

Capitol Controls: Congress and the Bretton Woods Twins in the Era of Migration

Brendan J. Connell[†] and Adrian J. Shin[‡]

[†]*Visiting Assistant Professor at Lyon College*

[‡]*Assistant Professor at the University of Colorado Boulder*

October 28, 2022

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has operated at the center of global economic governance through its backing of the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. However, since U.S. financing of the Fund and the World Bank ultimately depends on the acquiescence of Congress, the capacity of these institutions remains tightly linked to domestic politics. In this article, we revisit the domestic roots of congressional support for the funding of the IMF and the World Bank. Whereas past research emphasizes the role of financial interests and political ideology in guiding congressional preferences, we highlight policymakers' racial attitudes and fears about immigration as equally salient drivers. Specifically, we posit that racially conservative lawmakers whose districts face disproportionately high levels of migrant pressure are more likely to support congressional funding for the IMF and the World Bank. These international financial institutions are built to alleviate poverty and economic distress within the major migrant-sending countries of the U.S., and increasing the resources of these institutions can mitigate immigration flows. We evaluate this claim using a dataset of House votes on funding the international financial institutions during five congressional sessions (95th, 96th, 98th, 103rd, and 105th).

Over the past few decades, critics of economic globalization have vilified the free movement of goods, capital, and people as destabilizing forces of the domestic economy, the national identity, and traditional values. Capitalizing on citizens' growing dissatisfaction with the post-World War II (WWII) global economic order, politicians around the world have adopted increasingly protectionist and anti-immigrant views and policies.

This globalization backlash has inevitably stoked discontent with the international institutions that facilitate trade and cross-border factor flows. On January 30, 2017, the Trump administration formally withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. Similar political patterns have developed in Europe where Eurosceptics have made significant political gains by overestimating and sensationalizing national financial contributions to Brussels. In many European countries, such as Germany, attitudes toward European integration now constitute an important political dimension that cuts across the traditional left-right spectrum (Schneider, 2019). To this end, Brexit supporters justified cutting ties with the European Union (EU) to increase the UK's policy autonomy over both fiscal and immigration matters. Given the growing importance of these trends, the Political Economy of International Organization hosted its 11th annual conference on the relationship between populism and international organizations (IOs) with a dedicated special issue in *The Review of International Organizations*.¹

While trade, immigration, and supranational organizations, such as the EU have been the main targets of globalization backlashes, intergovernmental organizations that are designed to foster interstate cooperation and coordination have also faced intense scrutiny and opposition from various societal groups. From 1995 to 2013, citizen attitudes about IOs have become less favorable, which has been driven by growing dissatisfaction with economic globalization among low-skilled citizens (Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019). In the U.S., isolationist fiscal conservatives are at the forefront of reducing U.S. involvement in international institutions. In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, 26 senators from the

¹See Copelovitch and Pevehouse (2019) for the introduction to the special issue.

Republican Party introduced a bill—the “No More IMF Bailouts Act”—in attempts to stop International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout packages to Greece and Italy. The bill also sought to slash U.S. loans to the IMF and to decrease U.S. involvement in the Fund by preventing increases of its quota. Ultimately, this bill did not get voted on in the Senate. Yet, the 26 Republican senators’ cosponsoring of this bill epitomizes US lawmakers’ growing concerns over international financial institutions (IFIs).

The existing literature on congressional oversight of the IFIs highlights the delicate balance lawmakers must strike between their ideology, constituent pressure, and the demand of special interests within their districts. Most importantly, congressional support for bills on IFI funding depends crucially on each lawmaker’s economic ideology. Economically conservative lawmakers—as measured by the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 2000; Nokken and Poole, 2004)—have been shown to oppose further U.S. involvement in the IFIs, including the IMF and the World Bank (Broz, 2005, 2008). However, there are instances in which conservative policymakers are less opposed to funding the IFI. For instance, Broz (2005, 2008) finds that both constituency characteristics (e.g., education level) and special interests (e.g., banking industry) shape how representatives vote on IFI-related bills in Congress.

What is missing in this literature is the implication of development finance for emigration from borrowing countries and how U.S. lawmakers take this into account when voting on IFI-related bills. As a popular migrant destination, yet with rising anti-immigrant sentiment since the late 1960s, the U.S. has become more apprehensive about taking in more immigrants. In particular, racially conservative senators and representatives in the US have been sensitive to immigration flows in their congressional districts. This group of senators face a difficult policy dilemma. They may want to oppose additional funding to the IFIs to withhold U.S. taxpayers’ money from foreign countries, many of whom are developing countries in need. However, when these senators perceive IFI funding to decrease the likelihood of a financial crisis in a country which in turn can reduce immigration from the

borrowing country to their districts, they have much to gain from supporting pro-IFI bills. In these cases, the decision to support pro-IFI bills depends ultimately on each lawmaker's expectation of future immigration inflows in their district and their ideological view on immigration.

In this article, we argue that the share of foreign-born population is an important determinant of congressional votes on IFI-related bills. Existing migrant networks are known to be one of the most important indicators of future migration through both formal and informal channels. Large migrant networks can therefore increase congressional support for increased IFI funding among legislators who are ideologically opposed to immigration—as measured by the second dimension of the DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 2000; Nokken and Poole, 2004). We evaluate this claim and its extensions by analyzing a series of House bills concerning IFI funding during five congressional sessions (95th, 96th, 98th, 103rd, and 105th). We find support for our conjecture that migration pressure has played an important role for shaping the legislative preferences of racially conservative Democrats toward IFI funding. We also show that this relationship is primarily present in: 1) competitive districts (i.e., districts where the incumbent's margin of victory in past elections is relatively slim); and 2) districts with high unemployment.

Migration and Money in International Political Economy

Over the past decades, the international political economy (IPE) literature has seen a surge of research drawing connections between international migration and other issue areas, such as foreign direct investment (Leblang, 2010), sovereign debt crises (Bernhard and Leblang, 2016), and exchange rate regimes (Singer, 2010). More importantly, the research on migration and foreign aid has sparked debate on whether policymakers use aid, loans, and other types of development finance to reduce immigration (e.g., Bermeo and Leblang, 2015; Angin, Shehaj and Shin, 2021, 2022*a,b,c*) and its effectiveness in curbing

actual immigration flows (e.g., Clemens and Postel, 2018).

Multiple anecdotes reveal that policymakers think about reducing immigration flows by providing money to migrant-sending countries or migrant-transit countries. For instance, the Trump administration threatened to cut foreign aid to three Central American countries—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—if their governments do not keep their citizens from emigrating to the U.S.-Mexico border. The administration eventually cut hundreds of millions of dollars to these countries after Trump lashed out at them for allowing thousands of their citizens to seek asylum in the U.S. In the wake of the 2015 migrant crisis, European leaders also began to provide financial incentives to migrant-transit countries in exchange for holding migrants in their territories (Angin, Shehaj and Shin, 2021).

Knowing the electoral implications of rising immigration in Europe, the leaders of migrant-transit countries sought to extract more concessions from the EU. The Libyan leader, Gaddafi had once famously said that “the EU should pay Libya at least five billion euros a year to stop illegal African immigration and avoid a ‘black Europe.’” Turkey’s president also demanded six billion euros to host four million Syrian refugees in Turkey, which he still deemed unfair compared to the EU-Greece deal of three billion euros for just 100,000 refugees.

While foreign aid as a migration mitigator has received much scholarly attention, the EU’s increasing role in migration management shows that states have also begun to rely increasingly on multilateral aid and lending to address migration. For instance, Angin, Shehaj and Shin (2021) delve into how the EU has used its European Structural and Investment Funds to compensate its member states in the periphery to hold migrants within their territories. In the wake of the 1970s oil crisis, the IMF and the World Bank have also become more involved and influential in global financial distribution for crisis management and economic development with the intention of addressing the root causes of migration in major migrant-sending countries (Angin, Shehaj and Shin, 2022*a,b,c*).

Controlling Institutions and Migration

Using taxpayers' money to buy foreign governments' cooperation can generate significant domestic backlashes, especially when their leaders are autocrats with a record of human rights violations. Although research has shown that voters are less opposed to sending foreign aid to address migration than other issues (e.g., poverty) (Tobin, Schneider and Leblang, 2022), not all voters and their representatives support channeling financial resources to migrant-critical countries. Foreign aid is subject to legislative approvals and constant public scrutiny, and its disbursements can take long. For expediency and celerity, using IFIs as funding sources to address migration has become an attractive option for their powerful stakeholders, especially the U.S. (Angin, Shehaj and Shin, 2022*a,b*). Most voters are not keenly aware of the extent of U.S. involvement in the IMF and the World Bank, and it is unclear how much U.S. taxpayers' contributions constitute a particular borrowing country's funding package.

Although IOs—even those in which the U.S. is a major donor—do not have to obtain a congressional approval for each of its individual funding packages, Congress has regularly considered bills that would limit U.S. involvement and contributions to the world's major IFIs, such as the IMF and the World Bank. Fiscal conservatives in the Republican Party have cosponsored these bills while showing remarkable unity in opposing funding the IFIs. Yet, many other policymakers, including conservative and liberal policymakers, have voted in favor of funding the IFIs.

Looking into congressional votes allows us to look beyond the unitary role of the state in the politics of international migration. While it is undoubtedly true that most policymakers feel apprehensive about increased migration, many in Congress have expressed their support for admitting migrants on humanitarian grounds. These liberal policymakers are unlikely to support funding the IFIs to address migration even though they may support the IFIs for other reasons. More interestingly, some conservative policymakers have reluctantly voted in favor of protecting the IFIs from congressional oversight. These

pro-IFI votes have essentially given the IFIs more leeway to address migration at its root causes. Given the implications of congressional votes for the role of multilateral lending in addressing migration pressure, it is imperative to observe individual U.S. lawmakers' stances on bills that concern congressional funding of the IFIs.

In line with the existing literature on migration and money, we focus on lawmakers' apprehension about potential immigration into their congressional districts as an important driver of their support for the IFIs. To understand the determinants of this migration anxiety among legislators, we focus on two factors that are specific to their individual characteristics and districts: ideologies and the expected volume of immigration in their districts. U.S. lawmakers can be classified into two broad ideological spectra: economic and social. Economic conservatives, especially those in the Republican Party, oppose US financial involvement in global governance. Republican Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky has been spearheading congressional opposition to sending U.S. taxpayers' money abroad on the grounds that it could increase U.S. government deficits.

Social conservatives across the isle may not have a clear preference toward IFI funding unless they expect their districts to bear the disproportionate burden of hosting immigrants. They may oppose migration on various grounds, including cultural threat, welfare concerns, and labor-market competition with their constituents. While these effects of immigration may be only perceptions, these perceived effects could have important electoral consequences. We expect this dynamic to take a more prominent effect if socially conservative lawmakers expect their districts to absorb a disproportionately higher volume of immigration. Given the importance of existing migrant networks in attracting new immigrants (e.g., Massey et al., 1993; Altonji and Card, 1991), these lawmakers are particularly sensitive to the size of the foreign-born populations in their districts. A larger foreign-born population within a congressional district indicates increased immigration when there is a large emigration wave from the developing world. While socially liberal lawmakers are less likely to address this through IFI funding, IFI funding becomes an attractive option

Table 1: Policymaker Profiles and Pro-IFI Preferences among Democrats

		Policymaker Ideology on Social Issues	
		Liberal (Immigration-Accepting)	Conservative (Immigration-Averse)
Migration Pressure	High	Indifferent/Less Pro-IFI	More Pro-IFI
	Low	Indifferent/Less Pro-IFI	Indifferent/Less Pro-IFI

for socially conservative lawmakers whose districts host a sizable immigrant community.

We expect these dynamics to be different across the two parties. Most Republican lawmakers hold conservative economic ideologies, and they are more likely to oppose bills expanding IFI funding out of their concerns about government deficits, regardless of their immigration concern. Although Democrats are more economically liberal than Republicans, there is much more heterogeneity in social conservatism within the Democratic Party. This division within the party will elicit different votes on IFI bills depending on lawmakers' ideologies—measured on their places on the social conservatism spectrum—and the size of the foreign-born population in their districts. Among Democrats, our prediction centers on lawmakers who are socially conservative (immigration-averse) and whose districts host a large foreign-born population. These lawmakers support expanding IFI funding since more financial capacity at the IFIs can help reduce immigration inflows in their districts. We do not make definitive predictions about other types of Democrats except the expectation that they will be less supportive of IFI funding than the Democrats of our focus. We summarize these expectations in Table 1 and propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *When immigration-averse Democrats face a higher degree of migration pressure, they are more likely to support pro-IFI bills.*

Hypothesis 2: *The degree of migration pressure does not influence immigration-accepting Democrats' support for pro-IFI bills*

Research Design

We evaluate our argument by examining congressional roll call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives. International political economy research has increasingly turned to analyzing roll call voting as a means to approximate policymakers' preferences toward monetary cooperation (Broz, 2015), economic sanctions (Connell, Moya and Shin, 2021), and international trade (Magee, 2010; Milner and Tingley, 2015). Given the "power of the purse" claimed by Congress, we capture policymaker affinity for global governance by observing roll call votes on House legislation that aims to either buttress or undermine U.S. funding of IFIs—namely, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.

There are several advantages to using congressional roll call voting as a proxy for policymakers' revealed preferences. First, House members are particularly vulnerable to voter backlash against immigration. Local constituencies and the "permanent campaign" generated by two-year electoral cycles imply a high cost for ignoring the effects of U.S. foreign economic policies on future immigration. For this same reason, prior research reveals that congressional attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy are strongly shaped by the material concerns of their constituents (e.g., Milner and Tingley, 2015). The House therefore represents an appropriate context to assess how democratically elected policymakers balance their skepticism toward global economic governance with immigration concerns. Second, a focus on roll call votes attenuates concerns about reverse causality. Whereas actual policy changes (such as the fiscal expansion of IFIs) can exert effects on global migration patterns, votes are unlikely to elicit any contemporaneous effects on the characteristics of congressional districts.

Our sample is comprised of five different votes shown in Table 2, spanning 1977 to

Table 2: Summary of Congressional Roll Call Votes on IFI Funding

	Year	Purpose	Pro-IFI Variable
HR 5262	1977	<i>Increase participation in World Bank Agencies</i>	"Yea" Vote = 1
HR 7244	1980	<i>Increase Quota in the IMF</i>	"Yea" Vote = 1
AMDT.306 (HR 2957)	1983	<i>Remove budget provision to fund the IMF</i>	"Nay" Vote = 1
AMDT.115 (HR 2295)	1993	<i>Remove budget provision to fund the World Bank</i>	"Nay" Vote = 1
HR 3579	1998	<i>Approve quota increase in the IMF and creation of NAB</i>	"Yea" Vote = 1

1998.² While some votes relate to legislation aiming to augment IFI funding, other votes pertain to amendments that seek to block or strike pro-IFI language from larger omnibus bills. For instance, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1994 (HR 2295) appropriated funds for a long list of U.S. foreign policy objectives including not just multilateral economic assistance, but peacekeeping operations, international military training, and narcotics control. Republican John Kasich's amendment to HR 2295, however, sought to delete the specific provision of \$55 million in new funds to the World Bank and to "delete the corresponding loan authority such contribution would provide" (H.Amdt.115 to H.R. 2295, 103rd Cong.). Using these votes, we construct our dependent variable, *Pro-IFI*, which is a dichotomous variable equaling 1 if the legislator expresses support for expanding IFI funds. We drop all abstentions from the analysis.

Independent Variables

To capture the migration pressures faced by each policymaker's constituency, we use the district-level foreign born as a percentage of the district's total population (*% Foreign Born*).³ Not only does this variable distinguish which policymaker's constituents have experienced high levels of immigration in the past, but the measure is also indicative of which districts will experience *future* influxes of migration. When deciding where to relocate, migrants are most likely to move to places with sizeable co-ethnic diasporas who can assist them with finding job opportunities, housing, and other obstacles associated

²This sample replicates the selection of votes used by Broz (2010).

³These data come from Foster-Molina (2017).

with integration into host countries (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991; Eric and Ooka, 2006; Massey et al., 2005; Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Zavodny, 1997). Accordingly, *% Foreign Born* serves as an appropriate proxy for policymakers when gauging how policy decisions are likely to affect the future migration pressures within their districts.

% Foreign Born may also detect the political presence of ethnic diasporas. Similar to the case of foreign aid (Bermeo and Leblang, 2015; Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller, 2000), it is possible ethnic lobby groups favor augmenting the funds of major IFIs as a means to improve macroeconomic conditions in their home country. Unfortunately, the *% Foreign Born* measure is unable to distinguish between migration pressures and the migrant lobbying mechanism. We nevertheless find this competing mechanism unconvincing since, unlike foreign aid, our sample of bills on IFI funding do not pertain to specific migrant-sending countries. In addition, some of the interactive relationships we later present are hard to square with the story of migrant lobbying. For example, if *% Foreign Born* is a proxy for migrants' lobbying presence, it is not obvious why the political influence of these groups will *strengthen* among congressional districts with high unemployment and racially conservative incumbents.

Our hypotheses posit that policymakers' concerns about immigration become more salient under select conditions. Specifically, the connection between immigration and representatives' preferences toward IFIs is likely to be moderated by the ideological predispositions of individual policymakers. We account for policymakers' aversion to future immigration pressures by using the second dimension of Nokken and Poole's (2004) DW-NOMINATE scores. These scores vary for each lawmaker across congressional sessions and are suitable for approximating representatives' attitudes toward race relations and civil rights—issue areas that closely track immigration. Higher (lower) DW-NOMINATE 2 scores denote more conservative (liberal) positions on race issues. Accordingly, we predict *% Foreign Born* to elicit a positive effect on support for IFIs but primarily among representatives scoring high on DW-NOMINATE 2. Considering the partisan divide on

global economic governance, we also perform a triple interaction between *% Foreign Born*, DW-NOMINATE 2, and party affiliation, in order to assess whether immigration anxiety shapes affinity for IFIs differently among each of the parties.

We also assess two additional observable implications of our argument. First, while immigration influxes are likely to stoke resentment among all voters, policymakers in “safe” electoral districts are more shielded from public backlash against immigration and therefore afforded more leeway in straying from their constituents’ ideal point. We therefore expect *% Foreign Born* to be more strongly tied to congressional support for IFI funding among policymakers representing more competitive districts. To measure the safeness of each policymaker’s district, we use the vote share won by the incumbent during the previous election cycle (i.e., *Vote Share*). Thus, higher (lower) values of *Vote Share* denote less (more) competitive districts.

Second, we expect the connection between *% Foreign Born* and congressional affinity for IFIs to strengthen under adverse economic conditions. For both material and identity based reasons, recessions tend to galvanize public opposition to immigration (Goldstein and Peters, 2014). As perceived economic and cultural threats from immigration are heightened among constituents, representatives will be particularly concerned about how undermining IFIs affect future immigration flows. We measure economic conditions at the local level using the percentage of individuals unemployed within each policymaker’s electoral district (i.e., *% Unemployed*).

Model Specification

Because our dependent variable, *Pro-IFI*, is a dichotomous measure, we estimate the following probit regression model with standard errors clustered on congressional session:

$$Pr(Pro\ IFI_{it} = 1) = \Phi(\beta_1\% Foreign\ Born_{it} + \beta_2\% VoteShare_{it} + \beta_3\% Unemployed_{it} + \beta_4\% DWNOM\ 2_{it} + \beta_5\% Foreign\ Born_{it} \cdot VoteShare_{it} + \beta_6\% Foreign\ Born_{it} \cdot \% Unemployed_{it} + \beta_7\% Foreign\ Born_{it} \cdot DWNOM\ 2_{it} + \gamma X_{it} + \eta_s + \kappa_t + \varepsilon_{it})$$

where $Pro\ IFI_{it}$ denotes whether representative i casts a vote in favor of funding IFIs in session t and X_{it} is a vector of control variables. All models include state (η_s) and congressional session fixed effects (κ_t). η_s accounts for any time-invariant factors specific to each policymaker's state, such as geographic proximity to the border. Congressional session fixed effects control for the party composition of each Congress as well as time-specific factors that could affect policymakers' attitudes, including global economic conditions and changes in federal policy.

To attend to concerns about omitted variable bias, we control for a range of individual-level and district-level factors that predict support for IFIs. First, we control for a policymaker's party affiliation and DW-NOMINATE 1 score—factors that are also likely to correlate with opposition to immigration. Republican representatives have traditionally positioned themselves against global institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank. This opposition has, in part, been grounded in the party's concerns about U.S. sovereignty and (often mistaken) beliefs that global economic governance works against U.S. interests. Additionally, Republicans ostensibly present themselves as the more fiscally conservative party, in turn creating reluctance to using tax payer money to fund IOs. The first dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores captures this dynamic well, with higher (lower) scores denoting more (less) conservative positions on the economy.

Our models also control for the wealth and education levels of policymakers' constituents. Considering the integral role that global governance plays in fostering cross-border commerce and open foreign economic policies, policymakers representing the

domestic “winners” of globalization should be more likely to support IFIs than policymakers representing the “losers” of globalization (Broz, 2010). Under the assumptions of the Stolper-Samuelson model, capital owners and high-skill workers in the United States stand the most to gain from an open economy. Educated constituents may also be more socialized to believe in the merits of global economic governance and pro-globalization policies (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Importantly, these district-level characteristics are significantly correlated with the *% Foreign Born* variable. We therefore include *Median Income* which measures the median household income in policymaker *i*’s district. *% Bachelor’s Degree* measures the percentage of constituents in policymaker *i*’s district with at least a Bachelor’s degree.

Lastly, representatives’ affinity for IFIs may be shaped by industry-based cleavages. Export-oriented sectors. To capture industry-based interests within one’s constituency, we use Broz’s *Net Imports* and *Net Exports* variables. The former measures “the percentage of district workers employed in manufacturing industries where the ratio of imports to consumption is greater than the ratio of revenues from exports to total industry revenue” (Broz, 2010, 361). The latter measure calculates the district-level proportion of laborers in industries where export revenues exceed the imports-to-consumption ratio.

Results

Table 3 reports the main results. Prior to assessing our hypotheses, we first estimate the unconditional effect of *% Foreign Born* on congressional support for IFIs. *% Foreign Born* is positively signed but statistically insignificant in Model 1. We therefore do not find strong evidence that concerns about immigration drive all policymakers’ support for IFIs. However, our argument posits that these concerns are only likely to be salient in select contexts.

Model 2 differentiates between competitive and safe congressional districts by interact-

Table 3: Roll Call Votes on IFI Funding

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% Foreign Born	0.004 (0.004)	0.025*** (0.005)	-0.028* (0.012)	0.005+ (0.003)	0.012* (0.006)
% Foreign Born × Vote Share		-0.0003** (0.0001)			
% Foreign Born × % Unemployed			0.007*** (0.002)		
% Foreign Born × DW-NOMINATE 2				0.046* (0.023)	0.051* (0.025)
% Foreign Born × Republican					-0.021 (0.016)
Republican × DW-NOMINATE 2					-0.927** (0.289)
% Foreign Born × Rep. × DW-NOM 2					0.009 (0.027)
Republican	1.177*** (0.317)	1.184*** (0.313)	1.210*** (0.302)	1.169*** (0.328)	1.152*** (0.297)
DW-NOMINATE 1	-4.771*** (0.363)	-4.774*** (0.364)	-4.851*** (0.356)	-4.820*** (0.382)	-4.689*** (0.466)
DW-NOMINATE 2	-0.334 (0.211)	-0.337 (0.212)	-0.325 (0.205)	-0.557** (0.203)	-0.355+ (0.214)
Median Income	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.017+ (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)
% Bachelor's Degree	0.033*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.006)
Net Imports	1.150** (0.438)	1.169** (0.451)	1.149** (0.427)	1.213* (0.519)	1.211* (0.555)
Net Exports	2.305** (0.821)	2.309** (0.828)	2.233** (0.812)	2.210** (0.839)	2.007** (0.761)
Vote Share	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)
% Unemployed	-0.001 (0.073)	0.001 (0.074)	-0.056 (0.065)	-0.004 (0.065)	0.013 (0.062)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,908	1,908	1,908	1,908	1,908

Table 3. Standard errors clustered by Congress are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

ing % *Foreign Born* with *Vote Share*. Here, the constituent term for % *Foreign Born* is positive while the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Figure 1 illustrates the substantive nature of this finding. In the left panel, we plot the marginal effect of % *Foreign Born* at different values of *Vote Share*. In the right panel, we compare predicted probabilities of *Pro-IFI* at different values of % *Foreign Born* when holding *Vote Share* at either its lower or upper 10th percentile value. In competitive districts,

Figure 1: Effect of Percent Foreign Born Conditional on District Competitiveness




Figure 1. 95-percent confidence intervals are shown.

policymakers representing constituencies with a larger percentage of foreign born are significantly more likely to cast a vote favoring funding of IFIs. This relationship, however, disappears as the policymaker’s electoral margin of victory becomes more comfortable (i.e., *Vote Share* = 55%). For instance, in a hypothetical district where an incumbent won 51% of the vote during the previous election cycle, 1 SD increase in % *Foreign Born* from its mean elicits a 4 percentage-point increase in the probability of a pro-IFI vote. Conversely, in a safe district where an incumbent won roughly 85% of the vote, the relationship between % *Foreign Born* and *Pro-IFI* is null.⁴

Model 3 interacts % *Foreign Born* with the district-level unemployment rate. The interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level. Consistent with previous evidence showing that anti-immigrant sentiment tends to intensify during a

⁴In Table A2 of the appendix, we do not find evidence that the association between *Pro-IFI* and % *Foreign Born* is conditional on a policymaker’s vote share in primary elections. The interaction term is negatively signed but fails to reach statistical significance at conventional levels.

Figure 2: Effect of Percent Foreign Born Conditional on District-Level Unemployment




Figure 2. 95-percent confidence intervals are shown.

recession (Goldstein and Peters, 2014), this result suggests that migration pressures elicit a positive effect on policymakers’ support for IFIs but primarily during times of high unemployment. To further illustrate, we plot marginal effects and predicted probabilities, conditional on district level unemployment rates, in Figure 2. In districts with unemployment rates below 5%, the association between % *Foreign Born* and affinity toward IFIs is statistically insignificant. Yet, once unemployment rates move beyond 5%, % *Foreign Born* elicits an increasingly positive effect on congressional support for IFIs.

The remaining models in Table 3 test whether the relationship between % *Foreign Born* and support for IFIs is conditional on policymakers’ racial ideology. Model 4 examines how DW NOMINATE 2 conditions the effect of % *Foreign Born* among all representatives while Model 5 isolates this same conditional relationship among Democrats by including a triple interaction term. In Model 4, we find a positive and weakly significant constituent term for % *Foreign Born* ($p < 0.10$) but a positive and significant interaction coefficient. Thus,

Figure 3: Effect of Percent Foreign Born Conditional on Racial Ideology




Figure 3. 95-percent confidence intervals are shown.

Figure 4: Conditional Effects of % Foreign Born Among Democrats




Figure 4. 95-percent confidence intervals are shown.

the connection between *% Foreign Born* and representatives' support for IFIs is primarily driven by racially conservative policymakers. As shown in Figure 3, the effect of *% Foreign Born* is insignificant. However, when holding policymakers' DW NOMINATE 2 score at 0.5 (i.e., a more racially conservative ideology), a 1 SD increase in *% Foreign Born* from its mean elicits a roughly 10 percentage point increase in the probability of supporting pro-IFI legislation.

Turning to Model 5, we also find that migration pressures affect immigration-averse Democrats differently than immigration-accepting Democrats. Figure 4 plots predicted probabilities among Democrats when holding DW NOMINATE 2 scores at different hypothetical values.⁵ Consistent with our hypotheses, immigration-averse Democrats are more likely to back funding of IFIs when they host a larger foreign born population within their districts. For instance, holding DW NOMINATE 2 at 0.5, a 1 SD increase in *% Foreign Born* from its mean elicits a roughly 13 percentage point increase in the probability of supporting IFIs among Democrats. This relationship disappears, however, among immigration-accepting Democrats with DW NOMINATE 2 scores below zero. In addition, Model 5 finds no evidence that Republicans' voting behavior is driven by concerns about immigration, regardless of their ideology on social issues. Republican opposition instead appears to be shaped by conservative economic ideologies as well as party discipline.

Conclusion

Much of the IPE literature has focused on voter preferences and special interests to explain policy and political economic outcomes in the international realm. While the recent burgeoning of the IPE of migration literature has highlighted the importance of anti-immigrant attitudes to explain foreign economic policies, only a few studies have examined how apprehension about increased immigration can shape development finance and multilateral

⁵To compute predicted probabilities, all other covariates are held at their mean.

lending, and vice versa. Our investigation of congressional votes on the IFIs contributes to this emerging literature by providing much more fine-grained (subnational) evidence that lawmakers are aware of multilateral tools in addressing international migration.

Our focus on policymaker ideologies along economic and social dimensions also provides directions for future research. First, scholars need to look into domestic groups that oppose migration-related provisions of foreign aid, multilateral lending, and development finance. Whether they are fiscal hawks or oppose sending aid to less democratic and authoritarian regimes, their political influence holds the key to understanding the extent to which we observe the relationship between money and migration across time and space. Second, ideology and partisanship shape why some policymakers get more involved in addressing migration through global economic governance. While the Trump and the Biden administrations have both supported the idea of using money to relieve some of the migration pressure on the Mexico-US border, their narratives about the situation and strategies have been quite different. Third, migration management through IFIs is only possible because the US is their important stakeholder owing to both its large vote share and informal influence. Since the US cannot remain relevant within the IFIs without congressional support, it is important to look at how migration concerns across congressional districts helped secure the pro-IFI majority in Congress.

It is perhaps not a coincidence that the major donors of the IFIs—collectively known as the G5—are also popular destination countries for migrants coming from borrowing countries. The G5 countries—the US, the UK, France, Germany, and Japan—are wealthy advanced democracies who have helped establish the post-WWII global economic order. As wealth and power in these countries attract people from the developing world, public sentiments about immigration will continue to grow more negative. Recent political shifts in the US and Europe have shown that public dissatisfaction with one element of global economic integration and also spill over to other dimensions. In this case, anti-immigration attitudes can lead to broader societal support for protectionism in the global goods and

capital markets. In this regard, policymakers with vested interests in the current global economic order can continue to support the IFIs and use them as instruments of migration mitigation even if they personally believe in the net benefits of immigration for their countries.

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Appendix

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Pro-IFI	0.521	0.5	0	1	1908
% Foreign Born	6.783	9.157	0.139	60.8	1908
Vote Share	65.776	13.681	35.786	100	1908
% Unemployed	3.292	1.285	1.192	10.749	1908
DW-NOMINATE 1	-0.032	0.372	-0.736	0.986	1908
DW-NOMINATE 2	0.046	0.427	-1.303	1.25	1908
Republican	0.407	0.491	0	1	1908
Median Income	23.253	13.391	4.66	64.199	1908
% Bachelor's Degree	17.51	9.388	1.906	61.3	1908
Net Imports	0.154	0.089	0.007	0.668	1908
Net Exports	0.072	0.062	0	0.461	1908

Table A2: Effect of % *Foreign Born* Conditional on Vote Share in Primary Elections

	(A6)
% Foreign Born	0.015 (0.011)
Primary Election Vote Share	0.245 (0.231)
% Foreign Born × Primary Election Vote Share	-0.014 (0.016)
DW-NOMINATE 1	-4.841*** (0.377)
DW-NOMINATE 2	-0.309 (0.213)
Republican	1.230*** (0.315)
Median Income	-0.014 (0.010)
% Bachelor's Degree	0.033*** (0.005)
Net Imports	1.172* (0.462)
Net Exports	2.316** (0.781)
Vote Share	-0.004 (0.003)
% Unemployed	0.003 (0.076)
State Fixed Effects	✓
Congress Fixed Effects	✓
Observations	1,891

Table 3. Standard errors clustered by Congress are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.