Who Is Credible? Government Popularity and the Catalytic Effect of IMF programs

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November 13, 2020
Motivation

• Key purpose of IMF programs is “to unlock other financing acting as a catalyst ...It (IMF program) serves as a signal that the country has adopted sound economic policies, reinforcing policy credibility, and increasing investor’s confidence” (IMF 2020).

• However, not all IMF borrowers successfully restore market confidence (ex. Greece 2010-12).

Q. Under what conditions do IMF programs generate positive reactions from international investors?
• Overall, there are mixed results on the “catalytic effects”.
• Existing studies focus on semi-structural factors.
  • Regime type (Bauer et al. 2012)
  • Geopolitical ties (Chapman et al. 2015)
  • Gov’t partisanship (Cho 2014)
  • Macroeconomic fundamentals (Eichengreen and Mody 2001; Breen and Egan 2019)
1. International investors reward governments that are credibly committed to implementing IMF conditionality.

2. Government popularity is a powerful cue to assess a borrower’s credibility.
• Focus: International portfolio investors
• Key for investors: Implementation of IMF conditionality
  • IMF conditionality includes essential reforms and austerity targets
  • Not every borrower successfully implements IMF conditionality.

→ Investors carefully select credible governments.
• Government popularity serves as a credibility cue for successful reform.

• Government popularity is **not** a reflection of underlying economy, esp. for countries under reforms.
  • People show prospective attitudes during reform.
    • Stokes 2001; Wayland 1998; Echegrary and Elordi 2001
  • Not all IMF participants suffer low popularity.
    • ex. South Korea 1998-2000
• High gov’t popularity helps enactment of tough reforms.
  • Ostrom and Simon 1985; Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002; Calvo 2007; Henisz and Mansfield 2019.

• High gov’t popularity facilitates public compliance with reforms.
  • People support gov’t policies if they have a favorable opinion of the gov’t (Franklin et al. 1995; Meneguello 2005).

→ Investors show a more favorable reaction to a more popular borrower.
• However, the impact of gov’t popularity **decays over time**.
  • In the initial years, cues are highly important because there is little information about the borrower’s credibility.
  • As a program proceeds, cues become less important because investors learn about the borrower’s actual economic performance.
Interviews
“I am concerned about governments’ capacity to make commitment, which would be affected by politicians’ popularity…. When it’s obvious that significant public sentiment is against, to the point that it weakens government’s capacity, it’s all negative.”

- A senior investor

“Public opposition is the largest challenge. Government that enjoys strong support has a much higher chance to deliver the program.”

- An IMF official
Data overview

• 52 countries, 1998-2017, Country-year
• Dependent variable: Sovereign Bond Spreads
  • source: JP Morgan EMBI
• Key explanatory variable: Government approval ratings * IMF program
  • Source: Global, regional and country-specific polls
  • IMF program
    • IMF program measured as 1) binary variable and 2) # conditionality
    • 2SLS with compound instrumental variables (See Stubbs et at. 2020)
• Controls: Terms of IMF programs, Borrower's macroeconomic indicators, affinity with the U.S., regime type, domestic veto players, etc.
• Error Correction Models w/ country, year, and region fixed effects
Data overview: Sample Countries

Figure: Sample countries shaded in black
Data Overview: Government popularity

Figure: All sample (left) and IMF participants (right)
For 1% increase in govt’t popularity, we see 7% bond spreads decrease within a year.
Result

Coefficients on government popularity by IMF conditionality

Histogram of IMF conditionality

Coefficients and 95% CIs

IMF Conditionality
Does the effect of government popularity decay over time?

1) Long-run multiplier

- Total effect of 1 % increase in gov’t popularity = 121 bp spreads ↓
- It takes first two years for fully half of the total effect to occur
  - 22 % in \( t \), another 22% in \( t+1 \), and another 6% in \( t+2 \)
Does the effect of government popularity decay over time?

2) Marginal effect
Robustness Checks

- Monthly analysis, Jan 1998- Dec 2015, 26 countries
- Extra controls (CBI, inflation, Total debt % GDP, etc)
- Democracy vs Non-democracy
- Presidential vs. Parliamentary System
Implications and Conclusion

• Policy implications
  • A well-designed IMF program is not enough.
  • IMF conditionality does not have a linear effect.

• Scholarly implications
  • Mass public can influence international capital movements.
  • Much more attention needs to be given to public opinion to study the IMF, international finance, and the global economy.
  • Public opinion mediates IO’s commitment mechanism.
Thank you for your attention!

I look forward to your questions and comments.

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Avg. development of Gov’t approval ratings

**Figure:** Avg. Development of Gov’t Popularity before and during IMF program
Does the impact of government popularity vary depending on IMF conditionality?
- Quantitative vs. Structural

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Δ Bond Spreads</th>
<th>Coef</th>
<th>S. E.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>l. Bond spreads</td>
<td>-0.359**</td>
<td>-2.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>l. QPC</td>
<td>54.17***</td>
<td>2.74</td>
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<td>l. QPC x ΔGov’t popularity</td>
<td>-0.735**</td>
<td>-2.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>l. QPC x l. Gov’t popularity</td>
<td>-1.314**</td>
<td>-2.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>l. SPC</td>
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<td>0.45</td>
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<td>l. SPC x ΔGov’t popularity</td>
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<td>0.30</td>
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<td>l. SPC x l. Gov’t popularity</td>
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<td>-0.42</td>
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<td>l. Gov’t popularity</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Δ Gov’t popularity</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Controls* ✓

*Fixed effects* ✓

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Is the cue correct?

Is a higher government popularity actually associated with a successful implementation?
Gov’t popularity and IMF programs

Predicted Number of binding conditions and Gov’t Approval Rating

Predicted loan size and Gov’t Approval Rating