

International Economic Integration and Promissory Democracy

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Promissory Democratic Representation

- Promise making and keeping by political parties are key elements of promissory representation.
- Variation in promise keeping has been explained by domestic political institutions and economic conditions.
 - Electoral system (Klingemann et al 1994; McDonald/Budge 2005)
 - Executive power-sharing (Thomson et al 2017)
- What is the impact of international economic integration on promissory representation?

Theoretical Argument

International economic integration reduces governments' room to maneuver:

- Parties face greater uncertainty about economic business cycles when they formulate election pledges.
- Constraints are exacerbated by international commitments (e.g.; trade agreements).
- Expansion of set of (national and international) actors that influence national governments

Research Design


- Fulfillment of election promises using Comparative Party Pledges Project (CPPP).
- Data on over 20,000 election pledges by parties in 12 countries prior to the formation of 57 governments.
- Election pledge: “statement committing a party to one specific action or outcome that can be clearly determined to have occurred or not” (Naurin, Royed and Thomson, 2019, 24).
- Level of analysis (government party-pledge).

Research Design

- DV: Pledge Fulfillment (binary)
- IV: International Economic Integration (KOF Globalization Index)
- VoC, left-right ideology, executive-legislative relations, bicameralism, executive power-sharing, federal, Chief executive, fragmentation, incumbency, GDP growth, government duration, preelection agreement, etc.
- Logistic regression models
- Robustness Checks/Conditional Effects


Predicted Probabilities

The effect of international economic integration



The British Conservative Party's Migration Pledge

- Conservative Party Pledge to reduce net migration to below 100,000 in 2010.
- Typical case (Gerring 2008).
- Primary and secondary documents, elite interviews (forthcoming).
- Pledge making driven by party competition and ideology.
- Pledge breaking driven by:
 - International commitments: EU membership
 - Economic uncertainty: Decline in British emigration due to weak currency.
 - Actors: Lobbying by domestic and international market actors.



Summary

- International economic integration poses a formidable challenge to promissory democratic representation at the national level.
- Strong negative association between integration and pledge fulfillment, but effects might vary depending on national institutions and governing parties' ideologies.
- Case study provides further support for underlying causal mechanisms.
- Implications for debate on the effects of globalization on the quality of democracy (Dahl 1956; Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009; Rodrik 2012; Meyerrose 2020)

Thank you!

Appendix

Theoretical Argument


Hypothesis: Parties that hold executive power after elections are less likely to fulfill their election pledges in countries and time periods in which governments are exposed to greater international economic integration.

Effect may vary by:

- National approaches to managing risks (Varieties of Capitalism).
- Ideological position of the parties in government.
- Type of pledge (Cut versus expansionary pledges).

Pledge fulfillment Main Results

DV: Pledge Keeping



Marginal Effects

