

The International Liberal Foundations of Democratic Backsliding


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The End of the Cold War as Triumph of Democracy?



The Sources of Democratic Backsliding

- **Domestic politics of democratic backsliding** (e.g., Vachudova 2020; Bermeo 2016; Haggard and Kaufman 2021a, 2021b; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Rovny 2023; Waldner and Lust 2018; Grumbach 2021)
- **Globalization and the quality of democracy** (e.g., Acemogly and Robinson 2006; Dahl 1999; Rudra 2005; Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009a; Rodrik 1997, 2012; Meyerrose 2020; Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Milner and Mukherjee 2005; Schneider and Thompson 2023)


Theoretical Argument

- Effect of integration on democracy conditional on democratic values of political leaders.
- Integration contributes to democratic backsliding when anti-pluralist political parties (aspiring autocrats) are in executive office.
 - Material engagement.
 - Rhetorical disengagement.

Research Design

- Multi-methods design
- Comparative analysis of democratic backsliding in 97 democracies from 1970 to 2021.
- DV: Democratic backsliding event (binary)
- Explanatory variables:
 - Economic Integration (KOF Globalization Index)
 - Government Anti-Pluralism (V-Party)
- Control variables: Post Cold War, government populism, democracy, per capita GDP, GDP growth, presidentialism, polarization
- GLM with logit link function, robust standard errors & cubic splines

Government Anti-Pluralism



Robustness & Extensions

- [Alternative measures for democratic backsliding](#) (regime change, regime breakdown, electoral autocracies, placebo, high vs low income countries, democratic stock)
- [Alternative measures for international integration](#) (IO memberships, trade, finance, lag structures)
- [Alternative approaches to anti-pluralism](#) (estimated, populism, personalism)
- [Model Specification](#) (IV approach, regional FEs, STADL, non-linear effects)
- OVB ([geopolitics](#))
- Extensions ([democratic resilience](#))
- [Typical Case study of democratic backsliding in Hungary](#)

Summary

- International integration contributes to democratic backsliding when anti-pluralist parties are in government.
- International sources of democratic backsliding and resilience.
- Implications of the rise of aspiring autocrats for the LIO (Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth 2021; Colantone and Stanig 2018a, 2018b; De Vries, Hobolt, and Walter 2021; Farrell and Newman 2021; Galston 2017; Lake, Martin, and Risse 2021; Milner 2021; Rodrik 2012)


Thank you

Robustness & Extensions


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Appendix

Main Findings



The Spread of Anti-Pluralism




	mean	sd	min	max
Economic Integration	59.4632	15.67462	16.02952	90.85888
Financial Integration	62.99039	16.5462	13.03831	93.1143
Trade Integration	55.9219	17.25902	14.92078	91.63609
IO Memberships (#)	72.84191	19.12035	23	125
Polarization	-.7764355	1.281334	-3.817	2.996
Anti-pluralism (Gov)	.2891744	.2512966	.017	.993
Populism (Gov)	.3354798	.1923034	.0496667	.952
Democratic Stock	38.41399	22.6128	1.72161	95.07465
Per Capita GDP	17454.46	18985.44	322.7779	91565.73
GDP Growth	3.512107	3.646935	-14.81416	34.38957
Presidentialism	.2961841	.4567115	0	1
Accountability	1.374328	.4275445	-.5120759	2.168298
Horizontal Accountability	1.116019	.6182536	-1.141719	2.377501
Diagonal Accountability	1.387886	.4179317	-.914034	2.166188
Vertical Accountability	1.243994	.3468386	-.7090216	1.931787
N	1651			

Main and Conditional Results


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(5)
	Main	API	CW	Populism	Predicted API	Personalism
Economic Integration	0.864***	-0.030	-0.988*	0.867**	0.890***	0.746*
	(0.186)	(0.332)	(0.567)	(0.351)	(0.222)	(0.401)
Anti-pluralism (Gov)	-0.331	-1.219*	0.085	-0.331	-0.116	
	(0.241)	(0.733)	(0.218)	(0.241)	(0.415)	
Populism (Gov)	0.388**	0.455***	0.344**	1.784**	0.369**	0.459*
	(0.157)	(0.175)	(0.140)	(0.758)	(0.161)	(0.271)
Democratic Stock	0.178	0.158	0.331	0.178	0.242	0.241
	(0.213)	(0.208)	(0.204)	(0.212)	(0.225)	(0.436)
Per Capita GDP	-1.182***	-0.824**	-1.217***	-1.182***	-1.213***	-1.764**
	(0.295)	(0.321)	(0.282)	(0.295)	(0.389)	(0.759)
GDP Growth	-0.536**	-0.587**	-0.576***	-0.536**	-0.543**	-0.964**
	(0.231)	(0.268)	(0.216)	(0.231)	(0.233)	(0.389)
Presidentialism	0.181	0.108	0.120	0.181	0.126	0.346
	(0.126)	(0.130)	(0.119)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.254)
Polarization	0.664***	0.512**	0.611***	0.665***	0.681**	0.792**
	(0.198)	(0.202)	(0.184)	(0.200)	(0.326)	(0.345)
Interaction		2.142***	1.942***	-0.008		0.838*
		(0.685)	(0.563)	(0.582)		(0.447)
Post Cold War			1.458***			
			(0.526)			
Personalism						-0.381
						(0.537)



Post Cold War



Populism



Types of Integration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	IO	AIOs	Trade	Finance
	Memberships			
Integration	0.063*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.014)	0.685*** (0.171)	0.866*** (0.215)
Anti-pluralism (Gov)	-0.481* (0.278)	-0.083 (0.227)	-0.280 (0.243)	-0.449* (0.233)
Populism (Gov)	0.150 (0.196)	0.203 (0.165)	0.390** (0.153)	0.358** (0.158)
Democratic Stock	-0.712* (0.372)	-0.877** (0.379)	0.278 (0.207)	0.027 (0.224)
Per Capita GDP	-0.589* (0.329)	-0.584* (0.328)	-1.043*** (0.279)	-1.055*** (0.294)
GDP Growth	-0.601** (0.266)	-0.299* (0.174)	-0.506** (0.223)	-0.546** (0.233)
Presidentialism	0.096 (0.131)	-0.045 (0.139)	0.229* (0.128)	0.077 (0.122)
Polarization	1.015*** (0.307)	0.932*** (0.301)	0.600*** (0.196)	0.760*** (0.195)
AIOs (#)		-0.109 (0.067)		



Alternative Main Explanatory Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	5-year	Lag (1)	Lag (2)	Lag all
Economic Integration	0.886***	0.857***	0.866***	0.850***
	(0.189)	(0.187)	(0.215)	(0.182)
Anti-pluralism (Gov)	-0.339	-0.346	-0.449*	-0.342
	(0.239)	(0.241)	(0.233)	(0.232)
Populism (Gov)	0.382**	0.380**	0.358**	0.352**
	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.142)
Democratic Stock	0.149	0.164	0.027	0.196
	(0.214)	(0.213)	(0.224)	(0.199)
Per Capita GDP	-1.187***	-1.171***	-1.055***	-1.121***
	(0.300)	(0.298)	(0.294)	(0.275)
GDP Growth	-0.539**	-0.544**	-0.546**	0.047
	(0.231)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.104)
Presidentialism	0.155	0.168	0.077	0.205*
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Polarization	0.660***	0.668***	0.760***	0.373**
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.195)	(0.149)



Model Specification

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Region FE	IV	STADL
Economic Integration	0.781***	0.611***	0.816***
	(0.240)	(0.126)	(0.198)
Anti-pluralism (Gov)	0.024	-0.109	-0.321
	(0.284)	(0.121)	(0.242)
Populism (Gov)	0.282	0.142*	0.369**
	(0.182)	(0.074)	(0.156)
Democratic Stock	0.753*	0.068	0.165
	(0.452)	(0.115)	(0.214)
Per Capita GDP	-0.598	-0.719***	-1.183***
	(0.599)	(0.195)	(0.299)
GDP Growth	-0.620***	-0.320***	-0.534**
	(0.215)	(0.113)	(0.233)
Presidentialism	-0.115	0.121*	0.170
	(0.198)	(0.065)	(0.126)
Polarization	0.785***	0.368***	0.636***
	(0.246)	(0.092)	(0.195)



Dependent Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Breakdown	Hybrid	Democratization
Economic Integration	1.094*** (0.268)	0.294** (0.123)	-0.190* (0.107)
Anti-pluralism (Gov)	-0.823*** (0.317)	-0.341** (0.136)	0.034 (0.129)
Populism (Gov)	1.234*** (0.193)	0.313*** (0.093)	-0.075 (0.087)
Democratic Stock	0.316 (0.293)	0.087 (0.145)	-0.837*** (0.171)
Per Capita GDP	-4.288*** (0.698)	-0.670*** (0.209)	-0.762*** (0.227)
GDP Growth	-0.245 (0.302)	-0.068 (0.113)	-0.251** (0.126)
Presidentialism	-0.172 (0.165)	0.023 (0.078)	0.075 (0.068)
Polarization	0.643*** (0.232)	0.241** (0.113)	0.116 (0.111)



Geopolitical Interests




	(1)	(2)	(3)
	US	Autocrats	NRR
Economic Integration	0.893*** (0.189)	0.748*** (0.199)	0.845*** (0.191)
Anti-pluralism (Gov)	-0.367 (0.248)	-0.293 (0.251)	-0.371 (0.248)
Populism (Gov)	0.431*** (0.157)	0.337** (0.152)	0.403** (0.159)
Democratic Stock	0.157 (0.205)	0.432* (0.235)	0.119 (0.221)
Per Capita GDP	-1.183*** (0.300)	-1.529*** (0.321)	-1.161*** (0.305)
GDP Growth	-0.605*** (0.234)	-0.592*** (0.219)	-0.569** (0.232)
Presidentialism	0.174 (0.130)	0.309** (0.150)	0.195 (0.127)
Polarization	0.608*** (0.210)	0.667*** (0.210)	0.635*** (0.202)
POTUS Visits	0.494 (0.387)		
Distance US	0.000** (0.000)		
Distance China		-0.000** (0.000)	
Distance Russia		-0.000 (0.000)	
Natural Resource Rents			-0.014 (0.023)



Resilience


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Stock	Accountability	Horizontal	Vertical	Diagonal
Economic Integration	1.684***	2.403***	1.569***	2.041***	2.767***
	(0.309)	(0.538)	(0.306)	(0.567)	(0.573)
Democratic Stock	0.023*				
	(0.013)				
Interaction	-0.031***	-1.268***	-0.638**	-1.070**	-1.515***
	(0.009)	(0.416)	(0.263)	(0.461)	(0.451)
Populism (Gov)	0.447***	0.434***	0.418***	0.466***	0.455***
	(0.164)	(0.156)	(0.148)	(0.163)	(0.152)
Per Capita GDP	-0.708**	-1.142***	-0.989***	-1.376***	-0.893***
	(0.313)	(0.258)	(0.252)	(0.259)	(0.250)
GDP Growth	-0.527**	-0.570**	-0.512**	-0.566**	-0.545**
	(0.258)	(0.252)	(0.231)	(0.255)	(0.238)
Presidentialism	0.054	0.166	0.198*	0.149	0.146
	(0.129)	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Polarization	0.491***	0.600***	0.582***	0.491**	0.621***
	(0.187)	(0.200)	(0.205)	(0.196)	(0.201)
Accountability		1.611***	0.444	2.168***	1.357***
		(0.463)	(0.300)	(0.461)	(0.492)






The Liberal Foundations of Backsliding in Hungary

- Typical case (Gerring 2008).
- Primary and secondary documents.
- Backsliding driven by LIO integration




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- Mechanism support:
 - Material engagement for electoral benefit
 - Rhetorical disengagement
 - Stealth Authoritarianism
 - Protective shield

