

# Globalization and Elite Responsiveness: Trade Shocks, Competitive Contexts, and Political Ideology

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
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# The Political Center is Collapsing in Western Democracies



## Extensive Work on Trade and Voter Support for Populism


- Trade and other aspects of globalization linked to **cultural** ideological responses
  - Support for far-right populism (Gingrich 2017, Colantone & Stanig 2018, Milner 2021)
  - Anti-immigrant sentiment (Autor et al. 2020)
  - Authoritarian attitudes (Norris & Inglehart 2019)
- And more recently, **economic** self-interest (Rommel & Walter 2018, Campello & Urdinez 2021)

## Research on the Supply Side is Less Developed

Research on elite responses to trade is more limited and inconclusive (Rodrik 2021), focuses exclusively on **economic** ideology, and draws primarily from the US context.

- Evidence that voters' interests only marginally impact how members of Congress vote on legislative bills (e.g. Guisinger 2009)
- Others find local dynamics *do* impact legislative votes on trade policy in the US, but effects might either be:
  - Increased protectionism (Feigenbaum & Hall 2015)
  - Or more generalized ideological polarization (Autor et al. 2020)

## European Politics Takes Place Along Two Ideological Dimensions



- 1 Do legislators shift their economic and cultural ideology in response to trade-induced shifts?
- 2 What role do local competitive and electoral contexts play in shaping these ideological shifts?

## Theoretical Expectations

	<b>Economic dimension</b>	<b>Cultural dimension</b>
<b>Trade shock</b>	<b>Shift left</b>	<b>Contingent on local context</b>
Trade shock under competitive majoritarianism	Additional shift to left	Contingent on local party context
Trade shock + radical right competition	No change	Shift right (stronger effect for right-wing legislators)
Trade shock + strong radical left competition	Shift left (stronger effect for left-wing legislators)	Shift left (stronger effect for left-wing legislators)

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
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## France and the French Senate

- **Why France?:**
  - Trade with LDCs has increased dramatically over past two decades, but with significant regional variation
  - Prevalence of both far-right and far-left
- **Why the French Senate?:**
  - Use of majoritarian and PR electoral systems in the same body




- **Dependent Variable:** (Change in) individual legislator ideology
  - Original dataset of 3,600 roll call votes in the French Senate (1996-2007)
  - Hand-coded economic (2,227) and cultural (613) bills, validated with Comparative Agendas Project
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- **Main Independent Variables:**
  - Local trade exposure
    - Autor et al (2020)'s imports per worker (IPW) measure
  - Electoral institutions (majoritarianism vs. PR)
  - Electoral competitiveness
  - Vote share of far-right/far-left in previous election


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- **Models:** First-differences models with controls (department-level, demographic, economic, and political) and two-way unit/time FEs.

# Trade Shocks and Economic Ideology

Panel A:  $\Delta$  IRT Score, Economic Dimension (Individual)




Panel B:  $\Delta$  IRT Score, Economic Dimension (Department)




◆ Econ+Demog Ctrls    ▲ Pol Ctrls A  
■ Pol Ctrls B


# Trade Shocks, Competitive Majoritarianism, and Economic Ideology



## Trade Shocks and Radical Party Strength: Overall Results




(a) Strong Radical Left




(b) Strong Radical Right

## Trade Shocks and Radical Left Strength: Results by Party



(a) Economic Dimension



(b) Cultural Dimension



## Summary and Conclusion

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