# A Field Experiment on Business Opposition to the U.S.-China Trade War

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#### Overview

- 1. Motivation
- 2. Design
- 3. Findings
- 4. Implications

# The Trade War Devastated the U.S. Economy

#### The New York Times

#### American Consumers, Not China, Are Paying for Trump's Tariffs

New York Fed and academic researchers found that U.S. consumers and companies have borne the brunt of the president's trade war.





New research finds that American businesses and consumers are paying the price for President Trump's tariffs on Chinese goods. Jenub Moon for The New York Times



- \$4.6 billion per month during 2018 (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019)
- Exacerbated by global supply chains that amplify and conceal effects of tariffs (Flaaen and Pierce 2020)

# How Did Businesses Respond?

Try to change policy



Apply for exemption



Do nothing



# How Did Businesses Respond?

#### Try to change policy



only 1.73% of large firms (Zhu et al. 2021)

#### Apply for exemption



#### Do nothing



### Our Project

#### Research Question

Why would (or wouldn't) firms engage in collective action to end a trade war?

- Trade produces winners (consumers, export-oriented or GVC-linked businesses) who should support and losers (import-competing or non-GVC businesses) who should oppose free trade (Rogowski 1987; Hiscox 2002)
- Normally, firms better able to overcome collective action problem than individuals, often to support tariffs (Olson 1965)
- But diffuse costs of trade war born by big, diverse group of firms may prevent collective action to oppose tariffs
- Firms, especially small ones, lack **information** about the potential benefits of collective action

#### We...

- generated original industry-specific estimates of the costs of the trade war
- developed an interactive web application that allowed firms to further tailor these estimates
- created a novel sample of managers at U.S. firms
- randomly assigned different types of access to our estimates
- measured whether firms were willing to act to oppose trade war

#### Main Finding

Information mobilizes opposition among those who previously thought the trade war was harmful, but depresses opposition among those who thought they were helped.

#### Significance

First field experiment on corporate political action.

### Building a Sample of U.S. Business Managers

#### **Facebook Ad Targeting Managers**

#### Ad Through KC City of Commerce





(N = 906 validated responses)

# Estimating the Costs of the Trade War

We start with the "use" tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which report how much each industry (row) takes as its inputs from other industries (columns).

[Millions of d	le (Supply-Use Framework), 2012 oilars) onomic Analysis					
	Commodities/Industries	Olised farming	Grain farming	Vegetable and melon farming	Fruit and tree nut farming	Greenhouse, nursery, and floriculture production
Code	Commodity Description	1111A0	111180	111200	111300	111400
1111A0	Oilseed farming	2,507	145	4		
1111B0	Grain farming		7,731	1000	0.0	
111200	Vegetable and melon farming			909	8	
111300	Fruit and tree nut farming				189	
111400	Greenhouse, nursery, and floriculture production					3,970
111900	Other crop farming	458	223			
112120	Dairy cattle and milk production					
1121A0	Beef cattle ranching and farming, including feedlots and dual-purpose ranching and farming	38	225	4	24	12
112300	Poultry and egg production	10				
112A00	Animal production, except cattle and poultry and eggs	24	134	2	11	
113000	Forestry and logging					
114000	Fishing, hunting and trapping					799
115000	Support activities for agriculture and forestry	2,554	9,807	1,173	2,724	767
211000	Oil and gas extraction					
212100	Coal mining					
212230	Copper, nickel, lead, and zinc mining					
2122A0	Iron, gold, silver, and other metal ore mining	I				
212310	Stone mining and quarrying	74	449	31	21	18
2123A0	Other nonmetallic mineral mining and quarrying	1	1,163	1	4	
213111	Drilling oil and gas wells					
21311A	Other support activities for mining					
221100	Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution	154	160	115	168	37

### Estimating the Costs of the Trade War

Then we look at the commodities associated with each input industry using a concordance from Pierce and Schott (2009) and check whether those commodities appear on the tariff schedules (collected by PIIE).

	commodity	naics	
29	1,207,990,000	111120	
30	1,207,400,000	111120	
31	1,207,600,000	111120	
32	1,207,910,000	111120	
33	1,206,000,030	111120	
34	1,207,100,000	111120	
35	1,204,000,000	111120	
36	1,205,000,000	111120	
37	1,206,000,050	111120	
38	713,101,000	111130	
39	713,501,000	111130	
40	713,334,040	111130	
41	713,394,030	111130	
42	713,401,000	111130	
43	713,392,010	111130	
44	713,394,050	111130	
45	713,201,000	111130	
46	713,905,000	111130	
47	713,102,000	111130	
48	713,906,000	111130	
49	713,392,030	111130	
50	713,901,000	111130	
51	713,391,000	111130	
52	713,394,060	111130	
53	713,322,000	111130	
5.4	712 221 000	111120	

	hs10	year	init232Steel	
977	7217901000	2017	1	
978	7217905030	2017	1	
979	7217905060	2017	1	
980	7217905090	2017	1	
981	7218100000	2017	1	
982	7218910015	2017	1	
983	7218910030	2017	1	
984	7218910060	2017	1	
985	7218990015	2017	1	
986	7218990030	2017	1	
987	7218990045	2017	1	
988	7218990060	2017	1	
989	7218990090	2017	1	
990	7219110030	2017	1	
991	7219110060	2017	1	
992	7219120002	2017	1	
993	7219120006	2017	1	
994	7219120021	2017	1	
995	7219120026	2017	1	
996	7219120051	2017	1	
997	7219120056	2017	1	
998	7219120066	2017	1	
999	7219120071	2017	1	
1000	7219120081	2017	1	
1001	7219130002	2017	1	
4000	7210120021	2047		

#### Control

Please read the following information about the trade war and your company, and then scroll to proceed with the survey. The imposition of tariffs in 2018, recent studies show, cost U.S. consumers and companies \$1.4 billion a month and will force companies to redirect \$165 billion per year worth of imports affected by tariffs. Furthermore, \$121 billion of companies' exports to foreign markets have been harmed by retaliatory tariffs posed by other countries.

#### "Static" Treatment

**We've crunched some numbers for you.** Using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we have identified the most tariffaffected industries that provide important inputs to companies in your industry. These include:



# "Dynamic" Treatment

We have developed an online application to allow you to calculate precisely how much extra your firm may have paid for goods and services as a result of the tariffs. The application is available exclusively to you because of your participation in our study. You can access the application here.

# "Dynamic" Treatment

#### The Princeton Trade Study Impact Report




Step 2: Select which industries your firm has purchased products from in the list below.

Select the industries your firm purchased products from since July of 2018:

Step 3: Enter the amount your firm paid for products from these industries since July 2018.

Step 4: Download or copy and paste your data by clicking on one of the buttons below the table.

# "Dynamic" Treatment




#### Outcomes

Preference: We will present you with a list of actions you can take to support or oppose the use of tariffs. Would you like to see the support, oppose, or both lists? Interest and Action Items:

Interest item	Action item (oppose)	Action item (support)
Invite someone to participate in	Provides their e-mail address	Provides their e-mail address
this study		
Ask your Congressperson to [o]	Clicks link to Americans for Free	N/A
the trade war	Trade (write-in campaign)	
Donate to governors who $[o/s]$	Clicks link to donate to a gover-	N/A
tariffs	nor	
Sign a petition $[o/s]$ the trade	Clicks link to sign petition "Re-	Clicks link to sign petition
war	publicans Fighting Tariffs"	from American companies seek-
		ing protection
Donate to Congresspeople who	Clicks link to donate to sponsors	Clicks link to donate to spon-
[o/s] tariffs	of Import Tax Relief Act	sors of Fair Trade with China En-
		forcement Act
Join Facebook groups $[o/s]$ the	Likes "Tariffs Hurt the Heart-	Likes "American Jobs Build
trade war	land"	America"

### Informational Effects Greater for Those with Stronger Beliefs



Plot shows LATEs for the opposing trade war outcome conditional on the respondents' answers to the question, "On a scale of 1 to 10, has the trade war helped or hurt your firm?". The dependent variable is a 1 if the respondent selected any action to oppose the trade war, 0 otherwise. Treatment is a 1 if the respondent received any treatment, otherwise.

Figure 4: LATEs for Opposing Trade War by Prior Beliefs about Trade War

### Corrective Effect of Information Depends on Prior Knowledge





Figure 1: Comparison of Facebook and Kansas City Samples for Knowledge about Trade War

# Backfiring Happens for Firms with Low Prior Knowledge



Plot shows LATEs for the opposing trade war outcome conditional on the respondents answers to the question. On a sade of the 10, has the trade war helped for hurty our firm?" and the question, "On a scale of 1 to 10, how much knowledge on you have about the trade war?". The dependent variable is a 1 if the respondent selected any action to oppose the trade war, 0 otherwise. Treatment is a 1 first part of the trade war, 0 otherwise.

Figure 5: LATEs for Opposing Trade War by Prior Beliefs and Knowledge about Trade War

# No. of Tariffs in Treatment Varies by Respondent Industry





Figure 6: Histogram of Respondent's Industry Products with Tariffs

# Both Logical and Puzzling Findings!




- If managers believed the trade war extremely *hurt* them, more tariffs ↑ opposition. ✓
- If managers believed the trade war extremely *helped* them, more tariffs ↓ support. ✓
- For most managers with middling beliefs, more tariffs ↓ opposition.

# Possible Explanation

- Managers support the trade war *despite* the harms to their businesses (strong preferences)
- Managers concerned that quantifying the harms to businesses might discourage other businesses from sticking it out (counter-mobilization)
- Or perhaps partisan identities trumping information provision

# Partisanship A Significant Predictor of Trade War Opposition



Plot shows the survey proportion selecting at least one opposition to the trade war outcome subset by the political culture of the firm reported by the respondent for both management and rank-and-file employees in the company. The dependent variable is a 1 if the respondent selected any action to oppose the trade war, 0 otherwise.

Figure 8: Role of Partisanship in Explaining Opposition to Trade War

#### **Implications**

- Some firms face a collective action problem in opposing a trade war, and hard-to-get information encourages them to take action.
- But other firms react in counter-intuitive ways.
- Perhaps firms interpret information through partisan lenses or have political interests besides their bottom lines.