Parry (2019) shows how Cox and her internationalism became iconized following her death. Given both the nature and the extent of the public discourse around Cox’s murder, we can reasonably expect that the British public would associate Euroskepticism and anti-immigration sentiment more strongly with right-wing extremism in its immediate aftermath. This means the case of Cox’s murder represents a suitable setting to test the implications of my argument about the effect of closer links between anti-internationalism and extremism on support for international economic integration.

The Data

As the BES was fielding Wave 8 of its Internet Panel at the time Cox was murdered, I am able to use an unexpected event during survey design to estimate the effect of Cox’s murder on support for international economic integration. Wave 8 was fielded between May 6 and June 22, 2016, allowing me to compare survey responses that were collected prior to Cox’s murder on June 16 to responses collected after the incident.²⁰ I use responses to the question about respondents’ vote intention in the EU referendum as a measure of *support for EU*. As media coverage explicitly tied Cox’s murder to the referendum, estimating the effect of the murder on this outcome variable is a useful test of H1. Similarly, when the media discussed immigration in the context of Cox’s murder, it focused on cultural aspects, juxtaposing Cox’s message of common humanity with Mair’s ties to racist organizations. I therefore measure *support for immigration* using responses to the question whether immigration enriches or undermines Britain’s cultural life.²¹

²⁰Information on the survey waves used in this study is contained in Table C1 in Appendix C.

²¹Analyses using alternative measures for support for European integration and immigration generate similar results (see Table C5 in Appendix C).




Figure 5: Pre- and post-treatment trends in outcome variables during the survey period.

Figure 5 plots the mean values of *support for EU* (left panel) and *support for immigration* (right panel) during the survey period. The observable increase in internationalism—though stronger for support for immigration than for support for the EU—provides initial suggestive evidence in favor of H1. I conduct a more formal test of this hypothesis below.

Main Analysis

I estimate the following model, using *support for EU* and *support for immigration* as outcomes:

$$\text{Outcome}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Post}_i + \epsilon_i$$

where β reports the effect of responding to the survey after the murder (compared to before the murder) and ϵ_i is the error term. I use two different bandwidths for the number

of days prior to and after the murder that are included in the analysis: -6 to $+6$ days and -14 to $+6$ days (as the survey wave ends on June 22, it is not possible to go beyond 6 days after Cox’s murder).²² In additional analyses, I include control variables (gender, education, age, left-right self-placement, and geographic location) to ensure that my results are not the product of imbalances on these factors (see Table C7 in Appendix C for balance tests).

Table 3 shows the results from these analyses. The coefficient on *post* is positive throughout and reaches statistical significance at the 95% confidence level for three of the four models using the narrower bandwidth. Widening the bandwidth produces less clear results, potentially due to confounding as a result of prior events or underlying time trends. While the estimated effect sizes are modest (ranging from 5 to 8 percent of a standard deviation for the narrowest bandwidth), they are similar in size to the average change in individuals’ attitudes toward the EU and immigration between BES survey waves (which are on average six months apart). This suggests that it may be unrealistic to expect larger effects over such a short time period. Overall, therefore, these results are consistent with H1.

I conduct a number of additional tests to assess potential threats to inference. Causal identification using an unexpected event during survey design is based on two assumptions: (1) excludability (the timing of the survey response affects the outcome only through the event in question), and (2) temporal ignorability (selection of the moment of the survey response is as good as random) (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández 2020). First, I assess the likelihood that the excludability assumption is violated—that is, that the outcomes I am interested in were affected by other factors related to the timing of the survey response. This could be due to simultaneous events or unrelated time trends. I argue that it is unlikely that the excludability assumption is violated due to simultaneous events. While campaigning related to the Brexit referendum was ongoing throughout this period, there was no significant

²²Results from analyses using wider bandwidths are reported in Table C6 in Appendix C. While coefficients on *support for the EU* fail to reach statistical significance at the 95% confidence level when wider bandwidths are used, coefficients on *support for immigration* are similar to those reported in Table 3 below. I report results using narrower bandwidths for the main analysis, as these are more likely to reduce bias introduced by time trends or confounders (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández 2020).

Table 3: Effect of Cox’s murder on internationalism.

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Support for EU	Support for EU	Support for immigration	Support for immigration
± 6 days	Post	0.023** (0.011)	0.041** (0.020)	0.150*** (0.044)	0.146* (0.079)
	Control variables		✓		✓
	Observations	8,366	1,879	8,449	1,906
−14 to +6 days	Post	0.018* (0.009)	0.027 (0.017)	0.137*** (0.037)	0.062 (0.067)
	Control variables		✓		✓
	Observations	13,596	3,079	13,801	3,170

Note: Coefficients from OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

change in messaging around the time of the treatment that was not a function of Cox’s murder. One aspect of the Brexit campaign that did attract considerable media attention was the unveiling of a new UKIP campaign poster by then-leader Nigel Farage, suggesting that the EU was responsible for increasing numbers of migrants to Europe. The poster was criticized for its similarity to images from Nazi propaganda films (Stewart and Mason 2016). While the poster was revealed on the same day as Cox’s murder (June 16), data from Google search trends suggest that the salience of this event was dwarfed by the salience of the murder (see Figure C1 in Appendix C). As such, it is unlikely that this simultaneous event would violate the excludability assumption.

Similarly, I argue that underlying time trends are also unlikely to violate the excludability assumption. As Figure 5 shows, there is no clearly discernible trend in attitudes toward immigration in the period prior to the murder, while support for the EU is trending down, rather than up (which should, if anything, make it less likely that we would see an increase

in support in the post-treatment period).

As additional tests of the validity of the excludability assumption, I conduct two placebo analyses. For the first analysis, I analyze the effect of placebo treatments on my outcomes of interest at various dates prior to the murder. Specifically, I designate each day between May 12 and June 10 as a separate placebo treatment, and regress *support for EU* and *support for immigration*, in turn, on a series of variables that capture whether the responses were collected before or after each of the placebo treatments.²³ The coefficients on these placebo treatments nearly all fail to reach statistical significance, suggesting that it is unlikely that the timing of the survey responses is affecting the outcome variable via underlying time trends (see Figure C2 in Appendix C).

For the second placebo analysis, I test whether there are statistically significant differences between the (actual) treatment and control groups for an outcome variable that we would not expect to be affected by Cox’s murder. For this outcome, I use *support for monarchy*, which captures responses to the question whether Britain should continue to have a monarchy.²⁴ To test whether there are statistically significant differences between pre- and post-murder responses for *support for monarchy*, I use the same model and bandwidths as for the main analysis. The coefficients on the treatment variable are not statistically distinguishable from zero, indicating—as expected—that we cannot rule out that there was no change in support for the monarchy after Cox’s murder (see Figure C3 in Appendix C). The results of this analysis therefore provide additional evidence that post-murder changes in support for the EU and immigration do not reflect underlying time trends that are unrelated to the murder.

Second, I look at potential violations of the ignorability assumption. As the survey in question is part of an Internet Panel, it is possible that certain types of respondents are more likely to have taken the survey in the post-treatment period rather than in the pre-

²³For these analyses, I use a bandwidth of 6 days pre- and post-treatment, the narrowest bandwidth I use in the main analysis.

²⁴As most of the questions in Wave 8 of the BES Internet Panel are (directly or indirectly) related to the Brexit referendum, this question is one of the few in the survey for which we would not expect responses to be affected by Cox’s murder.

treatment period and that the attributes on which they differ are also correlated with the outcomes of interest. To evaluate how plausible this type of violation is, I conduct balance tests on a number of demographic variables (gender, education, age, geographic location, and income), as well as individuals’ self-placement on a left-right political ideology scale.²⁵ Education is the only covariate that shows a statistically significant imbalance (see Table C7 in Appendix C). As Table 3 shows, results for the narrowest bandwidth are similar when controlling for covariates, though the coefficient on *support for immigration* only reaches statistical significance at the 90% confidence level.

Finally, I analyze differences in the pattern of non-response (respondents selecting “Don’t know”) between the treatment and control group on the outcome variables of interest. Increases in item non-response rates may point to certain respondents choosing not to answer questions following the murder, which may bias results when item non-responses are excluded. There is no statistically significant difference in non-response rates on *support for immigration*, while respondents are *more* likely to respond to the question on *support for EU* following the murder, the opposite of what we would expect to see if the murder made certain respondents avoid answering the question (see Figure C4 in Appendix C).

Panel Analysis

As many of the individuals who responded to Wave 8 of the BES Internet Panel also responded to earlier waves, I am able to take advantage of the panel structure of the data. I compare the change in support for the EU and immigration from Wave 7 to Wave 8 among individuals in the treatment group (those completing the Wave 8 survey after Cox’s murder) to the change in support among the control group (those completing the Wave 8 survey before Cox’s murder).²⁶ This guards against potential violations of the ignorability assumption, as I can control for (time-invariant) unobservable heterogeneity among respondents. I

²⁵As the BES Internet Panel is panel data, I take the left-right self-placement measure from Wave 7 (the last wave prior to the one that coincided with the murder) in order to avoid post-treatment bias. Responses on income are also taken from Wave 7, as Wave 8 did not include questions on income.

²⁶This design follows a similar one by Solodoch (2021).

estimate the following model:

$$\text{Outcome}_{igt} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Post-event}_g + \beta_2 \text{Wave 8}_t + \beta_3 (\text{Post-event} \times \text{Wave 8})_{gt} + \zeta_i + \epsilon_{igt}$$

where β_1 reports the effect of being in the treatment group (individuals who responded to the Wave 8 survey after the murder), β_2 reports the effect of responding to the Wave 8 survey (compared to the Wave 7 survey), β_3 reports the effect of responding to the Wave 8 survey while being in the treatment group, ζ_i represents respondent fixed effects, and ϵ_{igt} is the error term. While the logic behind this model is similar to the logic underlying difference-in-differences estimation, the identification strategy is slightly different. In a difference-in-differences model, identification is based on comparing the change in outcomes between treated and control units from pre-treatment time t_0 to post-treatment time t_1 . In the design described here, only treated individuals are observed post-treatment (as the control responses were collected prior to the treatment). As such, identification is derived from the assumption that the selection of the moment of survey response is as good as random, as in the simple unexpected event during survey design.

This means that the design relies on (modified) assumptions of excludability and ignorability. First, we assume that the timing of the survey response does not affect the change in outcome from Wave 7 to Wave 8, except through the event in question (Cox's murder). Second, we assume that potential outcomes are independent from the moment at which individuals respond to the survey, conditional on individuals' time-invariant attributes. This is a weaker version of the assumption that in practice underlies many unexpected event during survey designs: that potential outcomes are independent from the moment at which individuals respond to the survey, conditional on a set of observable covariates (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández 2020). As I compare change in individual respondents' attitudes rather than the difference in attitudes between two groups, I am able to hold constant all time-invariant unobserved respondent heterogeneity. This mitigates, for instance, the threat to inference that imbalances on covariates across the treatment and control group

Table 4: Effect of Cox’s murder on internationalism, panel analysis.

		Support for EU	Support for immigration
± 6 days	Wave 8	-0.013*** (0.005)	0.094*** (0.023)
	Post \times Wave 8	0.016** (0.007)	0.078** (0.033)
	Observations	11,360	11,612
	Respondents	5,920	5,989
-14 to +6 days	Wave 8	-0.017*** (0.003)	0.075*** (0.015)
	Post \times Wave 8	0.021*** (0.006)	0.097*** (0.028)
	Observations	18,663	19,088
	Respondents	9,726	9,831

Note: Results from OLS regression. Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses. As the *post* variable is time-invariant (and therefore perfectly collinear with respondent fixed effects), it is omitted from these models. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

pose.

The results from the panel analysis are shown in Table 4, with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The coefficient on the interaction term *post* \times *Wave 8* is positive and statistically significant throughout. This suggests that individuals who responded to the Wave 8 survey after Cox’s murder became more supportive of European integration and immigration from Wave 7 to Wave 8, relative to individuals who responded to the Wave 8 survey before Cox’s murder. The results therefore provide strong evidence in support of H1 when using a design that relies on weaker assumptions.

I conduct similar tests as for the main analysis above to assess potential violations of the (modified) excludability and ignorability assumptions, which are described in detail in Appendix C. The results of these tests provide little evidence of violations of the excludability

and ignorability assumptions.

While this study provides important evidence in favor of two of my hypotheses, a key limitation is that it does not allow me to analyze the long-term effects of the tighter link between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism. As Cox was murdered only a week before the Brexit referendum, it is difficult to disentangle the long-term effect of the murder from the effect of the referendum outcome itself. Subsequent waves of the BES Internet Panel suggest that support for European integration continued to increase following the referendum, while support for immigration was maintained at roughly the level of support observed after Cox’s murder until 2018, when it began increasing further. These longer-term trends are likely related to the continued Brexit negotiations and the broader evolution of public discourse on European integration and immigration. The purpose of the study of Cox’s murder, then, is to demonstrate the short-term causal effect of a tighter link between anti-internationalism and extremism on support for international economic integration, while the purpose of the cross-national analysis is to demonstrate a systematic correlation between these factors across countries and over time.

Discussion

The results from two empirical studies—a cross-national analysis of media discourse and survey data, as well as a study on the murder of Jo Cox in the UK—support my argument that rising right-wing populism drives support for international economic integration by linking anti-internationalism to right-wing extremism in public discourse. At the cross-national level, closer links between Euroskepticism and right-wing extremism in media discourse co-occur with greater support for European integration. In the UK, Cox’s murder represented a shock that concentrated the association between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism in public discourse and led to increases in support for the EU and immigration. While the scope of this paper is limited to Western Europe, further research could explore the extent

to which these findings are generalizable to other political contexts, particularly those in which right-wing extremism has been legitimized and brought into the political mainstream under the umbrella of a major party (such as the US). As authors such as Frieden (2019) have noted, anti-internationalism in the US has taken a different political form than it has in much of Western Europe, in part due to the US electoral system. Further research is required to determine the applicability of the framework in this type of context.

This research holds important implications for the study of public opinion on international economic integration. In particular, it demonstrates the importance of situating attitudes toward international economic integration within broader processes of domestic political contestation and identity formation. This approach could be fruitfully applied to studying other types of public opinion in which asymmetric strength of preferences is expected to apply, such as attitudes toward other aspects of foreign policy. It also contributes to the literature on supply-driven political change by exploring the relationship between party strategies, media incentives, and public opinion (De Vries and Hobolt 2020).

The findings presented here also speak to the growing debate about the resilience of the liberal international order, and the conditions under which domestic backlash can undermine it (Copelovitch, Hobolt, and Walter 2019; De Vries, Hobolt, and Walter 2021; Goodman and Pepinsky 2021; Walter 2021b). On the one hand, the fact that the rise in PRR parties' popularity has sparked growing support for international economic integration is positive for defenders of the liberal international order. On the other hand, my argument suggests that this increase is built on what are almost necessarily weak preferences, and could therefore be reversed if the link between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism in public discourse were severed. This type of "de-linking" could easily occur, depending on the changing salience of international economic integration and the strategies PRR parties adopt in the future. The COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, has both dramatically raised the salience of issues related to public health and shifted the focus of many PRR parties toward government restrictions and vaccine policies.

This logic in turn has important policy implications. While there has been a long-standing debate on whether accommodating PRR parties by adopting their anti-immigration positions is an effective electoral strategy for mainstream parties (Dahlström and Sundell 2012; Hjorth and Larsen 2020; Spoon and Klüver 2020), my research indicates that this type of accommodation may have unintended consequences. Mainstream parties adopting PRR parties' anti-internationalist platforms could weaken the link between anti-internationalism and right-wing extremism in public discourse, resulting in lower overall support for international economic integration—a potentially undesirable outcome in the long term for mainstream parties operating in a globalized economy.

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Appendix A: Media Analysis

Table A1: Newspapers and data availability by country.

Country	Newspapers	Years for which data available
Austria	<i>Die Presse</i>	2004–2019
	<i>Der Standard</i>	2007–2019
France	<i>Le Figaro</i>	2000–2019
	<i>L’Humanité</i>	2002–2019
Germany	<i>Die Welt</i>	2000–2019
	<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>	2000–2019
Ireland	Irish Independent	2006–2019
	Irish Times	2000–2019
Italy	<i>Corriere della Sera</i>	2009–2019
	<i>La Stampa</i>	2000–2019
The Netherlands	<i>Algemeen Dagblad</i>	2000–2019
	<i>De Telegraaf</i>	2000–2019
Spain	<i>El Mundo</i>	2002–2019
	<i>El País</i>	2000–2019
UK	Daily Telegraph	2000–2019
	Guardian	2000–2019

List of Search Terms for Corpus Construction

The search terms that were used to select the initial corpora of articles that mention the EU or European integration are listed below, in each of the six relevant languages.

Dutch

Europese integratie; Europese unie; EU; Europese eenwording; Europese Commissie; Europees Parlement; Europees Gerechtshof; Europees Hof; Hof van Justitie van de Europese

Unie; Brexit; Grexit; Frexit; Europese Raad; eurosceptisch; eurosceptici; Europese Centrale Bank; ECB

English

European integration; EU; European Union; European unification; European Commission; European Parliament; CJEU; European Court of Justice; Brexit; Frexit; Grexit; European Council; Council of the European Union; Euroskeptic; Eurosceptic; Euroskeptics; Eurosceptics; European Central Bank

French

intégration européenne; UE; unification européenne; Union européenne; Commission européenne; Parlement européen; CJUE; Cour européenne; brexit; frexit; grexit; Conseil européen; eurosceptique; eurosceptiques; Banque centrale européenne; BCE

German

EU; Europäische Union; Europäischen Union; Europäischer Union; Europäische Einigung; Europäischer Einigung; Europäischen Einigung; Europäische Kommission; Europäischer Kommission; Europäischen Kommission; Europäisches Parlament; Europäischen Parlament; Europäischem Parlament; Europäischer Rat; Europäischem Rat; Europäischen Rat; Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union; Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union; EuGH; Europäischer Gerichtshof; Europäischen Gerichtshofs; Europäischem Gerichtshof; Brexit; Frexit; Grexit; euroskeptisch; euroskeptischer; euroskeptischen; euroskeptischem; euroskeptisches; euroskeptische; Euroskeptiker; Europäische Zentralbank; Europäischer Zentralbank; Europäischen Zentralbank

Italian

integrazione europea; UE; Unione europea; unificazione europea; Commissione europea; Parlamento europeo; Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea; Corte di giustizia europea; Corte europea di giustizia; Corte europea; brexit; frexit; grexit; Consiglio europeo; Consiglio

dell'Unione europea; euroscettico; euroscettici; euroscettica; euroscettiche; Banca centrale europea

Spanish

integración europea; Unión Europea; UE; unificación europea; Comisión Europea; Parlamento Europeo; Corte de Justicia europea; Tribunal de Justicia europeo; Tribunal Europeo de Justicia; Tribunal Europeo; brexit; frexit; grexit; Consejo Europeo; euroescéptico; euroescéptica; euroescépticos; euroescépticas; Banco Central Europeo; BCE

Coding Scheme

An article was coded as 1 if it referenced both Euroskepticism and right-extremism (0 for all others). Euroskepticism could either be mentioned explicitly (with reference to, for instance, “Euroskeptics”), or with reference to opposition to the EU or integral components of the European project, such as the Maastricht Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty. References to opposition to individual EU policies were not coded as Euroskepticism, unless they also contained a critique of the broader project (such as, for instance, descriptions of the EU as a “dictator”). In order to be classified as mentioning right-wing extremism, an article had to reference at least one of the types of extremism that are commonly espoused by PRR parties and that was *not* a form of anti-internationalism. For instance, an article that only referenced anti-immigrant rhetoric would not be classified as mentioning right-wing extremism. References to any of the following were considered right-wing extremism: far-right; right-wing extremism; fascism; Holocaust denialism/relativism; (neo-)Nazism (including references to “brown” elements); Islamophobia (as distinct from anti-immigrant sentiment); racism; antisemitism; homophobia; transphobia; white supremacism; sexism; anti-feminism; anti-Roma/anti-Traveller sentiment; hate speech; conspiracy theories; climate change denialism; and authoritarianism.

Pre-processing and Classification

All texts were pre-processed using the `quanteda` text analysis package in R. Duplicates of articles were removed. Within the texts, punctuation, numbers, and symbols were removed. Words were stemmed and stopwords were removed according to the relevant language. The Naive Bayes classifiers were trained on hand-coded, pre-processed texts with unigrams as predictors, separately for each country corpus.

Table A2: Number of articles and model accuracy for media analysis.

	Total country corpus	Number of hand-coded articles	Sensitivity rate	Specificity rate	Accuracy rate	F-Score
Austria	118,393	530	0.87	1.00	0.88	0.93
France	77,893	775	0.95	1.00	0.95	0.97
Germany	196,624	685	0.90	1.00	0.90	0.95
Ireland	139,637	930	0.92	0.81	0.90	0.94
Italy	87,706	715	0.89	1.00	0.90	0.94
The Netherlands	53,184	903	0.89	0.75	0.89	0.94
Spain	164,161	474	0.91	1.00	0.92	0.96
UK	166,390	492	0.93	0.80	0.92	0.96

Appendix B: Cross-National Analysis

Summary Statistics

Table B1: Individual-level data.

	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Support for EU	1.434	0.736	0	2
Euroskepticism-extremism link	0.765	1.556	0	8.64
Euroskepticism-extremism link _{rolling}	0.736	1.437	0	6.453
Female	0.523	0.499	0	1
Age	47.692	18.158	0	99
Age at which education completed	18.280	4.554	1	89
Left-right self-placement	4.961	2.016	1	10
Unemployment	7.813	4.138	2.12	26.09
Governing party	2.300	0.965	1	4
Number of parties	10.446	3.006	5	18
GDP growth	1.827	2.919	-5.690	25.180
PRR strength	7.079	7.595	0	28.24
PRR Euroskepticism	0.405	0.491	0	1

Table B2: Time-series cross-sectional data.

	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Support for EU	1.426	0.220	0.99	1.79
Euroskepticism-extremism link	0.821	1.573	0	8.64
Euroskepticism-extremism link _{rolling}	0.786	1.453	0	6.453
Unemployment	8.167	4.448	2.12	26.09
Governing party	2.331	0.956	1	4
Number of parties	10.544	3.046	5	18
GDP growth	1.872	3.039	-5.690	25.180
PRR strength	7.240	7.792	0	28.24
PRR Euroskepticism	0.375	0.486	0	1

Table B3: The Euroskepticism-extremism link and support for European integration, full results for models with control variables.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Euroskepticism-extremism link	0.027*** (0.004)		0.037** (0.017)	
Euroskepticism-extremism link _{rolling}		0.049*** (0.005)		0.071** (0.029)
Female	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)		
Age	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)		
Age at which education completed	0.024*** (0.000)	0.024*** (0.000)		
Left-right self-placement	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)		
PRR strength	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)

Unemployment	-0.024*** (0.001)	-0.023*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)
GDP growth	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Number of parties	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.008 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)
Governing party: Grand coalition	0.031*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.047 (0.058)	0.047 (0.059)
Governing party: Center-right	0.010* (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.050 (0.032)	0.050 (0.033)
Governing party: Other	0.022*** (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	0.080** (0.037)	0.065 (0.045)
Type of model	Multilevel	Multilevel	Fixed effects	Fixed effects
Observations	229,674	229,674	156	156
Countries	8	8	8	8

Note: Regression coefficients from multilevel models with standard errors in parentheses. Regression coefficients from fixed effects models with standard errors clustered at the country level using wild cluster bootstrap in parentheses. Fixed effects models include country and decade fixed effects. The reference category for *Governing party* is “Center-left.” * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B4: The Euroskepticism-extremism link and support for European integration, controlling for Brexit.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Euroskepticism-extremism link	0.010** (0.004)		0.044* (0.024)	
Euroskepticism-extremism link _{rolling}		0.049*** (0.006)		0.098** (0.029)
Brexit	0.061*** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.005)	0.098*** (0.034)	0.070* (0.039)
Type of model	Multilevel	Multilevel	Fixed effects	Fixed effects
Observations	229,674	229,674	156	156
Countries	8	8	8	8

Note: Regression coefficients from multilevel models with standard errors in parentheses. Regression coefficients from fixed effects models with standard errors clustered at the country level using wild cluster bootstrap in parentheses. Multilevel models include individual-level control variables (gender, age, education, and left-right self-placement). Fixed effects models include country and decade fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The *PRR Euroskepticism* Variable

The *PRR Euroskepticism* variable capturing whether or not a PRR party is the primary political actor promoting Euroskepticism in a given country is based on the 2002–2019 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2015; Bakker et al. 2020; Polk et al. 2017) and validated using adjusted data on party positions developed by Bakker, Jolly, and Polk (2020). Austria, Germany, and Spain are classified as countries where PRR parties are the primary political actors promoting Euroskepticism. While radical left parties in Germany and Spain have been critical of the EU, their Euroskepticism is often characterized as “soft” (focused on reforming existing institutions and advocating for deeper, rather than shallower, European integration) in comparison to the harder Euroskepticism (focused on leaving the EU or the eurozone, or significantly rolling back EU competencies) promoted by radical left parties in France and the Netherlands. According to the CHES, the average score on support for European integration for the German radical left party *Die Linke* was 3.8 (on a scale of 1–7), while the average for the Spanish radical left parties *Izquierda Unida* and *Podemos* was 4.7 and 4.8, respectively. No prominent non-PRR party in Austria has scored below a 5 on the CHES measure of support for European integration.

Ireland does not have a prominent PRR party. In France and the Netherlands, radical left parties as well as PRR parties have promoted Euroskepticism. In Italy, the populist party *Movimento 5 Stelle*—which defies clear left-right classification—has promoted Euroskepticism alongside the PRR parties *Lega* and *Fratelli di Italia*. In the UK, prominent members of the two main parties have promoted Euroskepticism alongside the PRR parties UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Brexit Party/Reform UK. The average CHES score on support for European integration was 2.6 for *La France Insoumise*, 2.5 for *Movimento 5 Stelle* and Dutch radical left party *Socialistische Partij*, and 2.3 for the British Conservative Party, much lower than the score for any prominent non-PRR party in Austria, Germany, or Spain. The adjusted party placements developed by Bakker, Jolly, and Polk (2020) confirm these differences in Euroskepticism between non-PRR parties in Austria, Germany, and Spain on

the one hand, and those in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK on the other hand.

Appendix C: The Murder of Jo Cox

Table C1: BES Internet Panel survey waves used in study.

Wave	Dates	Number of respondents
7	14 April–4 May 2016	30,895
8	6 May–22 June 2016	33,502

Summary Statistics

Table C2: Summary statistics for main analysis.

		Mean - treatment	Mean - control	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
± 6 days	Support for EU	0.493	0.470	0.500	0	1
	Support for immigration	3.751	3.602	2.005	1	7
	Allow more immigrants	3.242	3.030	2.860	0	10
	Immigrants good for economy	4.019	3.841	1.859	1	7
	North East	0.029	0.027	0.164	0	1
	North West	0.068	0.069	0.253	0	1
	Yorkshire and The Humber	0.051	0.058	0.227	0	1
	East Midlands	0.049	0.052	0.219	0	1
	West Midlands	0.047	0.050	0.215	0	1
	East of England	0.062	0.060	0.239	0	1
	London	0.085	0.076	0.272	0	1

	South East	0.085	0.089	0.284	0	1
	South West	0.060	0.062	0.238	0	1
	Wales	0.055	0.058	0.232	0	1
	Scotland	0.098	0.100	0.297	0	1
	Left-right self- placement	5.026	5.012	2.409	0	10
	Income	6.772	6.884	3.527	1	15
	Female	0.515	0.513	0.500	0	1
	Education	3.051	2.958	1.391	0	5
	Age	5.390	5.393	1.409	1	7
	Support for monarchy	3.821	3.815	1.321	1	5
	Support for EU non-response	0.049	0.061	0.227	0	1
	Support for immigration non-response	0.044	0.047	0.208	0	1
-14 to +6 days	Support for EU	0.493	0.476	0.500	0	1
	Support for immigration	3.751	3.614	2.010	1	7
	Allow more immigrants	3.242	3.034	2.878	0	10
	Immigrants good for economy	4.019	3.842	1.871	1	7
	North East	0.029	0.029	0.166	0	1
	North West	0.068	0.069	0.253	0	1
	Yorkshire and The Humber	0.051	0.057	0.228	0	1
	East Midlands	0.049	0.048	0.215	0	1
	West Midlands	0.047	0.052	0.219	0	1
	East of England	0.062	0.063	0.242	0	1
	London	0.085	0.077	0.270	0	1
	South East	0.085	0.089	0.284	0	1
	South West	0.060	0.063	0.240	0	1
	Wales	0.055	0.061	0.236	0	1

	Scotland	0.098	0.095	0.294	0	1
	Left-right self- placement	5.026	4.996	2.414	0	10
	Income	6.772	6.848	3.538	1	15
	Female	0.515	0.512	0.500	0	1
	Education	3.051	2.986	1.391	0	5
	Age	5.390	5.401	1.414	1	7
	Support for monarchy	3.821	3.806	1.323	1	5
-21 to +6 days	Support for EU	0.493	0.477	0.500	0	1
	Support for immigration	3.751	3.602	2.013	1	7
-35 to +6 days	Support for EU	0.493	0.487	0.500	0	1
	Support for immigration	3.751	3.602	2.007	1	7

Table C3: Summary statistics for panel analysis.

		Mean - treatment	Mean - control	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
± 6 days	Support for EU	0.486	0.479	0.500	0	1
	Support for immigration	3.594	3.537	2.003	1	7
-14 to +6 days	Support for EU	0.486	0.485	0.500	0	1
	Support for immigration	3.594	3.553	2.013	1	7

Tests for Main Analysis

Full results for models with covariate adjustment are reported in Table C4. Results using alternative indicators for internationalism are shown in Table C5. *Support for European integration* captures responses to the question on the desired extent of integration between the UK and the EU, *allow more immigrants* captures responses to the question whether more or fewer immigrants should be allowed to come to the UK, and *immigration good for economy* captures responses to the question whether immigration is good or bad for the UK's economy. Results using wider bandwidths are reported in Table C6.

Table C4: Effect of Cox’s murder on internationalism, full results for models with covariate adjustment.

	Support for EU - ± 6 days	Support for EU - −14 to +6 days	Support for immigration - ± 6 days	Support for immigration - −14 to +6 days
Post	0.041** (0.020)	0.027 (0.017)	0.146* (0.079)	0.062 (0.067)
Education	0.064*** (0.008)	0.062*** (0.006)	0.258*** (0.031)	0.281*** (0.024)
Female	0.025 (0.021)	0.005 (0.016)	0.143* (0.081)	0.048 (0.063)
Age	−0.017** (0.008)	−0.022*** (0.006)	−0.091*** (0.031)	−0.092*** (0.024)
Left-right self- placement	−0.078*** (0.004)	−0.077*** (0.003)	−0.352*** (0.017)	−0.342*** (0.013)
Income	0.014*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.037*** (0.012)	0.036*** (0.010)
North West	−0.074 (0.063)	−0.053 (0.049)	0.137 (0.250)	0.199 (0.194)
Yorkshire and The Humber	−0.006 (0.064)	−0.028 (0.050)	0.241 (0.254)	0.293 (0.198)
East Midlands	−0.062 (0.067)	−0.043 (0.052)	0.168 (0.265)	0.313 (0.208)
West Midlands	−0.023 (0.064)	−0.026 (0.050)	0.082 (0.254)	0.089 (0.198)
East of England	−0.089 (0.064)	−0.066 (0.050)	0.037 (0.254)	0.170 (0.198)
London	0.020 (0.061)	0.025 (0.047)	0.465* (0.239)	0.498*** (0.187)
South East	−0.035 (0.061)	−0.036 (0.047)	0.294 (0.241)	0.368** (0.185)
South West	0.009 (0.064)	0.001 (0.049)	0.467* (0.253)	0.558*** (0.195)
Wales	0.004	0.014	0.192	0.258

	(0.062)	(0.048)	(0.245)	(0.189)
Scotland	0.026	0.052	0.246	0.431**
	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.231)	(0.180)
Observations	1,879	3,122	1,906	3,170

Note: Coefficients from OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. The reference category for geographic location is the North East. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C5: Effect of Cox’s murder on internationalism, alternative indicators.

		Support for European integration	Allow more immigrants	Immigration good for economy
± 6 days	Post	0.129*	0.212***	0.179***
		(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.041)
	Observations	8,374	8,054	8,387
−14 to +6 days	Post	0.119**	0.208***	0.178***
		(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.035)
	Observations	13,636	13,145	13,703

Note: Coefficients from OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C6: Effect of Cox’s murder on internationalism, wider bandwidths.

		Support for EU	Support for immigration
–21 to +6 days	Post	0.016* (0.009)	0.149*** (0.035)
	Observations	18,288	18,661
–35 to +6 days	Post	0.007 (0.008)	0.150*** (0.033)
	Observations	26,931	27,696

Note: Coefficients from OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$




Figure C1: Google trends data on relative search interest in “Jo Cox” and “Farage poster” in the UK around the day of the murder.




Figure C2: Effect of placebo treatments on support for EU and immigration for different dates in the pre-treatment period.




Figure C3: Effect of Cox's murder on support for monarchy (placebo analysis).

Table C7: Balance tests.

		Treatment	Control	<i>p</i> -value
± 6 days	Female	0.515	0.513	0.860
	Age (1–7 scale)	5.390	5.393	0.950
	Education (0–5 scale)	3.051	2.958	0.004
	Left-right self-placement (0–10 scale)	5.026	5.012	0.831
	Income (1–15 scale)	6.772	6.884	0.286
	North East	0.029	0.027	0.539
	North West	0.068	0.069	0.932
	Yorkshire and The Humber	0.051	0.058	0.178
	East Midlands	0.049	0.052	0.579
	West Midlands	0.047	0.050	0.393
	East of England	0.062	0.060	0.667
	London	0.085	0.076	0.119
	South East	0.085	0.089	0.459
	South West	0.060	0.062	0.645
	Wales	0.055	0.058	0.614
	Scotland	0.098	0.100	0.730
	-14 to $+6$ days	Female	0.515	0.512
Age (1–7 scale)		5.390	5.401	0.766
Education (0–5 scale)		3.051	2.986	0.017
Left-right self-placement (0–10 scale)		5.026	4.996	0.604
Income (1–15 scale)		6.772	6.848	0.400
North East		0.029	0.029	0.875
North West		0.068	0.069	0.897
Yorkshire and The Humber		0.051	0.057	0.181
East Midlands		0.049	0.048	0.741
West Midlands		0.047	0.052	0.134
East of England		0.062	0.063	0.752
London		0.085	0.076	0.119
South East		0.085	0.089	0.390
South West		0.060	0.063	0.483
Wales		0.055	0.061	0.190

Scotland

0.098

0.095

0.692




Figure C4: Estimated post-treatment change in item non-response rates.

Tests for Panel Analysis

Similarly to the tests conducted for the main analysis, I look at time trends in wave-on-wave change in support for the EU and immigration during the Wave 8 survey period (see Figure C5). While there does seem to be an increase in support for immigration just before the date of the murder, there appears to be little systematic change in attitudes throughout the pre-treatment survey period.

I also conduct a placebo analysis designating each day between May 12 and June 10 as a separate placebo treatment. Figure C6 plots the estimated effects of the placebo treatments on change in support for the EU and immigration in the pre-treatment period. For both *support for EU* and *support for immigration* as the outcome variable, only three of the 30 analyses generate a coefficient that is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

As Wave 7 and Wave 8 of the BES have no suitable questions in common that are unrelated to Brexit, immigration, politicians, or parties, I am unable to conduct an equivalent analysis using a placebo outcome.




Figure C5: Pre- and post-treatment trend in changes in outcome variables.




Figure C6: Effect of placebo treatments on change in support for EU and immigration for different dates in the pre-treatment period.