

To Accommodate or Not?

Balancing reputational and material concerns in international negotiations

Stefanie Walter
University of Zurich
walter@ipz.uzh.ch

Some international situations put states' reputation in question. When countries are confronted with non-compliance with core norms, for example, or unilateral efforts by other states to renegotiate or withdraw from international treaties in order to achieve better terms for themselves, governments are confronted with difficult questions: Should they accommodate such demands and behavior, even though this may negatively impact their reputation? Should they take a tough stance, even if this may be costly? And how can they take their domestic audiences on board? This paper examines how voters want their governments to respond to such challenging situations. I argue that the extent to which citizens are willing to accommodate challenging states is influenced by how the costs of (not) accommodating such are framed. I evaluate this argument by exploring Europeans' willingness to accommodate the UK and Switzerland in renegotiations about these countries' access to the EU's internal market and to accommodate countries that do not comply with core rule of law norms in the European Union. I employ survey experiments of approximately 22,000 EU-27 Europeans, which randomly receive vignettes framing the respective challenge in terms of cost of accommodation, cost of non-accommodation, or both. Across all three cases, I find that concerns about reputational risks strengthen voters' willingness to support an uncompromising stance and that this willingness is particularly strong when both types of cost are emphasized. Emphasizing the costs of non-accommodation, in contrast, does not increase voters' willingness to compromise.

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International negotiations are at the heart of international relations. Not surprisingly, we have developed a detailed understanding of when, why, and how sovereign states negotiate to cooperate internationally (e.g., Fearon 1998; Keohane and Nye 1977; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Martin and Simmons 1998). However, not all international negotiations occur with the aim to establish mutually beneficial cooperation. Some situations instead rather present governments with difficult choices and test their resolve. For example, states sometimes try to unilaterally change the negotiated terms of cooperation to their own advantage, either explicitly by seeking to renegotiate these terms, or more implicitly by failing to comply with them. From the most explicit cases where countries try to coerce other countries to change negotiated agreements by military means or exit an international organization, to less glaring cases, in which states seek to renegotiate the terms of an agreement in their own favor or cease to comply with core norms laid out in international agreements, such unilateral attempts to change the status quo in their favor confront the other parties to these agreements with difficult questions. Should they seek to accommodate the challenging country's demands? Should they take a tough stance and refuse any changes to the status quo? Or should they find some kind of compromise in the middle ground?

Answering these questions is not easy and confronts states with a dilemma (Jurado, Léon, and Walter 2021; Walter 2020). Because the goal of attempts to change the status quo is to improve the challenging country's position vis-à-vis that of other countries, states confronted with such behavior have incentives not to accommodate such behavior. Not only would accommodating change the distribution of cooperation gains in favor of the challenging state, accommodation also carries long-term reputational risks (Kertzer 2016; Tingley and Walter 2011; Walter 2006, 2009). For example, accommodating such demands or behavior signals that the government is likely to back down in similar disputes, this affects its reputation for resolve (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014) and may thus create considerable audience costs (Fearon 1994). This may lead to repeated challenges in the future, either originating from the same challenging state, or from other countries who observe the accommodating response and seek to extract similar concessions from the accommodating state.

The alternative to accommodation is a non-accommodating response, which highlights the challenged state's resolve not to be coerced into agreeing to a change in the status quo in its disfavor. Such a strategy not only increases the odds that the challenging state abandons its non-cooperative behavior or demands, but also can have long-term benefits in terms of bolstering a state's reputation that it cannot be blackmailed. This effect is likely to be particularly large when non-accommodation comes in the form of a clearly visible action (Katagiri and Min

2019). The problem with a non-accommodating response is, however, that it can be very costly. Costs can be relatively minor, such as the EU's decision to exclude Switzerland from the European research program in 2014 until it extended the Switzerland-EU bilateral treaty on free movement of people to include the new EU member state Croatia. But costs can also be potentially large – think of the EU's threat to rather let Greece leave the Eurozone rather than accommodate its demands for a low-austerity bailout package in 2015 (Walter, Dinas, Jurado, and Konstantinidis 2018). Whereas these costs can be avoided if the challenging state backs down quickly, they can also become sizable quickly and affect a broad range of domestic societal actors if the challenging state persists. The consequences of the sanctions against Russia imposed in the aftermath of its invasion of Ukraine for energy prices, inflation, and economic growth in the West are an obvious example, but countless other examples exist. Such costs present a challenge to governments, as they can reduce (and in the worst case undermine) their support from domestic stakeholders. For democratic policymakers, the question of how their voters respond to these kinds of costs and whether they support a non-accommodative strategy despite these costs is particularly important.

This paper therefore examines how citizens respond to unilateral challenges to international cooperation by other states that put both reputational and more material concerns regarding cooperation gains on the line. Can governments convince their citizens that taking a non-accommodating position is worth the potential pain of this strategy, and if so, how? Building on research on resolve, coercive diplomacy, crisis bargaining, and audience costs (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014; Fearon 1997; George 1991; Kertzer 2016; Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Tomz 2007; Walter 2009), the paper examines some of the domestic sources of resolve: voter support for non-accommodation. Because the justifications given by political decisionmakers can influence audience costs (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012), I argue that voters' preferred response is related to how the choice between accommodation and non-accommodation is framed. If the potentially high material costs of non-accommodation are highlighted, voters should become more willing to tolerate such challenges in order to continue to benefit from cooperation with the challenging state. In contrast, emphasizing the reputational risks associated with accommodation should increase voters' support for an uncompromising stance. Finally, predictions about how voters will respond when are told that both accommodating and not accommodating carry costs are less clear. On the one hand, highlighting the accommodation dilemma could lead to a more muted response among respondents. On the other hand, highlighting that non-accommodation is a costly action might

reinforce voters' belief in the effectiveness of the signal and might hence strengthen support for non-accommodation.

Empirically, I evaluate this argument by exploring Europeans' willingness to accommodate the UK and Switzerland in renegotiations about these countries' access to the EU's internal market and to accommodate countries that do not comply with core rule of law norms in the European Union through the use of survey experiments with approximately 22.000 EU-27 Europeans.¹ Respondents receive different vignettes that frame the respective challenge in terms of cost of accommodation, cost of non-accommodation, or both. Across all three cases, I find that concerns about reputational risks strengthen voters' willingness to support an uncompromising stance and that this willingness is particularly strong when both types of cost are emphasized.

Argument

In international negotiations, having a position that is backed by voters can be very helpful for governments. First, governments have been found to be responsive to their voters' preferences in a number of negotiation contexts (Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2017; McLean and Whang 2014; Schneider 2019; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020; Wratil 2018). Voters also matter because their ability to impose audience costs on leaders can increase governments' resolve in international negotiations (e.g., Fearon 1994; Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Tomz 2007). To the extent that international cooperation has become increasingly politicized in recent years (De Vries, Hobolt, and Walter 2021; Zürn 2014; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012), these mechanisms are likely to be increasingly important. Voters' preferences can therefore enhance the bargaining power of governments in international negotiations (Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012; Hug and König 2002; Putnam 1988; Schneider and Cederman 1994).

Voters have also been shown to be able to form consistent and clear preferences on a range of issues related to international negotiations. Voters voice preferences about international issues in line with their values and material interests – from security policy (Gartner 2008), over support for international organizations (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Kiratli 2020) to more specific international policies such as trade (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Owen and Johnston 2017; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) or the environment (Bechtel, Genovese, and Scheve 2017; Gaikwad, Genovese, and Tingley 2022). We also know that citizens evaluate the benefits of international cooperation not only in relation to themselves, but also take into

¹ In ongoing work (not yet included in this version of the paper), I am also conducting survey experiments in Finland and Sweden about these countries' negotiations with Turkey about NATO accession, and about maintaining the sanctions against Russia.

account broader concerns such as their country's reputation or norms such as reciprocity and fairness (Bechtel, Genovese, and Scheve 2017; Chilton, Milner, and Tingley 2017; Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 2012; Mansfield and Mutz 2009).

Moreover, research shows that voters indeed care both about their country's reputation for resolve (Kertzer 2016) and about the material consequences of international interactions (Franchino and Segatti 2017; Jurado, Léon, and Walter 2021). When compromises are necessary in international negotiations, they care about whether their country played an active or passive role in facilitating the compromise (Brutger 2021). And they voice concerns that accommodating a challenging state could encourage others to launch similar challenges in the future (Walter 2021). Moreover, voters invest energy and effort to learn about international issues when their relevance increases (Pelc 2013) and take the strategic motivations of prominent foreign leaders into account when thinking about foreign policy issues (Gravelle 2018).

Because these strategic considerations can be quite complex, it is not surprising that an important source of public opinion on international politics are elite cues: the framing of a certain international issue influences how voters want their government to respond (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Nguyen and Spilker 2022). Justifications given by political decisionmakers can therefore have large and consequential effects on audience costs (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012). This also means voters' support for a more or less accommodating negotiation stance will be influenced by how policymakers frame the costs and benefits of possible responses to other states' challenges

Taken together, these considerations give rise to several hypotheses. First, I expect that framing that highlights the reputational risks of accommodating such a challenge increases support for non-accommodation. This suggests that *emphasizing the reputational risks associated with accommodating another state's challenge should make voters less supportive of an accommodating negotiation strategy (H1)*. In contrast, non-accommodation can be costly to voters and these costs are likely to make them more willing to compromise with the challenging state. For example, in the Brexit negotiations, European citizens living in regions that were heavily exposed to the potential fallout from a hard Brexit were significantly more supportive of compromising with the UK in the EU-UK negotiations about the terms of the UK's withdrawal from the EU than those living in regions relatively sheltered from the economic costs of a hard Brexit (Walter 2021). They were also more willing to support compromise on issues where a failure to cooperate would be costly not just for the UK, but also for the remaining member states (Jurado, Léon, and Walter 2021). Another example is that the

rising gas prices and a looming recession caused by Western sanctions against Russia have led to growing calls among some Western voters to negotiate with Russia about ending the Ukraine war rather than maintain an uncompromising stance. All this suggests that *highlighting the costs of non-accommodation should thus decrease voters' support for a non-accommodating strategy (H2)*.

It is harder to predict what will happen when voters are told that both accommodating and not accommodating carry costs. On the one hand, emphasizing both the risks associated with accommodating a challenging demand or non-cooperative behavior, as well as the costs such a strategy is likely to bring, highlights that states confront a dilemma in such situations. Given that either response is likely to be costly, one possibility is that highlighting this accommodation dilemma (Jurado, Léon, and Walter 2021; Walter 2020) reduces voters' willingness to fully accommodate or to pursue a very uncompromising stance, and to seek some middle ground instead. As a result of this accommodation dilemma mechanism, *voters' support for non-accommodation should be moderated when not just the benefits, but also the costs of this strategy are emphasized (H3a)*.

On the other hand, a second mechanism might reinforce support for non-accommodation in these situations. This is because the fact, that non-accommodation is costly, allows targeted states to send costly, and hence credible, signals to challenging states that they are resolved not to accommodate their non-cooperative behavior (Fearon 1997). The costs of non-accommodation thus increase the effectiveness of the strategy, both in terms of deterring similar challenges in the future and in terms of increasing the odds that the challenging state backs down and (re)engages in cooperative behavior. This costly signaling mechanism suggests that *highlighting the costs of this strategy might lead to an increase in support for non-accommodation if voters intuitively understand that these costs are likely to increase the effectiveness of the strategy (H3b)*.

Research Design

To evaluate how highlighting the costs of different negotiation strategies affects support for accommodating and non-accommodating negotiation strategies, I conduct survey experiments that exploit the context of three ongoing real-life challenges. These experiments explore how emphasizing different consequences of possible policy responses influences voters' willingness not to accommodate international negotiation partners.

I conducted experiments in various settings² The first two cases cover the negotiations between the EU and the UK about their future, post-Brexit relations, as well as the negotiations between Switzerland and the EU about a framework agreement designed to provide a more institutionalized context for all future and the revision of existing bilateral agreements. In both of these cases, individual states (the UK and Switzerland) are trying to negotiate a new (UK) or revised (Switzerland) set of rules for access to the EU's internal market that allows them to retain significant access to the market while at the same time granting them significant exceptions that other EU member states are not granted. The two cases thus represent instances in which states are seeking a more privileged position compared with other countries in comparable situations and thus considerable concessions from their negotiation partner. The third case uses the rule of law crisis in the EU that has been triggered by Hungary and Poland and leverages the EU's attempts to make EU funding conditional on compliance with core EU norms. This third case thus focuses on responses to non-compliance with core rules of an international organization.

The survey experiments were conducted in the context of two larger, EU-wide online omnibus surveys (the 'EuroPulse') conducted by Dalia Research in June and December 2019. In each survey wave, a census representative sample of approximately 11,000 working-age respondents (aged 18-65) from all EU member states were surveyed, with sample sizes roughly proportional to their population size. Because the focus is on potential EU responses to different scenarios, I omit UK respondents from the sample, as the Brexit process was well-advanced at the time of the survey. The survey thus covers individuals in the remaining EU-27 member states only. The data are weighted using information from the most recent Eurostat statistics.

I use two survey experiments, which highlight the costs of accommodation and/or the costs of non-accommodation in the context of two ongoing negotiations with close third-country neighbors, in which the EU was involved at the time: negotiations about future EU-Switzerland relations (June 2019, 10 792 respondents) and future EU-UK relations (December 2019, 11 543 respondents). For the experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to one control and three treatment groups. The control group only received some general information about the negotiations in question and the key issue of disagreement between the two sides. Respondents in three treatment groups additionally received information about the costs of accommodation and non-accommodation. Treatment 1 focused on the cost of non-

² Additional survey experiments are planned in Sweden and Finland for fall 2022, focusing on the question of whether the countries should accommodate Turkish demands in return for Turkish approval to Swedish and Finnish NATO membership as well as Russia sanctions

accommodation in the form of trade-related costs. Treatment 2 highlighted the reputational costs of accommodation, emphasizing the risk that other countries may make similar demands. Finally, treatment 3 presented the costs associated with both types of negotiation strategy. The detailed text that each of the groups received is shown in table 1.

Table 1: Set-up of survey experiments: Control and treatments

<p style="text-align: center;">Control group: Intro text on context</p> <p>UK: After Brexit, the UK and the EU will have to negotiate about their future relationship. They particularly disagree about how much the UK will have to adhere to EU rules in this new framework in return for wide access to the EU market.</p> <p>Switzerland: The EU and Switzerland are negotiating about having closer economic relations. They disagree about how much Switzerland will have to adhere to EU market rules in this new framework.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Treatment 2: Cost of Non-Accommodation</p> <p>Intro text (control) + “The EU is concerned that trade relations between the UK and the EU would deteriorate if the negotiations failed .”</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Treatment 1: Cost of Accommodation</p> <p>Intro text (control) + “The EU is concerned that other member states will also insist on exceptions from EU rules if the UK/Switzerland were granted exceptions”</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Treatment 3: Both types of cost</p> <p>Intro text (control) + The EU is concerned that other member states will also insist on exceptions from EU rules if the UK/Switzerland were granted exceptions. At the same time, it worries that trade relations between the UK/Switzerland and the EU would deteriorate if the negotiations failed.”</p>

Note: Bold text added for ease of reading; respondents did not see any emphasis in the text.


Directly after the experiments, respondents were asked how the EU should respond in each of these two cases, prompting them to indicate whether the EU should offer the UK wide access to the EU market with no (0), only very few (1), some (2), or many (3) exceptions from EU rules. Higher values denote more exceptions and hence indicate support for accommodation, whereas lower values indicate support for non-accommodation.

Both experiments gauge support for accommodation or non-accommodation directly for the issue presented in the survey question. To additionally study whether a heightened awareness of the costs of (non-)accommodation also affects respondents’ general view about

how policymakers should respond to non-cooperative behavior, the December 2019 survey, which included the experiment on future UK-EU relations, directly followed up the survey experiment with a question on how the EU should respond to non-compliance of EU member states with core EU norms. The question informed respondents that the European Commission had recently proposed to make subsidies for member states conditional on their compliance with core EU norms, such as respect for the rule of law and that critics said that such a move would infringe too much on countries' national sovereignty. It then asked respondents whether they were for or against the EU proposal to make EU subsidies conditional on a country's adherence to core EU norms. The five answer categories ranged from strongly in favor of conditionality (1) to strongly opposed (5), with higher values again indicating support for a more accommodating response.

Figure 1 displays the distributions of the three dependent variables. It shows that on average, Europeans tend to support a non-accommodating over an accommodating stance across a variety of issues. However, there is also considerable willingness to compromise.

Figure 1: Dependent variable - Support for accommodation and non-accommodation



Because respondents were randomly assigned to the control and three treatment groups, my baseline analysis does not include any control variables, but uses weights and a multilevel structure to take into account that the data were collected in 27 different national contexts. In a second specification, I control for two pre-treatment variables and several demographic

variables. Before the survey experiment, the survey asked respondents a number of questions to the then ongoing Brexit negotiations. I use a question about whether the EU should take a hard (non-accommodating) or soft (accommodating) approach to the exit negotiations with the UK to proxy respondents pre-treatment willingness to accommodate. This is important because we know that voters do not just care about the reputational effects of the government's negotiation behavior, but also about the substantive issues at stake (Chaudoin 2014a). In addition, I include a question about how much respondents are following news on Brexit to proxy for political interest. In addition, I control for gender, education, and age. To explore the robustness of the results, I additionally re-estimate each type of model (with and without control variables) in models that do not account for the multi-level structure, models that include country level controls and weights, and models that neither control for country context nor include any weights.

Results

How does the framing of the costs of different possible strategies in international negotiations influence voters' support for these strategies? When are voters most likely to support an uncompromising, non-accommodating negotiation stance? I have argued that these decisions are particularly difficult when accommodation puts a country's reputation on the line, but non-accommodation is costly in material terms. Here, governments face a dilemma: Accommodation may encourage other states to try the same,³ but not accommodating such demands carries the risk that cooperative relations deteriorate or break up altogether, so that the costs associated with this strategy are very high. I have argued that how voters' view this dilemma depends on how the situation is framed. When the long-term risks of accommodation are highlighted, they are more likely to support non-accommodation (H1), whereas an emphasis on the costs of non-accommodation is likely to decrease such support (H2). It is harder to predict how respondents will react when both the costs and benefits of non-accommodation are emphasized, as different effects pull in different directions. The accommodation dilemma suggests that highlighting both types of costs decreases support for non-accommodation (H3a), whereas the costly signaling mechanism predicts an increase in support (H3b).


Figure 2 shows the results for the analysis of the two survey experiments in the July 2019 survey (Switzerland experiment) and the December 2019 survey (UK experiment and non-compliance follow-up question).⁴ The results across all three analyses show that as

³ As a result, cooperative relations may change to the country's disadvantage, as it receive a smaller share of cooperation gains going forward.

⁴ A full results tables can be found in the appendix (Table A1).

expected (H1), highlighting the costs of accommodation decreases support for a non-accommodating strategy. When respondents are informed that EU is concerned that other member states will also insist on exceptions from EU rules if the UK/Switzerland were granted exceptions (treatment 1), respondents are less willing to agree to exceptions from EU rules if the negotiation partner receives wide access to the EU market in return. That said, whereas the coefficient is negative across all settings and specification, it only consistently reaches a statistically negative effect at the 95% level for the non-compliance case. Nonetheless, the results suggest that concerns about contagion risk have the potential to dampen voters' willingness to accommodate challenges from other states.


Figure 2: Results survey experiment, no controls



Interestingly, the strongest effect on voters' opinions occurs when both the costs of accommodation and non-accommodation are emphasized. Informing respondents that the EU is concerned that other member states will also insist on exceptions from EU rules if the UK/Switzerland were granted exceptions, but that it also worries that trade relations between the UK/Switzerland and the EU would deteriorate if the negotiations failed has a clear negative effect on respondents' willingness to accommodate. For the Switzerland and non-compliance analyses, this effect is statistically significant at the 99% level, although it is a bit less stable across specifications for the UK analysis. The strong effect suggests that the accommodation

dilemma dynamic (H3a) is not at play here; rather than dampening effects, it hardens respondents' stance, as predicted by the costly signaling mechanism (H3b).

Figure 3: Results survey experiment, with controls



In contrast, the risks associated with non-accommodation hardly move respondents' support for accommodation. Even if respondents are explicitly informed that a failure to conclude an agreement risks deteriorating trade relations between the negotiation partners (treatment 2), respondents are not significantly more willing to agree to more exceptions from EU rules despite offering Switzerland or the UK wide access to the EU market. This is in line with research on individual attitudes towards the use of economic sanctions, where the economic cost of sanctions also do not seem to drive approval of sanctions (Onderco 2017), but not in line with the expectations formulated in H2.

To explore the robustness of these findings, I reestimate all models controlling for respondents' pretreatment willingness to accommodate in another case (the Brexit negotiations about the terms of leaving the EU), as well as an indicator of political interest. Even though respondents were randomly assigned to the treatment groups, the possibility exists that - by chance - respondents in one treatment group differ in their willingness to accommodate not because of the treatment, but because of some pre-existing characteristics. To address this

possibility, I reestimate the analyses while controlling for some of these characteristics. Figure 3 and the analyses in tables 1-3 in the appendix show that results remain largely unchanged.

Conclusion

How do voters want their governments to respond to unilateral attempts to change the status quo in their favor? Do they support a tough stance and refuse any changes to the status quo? Or do they instead want their government to accommodate the challenging state so as not to risk what remains of the cooperation with that state?

Building on research about resolve, audience costs, and reputational concerns (Brutger and Kertzer 2018; Chaudoin 2014b; Fearon 1994; Kertzer 2016; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015) this paper has explored how framing the choice between different negotiation strategies affects public support for accommodation and non-accommodation. While much previous research has focused on security issues, it has broadened the focus to a broader set of cases, such as the renegotiation of international agreements, non-compliance with core norms, or unilateral withdrawals from international organization. To evaluate to what extent voters' preferred response is related to how the choice is framed, the paper analyzed survey experiments with approximately 22,000 EU-27 Europeans that randomly varied the information given to respondents about the costs associated with each of these strategies. Exploiting three ongoing situations in which individual states were trying to change the status quo to their advantage, I have shown that voters are particularly concerned about the reputational consequences of accommodation. Interestingly, this willingness is particularly strong when both types of cost are emphasized. Highlighting the (economic) costs of non-accommodation, in contrast, does not move voters' preferred response.

These findings have important implications, both with regard to research and for policymakers. In terms of research, these findings underscore the importance of reputational concerns that recent research has highlighted (Brutger 2021; Brutger and Kertzer 2018; Kertzer 2016) and show that such concerns also matter for foreign policy issues beyond the security realm. In terms of policy implications, these findings suggest that policymakers have some room to garner public support for an uncompromising line if they communicate the rationale for their strategy and the risks associated with accommodation clearly. For example, in the context of the West's challenge in keeping up public support for the sanction regime against Russia, my findings suggest that it will be important to highlighting what the sanctions are for, what long-term benefit Western societies are set to derive from them, and why capitulating may be

associated with significant risks. Incidentally, the findings also suggest that policymakers should not downplay the costs associated with the sanctions, but rather emphasize that demonstrating a willingness to accept these costs is likely to make the sanctions more credible and thus ultimately more successful. More generally, the results suggest that voters are capable of understanding more complex and medium-term arguments about strategic foreign policy considerations than some previous research has assumed.

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Table A1: Regression results

	Switzerland		UK		Non-compliance	
T1: costs accommodation	-0.043 (0.03)	-0.045 (0.03)	-0.055* (0.03)	-0.053* (0.03)	-0.073** (0.03)	-0.083** (0.03)
T2: costs non-accommodation	0.049 (0.04)	0.048 (0.04)	0.006 (0.03)	0.002 (0.03)	-0.041 (0.04)	-0.058 (0.04)
T3: both costs	-0.099*** (0.03)	-0.104*** (0.04)	-0.063* (0.04)	-0.068 (0.04)	-0.110*** (0.03)	-0.115*** (0.03)
Brexit accommodation		-0.103*** (0.02)		0.155*** (0.01)		0.223*** (0.02)
Brexit awareness		0.089*** (0.01)		0.069*** (0.02)		-0.118*** (0.02)
Female		-0.060*** (0.02)		0.023 (0.03)		0.068* (0.04)
Education		-0.033 (0.03)		-0.091*** (0.01)		-0.104*** (0.02)
Age in years		0.010 (0.02)		-0.008*** (0.00)		-0.003** (0.00)
Constant	1.187*** (0.04)	1.926*** (0.11)	1.254*** (0.04)	1.253*** (0.08)	2.516*** (0.04)	2.523*** (0.11)
Country-level variance	-1.979*** (0.18)	-2.079*** (0.18)	-1.962*** (0.29)	-1.968*** (0.27)	-1.796*** (0.10)	-1.984*** (0.13)
Individual-level variance	-0.054*** (0.01)	-0.083*** (0.01)	-0.023** (0.01)	-0.047*** (0.01)	0.096*** (0.02)	0.067*** (0.03)
N	8706	8321	9631	9313	10018.00 0	9543.000
Log Likelihood	1.15E+04 23068.52	1.08E+04 21564.09				
AIC	6	5				