

# Capitol Controls

## Congress and the Bretton Woods Twins in the Era of Migration

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Particularly alarming when looking at the U.S.

## Research Question

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**Our Answer:** Policymakers *support* IFIs as a means to curtail migration pressures into their respective districts.

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However, concerns about immigration are not shared by all policymakers.

- Immigration flows are geographically concentrated
- Socially liberal versus socially conservative lawmakers

# Hypotheses

Table: Policymaker Profiles and Pro-IFI Preferences

		Policymaker Ideology on Social Issues	
		Liberal (Immigration-Accepting)	Conservative (Immigration-Averse)
Migration Pressure	High	Indifferent/Less Pro-IFI	More Pro-IFI
	Low	Indifferent/Less Pro-IFI	Indifferent/Less Pro-IFI



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**Hypothesis 1:** *When immigration-averse policymakers face a higher degree of migration pressure, they are more likely to support pro-IFI bills.*

**Hypothesis 2:** *The degree of migration pressure does not influence immigration-accepting policymakers' support for pro-IFI bills.*

# Research Design

**Table:** Sample of Congressional Roll Call Votes on IFI Funding

	<b>Year</b>	<b>Purpose</b>
HR 5262	1977	<i>Increase participation in World Bank Agencies</i>
HR 7244	1980	<i>Increase Quota in the IMF</i>
AMDT 306 to HR 2957	1983	<i>Remove budget provision to fund the IMF</i>
AMDT 115 to HR 2295	1993	<i>Remove budget provision to fund the World Bank</i>
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- District-level foreign born as a percentage of the population (*% Foreign Born*)
- Policymaker  $i$ 's DW NOMINATE 2 score (*DWNOM 2*)

# Model Specification

$$\Pr(\text{Pro IFI}_{it} = 1) = \Phi(\beta_1 \% \text{ Foreign Born}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{DWNOM } 2_{it} \\ + \beta_3 \% \text{ Foreign Born}_{it} \cdot \text{DWNOM } 2_{it} + \gamma X_{it} + \eta_s + \kappa_t + \varepsilon_{it})$$

- **Controls:** Republican; DWNOM 1; Median Income; % Bachelor's Degree; Net Imports; Net Exports; Vote Share in Previous Election; District-Level Unemployment Rate

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
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- State fixed effects ( $\eta_s$ )
- Congressional session fixed effects ( $\kappa_t$ )
- Standard errors clustered on congressional session


# Immigrant-Averse vs Immigrant-Accepting Policymakers

Figure: Marginal Effect of % Foreign Born Conditional on DWNOM2




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Figure: Predicted Support Conditional on % Foreign Born and DWNOM2




# Immigrant-Averse vs Immigrant-Accepting Democrats

Figure: Predicted Support Conditional on % Foreign Born and DWNOM2




# Additional Results

Figure: Conditional Marginal Effects of % *Foreign Born*



(a) Conditional on Vote Share



(b) Conditional on Unemployment

## Conclusion

Migration concerns drive support for IFIs but primarily among socially conservative (Democrat) policymakers.

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**Thank you!**

# Appendix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% Foreign Born	0.004 (0.004)	0.025*** (0.005)	-0.028* (0.012)	0.005+ (0.003)	0.012* (0.006)
% Foreign Born × Vote Share		-0.0003** (0.0001)			
% Foreign Born × % Unemployed			0.007*** (0.002)		
% Foreign Born × DW-NOMINATE 2				0.046* (0.023)	0.051* (0.025)
% Foreign Born × Republican					-0.021 (0.016)
Republican × DW-NOMINATE 2					-0.927** (0.289)
% Foreign Born × Rep. × DW-NOM 2					0.009 (0.027)
Republican	1.177*** (0.317)	1.184*** (0.313)	1.210*** (0.302)	1.169*** (0.328)	1.152*** (0.297)
DW-NOMINATE 1	-4.771*** (0.363)	-4.774*** (0.364)	-4.851*** (0.356)	-4.820*** (0.382)	-4.689*** (0.466)
DW-NOMINATE 2	-0.334 (0.211)	-0.337 (0.212)	-0.325 (0.205)	-0.557** (0.203)	-0.355+ (0.214)
Median Income	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.017+ (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)
% Bachelor's Degree	0.033*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.006)
Net Imports	1.150** (0.438)	1.169** (0.451)	1.149** (0.427)	1.213* (0.519)	1.211* (0.555)
Net Exports	2.305** (0.821)	2.309** (0.828)	2.233** (0.812)	2.210** (0.839)	2.007** (0.761)
Vote Share	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)
% Unemployed	-0.001 (0.073)	0.001 (0.074)	-0.056 (0.065)	-0.004 (0.065)	0.013 (0.062)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,908	1,908	1,908	1,908	1,908

**Table 3.** Standard errors clustered by Congress are shown in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.