


Nativism and Economic Integration Across the Developing World: Collision and Accommodation

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The overlooked backlash against globalization

- ▶ Rejection of international migration well known
- ▶ Internal migration dwarfs international migration (760m versus 210m)
- ▶ Domestic market integration and technological change
- ▶ Populist backlash against internal migration



Source: DESA(2015).

The reaction to internal migration: Collision and accommodation

- ▶ Internal migration encourages sons-of-the-soil politicians to organize, wins them followers, and makes discrimination and sons-of-the-soil violence more likely
- ▶ Scope condition: The developing world
 - ▶ Greater within-country (regional, ethnic) inequalities
 - ▶ Weaker national identities, institutions
- ▶ Greater political decentralization strengthens link between migration and successful sons-of-the-soil politicking.
Ambiguous relationship with violence.

Comparing international and domestic migration

- ▶ Internal migrants are more numerous
- ▶ Conflated with international migrants
- ▶ Institutional history of regulating internal migration as closely as international flows

	% endorse hiring preferences for . . .	
	Local citizens cf. other citizens	Citizens cf. non-citizens
Croatia	75	88
Poland	71	91
Russia	70	73
Ukraine	69	70
Turkey	68	68
Germany	.	64
Great Britain	.	59
France	.	54


Source: EVS, 1999–2001

Our book

- ▶ Posits destabilizing effects of internal migration, noting the role of decentralization
- ▶ Draws the links between international, domestic migration
- ▶ Tests the theory without selecting on the dependent variable
 - ▶ Data on internal migration from Latin America, Africa, Asia
 - ▶ The rise of sons-of-the-soil parties (in Latin America and India), discrimination (in India), violence (across the world and in India)
 - ▶ Causally identifies the effects of migration using rainfall shock-induced migration in India


Internal migration and violence across 526 regions

- ▶ $violence = f(migration)$
- ▶ Internal migration data are from IMAGE (56 countries)
- ▶ Violence data are from ACLED (60 countries)
- ▶ Overlap: 526 regions across 21 developing countries



A robust association

Scatterplot of internal migrants and riots in subnational regions in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia



Notes: Data are for countries in Asia (Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam), North Africa (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) and sub-Saharan Africa (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia). Riot data are from the ACLED database; migration data are from the IMAGE database.

But is the migration-violence relationship causal?

- ▶ Potential problems: reverse causality, omitted variables, measurement error
- ▶ Solution: use panel data on Indian states and instrument for migration using (distance and population-weighted) abnormal rainfall in other states

$$\text{Ln} \left[\sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\text{Abnormal rainfall}_j * \text{Population}_j}{\text{Distance}_{ij}} \right]$$

where i and j are destination and sending states

The causal effect of internal migration on violence in India

	<i>Ln riots</i>			<i>Ln insurgency</i>	
	OLS	2SLS		OLS	2SLS
		1st stage	2nd stage		2nd stage
<i>Ln male migrants</i>	0.296** (0.140)		0.548*** (0.196)	-0.0117 (0.0277)	0.0907* (0.0540)
Abnormal monsoon instrument		0.890*** (0.161)			
State fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	138	138	138	138	138
First stage <i>F</i> -statistic		31			

Notes: Control variables, measured for the host state, are abnormal monsoon rainfall, land degradation, income per capita, unemployment among secondary-school educated male natives, trade flows from other states, population, urbanization among the native population, native male childrens school enrollment rates, and the share of the native male population aged 15–19. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.



Conclusions, implications

- ▶ We theorize that in developing countries, internal migration might be met with a backlash
- ▶ We find evidence of this across the developing world
 - ▶ This backlash takes many forms, some of which are substitutes
 - ▶ Decentralization affects this dynamic, exacerbating or blunting these effects
- ▶ Domestic nativism is a major, under-appreciated force across the developing world
- ▶ Decreases the movement of people, and also goods
- ▶ But why are some places more resilient to migration and when?

Thank you


A robust association

Scatterplots of internal migrants and riots in subnational regions, by country, with lines of best fit



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