Back to Current Schedule
Virtual IPES Fall 2016
September 30 - 10 AM Eastern Time
Haley Swedlund, Nijmegen School of Management
"Aid Diplomacy Reconsidered: Survey evidence on the microfoundations of foreign aid suspensions"
Abstract (click to toggle)
Foreign aid is a tool of policy, which donor governments use strategically to advance their diplomatic and commercial interests abroad. Why then do donors sometimes sanction even strategically-important recipient governments for committing political transgressions, such as political repression, election fraud, or corruption? In this paper, I argue that the willingness of donors to sanction a political transgression by suspending foreign aid depends not only on the strategic interests of donor governments, but also on the institutional incentives of donor agencies. To evaluate my argument, I present evidence from an original, multi-country survey of top-level donor representatives, including a list experiment designed to elicit truthful information regarding the willingness of a donor agency to suspend aid in response to severe political repression. Consistent with my argument regarding institutional incentives, I find that donor agencies are more willing to sanction a political transgression: (1) if the transgression directly affects the donor’s programming in the country, (2) if the donor agency provides direct budget support to the recipient government, and (3) if there are fewer veto players that can block an aid suspension decision.
Discussants:
- Sarah Bermeo, Duke University
- Sarah Bush, Temple University
- Simone Dietrich, University of Essex
- Martin Steinwand, Stony Brook University
- Joseph Wright, Penn State University
Chair:
- Raymond Hicks, Princeton University
Watch the workshop
October 28 - 12 PM Eastern time
Hsuan-Wei Lee, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Huan-Kai Tseng, George Washington University
"Partner-switching and Strategy-updating: A coevolving network model of free trade negotiation"
Abstract (click to toggle)
This study develops a generalized coevolving network model to explain the evolution of multilateral free trade negotiation and the conditions under which a global FTA is most likely to emerge. Our formal and simulation analyses suggest that without having to forgo existing multilateral framework, countries, particularly leading countries, can maximize cooperation in the network toward the achievement of a global FTA through two different mechanisms. First, states can adopt the strategies of their partners that accrue higher accumulated payoffs from the interaction with immediate neighbors. On the other hand, cooperative countries can bypass defecting type partners and switch to more profitable partners to negotiate FTA. The payoffs accumulated through this partner-switching strategy can induce defecting-type partners to cooperate. Thus, a global FTA can be achieved when smaller, more exclusive free trade pacts are allowed to flourish. The application of approximate master equations (AMEs) introduced in this paper also provides more accurate estimation of the time evolution of network. Our more brief discussion of recent FTA cases that owe their origins to small cohesive networks lends additional empirical support to the model.
Discussants:
- Leonardo Baccini, McGill University
- Xun Cao, Penn State University
- Robert Gulotty, University of Chicago
- Iain Osgood, University of Michigan
Chair:
- Cristina Bodea, Michigan State University
Watch the workshop
November 18 - 10:30 AM Eastern time
Jeffrey Kucik, City College of New York
"How Prior Legal Rulings Affect Future Outcomes"
Abstract (click to toggle)
International agreement members have competing preferences over dispute settlement. They want to insulate themselves from the risk of being exploited by other members, but they also want to leave themselves room to maneuver within the law. Members balance these interests by designing dispute settlement mechanisms that do not set precedent. However, doing so does mean that disputes are isolated events. This paper explores agreement members' incentives to learn from previous rulings, and it shows how the accumulation of case law affects future dispute outcomes. Looking at the World Trade Organization, I use new data on the direction of rulings on each individual legal claim made in DS1-450. The results show that prior rulings promote early settlement. Disputes are less likely to reach a panel ruling when previous legal decisions — i.e., case law — transmit information to litigants about the likely outcome of going to court.
Discussants:
- Mark Copelovitch, University of Wisconsin, Madison
- Christina Davis, Princeton University
- Yon Lupu, George Washington University
- B. Peter Rosendorff, New York University
Chair:
- Rachel Wellhausen, University of Texas at Austin
Watch the workshop
December 2 - 8:30 AM Eastern time
Celine Carrere, University of Geneva
Marcelo Olarreaga, University of Geneva
Damian Raess, University of Reading
"Labor Clauses in Free Trade Agreements: worker protection or protectionism?"
Abstract (click to toggle)
We explore the impact that the inclusion of a labor clause (LC) in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) has on bilateral trade flows. Using a gravity type framework we find that FTAs that contain LCs tend to trade more with each other, and that the positive trade flows effect is reinforced when the LC is enforceable. This is not consistent with the idea LC are set for protectionist reasons, casting doubt on the reluctance by low income countries to include labor clauses in their trade agreements with the North.
Discussants:
- Adam Dean, Middlebury College
- Sean Ehrlich, Florida State University
- Nita Rudra, Georgetown University
Chair:
- James Morrison, London School of Economics
