Power Transitions and International Economic Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Parallel Surveys in China and the United States*

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Abstract

How does the changing balance of power between the U.S. and China affect public support for international economic cooperation? Historically, power transitions often have spurred political and economic conflict between the dominant and the rising power. Our analysis builds on this insight and explains the current tensions in American-Chinese trade relations with the growing concern of citizens about unequal gains from bilateral economic cooperation. This implies that citizens in the declining power are more critical of bilateral economic cooperation than citizens in the rising power. Our analysis based on parallel, survey-embedded experiments in China and the United States lends support to this conjecture. Great Power competition, therefore, interferes with international economic affairs also in our current world order – an aspect that has received less attention in previous research on trade politics. Viewed from this perspective, the bilateral economic tensions between the U.S. and China have structural roots and are likely to persist in the future.

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Introduction

The recent trade conflict between the U.S. and China, so far, has been the most serious clash between the current hegemon and its potential challenger. When the U.S. government initiated the conflict in April 2018, the declared goal was to restructure American-Chinese trade such that the U.S. would benefit more than in the past. This trade war was sometimes attributed to President Trump's worldview, but the recent partisan shift in the U.S. government has not changed much in American-Chinese trade relations. In fact, at the time of writing, the trade remedies imposed by the previous administration, are still in place. The first meeting between the Biden administration and the Chinese government in March 2021 was characterized by fundamental disagreements and even open hostility with some observers noting: "[Biden's] China policy is looking even tougher than Donald Trump's" (The Economist, 2021).

These events are illustrative of a deeper concern about the impact of China's rise on the prospects for international cooperation. For a long time, there was wide-spread hope that this change in the balance of power would not generate major conflict. Therefore, the United States pursued a policy of engagement with the challenger power (Johnston, 2019). With the growing tensions of the past years, however, there is now more skepticism about this (Zakaria, 2014). Discussions of contemporary U.S.-China economic relations are now accompanied by demands to further "decouple" and questioning whether China's rise is conducive for the continuation of the liberal international order has become more prevalent (Copelovitch, Hobolt and Walter, 2020). If the tensions between the two superpowers further aggravate, this relationship will shape cooperation in the international system at large because other states eventually will have to take sides (Fordham and Kleinberg, 2011).

To get a better sense of the potential for further disruption or cooperation, we examine how American and Chinese citizens assess bilateral cooperation between their countries.

We focus on citizens because the trade war is regularly traced back to the growing political importance of American-Chinese trade in both countries, and especially in the United States. For instance, recent research shows that the unprecedented level of Chinese imports has increased anti-incumbent votes and support for radical candidates among losers of trade with China, thereby fueling political polarization (e.g., Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth, 2017; Baccini and Weymouth, 2021; Autor et al., 2020; Mansfield, Milner and Rudra, 2021). In other words, the distributional effects of American-Chinese trade on citizens play an important role for trade policy via the electoral incentives of American politicians. In China, despite the lack of elections, the political leadership has been wary of public sentiments about its handling of the trade war given the importance of China's trade relations with the United States.

Although these domestic distributional consequences of trade with China are undeniably important, at a broader level, China's economic success is also indicative of an international systemic transformation that reshuffles long-standing power relations in international politics. The rise of China challenges the long-held preeminence of the U.S. in world politics and, thus, threatens the ability of the United States to defend its interest and the interests of its citizens in the international system in the future. This does not mean that China will necessarily replace the U.S. as the dominant Great Power, which still remains unclear at this stage. But China's rise should already affect the expectations of citizens about the opportunities that they and their country will have in the international system in the future. The tensions between China and the U.S., thus, may have systemic roots that precede the domestic welfare effects captured by the previous literature.

Our analysis takes such a systemic perspective. Building off the classic international relations literature (e.g., Organski and Kugler, 1981; Gilpin, 2001), we argue that expectations of the evolution of national power is an important determinant of individuals' attitudes toward bilateral economic cooperation. Specifically, perceived shifts in the country's power

position vis-à-vis a trading partner provides individuals with a heuristic to assess the potential gains and losses for their country in the global order. A rise in power is interpreted as a sign that the country gains from the global order and hence will also do well in the future. Accordingly, citizens from a rising power are likely to support further global engagement as it will consolidate their country's power status in world politics. In contrast, a decline in power relative to another major country is interpreted as a worrying sign even if the country gains in absolute terms. Citizens from a declining power fear that the weakening position has implications for gains in the future and hence oppose bilateral economic cooperation that, in their perception, puts their country at a disadvantage relative to the rising power.

To empirically test these hypotheses, we employ an experimental design, which we implemented as part of parallel surveys in China and the U.S. between December 2020 and January 2021. In the experiment, we prime respondents about how their countries' power status is changing in the global hierarchy. Their country is portrayed as either a declining or an ascending power in terms of its economic strength *relative* to an abstract, unnamed trading partner. This allows us to assess the causal impact of the possible future evolution of bilateral power relations on individuals' attitudes toward international economic cooperation.[1] In addition, to make the policy context more directly relevant, we include an additional treatment group: in the U.S., respondents saw a scenario, in which the U.S. economy declines relative to China; in China, respondents saw the corresponding scenario, in which China's economy rises relative to the United States.[2] Thus, in addition to identifying the causal effect of power shifts on individual trade policy preferences, we can detect potential effects that are idiosyncratic to respondents' preexisting beliefs about specific trade partners.

We find that perceived power shifts have a strong effect on people's trade pref-

[1]In other words, we manipulate the expectations of respondents and therefore examine the impact of future changes in power status, rather than the current status quo, on trade attitudes.

[2]To keep the scenarios realistic, given current international developments, we did not use a prime that claims that China's economy is declining compared to the United States.

erences with the other country. Respondents from a country experiencing a power decline relative to its trade partner are much less enthusiastic about bilateral trade cooperation than respondents from the control group and their counterparts who see a scenario, in which their country is a rising power. Specifically, support for a bilateral trade agreement drops by 43 percent in the U.S. and by 18 percent in China if respondents learn that their country experiences a decline relative to another country. We observe an even stronger reaction among respondents in both country samples when China or the U.S. is explicitly mentioned. In the U.S., support for entering into a trade agreement drops by 86 percent when the trading partner is China. In China, when the trade partner is the U.S., we see a 28 percent drop in support for bilateral trade, even though Chinese respondents in this group learn that their country is rising compared to the U.S.. This effectively overrides the effect of the *rising power* prime.

To probe the mechanisms underlying of the impact of power status on people's support for trade, we use a causal mediation analysis (CMA). The findings from the CMA show that citizens in a rising power expect their country to gain from the international order, which translates into greater support for bilateral economic cooperation. In contrast, citizens in a declining power expect their country to lose from the global order, which dampens their support for further cooperation.

Examining heterogeneous treatment effects, our results show that while some subgroups have a more pronounced reaction to the information treatment (especially the *declining power* prime), overall, citizens' concerns about unequal gains seem to cut across gender, political orientation, trade literacy and nationalist sentiment. Notably, in the U.S., we find that the *declining power* primes decrease support for trade among Democrats, Republicans, Independents and individuals with no party affiliation although the effect is considerably stronger for the latter three groups. These results in part explain why the current Democratic U.S. President has not changed his trade policy toward China since his inauguration

in January 2021.

Our analysis provides a new perspective on the American-Chinese trade war and the growing politicization of international trade, beyond the so-called China shock literature discussed above. For instance, Chinese counter-tariffs have been politically targeted and are perceived as a form of election interference by the mass public in the U.S. (Kim and Margalit, 2021; Brutger, Chaudoin and Kagan, 2022). Vice versa, non-cooperative reciprocal trade responses find the support of the mass public in China (Steinberg and Tan, 2022; Schweinberger, 2022). Closest to our analysis, Yeung and Quek (2022) show that relative gains concerns are the most salient when the trading partner is China. These studies show how American-Chinese economic relations have reached an unprecedented level of political salience (see also De Vries, Hobolt and Walter, 2021), but they do not explicitly show if and how changing power relations operate as root cause of this politicization. This is what our paper does.

More broadly, our study relates to the wider literature on the rise of China and its relevance for growing geopolitical concerns on international politics. China's continuing rise questions the continuation of the liberal international order (Weiss and Wallace, 2021) as the U.S. becomes less willing to support a system from which the power challenger benefits. Whilst the importance and consequences of U.S.-China power changes are often examined for security issues (Chan, 2007; Mukherjee, 2022), our findings suggest that power concerns also prevail in the realm of economic affairs.

The results also speak to the wider literature on trade preferences. Consistent with Walter (2021), American and Chinese citizens may remain supportive of trade in general, but they become increasingly skeptical of bilateral trade with the respective other country, which they see as key political competitors in the international system (Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022). Seen from this perspective, the backlash against globalization represent more an opposition against trade with specific other countries. This underlines conclusions about

the importance of country characteristics on other dimensions, such as political system, economic size and foreign policy orientation, for international trade support (Pevehouse, Chen and Powers, Forthcoming; Spilker, Bernauer and Umaña, 2016). At the same time, our analysis underlines that expectations about future power shifts and not only the current power asymmetries play a particularly important role for citizens in the U.S. and China (Tingley, 2017).

Power and International Trade

The classic international relations (IR) literature has long emphasized the potentially disruptive nature of international power transitions (Gilpin, 1981; Organski and Kugler, 1981; Carr, 1939). These transitions spur political conflict when the dominant state – the hegemon – and the rising power – the challenger – disagree over policy objectives, such as the structure of international trade, foreign investment flows or access to resources (Organski and Kugler, 1981). These disagreements occur because rising and declining powers tend to pursue diverging foreign policy strategies in order to safeguard their interests. The rising power attempts to promulgate an international order that attracts others, enabling it to advance its objectives and amplify its values far more than it could do on its own. In contrast, the declining power anticipates that a potential restructuring of the global system will deprive it of many privileges in the future that it enjoyed in the past and defends the status quo.[3]

These insights raise the question to what extent the changing power balance between China and the U.S. is a major source of the American-Chinese tensions of the past years, especially in the area of trade. China and the United States not only represent the two

[3]The amount of disagreement between the hegemon and the challenger determines the degree of conflict associated with a power transition. One source of disagreement is the 'dissatisfaction' of the challenger with the current system (Organski and Kugler, 1981), which can vary from case to case. We come back to this at the end of the paper when we discuss the scope conditions of our findings.

most important trading nations, but also come closest to a declining-rising powers rivalry in contemporary global politics. Whether China will indeed surpass the U.S. as the dominant power in the international system is still subject to debate (Beckley, 2011), but the power gap between China and the U.S. has decreased visibly since the 1990s. As the upper panel of Figure 1 shows, China experienced high fluctuations in its growth rate before the 1980s, but it eventually stabilized at a high level allowing China to overtake the U.S. GDP growth rate. In terms of absolute GDP value, China's GDP remains below the U.S.' GDP, but the slope of China's growth is steeper and in recent years it appears to be approaching more rapidly the U.S.' GDP value. Consequently, future projections about China's economic growth based on these current trajectories have sparked headlines such as "China to leapfrog as world's biggest economy by 2028".[4]



Figure 1: Comparison of economic strength between China and the U.S. Source: World Bank Database.

[4]Reuters Business News, December 26, 2020, available at `https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-economy-idUSKBN29000C`.

Although the rise of China has spurred new analyses on the broader impact of China's rise (Weiss and Wallace, 2021; Wang and Stone, 2022), the most influential analyses of American-Chinese trade politics emphasize domestic distributional rather than international political concerns. The so-called 'China shock' literature explains American protectionist sentiment with the adverse economic impact of Chinese imports on an important part of the American electorate (Fordham and Kleinberg, 2011). Specifically, Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) find that communities with firms who compete with Chinese imports suffered job loss, decreased labor force participation and suppressed wages. These adjustment costs from trade with China have a considerable impact on political behavior. Autor et al. (2020) and Baccini and Weymouth (2021) find that Chinese imports increase support for more extreme candidates, especially among Republicans. Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth (2017) show that voters punish incumbents in presidential elections when trade has a negative impact on them.[5] And since losers from trade in low-skilled manufacturing are concentrated in Swing States, these voters have a strong influence over American trade policy.[6]

While these studies point to an important mechanism that was set in motion by growing Chinese trade, the rise of China has other facets that go beyond the immediate economic impact on those who compete with Chinese manufacturing. It can trigger psychological mechanisms by which citizens oppose trade when members of the out-group - the other nation - benefit more than the members of the in-group - their own nation (Mutz

[5]Specifically, job gains in high-skilled industries help the incumbent, while trade-induced employment losses in low-skilled sectors hurt the incumbent. See also Margalit (2011). Similar reactions can be found in other parts of the world (Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Mansfield, Milner and Rudra, 2021; Milner, 2021; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2021; Rudra, Nooruddin and Bonifai, 2021).

[6]In addition, citizens form their opinion based on the impact of trade on the country as a whole (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Schaffer and Spilker, 2019; Guisinger, 2017), the distribution of the gains from trade between members of the same or other domestic social groups (Mutz and Kim, 2017; Mutz and Lee, 2020) and the perceived fairness of the domestic distribution of gains from trade (Lü, Scheve and Slaughter, 2012). These alternative mechanisms also emphasize domestic concerns rather than international factors that we put at the center of our explanation.

and Kim, 2017). It also raises geopolitical concerns that are now increasingly highlighted in recent international political economy research (e.g., DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg, 2019; Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022; de Goede and Westermeier, 2022; Brutger and Clark, 2022). Relatedly, it provides citizens with a heuristic on the distribution of gains in the international system (Brutger and Rathbun, 2021). This, in turn, shifts citizens' expectations about the opportunities that they and their country will have in the international system in the future. In this view, a key reasons for the growing tensions between China and the U.S. are found on the international level, specifically in the evolution of power between these two countries.

Our analysis focuses on power as key determinant of economic cooperation. In line with classic IR research mentioned above, the classic international political economy (IPE) research saw international power concerns as a critical determinant of foreign economic policy (Gilpin, 2001). With the uncontested American hegemony of the past decades, these power concerns became secondary and domestic distributional effects were the major political source of trade policy, as reflected by the large amount of research in the 'open-economy politics' tradition (Lake, 2009). With the rise of China, however, international factors, especially the role of power, move again to the fore. Power relations among key states, therefore, should be reflected in how we think about trade politics today, and the American-Chinese trade war in particular, in addition to the domestic distributional effects of American-Chinese trade.

Power Transition and Individual Trade Preferences

How, then, do shifts in the global balance of power affect citizens' support for international cooperation? We examine citizens' attitudes because they form an integral part of the societal consensus on how to deal with international challenges, such as power transitions. Even according to state-centric views of foreign economic policymaking,"the goals of economic activities (...) are determined by political processes and ultimately are responsibilities del-

egated by society to the state" (Gilpin, 2001, 23-24). Citizens represent one of the societal pillars of a long-term foreign economic strategy even if short-term foreign policy decisions do not necessarily follow popular preferences (Naoi, 2020; Steinberg and Tan, 2022). Ultimately, cooperation is less stable if citizens believe that this is against their and their country's interest. Similarly, a confrontational strategy is difficult to uphold if citizens are not willing to burden the costs of this strategy (cf. Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) and Milner and Tingley (2010)).

It is plausible that this is the case for trade cooperation between China and the United States. Ultimately, it is citizens who will forego the benefits of international economic exchange, e.g. in form of higher prices and lower economic growth, when trade relations are disrupted by a trade war. Thus, whether trade should primarily serve economic welfare or also national power goals, is a fundamental question that concerns not only governments, but society as a whole. The growing politicization of trade and the central role that trade with China nowadays plays in American electoral politics confirms that citizens matter when it comes to American-Chinese trade.

Even in non-democratic China, where trade liberalization has played a crucial role in improving living standards in the past few decades, trade-related issues have high political currency (Lardy, 2003). Trade disruptions, such as the ones caused by the trade war with the U.S. represent a potential risk to China's economic wealth, and, ultimately, its one-party rule (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Dickson, 2007). Notably, to avoid widespread public dissatisfaction the government has conducted a public consultation process to devise its response in the trade war.[7] Thus, despite the lack of elections, at least when it comes to trade policy towards the U.S., we observe some level of responsiveness to mass public concerns due to the desire of China's political leadership to maintain mass support – or at least avoid public opposition – to sustain its rule (Distelhorst and Hou, 2017; Chen, Pan and

[7]Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China. 2018. `http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201803/20180302723376.shtml`.

Xu, 2016).

Public opinion polls in both countries confirm that the general public is well aware of the potential geopolitical implications of bilateral trade. Chinese citizens show considerably more confidence about China exerting a global leadership role in the next ten years than their U.S. counterparts (Burzo and Li, 2018). While Chinese respondents believe that China will be the international leader in all areas, including trade, U.S. respondents only attribute that role to their own country in the area of international security. Accordingly, U.S. public attitude toward China has turned considerably more negative in recent years (Galston, 2021). Fears triggered by China's economic rise play a key role for this shift in U.S. public opinion about China (Silver, Devlin and Christine, 2020) and influence the attitudes of Americans toward Chinese outbound foreign investment Zeng and Li (2019). These findings emphasize the close link between geopolitical developments and voter preferences over international economic cooperation (Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022; DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg, 2019).

The question then is how changing power relations translate into specific trade preferences. Power transitions, by definition, are situations, in which long-term economic growth in the rising country exceeds economic growth in the established, dominant power. Although this divergence in growth rates can have many reasons, international trade often plays an important role. According to economic theory, all countries can benefit from international economic exchange in absolute terms, but the gains from trade can still be unequally distributed across countries. China's export-oriented development strategy that underpins the high Chinese growth rates of the past decades is a case in point (Tan, 2021; Tan and Conran, 2022). If bilateral trade asymmetrically influences national growth rates and hence affects the balance of power between potential rivals, citizens should take these relative gains into account when forming an opinion over bilateral trade.

Recent research suggests that this is indeed the case. While citizens generally are rather critical of asymmetric gains from trade (Herrmann, Tetlock and Diascro, 2001;

Chilton, Milner and Tingley, 2020; Brutger and Rathbun, 2021), there are instances when citizens do support relative gains. For instance, they are willing to trade absolute against relative gains in terms when they face a country that does not belong to their in-group for social-psychological reasons (Mutz and Kim, 2017). Directly related to our analysis, Yeung and Quek (2022) find that in a win-win situation, i.e. when both countries win in absolute terms, Americans favor an outcome that yields higher relative gains for the U.S. relative to China.[8] The situation between China and the U.S. that we describe in the previous section is similar to such a situation: both countries benefit from trade, but China seems to win more when we consider the impact of trade on growth. To what extent power concerns cause this preference for relative gain remains unexplored, however, because the power constellations between the U.S. and the other country do not vary in the experimental setup of this study.

There are good reasons why this preference for relative gains varies with power. From the perspective of the declining power, such a power shift increases the risk of future losses (Tingley, 2017), prompting more protectionist policy to limit its challenger's economic gains from trade, which contribute to the power transition. The disruption of cooperative trade relations may slow down absolute gains, but also equilibrate relative gains between their and the other country. To the extent that citizens believe that trade impacts countries' global power status, and thus their long-term ability to chart the course of world politics to the respective country's favor, citizens in a declining power are likely willing to put more emphasis on relative gains to inhibit the rise of the challenger and enhance their own country's long-term utility. In other words, citizens may be willing to forego some of the absolute benefits from international economic cooperation in exchange for relative gains in order to secure superior international political power for their own country.

Conversely, in the rising power, citizens see no need to disrupt the trading relations that already works in their country's favor. While rising powers could seek to speed up the

[8]They also find that American do not favor relative gains when they win and the other country loses.

power transition by pushing for greater relative gains, doing so raises the risk of countermeasures by the current hegemon, which, in turn, imposes risk on their own economy. Thus, rising powers are more keen to signal their commitment to cooperative relations and avoid policies that put their gains at risk (Tingley, 2017). From the citizens' perspective, therefore, there is no reason to forego absolute gains in exchange for greater relative gains. Instead, they are likely to support international economic cooperation and promoting the status quo, from which their country derives global power status which helps the country to assert its national interest and the interest of its citizens on the stage of world politics.

Following these premises, we therefore expect differences in citizens' attitudes toward international economic cooperation depending on their expectations about their countries' future power status.

H1: Citizens from a rising power are more likely to support trade liberalization.

H2: Citizens from a declining power are less likely to support trade liberalization.

Research Design

We examine the effect of power transitions on public attitudes toward international economic cooperation using a randomized experiment, which we implemented as part of original surveys in China and the U.S. The survey experiments were conducted in parallel in the two countries between November 2020 and February 2021 with the survey company IPSOS and were administered online via the Qualtrics platform. Survey samples in both countries (U.S.: N=1,900; China: N=2,494) are representative of key socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender, age and region of origin.[9]

[9]We registered our pre-analysis plan with EGAP (Registration ID: 20201002AB).

China and the U.S. were selected for two main reasons. First, the countries currently represent the two largest markets in the global economy with significant trade ties to one another. Second, testing our theoretical conjectures with samples from China and the U.S. allows us to examine the validity of our theoretical arguments across different political and socio-economic contexts. Moreover, given the emerging changes in the global economic order between the two countries, our parallel surveys provide a rare occasion to investigate the effect of our information treatments versus the effect of real-world power dynamics on mass attitudes toward trade cooperation. In other words, does public opinion of international trade reflect the views consistent with the hypothesized preferences of a declining/ascending power or are citizens' views largely affected by real-world developments in global power balances? If we find that respondents in both countries react similarly to the information treatments as hypothesized, this would lend important external validity to our theoretical arguments, suggesting that our information treatments are effective in inducing mass support for (opposition against) international trade in response to different power transition scenarios.

Information Treatment: Power Transition

In the experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to information about their country's current and projected position vis-à-vis a potential trade partner country. Specifically, we examine how different scenarios about the future evolution of the power gap between the two countries affect public support for international economic cooperation. To begin with, respondents read about a scenario in which their country's leadership is considering a trade agreement to further trade liberalization with another country. In a next step, we then randomly assigned respondents to an experimental stimuli containing information about the status of their own country as either rising or declining in power relative to the trade partner. Respondents assigned to the *rising power* treatment learn that their home country's power is projected to increase vis-à-vis its trade partner in the next five to ten years. In contrast, the

declining power scenario informs respondents that their home country's power is projected to be on a downward trend relative to the trade partner country.[10]

We use scenarios with a generic, 'other' country that remains unspecified and scenarios that make explicit reference to China or the United States. However, based on actual projections we only include the country-specific labels in those narratives that depict a realistic future scenario. Accordingly, in the U.S., we include a scenario with specific reference to China as the potential trade partner in the *declining vs. China* treatment. Conversely, in our Chinese sample, as a mirror image of the country-specific scenarios in the U.S. sample, we include the U.S. as the potential trade partner country for the *rising power vs. USA* treatment. This results in three experimental groups and a fourth *no information* group, in which respondents do not receive additional information about the power dynamics between the respondent's own country and the trade partner country. An overview of the experimental groups for each country sample is presented in Table 1.

Group	*USA* Information	*China* Information
T0	No information	No information
T1	Rising vs. other country	Rising vs. other country
T2	Declining vs. China	Rising vs. USA
T3	Declining vs. other country	Declining vs. other country

Table 1: Experimental groups

To reduce cognitive burden on the respondents, for each scenario, we provide both text-based description and graphical illustration of the experimental stimuli. Figure 2 shows the graphs representing the three different possible information treatments that U.S. respon-

[10]In our pilot studies, we distinguished between power in two major policy areas: 1) economic power, indicated by the country's GDP, and 2) military power, demonstrated by the country's military spending. After careful consideration, we decided to remove the military treatment to reduce the number of treatment groups in order to increase sample size for statistical power.



(a) U.S. declining; other rising **(b)** U.S. declining, China rising **(c)** U.S. rising, other declining

Figure 2: Graphical depiction of primes displayed to U.S. respondents

dents saw. Each graph depicts the total GDP (in trillion US-$) in the respondent's own country and the potential trade partner country from 2000 to 2030. Until 2018, we use actual GDP data from the World Bank Development Indicators database. To generate the different economic power dynamics between the respondent's home country and its trade partner (or China and the U.S., respectively), we computed projections for U.S. and China's GDP development from 2018 to 2030. Specifically, in the *declining power* treatment (panel a), the forecast of GDP growth suggests that the foreign country will overtake the home country by 2030. In the *rising power* prime (panel c), the forecast indicates that the home country will widen its existing lead over the other country. Panel b shows the projection of U.S. GDP vis-à-vis China's GDP. The information text and the graph suggest that China's GDP will overtake U.S. GDP in the coming years. Including scenarios with a generic "other" country as well as scenarios that specify the potential trade partner country as the U.S. and China, respectively, allows us to account for potential country biases driving our results.

Individual Trade Preference

After respondents saw one of the power transition scenarios (or none if randomly assigned to the control group), we asked them about their support for international economic co-

operation.[11] Respondents were asked to report how much they support or oppose their government's plan to enter into a trade agreement with the other country (or China and the U.S., respectively). *Bilateral trade support* is measured on a 5-points scale ranging from -2 ("Strongly oppose") to 2 ("Strongly support"). Figure 3 shows the distribution for *Bilateral trade support* in the full samples. Chinese respondents (in red) seem on average more supportive of *bilateral* trade than their U.S. counterparts. For example, while 55.9% of the people surveyed in the U.S. somewhat or strongly support entering into a trade agreement with the other country, this amounts to 71.5% in the Chinese sample.[12]



Figure 3: Variable distributions of outcome variables for U.S. and Chinese samples. Bar height indicates proportion of responses. Label indicates the absolute number of responses.

In the survey, we also ask respondents about their attitudes toward general trade (*Unilateral trade support*). However, our theoretical framework and accordingly our infor-

[11] As a comprehension check, we ask respondents: "Based on the information you just read, compared to the other country, is the U.S./Chinese economy likely to be larger or smaller in the coming years?" after reading the information treatment. If respondents did not answer the comprehension check question correctly, the prime was shown again.

[12] 27% in the U.S. and 8% in China answered "Don't know" in response to *Bilateral trade support* question. We exclude these responses from the subsequent analyses.

mation treatments are more narrowly focused on situations of bilateral trade. For example, while our theory puts forward that citizens from a declining power are less enthusiastic about trading with a partner country that is experiencing a rise in power (relative to their own country), it might well be the case that these citizens view trade in general or trade with other countries favorably. In short, our theory is agnostic about the implications of a country's power status on individual attitudes toward trade in general. In what follows, we therefore focus on presenting and discussing the results for our main outcome variable, *Bilateral trade support*.[13]

Finally, we also collect information on respondents' socio-demographic characteristics, including gender, education, income, political ideology, trade literacy and nationalism. Further information about the information treatment and all survey items used in the analysis, including question wording and descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix, section A.1.

Results

Figure 4a plots cell means of *Bilateral trade support* in the U.S. sample (left panel).[14] In what follows, we compare the mean responses from participants assigned to the experimental groups to those in the *no information* group. We find that people assigned to the *rising power* scenario were not more likely to support the government's plan to enter into a trade agreement with the other country than respondents who did not receive any information about the U.S.' power position vis-à-vis the potential trade partner. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis (H1) that individuals from a rising power are more supportive of trade

[13]We present the results from the analysis of *Unilateral trade support* in the Appendix (section A.4).

[14]Frequencies of the responses across all treatment groups are summarized in Section A.2 of the Appendix.

cooperation.



(a) Cell means of *Bilateral Trade Support* across different treatment conditions with 95% confidence intervals. USA, N = 1,900; China, N = 2,494



(b) Marginal Treatment Effects on *Bilateral Trade Support*. The baseline for these analyses is the "no info" control group.

Figure 4: Comparing *Bilateral trade support* across treatment and control groups. Cf. Appendix Table A.10 for regression table results.

However, people who read about the U.S.' projected decline in relative power in the near future were significantly more likely to reject trade cooperation with the partner country. While support for entering into a trade agreement with the described trade partner country averages .7 (on a -2 to 2 scale) among respondents assigned to the control group, the average level of support shrinks to .4 in the *declining power* group, representing a 43% drop in *Bilateral trade* support. We observe even larger differences in average support for *Bilateral trade* when comparing between the control group and respondents who learnt that

China's GDP will overtake U.S.' GDP in the years to come as described in the *declining vs. China* prime. In the latter group, mean support for a trade agreement with China is as low as .1. Thus, when comparing the cell means between rising and the declining information treatments we find strong support for H2. Put differently, when revealing that China is the potential trade partner, support for *Bilateral trade* experiences a whopping decrease by 86%. The negative effect of this information treatment is consistent with our prediction, because, based on actual macro-economic indicators, we inform respondents who were assigned to this treatment condition that the U.S. economy is predicted to be overtaken by the Chinese economy in the near future. Thus, this represents a *declining power* scenario, which in accordance with H2, should reduce support for trade cooperation.

In China, we find a similar picture (see Figure 4a, right panel). Compared to respondents from the *no information* group, learning about China's prospects to overtake the trade partner country's economy in 2025-2030 seems to only slightly increase people's *Bilateral trade support*. Surprisingly, support for the proposed trade agreement does not increase when respondents learn that China will be the rising economic power, ahead of the United States. To the contrary, across all four treatment conditions, this prime elicits the lowest level of *Bilateral trade support*. This is inconsistent with our prediction formulated in H1, but may simply reflect a general hesitation about increasing trade with the U.S. among Chinese citizen amid the current tensions between the two countries. The low support among respondents assigned to this treatment group compared to the control group is therefore likely to capture a country label effect, which is also observable in the U.S. sample. However, similar to the findings reported in the U.S. sample and in line with H2, we find we statistically differences in the level of *Bilateral trade support* between members of the *declining power* and the *no information* group. While mean support among the control group is at .8, it drops to .7 among respondents who learn that China's economic power is projected to decline over the next 5-10 years, representing an 18% decrease.

Are the reported differences in average *Bilateral trade support* statistically significant? Figure 4b plots the difference in mean trade support level between the control group and each of our three treatment groups. As noted above, we only find a small difference in the level of *Bilateral trade support* between people from the *no information* group and respondents who were assigned to the *rising power* prime. This difference is not statistically different from zero since the corresponding 95% confidence interval includes zero. However, consistent with H2 the differences between the control group and respondents who read the *declining power* primes is negative and statistically significant at the 95% level. In the U.S. sample (left panel), when China is mentioned as the trade partner country, support for trade plummets even further. Surprisingly, in China (right panel), respondents who learn that the U.S. is the potential trade partner were also less enthusiastic about trade than people from the control group, even though respondents in this treatment group were primed about China's projected *rising power* relative to the United States.

Overall, the results from the previous analysis provide empirical support for our theoretical expectations about the impact of power transition on public support for international economic integration. More specifically, while the results only lend partial support to H1, we find that in line with H2, the *declining power* narrative that has a consistently strong and statistically significant effect on people's trade attitude. This may be explained by loss aversion, people's tendency to overemphasize losses over equivalent gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which we will address in greater detail in the discussion.

Regression Analysis

The results from the balance tests (see Tables A.6 and A.5) show that our Chinese sample is balanced across the treatment groups with regard to all key socio-demographic characteristics and predictors of trade attitudes. In the U.S. sample, we find that respondents from the

control group reported a lower income and respondents assigned to the *rising power* prime, on average, displayed higher nationalist sentiment. We therefore control for these variables as well as a number of additional socio-demographic characteristics and respondents' ideological beliefs.



Figure 5: Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals for *Bilateral Trade Support*.

Figure 5[15] shows that in both samples the estimated treatment effects are consistent with the findings from the simple difference-in-means tests presented above.[16] In these models, exposure to the *declining power* prime significantly decreases support for international economic integration compared to the *no information* group. In contrast, respondents assigned to the *rising power* information treatment do not significantly differ in their level of *Bilateral trade support* from respondents in the control group. The effects of the socio-demographic variables are largely consistent with previous findings: male respondents and people with higher subjective trade literacy are more enthusiastic about trade cooperation in both countries.

[15]Cf, the Appendix Table A.8 for table regression results.

[16]Section A.1 of the Appendix provides details about the coding of the covariates used in the regression. NAs are excluded from the analysis.

However, we find interesting differences between Chinese and U.S. respondents with respect to the estimated effects of the ideological variables. First, party ideology is an important driver in the U.S. with Republicans and Independents[17] displaying significantly more skepticism toward trade openness than Democrats. Although Republicans have historically held more favorable views about free trade than Democrats, the former's decline in support for trade has been documented in recent public opinion polls, especially since Donald Trump's presidential campaign in 2016 (Stokes, 2016). In China, membership to the Communist party does not affect trade attitudes. Second, nationalist sentiment seems to be pulling Chinese and American public opinion about trade into opposite directions. As indicated by the negative coefficient sign, nationalism seems to deflate support for trade among Americans. However, the estimated effect does not reach statistical significance. In contrast, in China, nationalist sentiment is significantly and positively correlated with support for economic integration. While this is inconsistent with the existing individual trade policy preference literature, which has mainly focused on identifying determinants of trade attitudes in the U.S. and other Western countries, this finding is not surprising in the Chinese context, where the government is actively promoting global capitalism (Lee et al., 2009). Specifically, while we observe a growth in protectionist rhetoric in the public discourse in many Western countries, China's political leadership has consistently emphasized the gains from international economic engagement, underlining the compatibility of such a strategy with China's national interests (Lee et al., 2009).

Causal Mediation Analysis

To probe the underlying mechanisms driving the effect of our information treatment, in particular the estimated effect of the *declining power* prime, on public support for interna-

[17]Please note that the group of independents encompasses both independent, as well as no party, affiliation.

tional economic cooperation, we employ causal mediation analysis (CMA). As hypothesized, perceived power transitions lead citizens to anticipate their country's benefits and losses in the global order. Whereas citizens of a rising power will be optimistic about their country's prospects to reap the benefits from the global order, citizens from a declining power will fear disadvantages from the global order resulting from their country's loss of power. This, in turn, influences their attitudes toward trade cooperation; individuals who believe that their country will benefit from the global order will support international economic integration. In contrast, those who think their country stands to lose from the global order will naturally oppose further economic integration.

To this end, immediately after reading the randomly assigned information text we ask respondents to report how they expect their country to fare in the international order in the next 10 years.[18] *Country prospects* is a categorical variable ranging from -2 to +2 with zero indicating neither gain nor loss and higher values denoting respondents' expectation that their country will gain from the international order. Figure 6a and 6b plot respondents' expectations about their country's future prospects in the international order across treatment groups. In both countries, we find that respondents who read about their country's economic power being in decline were indeed less likely to say that their country will gain from the international order than people assigned to the control group and people who received the *rising power* prime.

When comparing between our country samples, we find that Chinese respondents are overall considerably more optimistic about China's prospects to gain from the international order in the next 10 years than their U.S. counterparts. Among people in the control group, i.e., those who did not receive any information about power distributions between respondents' home country and the trade partner country, on our -2 to +2 scale, the mean response is .8 China, but only .5 in the U.S.. In the U.S., average responses from the *declining*

[18]Note that respondents who were assigned to the control group, and hence did not receive an information treatment text, also answered this question.



(a) U.S. citizens **(b)** Chinese citizens

Figure 6: Expected *Country prospects* from international order by treatment groups with 95% confidence intervals.

prime (vis-à-vis the other country and China, respectively) even turn negative, indicating that respondents from these group believe that the U.S. will lose from the international order in the coming years. In China, the *declining power* prime significantly reduces people's expectation about their country's prospects to gain from the international order compared to the expectation of people in the control group and respondents assigned to the *rising power* treatment group. However, the mean responses across all groups are consistently larger than zero, suggesting that all Chinese respondents anticipate China to gain from the international order.

Following Imai et al. (2011), we estimate the average causal mediation effect (ACME) of respondents' expected loss and gains from the international order on their country using CMA. In essence, CMA allows us to dissect the total effect of a treatment into a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect, also called the average direct effect (ADE), is the causal effect of the information treatments on respondents' support for trade that is not transmitted by their beliefs about how their country will fare in the international order. In other words, this reflects the difference in the power primes while holding the level of the mediator variable constant. The indirect effect represents the effect of the treatment on the outcome through the mediator variable. This can be understood as the extent to which support for trade cooperation would change in the *rising power* treatment group if we could

set the average value of the mediator to the average value that we would have observed in the *declining power* group.



Figure 7: Proportion Mediated of loss/gain perception on responses to outcome for U.S. and Chinese Sample with 95% confidence intervals. Comparison between the rising and declining treatment groups.

We conduct the CMA using the mediation package in R. To run the mediate function from the mediation package, we need to specify the outcome variable, the treatment variable and the mediator variable, which we operationalize as follows. Our dependent variable is *Bilateral trade support* capturing the extent to which respondents favor entering into a trade agreement with another country. Since we are interested in the mediated effect of the *declining power* prime versus the mediated effect of the *rising power* prime (rather than the differences between the *no information* and the power primes), we define the treatment variable, *Treatment* as a binary variable that is coded as 1 if the respondent received the *declining power* treatment and 0 if they were assigned to the *rising power* treatment group. *Country prospects* is the mediator variable and captures respondents' optimism about their country's ability to reap benefits from the international order in the next 10 years.

The analysis yields the ACME, the ADE and their combined effect, the total effect. Moreover, we obtain information about the proportion of the effect of the treatment variable (*Treatment*) on our outcome variable (Bilateral trade support) that goes through the medi-

ator (*Country prospect*) and its corresponding confidence intervals. This effect is calculated by dividing the ACME by the total effect. As shown in Figure 7, the effect of the power primes on U.S. voters' support for trade liberalization is almost fully mediated with 97% via their perception about how much the U.S. will gain or lose from the global political order in the next 10 years. In China, people's beliefs about how the international order will benefit China mediate 63% of the treatment effect. These results lend support for our hypothesized mechanism underlying the effect of power transitions on citizens' support for international economic integration.[19]

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Building on the findings from the regression analysis, we examine to what extent our treatment effects are moderated by respondents' gender, trade literacy, political orientation and nationalism.[20] To examine heterogeneous treatment effects, we run separate models for each of our covariate of interest, where we regress our outcome variable on treatment status and include interaction terms of the treatment variable and covariate under investigation.[21]

Figure 8 plots the results from the subgroup analyses.[22] Overall, the subgroup results look mostly similar to the treatment effects we observe in the full sample; we generally find that the *declining power* prime consistently decreases people's appetite for foreign trade. A notable exception to this pattern is among Chinese respondents with low nationalist sentiment for whom the information treatments do not seem to have any effect on their

[19]In Figure A.3a to A.3b of the Appendix, we perform sensitivity analyses to test the assumption of sequential ignorability, which implies that the relationship between the mediator and the outcome variable is not confounded by unmeasured pre-treatment variables that confound the relationship (Imai et al., 2011). The results from the sensitivity analysis indicates that the results from the CMA are robust.

[20]Section A.10 provides details about the coding of the covariates.

[21]In these models, we control for the level of nationalism, gender, the level of trade literacy and party affiliation/CCP membership. Cf. Appendix Table A.11 for each model.

[22]The distribution of all the variables can be found in the Appendix in Figure A.4.



Figure 8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on *Bilateral Trade Support* with 95% confidence intervals. Cf. Appendix Table A.11 for regression table results.

trade policy preferences. However, as shown by the large confidence intervals, the number of Chinese respondents who have weak nationalist sentiment is quite small. In addition, we find that certain groups respond more strongly to the information treatment, especially the *declining power* scenario than their reference group. For example, in both countries, women show less enthusiasm for economic cooperation when they learn that their country's economy will be overtaken by the trade partner country, respectively, than their male counterparts. These findings suggest that women may be more sensitive to the loss aversion logic triggered by the *declining power* treatment information.

Similarly, support for *Bilateral trade* is lower among both Democrats and Republican in response to information that U.S. economic power is projected to decline compared to respondents from the control group. The treatment effect is very similar for both political camps when respondents learn about economic decline relative to an unnamed country. But it is significantly stronger among Republicans when China is explicitly mentioned, in which case we observe a whopping decrease of .9 points on the five-point scale relative to Republicans who were assigned to the control group. Interestingly, respondents who identify themselves as Independents or who do not mention a party react very similarly to the treatments as Republicans. This speaks to previous, inconclusive findings about the impact of partisan ideology on the evaluation of international power competition among American voters (Prather and Shi, 2021). In our sample, this group is similar in size as the Republican and Democratic political camps. The attitudes of these respondents, therefore, should be politically relevant for Democratic and Republican policymakers when designing trade policy toward China.

In China, we do not find any difference between members and non-members of the Communist Party. Likewise, there are few statistically significant differences between Chinese, as well as American, respondents who have high self-reported knowledge of trade and their low trade-literacy counterparts. While the level of nationalism does not affect

U.S. responses, highly nationalist Chinese citizens are more likely to support bilateral trade cooperation in the *rising power* scenario than individuals with low levels of nationalism.



Figure 9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on *Bilateral Trade Support* with 95% confidence intervals. Cf. Appendix Table A.12 for regression table results.

In order to link our findings directly to those from the 'China shock' literature, we also examine how local import penetration by China moderates the treatment effects. With the information on the respondents' locality from the survey, we match respondents' postcode with the county-level import penetration data from Autor et al. (2020). If the import penetration level is below (over) the median value, we assign the respondents' locality to "low" ("high"). [23][24] Figure 8 visualises the interaction between the treatments and the import penetration of the respondents' locality in the United States. We find that respondents who live in locations that experience higher imports from China react more strongly to the *declining power* primes. Mean support among respondents whose location received higher Chinese imports declines from .82 for respondents in the control group to .3 and .0 for those who received one of the two *declining power* primes. In comparison, the difference in ATEs among respondents from a location with low Chinese import penetration is less pronounced, but still very strong. These findings corroborate existing work about the political repercussions of manufacturing decline in the U.S. (Baccini and Weymouth, 2021).

[23]Like for the other analysis, this model controls for level of nationalism, sex, trade knowledge and party affiliation.

[24]Re-running the analysis with the mean value conveys similar results.

But they also show that the reaction to expected power shifts is not simply a result of the personal material effects of trade with China because global power considerations prevail across different economic localities.

In sum, the findings from the heterogeneous treatment analysis suggest that different groups of citizens have different levels of sensitivity to the implications of global power transitions and its implications on individual countries' power status. This is influenced by both voters' socio-demographic characteristics (and perhaps by extension psychological traits) and their ideological orientation. Overall, however, our findings indicate that the impact of perceived global power status on individual trade policy preferences largely cuts across multiple social cleavages.

Discussion

In our information treatments we invite respondents to compare their country's projected power status to a generic, unspecified "other" potential trading partner country. This allows us to examine the extent to which our theoretical predictions are generalizable beyond the dynamics of the U.S.-China rivalry. However, given the salience of the US-China competition in the media and the public discourse, citizens in both countries may be cued to think of China/the U.S. as the unnamed country in answering the questions. If that is the case, then the reported ATEs of the generic treatment could be a weighted average of both the generic treatment and the country-specific treatment.

To further explore to what extent our results are specific to the American-Chinese context, we asked respondents which country they thought of (or none/no specific country) after reading the generic treatment texts and graphs. In the U.S., 18% of the respondents indeed thought of China when they were presented with the unnamed trading partner country,

while in China 13% thought of the U.S.. To address the above-mentioned concern, we re-ran our main analyses without respondents who were assigned to the generic information treatments but still thought of China/the U.S., and find that our results remained substantively unchanged.[25] This gives us some confidence that our results are not entirely influenced by the current tensions between China and the U.S., but that a reduction in trade support levels is at least partly explained by the power dynamics between the respondent's own country and the potential trading partner. In other words, due to the existing tensions between the U.S. and China American citizens may view trade with China as less desirable than trade with another country (e.g., the United Kingdom). However, if citizens in the U.S. learnt that this other country is about to overtake the U.S., our findings suggest that we are likely to also see a significant decrease in public support for a trade agreement between the U.S. and this other country.

That said, there is still an important difference how respondents react to an unnamed, other country compared to a situation when the U.S. or China are explicitly mentioned. The explicit mentioning of U.S./China as the potential trade partner elicits an even stronger negativity bias. In fact, U.S. respondents who learnt that China will overtake the U.S. economy in the foreseeable future showed the highest opposition against economic cooperation. In China, the explicit mention of the U.S. leads to a decline in support for bilateral cooperation even though our information treatment suggests that China's economy will be rising vis-à-vis the United States. We believe that much of this can be explained by the ongoing tensions, with political leaders on both sides playing up suspicions of the other to bolster their own popularity (Feng, 2020). Nonetheless, country labels, and therefore characteristics specific to the China-U.S. dyad, e.g. the political system of other other country, have an impact on respondents.

Finally, while the results are overall consistent with our theoretical predictions, we

[25]The results are included in the Appendix, cf. A.5.

find that it is the *declining power* prime that elicits the strongest effect on respondents' trade policy preferences. Although individuals show more favorable attitudes towards trade when they are informed that their country's power is rising, the effect of the *rising power* prime is weak. These results point to a sense of both over-confidence and loss aversion. The similar responses of respondents from the control and the *rising power* groups suggest that, absent any information, respondents are fairly confident about their respective country's global power status. Thus, informing them about an expected rise in power does not seem to trigger a discernible reaction. At the same time, the consistent and strong effect of the *declining power* prime can be explained by a negativity bias in respondents' information processing. This negativity bias has been documented in other areas of public opinion research (e.g., Fridkin and Kenney, 2004; Soroka, 2006). This phenomenon can be traced back to what Kahneman and Tversky (1979) term as "loss aversion", i.e., individuals' tendency to prioritize potential losses over potential gains.

Conclusion

The international relations literature has long debated how power transitions in the international system shake international interactions and destabilize international cooperation. Examining the impact of such changes in global power on the microfoundations of international economic cooperation, i.e., individual trade policy preferences, our empirical findings suggest that power transitions leave significant marks on citizens' perceptions of the value of international cooperation. Importantly, we find that in both China and the U.S. - the two economies that come closest to a declining-rising powers rivalry in contemporary global politics - our experimental manipulation largely works as theorized. Citizens of the declining power are much less likely to support trade cooperation than citizens of the rising power. This suggests that our findings can help understand variation in public support for or oppo-

sition against international economic cooperation in response international power dynamics and shifts therein across different country contexts.

From this perspective, the recent trade war between the U.S. and China have underlying causes that can be found in the ongoing power dynamics in the international system. Although this explanation differs from the seminal 'China shock' argument (Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth, 2017; Autor et al., 2020; Baccini and Weymouth, 2021), the two explanations are not incompatible. The rise of China has different facets. One is the immediate and direct material impact on specific, electorally relevant groups, e.g. manufacturing workers in U.S. Swing States or elsewhere across the world. Another is the long-term impact on the distribution of gains from international cooperation across countries. The latter points to a parallel mechanism that affects a broader range of people than only those who are personally affected by the China shock and that is unique to American-Chinese relations. Our paper, therefore, offers an explanation for the growing support for anti-globalist politicians in the U.S. despite the generally stable support for economic openness (Walter, 2021).

This has important implications. Our findings point to more fundamental problems for international cooperation than the China shock literature. Structural disruptions, job and income losses, emerging from trade with China may eventually fade and could potentially be addressed with industrial, social and educational policies. Here, a significant partisan division should be visible as different parties opt for different solutions to this problem. An example is the division in Congress over President Biden's fiscal policy package. In comparison to the partisan clash over fiscal policy, the division over trade with China seem much smaller. Although the tone may differ across presidential administrations, actual policy has not changed much since the inauguration of President Biden. Our paper offers an explanation for the continuation of tensions between U.S.-China trade relations.

More broadly, our results show that Great Power competition interferes with the course of international economic affairs also in our current world order – an aspect that has

been downplayed for a long time in much of international political economy research. Given the unchallenged U.S. dominance during the past decades, international legalization and rules-based global governance moved into the center of the debate and supplanted concerns about Great Power competition. But if China keeps rising as it has in the past twenty years, we are moving toward an international system where power will again take a more prominent place in public debate over international economic affairs.

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A Appendix

A.1 Question wording and Summary Statistics

Variable and Question	Response Categories and Coding	Responses Mean	Responses Median	Responses Min	Responses Max
Outcome Variables					
Country prospects: "Overall, do you expect your county to gain or lose from the international order in the next 10 years?"	Gain a lot (2) Gain (1) Neither gain nor lose (0) Lose (-1) Lose a lot (-2)	0.12	0.00	-2.00	2.00
Bilateral Trade Support:"Please tell us how much you support or oppose the U.S. government's plan to enter into a trade agreement with the other country?"	Strongly support (2) Somewhat support (1) Neither support not oppose (0) Somewhat oppose (-1) Strongly oppose (-2)	0.48	1.00	-2.00	2.00
Unilateral Trade Support:"In general, do you think the U.S. government should increase, decrease or keep the same the amount of international trade it has with other countries?"	Increase (1) Decrease (-1) Keep the same (0)	0.2	0.00	-1.00	1.00
Covariates					
Sex: "Are you ...?"	Female, Male, Other	Male: 1177, Female: 1013, Other: 7			
Education: "What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?"	Less than high school degree (1) High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent) (2) Some college but no degree (3) Associate degree in college (2-year) (4) Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)(5) Master's degree (6) Doctoral/Professional degree(7)	4.031	4.000	1	7
Income: "Next, we would like to ask you about your annual net household income in the past 12 months, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other income after taxes and other deductions. "	-Less than $ 10,000 (1) - $10,000 to $19,999 (low) - $20,000 to $29,999 (low) - $30,000 to $39,999 (low) - $40,000 to $49,999 (low) - $50,000 to $59,999 (high) - $60,000 to $69,999 (high) - $70,000 to $79,999 (high) - $80,000 to $99,999 (high) - $100,000 to $119,000 (high) - $120,000 to $129,000 (high) - $130,000 to $139,000 (high) - $140,000 to $149,000 (high) - $150,000 to $159,000 (high) - $160,000 to $169,000 (high) - $170,000 to $179,000 (high) - $180,000 to $189,000 (high) - $190,000 to $199,000 (high) - $200,000 or more	6.55, Income high: 1213, Income low: 984	6.00	1.000	1.000
Age: "What is your year of birth?"	2020-YOB	48.17	48.00	19.00	85.00
Employment: "Are you currently employed?"	Yes, No	Yes: 1033, No:767			
Trade literacy: "In your opinion, how much do you personally know about international trade issues between the People's Republic of China/US and other countries in the world?"	Nothing or almost nothing (1) A little bit (2) A moderate amount (3) A lot (4)	2.195	2.00	1	4
Nationalism (responses for all the items are added together, reverse polarity for third item):"Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements: -I'm glad to be American. -The U.S. is always right. -The U.S. is the worst country in the world. -In the U.S., our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others. -I would rather be a citizen of the U.S. than of any other country in the world. -The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the U.S. "	Strongly disagree (-2) Somewhat disagree (-1) Neither agree nor disagree (0) Somewhat agree (1) Strongly agree (2)	3.214	4.000	-14	14
Party Affiliation: "Generally speaking, with which party do you affiliate?"	Republican Party, Democratic Party	Republican: 596, Democrat: 645			

Table A.1: Overview of questions and summary statistics for survey in the U.S.

Variable and Question	Response Categories and Coding	Responses Mean	Responses Median	Responses Min	Responses Max
Outcome Variables					
Country prospects: "Overall, do you expect your county to gain or lose from the international order in the next 10 years?"	Gain a lot (2) Gain (1) Neither gain nor lose (0) Lose (-1) Lose a lot (-2)	0.79	1.00	-2.00	2.00
Bilateral Trade Support:"Please tell us how much you support or oppose the Chinese government's plan to enter into a trade agreement with the other country?"	Strongly support (2) Somewhat support (1) Neither support not oppose (0) Somewhat oppose (-1) Strongly oppose (-2)	0.8	1.00	-2.00	2.00
Unilateral Trade Support:"In general, do you think the Chinese government should increase, decrease or keep the same the amount of international trade it has with other countries?"	Increase (1) Decrease (-1) Keep the same (0)	0.73	1.00	-1.00	1.00
Covariates					
Sex: "Are you . . . ?"	Male, Female	Male: 1164 Female: 1354			
Education: "What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?"	Less than high school degree (1) High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent) (2) Some college but no degree (3) Associate degree in college (2-year) (4) Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)(5) Master's degree (6) Doctoral/Professional degree (7)	4.402	5.000	1	7
Income: "Next, we would like to ask you about your annual net household income in the past 12 months, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other income after taxes and other deductions. "	-Less than ¥ 5,000 (1/low) - ¥100,000 to ¥119,000 (11/high) - ¥5,000 to ¥9,999 (2/low) - ¥120,000 to ¥129,000 (12/high) - ¥10,000 to ¥19,999 (3/low) - ¥130,000 to ¥139,000 (13/high) - ¥20,000 to ¥29,999 (4/low) - ¥140,000 to ¥149,000 (14/high) - ¥30,000 to ¥39,999 (5/low) - ¥150,000 to ¥159,000 (15/high) - ¥40,000 to ¥49,999 (6/high) - ¥160,000 to ¥169,000 (16/high) - ¥50,000 to ¥59,999 (7/high) - ¥170,000 to ¥179,000 (17/high) - ¥60,000 to ¥69,999 (8/high) - ¥180,000 to ¥189,000 (18/high) - ¥70,000 to ¥79,999 (9/high) - ¥190,000 to ¥199,000 (19/high) - ¥80,000 to ¥99,999 (10/high) - ¥220,000 or more (20/high)	10.52, Income high: 1291, Income low: 647	11.00	1.00	19.00
Employment: "Are you currently employed?"	Yes, No	Yes: 1610 , No:343			
Trade literacy: "In your opinion, how much do you personally know about international trade issues between the People's Republic of China/US and other countries in the world?"	Nothing or almost nothing (1) A little bit (2) A moderate amount (3) A lot (4)	2.236	2.00	1	4
Age: "What is your year of birth?"	2020-YOB	36.74	36.00	19.00	85.00
Nationalism(responses for all the items are added together, reverse polarity for third item):"Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:-I'm glad to be Chinese. -China is always right. -China is the worst country in the world. -In China, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others. -I would rather be a citizen of China than of any other country in the world. -The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like China. "	Strongly disagree (-2) Somewhat disagree (-1) Neither agree nor disagree (0) Somewhat agree (1) Strongly agree (2)	7.823	8.000	-14	14
Party Membership: "Are you a member of the Communist Party?"	Yes, No, Prefer not to say	Yes:416, No:1413, Prefer not to say: 108			

Table A.2: Overview of questions and summary statistics for survey in China

A.2 Treatments and Responses Frequencies

These tables show the frequencies (in percent) of the responses (out of the total responses, without the don't knows) for each treatment group. Values in brackets indicate the 95% confidence intervals (first value lower bound, second value upper bound).

Treatment group	Distribution of respondents (bilateral)			Distribution of respondents (unilateral)		
	% against	% indifferent	% in favor	% against	% indifferent	% in favor
No info	8 [5-10]	28 [24-32]	64 [60-69]	25 [20-29]	35 [30-40]	40 [35-46]
Rise	8 [5-10]	24 [24-33]	64 [59-69]	18 [14-22]	33 [28-38]	49 [44-54]
Decline	19 [16-23]	27 [22-31]	54 [49-59]	24 [20-28]	30 [25-34]	46 [41-51]
Decline vs. China	27 [23-32]	31 [27-36]	41 [37-46]	23 [19-28]	35 [30-40]	42 [37-47]

Table A.3: Response frequencies for U.S. sample with 95% CI

Treatment group	Distribution of respondents (bilateral)			Distribution of respondents (unilateral)		
	% against	% indifferent	% in favor	% against	% indifferent	% in favor
No info	1 [0-2]	21 [17-24]	78 [75-81]	4 [3-6]	17 [14-20]	79 [75-82]
Rise	1 [0-3]	21 [17-24]	76 [74-81]	5 [3-6]	14 [12-17]	80 [78-84]
Decline	5 [3-6]	26 [23-30]	69 [65-73]	8 [6-10]	18 [15-21]	74 [70-78]
Rise vs. US	6 [4-8]	33 [29-37]	61 [57-65]	4 [2-6]	15 [12-18]	81 [78-84]

Table A.4: Response frequencies for Chinese sample with 95% CI

A.3 Balance Tests

	Treatment group				
	No info	Rise	Decline	Vs China	P-value
Sex	0.5	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.972
Education	4.09	4.09	4.21	4.36	0.45
Income	0.55	0.65	0.73	0.63	0.0275
Age	47.60	49.62	47.73	47.78	0.732
Employment	0.60	0.55	0.61	0.63	0.573
Trade Knowledge	2.07	2.27	2.22	2.22	0.17
Nationalism	0.70	0.83	0.65	0.65	0.00426
Party Affiliation	0.49	0.51	0.44	0.41	0.33

Table A.5: Balance test for responses from the U.S. P-values are based on one-way ANOVA tests across all groups. Other values are the means for each treatment group.

	Treatment group				
	No info	Rise	Decline	Vs US	P-value
Sex	0.46	0.47	0.49	0.47	0.918
Education	4.42	4.40	4.44	4.42	0.978
Income	0.68	0.65	0.66	0.69	0.59
Age	37.13	36.59	36.50	36.75	0.86
Employment	0.83	0.81	0.82	0.82	0.95
Trade Knowledge	2.21	2.25	2.26	2.22	0.6
Nationalism	0.93	0.92	0.96	0.94	0.11
Party Membership	1.49	1.5	1.52	1.48	0.89

Table A.6: Balance test for responses from China. P-values are based on one-way ANOVA tests across all groups. Other values are the means for each treatment group.

A.4 Unilateral trade support

To capture more general trade preferences, we asked whether respondents would want their government to increase, decrease or keep the same the trade ties it currently has with other countries. *Unilateral trade support* ranges from -1 to 1 with higher values indicating a stronger preference for intensifying the country's existing trade ties with other countries.

Next, we examine the ATEs for our second outcome variable, *Unilateral trade support*. Figure A.1a (left panel) shows the results for the U.S. sample. We find that respondents from the *rising power* group are more supportive of increased trade with other countries than respondents from the control group. However, respondents assigned to the *declining power* information are not significantly less supportive of trade cooperation with other countries than those who did not receive any information about their country's power position. Similarly, reading about the U.S.' expected decline of economic dominance relative to China does not seem to trigger more opposition against international trade than not having any information about the U.S.' power position at all. Thus, the results from the U.S. sample for *Unilateral trade support* only partly support our predictions.

Figure A.1a (right panel) shows an overall higher level of enthusiasm for trade cooperation among Chinese respondents. Nevertheless, we observe a considerable decline in *Unilateral trade support* when China's economic power is described as being on a downward trajectory. In contrast, among respondents who learn that China will become the leading global economic power within the coming years, support for trade cooperation increases. Trade support levels differ significantly between respondents from the *rising power* group and those from the *declining power* treatment group. Surprisingly, against our prediction we find that mentioning the U.S. as the trade partner at hand, elicits the highest opposition to trade. We will return to this issue in the discussion.

Again, we plot the marginal effects of our information treatments on *Unilateral*



(a) Cell means of *Unilateral Trade Support* across different treatment conditions with 95% confidence intervals. USA, N = 1,900; China, N = 2,494



(b) Marginal Treatment Effects on *Unilateral Trade Support*. The baseline for these analyses is the "no info" control group.

Figure A.1: Comparing *Unilateral trade support* across treatment and control groups. Cf. Appendix Table A.10 for regression table results.

trade support relative to the control group in Figure A.1b. In the U.S., in line with H1, the difference between respondents from the *no information* group and respondents who were assigned to the *rising power* treatment group is positive and statistically significant at the 95% level. However, the differences in *Unilateral trade support* between the control group and respondents who received the *declining power* primes are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In China (right panel), we only find statistically significant differences when we compare trade support levels of respondents from the control group and respondents from the *declining power* group.

Furthermore, Figure A.1b shows that the treatment effects on *Unilateral trade support* are slightly more muted than the reported ATEs for *Bilateral trade support* (see Figure 4b). While our theoretical conjectures do not point to differences in effect between public support for trade with a specific trade partner country and general trade preferences a priori, our information treatment is primarily concerned with bilateral power dynamics. Accordingly, we would expect a stronger causal effect of the treatment on *Bilateral trade support*. In the interest of brevity, we focus the following analyses on *Bilateral trade support*. However, we also ran all the subsequent analyses with Unilateral trade support and report the results in the Appendix, sections 1.4 and 1.6.

A.4.1 Regression plot for *Unilateral trade support*



Figure A.2: Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals for *Unilateral Trade Support*

A.4.2 Regression tables for *Unilateral trade support*

	Unilateral Trade Support					
	U.S.			China		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rise	0.146**	0.105	0.066	0.020	0.018	0.034
	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Decline	0.065	0.007	−0.010	−0.081**	−0.104***	−0.106***
	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Vs US/China	0.031	0.002	−0.037	0.029	0.029	0.029
	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Male		0.231***	0.287***		0.078***	0.078***
		(0.047)	(0.057)		(0.028)	(0.029)
Education		0.044**	0.052***		0.023*	0.033**
		(0.017)	(0.020)		(0.012)	(0.013)
Income		0.011*	0.011		0.004*	0.004
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Age		0.002	0.003		−0.0003	−0.0003
		(0.001)	(0.002)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Employment		0.019	0.002		−0.035	−0.053
		(0.053)	(0.065)		(0.037)	(0.039)
Trade literacy		0.086***	0.083**		0.019	0.005
		(0.031)	(0.037)		(0.020)	(0.021)
Republican			−0.146**			
			(0.072)			
Independent			−0.218***			
			(0.068)			
CCP Member						0.016
						(0.032)
Nationalism			−0.022***			0.011***
			(0.005)			(0.003)
Constant	0.157***	−0.459***	−0.336**	0.742***	0.555***	0.479***
	(0.041)	(0.111)	(0.145)	(0.023)	(0.082)	(0.088)
Observations	1,458	1,122	728	2,246	1,776	1,635
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.058	0.099	0.005	0.017	0.024
Residual	0.789	0.762	0.738	0.546	0.547	0.542
F Statistic	2.343*	8.618***	7.678***	4.691***	4.418***	4.629***
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7: Estimated effect of power transition primes on *Unilateral trade support*

A.5 Regression tables for *Bilateral trade support*

	Bilateral Trade Support					
	U.S.			China		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rise	−0.009	−0.012	−0.036	0.004	0.002	0.016
	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Decline	−0.294***	−0.326***	−0.302***	−0.165***	−0.196***	−0.220***
	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Vs US/China	−0.613***	−0.604***	−0.632***	−0.251***	−0.263***	−0.253***
	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Male		0.236***	0.299***		0.094***	0.090**
		(0.057)	(0.070)		(0.034)	(0.036)
Education		0.048**	0.034		0.023	0.025
		(0.021)	(0.025)		(0.015)	(0.016)
Income		0.008	0.009		0.013***	0.012***
		(0.008)	(0.009)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Age		−0.001	−0.001		0.004**	0.004***
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.001)	(0.002)
Employment		0.012	0.007		0.013	−0.014
		(0.064)	(0.079)		(0.046)	(0.048)
Trade literacy		0.107***	0.119***		0.123***	0.109***
		(0.037)	(0.045)		(0.025)	(0.026)
Republican			−0.290***			
			(0.089)			
Independent			−0.379***			
			(0.082)			
CCP Member						0.044
						(0.040)
Nationalism			−0.003			0.015***
			(0.007)			(0.004)
Constant	0.709***	0.168	0.403**	0.900***	0.209**	0.125
	(0.049)	(0.133)	(0.176)	(0.029)	(0.101)	(0.109)
Observations	1,603	1,243	805	2,310	1,826	1,670
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.088	0.125	0.023	0.078	0.086
Residual Std. Error	0.978	0.973	0.944	0.702	0.686	0.682
F Statistic	35.215***	14.380***	10.540***	18.792***	18.156***	15.203***
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.8: Estimated effect of power transition primes on *Bilateral trade support*

A.6 Manipulation Check

	Manipulation check	
	U.S. citizens	Chinese citizens
Rise	0.203^{***}	0.119^{***}
	(0.066)	(0.039)
Decline	-0.835^{***}	-0.352^{***}
	(0.066)	(0.039)
Vs US / China	-0.880^{***}	0.137^{***}
	(0.066)	(0.038)
Constant	0.506^{***}	0.816^{***}
	(0.047)	(0.027)
Observations	1,583	2,291
Adjusted R^2	0.214	0.082
F Statistic	144.778^{***}	68.905^{***}
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table A.9: Manipulation Check Expected *Country prospects* from international order.

A.7 Average Treatment Effects

	Trade Support	
	U.S. citizens	*Chinese citizens*
Rise	−0.009	0.004
	(0.069)	(0.041)
Decline	−0.292***	−0.165***
	(0.069)	(0.041)
Decline Vs US / China	−0.613***	−0.251***
	(0.069)	(0.041)
Constant	0.709***	0.900***
	(0.049)	(0.029))
Observations	1,604	2,310
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.023
F Statistic	35.204***	18.792***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.10: Average Treatment Effects for *Trade Support*

A.8 Sensitivity Analysis



(a) U.S. citizens ACME **(b)** Chinese citizens ACME

Figure A.3: Sensitivity Analysis

A.9 Distribution of moderator variables



Figure A.4: Distribution of Moderator Variables

A.10 Regression results for HTE

Gender is coded as 0 if the respondent is female and 1 if the respondent is male.[26] To capture respondent's self-reported trade literacy, we ask: "In your opinion, how much do you personally know about international trade issues between the People's Republic of China/United States and other countries in the world?" Responses are recorded using a 1-4 scale with higher values indicating more knowledge about trade affairs. For the subgroup analysis we collapse responses to create a binary variable, *Trade literacy*, where respondents who selected "Nothing or almost nothing" or "A little bit" are coded as 0 (=Low) and respondents who feel that they know "A moderate amount" or "A lot" are coded as 1 (=High). The regression below uses the continuous variable for Trade Literacy. Respondents' political orientation is measured using party ID (*Party affiliation*) in the U.S. as follows: Democrat=1, Republican=2, Independents/No party=3. To proxy political orientation in China, membership to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (*CCP membership*) is coded as 1, while non-members are coded as 0. Following Mansfield and Mutz (2009), we use a battery consisting of six survey items to create an index of nationalist sentiment, *Nationalism*. Respondents indicated their agreement to each of the items on a -2 (strongly disagree) to 2 (strongly agree) scale. Based on the average value across all six survey items, we then created a dummy variable that assigns average responses above 0 to the category "high" and below 0 to the category "low". The regression below uses the continuous variable for Nationalism.

[26]We also offered "Other" as a response category in the U.S. survey. 7 respondents in our sample identified as "Other".

	Bilateral Trade Support								
	U.S.					China			
	Democrat	Independent	Nationalism	Male	Trade Literacy	CCP Member	Nationalism	Male	Trade Literacy
Rise	−0.048	−0.048	−0.109	0.009	−0.007	0.007	−0.255	−0.004	0.016
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.175)	(0.127)	(0.107)	(0.053)	(0.184)	(0.063)	(0.057)
Decline	−0.295*	−0.295*	−0.158	−0.336***	−0.265**	−0.250***	−0.386*	−0.288***	−0.208***
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.128)	(0.106)	(0.054)	(0.224)	(0.064)	(0.057)
Vs US / China	−0.886***	−0.886***	−0.415***	−0.694***	−0.618***	−0.243***	−0.222	−0.259***	−0.237***
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.125)	(0.102)	(0.053)	(0.193)	(0.063)	(0.056)
Moderator	0.160	−0.152	0.015	0.203*	0.190	0.052	0.093	0.073	0.254***
	(0.153)	(0.150)	(0.133)	(0.122)	(0.140)	(0.078)	(0.140)	(0.066)	(0.072)
Interaction with Moderator									
Rise	0.047	0.054	0.116	−0.047	−0.036	−0.005	0.276	0.023	−0.022
* Moderator	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.203)	(0.177)	(0.192)	(0.110)	(0.190)	(0.094)	(0.100)
Decline	0.101	0.064	−0.125	0.179	0.075	0.093	0.162	0.127	−0.056
* Moderator	(0.217)	(0.221)	(0.191)	(0.177)	(0.196)	(0.110)	(0.229)	(0.094)	(0.100)
Vs US / China	0.582***	0.227	−0.270	0.163	0.060	−0.047	−0.035	0.015	−0.042
* Moderator	(0.215)	(0.217)	(0.188)	(0.175)	(0.197)	(0.110)	(0.199)	(0.093)	(0.101)
Control Variables									
Republican			−0.323***	−0.343***	−0.348***				
			(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.084)				
Independent			−0.398***	−0.418***	−0.437***				
			(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)				
CCP Member							0.066*	0.062	0.064
							(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Nationalism	−0.002	−0.002		−0.002	−0.001	0.017***		0.017***	0.018***
	(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Male	0.283***	0.283***	0.279***		0.283***	0.114***	0.119***		0.121***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)		(0.065)	(0.033)	(0.034)		(0.033)
Trade Literacy	0.148***	0.148***	0.144***	0.137***		0.154***	0.161***	0.155***	
		(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)		(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	
Constant	0.266*	0.266*	0.505***	0.587***	0.789***	0.388***	0.417***	0.404***	0.636***
		(0.138)	(0.147)	(0.129)	(0.088)	(0.071)	(0.146)	(0.073)	(0.053)
Observations	895	895	895	895	895	1,538	1,742	1,742	1,742
Adjusted R^2	0.125	0.125	0.123	0.121	0.117	0.070	0.065	0.070	0.069
Residual	0.938	0.938	0.939	0.940	0.943	0.688	0.690	0.688	0.689
F Statistic	10.10***	10.10***	12.39***	12.17***	111.73***	14.09***	13.13***	14.15***	13.90***
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.11: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for *Bilateral trade support*

A.10.1 Chinese Import Penetration Model

	Bilateral Trade Support
Rise	−0.161
	(0.130)
Decline	−0.463***
	(0.132)
Decline Vs CN	−0.740***
	(0.132)
Low Import Penetration	−0.241*
	(0.127)
Nationalism	−0.005
	(0.006)
Male	0.266***
	(0.068)
Trade literacy	0.176***
	(0.044)
Republican	−0.274***
	(0.087)
Independent/No party	−0.433***
	(0.081)
Rise * Low Import Penetration	0.252
	(0.185)
Decline * Low Import Penetration	0.463**
	(0.185)
Decline Vs CN * Low Import Penetration	0.279
	(0.183)
Constant	0.599***
	(0.140)
Observations	811
Adjusted R^2	0.133
Residual	0.937
F Statistic	11.330*** (df = 12; 798)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.12: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Chinese Import Shock - U.S. citizens

A.11 Exclusion of respondents who thought of China/the U.S.



(a) Cell means of *Bilateral Trade Support* across different treatment conditions with 95% confidence intervals. Respondents who thought of China/USA are excluded from this analysis. USA, N = 1,313 ; China, N = 1,765



(b) Marginal Treatment Effects on *Bilateral Trade Support*. The baseline for these analyses is the "no info" control group. Respondents who thought of China/USA are excluded from this analysis.

Figure A.5: Results for *Bilateral trade support* across treatment and control groups when excluding respondents who thought of the other power, i.e. China/USA. The results are the similar to the ones from the entire sample presented in the main text.